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 The nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is notoriously a 
misogynist according to many feminists. In parallel, Nietzsche’s theory of value, 
perspectivism, is relativist according to many philosophers. However, I propose a 
counter-reading of both Nietzsche’s comments regarding women and his comments 
regarding perspective in which I interpret Nietzsche as neither misogynistic nor 
relativistic. I adopt a stance which is non-apologist, in that I do not merely wash my 
hands of Nietzsche’s apparently sexist remarks about women as Walter Kaufmann does, 
for example. Rather I demonstrate that Nietzsche is performing a polemical attack on a 
particular kind of naïve feminism which only seeks certain privileges for women in 
principle without determining whether those privileges are valuable for the empowerment 
of any actual women.  
 I argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism and his remarks about women are 
explicitly and inextricably intertwined because of his repeated and explicit connections 
between ideas of women and ideas of truth. Thus any reading of Nietzsche’s remarks 
about women must be tied to a reading of Nietzsche’s remarks about truth and other 
axiological judgments made from necessarily human perspectives. Judgments made from 
the inhuman perspective of ‘objectivity’ fail to obtain regarding truth or women. Because 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism advocates a non-relativist plurality of interpretations about 
truth and hence also truths about women, I argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism actually 
provides a feminist argument.  
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Introduction: A Feminist Counter-Reading of Nietzsche and 
Perspectivism 
 
 The nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is notorious as a 
misogynist. Likewise, Nietzsche’s axiological stance, commonly called perspectivism, is 
notorious as relativism. However, I would like to propose a counter-reading of both Nietzsche’s 
comments regarding women and his comments regarding perspective which interprets Nietzsche 
as neither misogynistic nor relativistic. In order to do so, I will adopt a stance which is non-
apologist in that I will not merely wash my hands of Nietzsche’s apparently sexist remarks about 
women as Walter Kaufmann does, for example, but rather I will attempt to demonstrate that 
Nietzsche is performing a polemical attack on a particular kind of naïve feminism which only 
seeks certain privileges for women in principle without determining whether those privileges are 
valuable for the empowerment of any actual women. In my dissertation, I will argue that 
Nietzsche’s remarks about women and perspective are explicitly and inextricably intertwined, and 
thus any reading of Nietzsche’s remarks about women must be tied to a reading of Nietzsche’s 
remarks about truth and other axiological judgments made from necessarily human perspectives.  
 To begin, I would like to say a few things about both feminism and perspectivism. 
Concerning feminism, first note that not all feminisms are equal; there are many different kinds of 
feminism, frequently overlapping and blending together, other times at odds with one another. 
Furthermore, we must note that Nietzsche would not have been familiar with the vast majority of 
feminisms, and the feminism with which he would have been most familiar would have been a 
collection of Wilhelmine feminisms from nineteenth-century Germany.1 Note that the 
Wilhelmine feminism with which Nietzsche would have been familiar would most likely be 
classifiable as a kind of nineteenth-century German first-wave feminism. Traditionally we 
                                                          
1 See for example Diethe (Autumn 1996), p. 69-81. 
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distinguish between several different ‘waves’ of feminism, although the waves model has also 
come under attack in recent years (Hewitt, p.1).2  
First wave feminism encompasses the motives of nineteenth and early twentieth century 
suffragettes and activists who fought against de jure inequalities such as the infringement on 
rights to vote, own property, and obtain higher education; later feminists often criticize first wave 
feminism for ascribing to an essentialist and totalizing picture of femininity (Hewitt, p. 3). 
Second wave feminism encompasses the political activism of the 1960s and 70s focusing on de 
facto inequalities such as the glass ceiling, sexual liberation, and family planning, as well as de 
jure inequalities including reproductive rights and military integration; later feminists often 
criticize second wave feminism for being Euro-centric and hegemonic in that it ignored racial 
differences in discrimination against women, as well as differences in ethnicity, nationality, class, 
religion, sexuality, and ability (Hewitt, p. 4).3 Third wave feminism encompasses the movement 
towards gender studies, including transfeminism and queer theory, rather than exclusively 
women’s studies as well as having a broader international scope, and which attempts to be more 
inclusive generally speaking; current feminists both within and without third wave feminism 
often criticize this movement for its lack of focus, coherence, and distinct definition from second 
wave feminism, as well as being whiggish, among other things (Hewitt, p. 4).  
Other feminisms outside and within the waves model include post-modern feminism, 
womanism, and postfeminism. Post-modern feminism incorporates post-structuralism, post-
colonialism, and other post-modern theories in an attempt to move past modernist theories, 
particularly those concerning the determination of self-identity; other feminists often criticize 
post-modern feminism for undermining the basis for political movement by focusing on 
difference to the detriment of a shared female identity (Fernandes, p. 113). By contrast 
                                                          
2 See also Henry, p. 103-5. 
3 See also Maparyan, p. 18 and 24. 
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womanism focuses on racial inequalities, especially those due to anti-Black racism, slavery and 
segregation in the United States, and the mainstream feminists’ neglect of racial differences and 
inequalities; among others, Black feminists and other feminists of color often criticize womanism 
for its focus on naming conventions for pro-woman movements, thus distracting from the 
political goals of reducing and eliminating social inequalities, as well as uncritically 
essentializing and totalizing all women of color (Marpayan, p. 27-30). Postfeminism primarily 
rejects feminism on the grounds that sexual inequalities have been largely if not completely 
ameliorated; contemporary feminists often criticize postfeminism as being incoherent, 
reactionary, and deriving largely from ignorance of lived social inequalities, as well as 
sexualizing the rejection of feminism to the detriment of young women (Press, p. 17). Finally 
note that each of these feminisms, perhaps excepting much of womanism, for the most part 
focuses on the writings and experiences of women in the United States and Europe, and thus no 
one of them can comprehensively describe the feminisms extant in other nations. 
Criticizing one form of feminism does not entail that one’s critique applies to any or all 
of the other feminisms. While some feminisms are essentialist, others are anti-essentialist; while 
some are hegemonic, others are heterogeneous; while some feminisms are separatist, others are 
anti-separatist; and while some feminisms exclude the interests of various female-identified 
persons on the basis of sexuality, race, being non-cisgendered, etc., others are highly inclusive 
and are concerned not only with the interests of female-identified persons, but also of male-
identified, trans-identified, and intersex-identified persons. Likewise, we should note that 
criticizing feminism or women does not make one inherently anti-feminist or anti-woman; in fact, 
from the descriptions above we can see that criticizing feminism and women is a necessary part 
of nearly all feminisms. Thus we cannot conclude from the fact that Nietzsche claims to be 
opposed to feminism or critical thereof that he is necessarily sexist, misogynist, or naïvely anti-
feminist. Just as we cannot say that all women are feminists, we cannot say that all white male 
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philosophers who criticize feminism are wholly or naïvely anti-feminist. Therefore there is a great 
deal of room for us to situate Nietzsche’s criticisms within the feminist canon, should my 
counter-reading prove viable. In doing so, however, I will strive to make clear exactly when and 
on what grounds we can say that Nietzsche is not being merely provocative with his remarks. 
With regards to perspectivism, too, there are a number of different models and kinds. 
Defining “perspectivism” or enumerating all types of perspectivisms is a difficult task, as there is 
very little consensus among scholars as to what Nietzsche’s perspectivism is or what it entails. 
Throughout the dissertation I will focus primarily on the works of a limited number of 
Nietzsche’s commentators, namely Brian Leiter, R. Lanier Anderson, Maudemarie Clark, 
Christoph Cox, and John Wilcox. Each commentator provides different insights into the problems 
generated by the multitude of interpretations previous commentators have given, while 
simultaneously generating different problems within each of these newer interpretations. I hope to 
draw together the salvageable elements of each of these five interpretations in order to alleviate 
some general interpretive problems. I have not included many other authors primarily because I 
have a limited amount of space, and the reasons I have chosen these five authors are that they are 
all prominent interpreters of Nietzsche writing in English and engaged in a critical dialogue with 
each other. Importantly, each of these authors also rejects the reading of perspectivism which 
treats it as relativism, although not always for the same reasons or based on the same texts. By 
combining their critiques, I hope to alleviate some of the negative features of instability which 
appear to permeate perspectivism, while retaining the positive features of instability which 
Nietzsche seems to value for perspectivism.  
However, as a group these authors also tend to focus on either epistemological or 
alethiological perspectivism to the exclusion of moral and aesthetic perspectivism, as well as 
perspectivisms of other kinds of value judgments. Thus the broader and more interesting question 
of determining what axiological perspectivism is remains mostly undeveloped or at least under-
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developed in current literature on perspectivism. Furthermore, each of these authors tends to 
ignore how Nietzsche’s discussion of truth, falsity, and other value judgments are necessarily and 
inextricably tied to his comments regarding women. This is surprising, given Nietzsche’s explicit 
equation of truth to women in the very first sentence of the preface to Beyond Good and Evil 
(BGE P, p. 192),4 and given Clark’s separate attempts to address the problem of Nietzsche’s 
supposed misogyny in BGE and other texts.5 Therefore further, the question of the relationship 
between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and his use of women as metaphor for truth is also under-
developed in the literature on perspectivism.  
Thus, even if we limit perspectivism to a description of perspectivally-limited knowledge 
and truth, we must connect our reading of perspectivism to our reading of Nietzsche’s remarks on 
women; further, if we expand perspectivism to include perspectivally-limited axiological 
judgments more broadly, then it is even more important to connect our reading of perspectivism 
to our reading of Nietzsche’s remarks on women because many of these remarks appear to 
constitute political, moral, and aesthetic judgments about women, women’s behaviors, and 
women’s roles in society. Therefore, in my dissertation I hope to make this connection between 
Nietzsche’s remarks on women and his discussion of perspectival axiology much clearer, as well 
as discussing how each informs the other.  
In what follows, I outline the chapter-by-chapter organization I propose for my 
dissertation. As is typical for a dissertation, I divide the work into five chapters, each with 
                                                          
4 Hereafter, I will abbreviate the titles of Nietzsche’s texts as follows: A=Antichrist, AOM=Assorted 
Opinions and Maxims, BGE=Beyond Good and Evil, BT=Birth of Tragedy, D=Daybreak, EH=Ecce Homo, 
GM=Genealogy of Morals, GS=Gay Science, HATH=Human, All-Too-Human, KS=Kritische 
Studienausgabe Herausgegeben, OTL=“On Truth and Lie in a Non-Moral Sense,” TI=Twilight of the Idols, 
TSZ=Thus Spoke Zarathustra, UM=Untimely Meditations (including DS or I = “David Strauss, the 
Confessor and the Writer,” HL or II = “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” SE or III = 
“Schopenhauer as Educator,” and RW or IV = “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth”), WP=Will to Power, and 
WS=The Wanderer and His Shadow. Also note that ‘P’ will stand for ‘Preface,’ ‘F’ for ‘Foreword,’ ‘E’ for 
‘Epilogue,’ and ‘A’ for ‘Afterword’ throughout these citations. All page numbers are references to the 
editions included in the bibliography.  
5 See Clark 1998, p. 187-198. 
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subsections dealing with particular themes. The first chapter introduces the received view 
regarding Nietzsche’s remarks on women. The second chapter introduces the received view 
regarding Nietzsche’s remarks on perspective. The third chapter provides a description of 
Nietzsche’s remarks on women, while the fourth chapter provides a description of Nietzsche’s 
remarks on perspective, truth, and falsity. The fifth and final chapter ties the preceding chapters 
together into a discussion of different kinds of perspectivism and accounts for the differences 
between Nietzsche’s position and relativism, standpoint theory, and misogyny, as well as 
accounting for any similarities between each of these positions; in the end I describe what my 
interpretative strategy offers to both Nietzsche scholars and feminist philosophers. I conclude by 
acknowledging any unresolved issues and by pointing towards future avenues of research. 
Chapter One 
 
 The first chapter presents the problem of Nietzsche’s supposed misogyny. I wish to 
clearly describe the received view that Nietzsche is representative of a wide swath of middle-to-
upper class white European male philosophers beginning with the ancient Greeks, including 
Plato, up through the end of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, who 
essentialize and totalize femininity as a singular morass of irrational, childish and maternalistic, 
uneducated and uneducable, subservient women; this femininity should be contrasted with the 
essentialist picture of masculinity as a singular morass of rational, adult and paternalistic, 
educated and educable, dominating men. Herein I expand on the above description of Nietzsche’s 
apologists and critics in order to provide the clearest view of the charges leveled against 
Nietzsche’s remarks regarding women, femininity, and feminism. To do so I focus primarily on 
Carol Diethe’s account of Nietzsche, as I consider it most representative of the position that 
Nietzsche is a misogynist. 
Chapter Two 




Additionally, I wish to clearly describe the received view that Nietzsche’s perspectivism 
is a relativism of truth and knowledge, while acknowledging that this relativism can further be 
applied to Nietzsche’s positions on morality and aesthetics, as well as all value judgments broadly 
speaking. I have to elaborate on the claim that perspectivism is tied to Nietzsche’s views on 
women at a later point, but in this chapter I hope to demonstrate the specific brand of nihilist 
relativism that leads many to conclude that misogyny is acceptable in certain times and places. 
This is the kind of relativism which justifies ignoring problems in other societies on the grounds 
that all moral systems are acceptable. Thus, I intend to demonstrate exactly the brand of 
relativism Nietzsche purportedly advocates as well as some of the flaws of this relativism. To do 
so I focus primarily on Arthur C. Danto’s account of Nietzsche’s philosophy, as I consider it most 
representative of the position that Nietzsche is a relativist.  
Chapter Three 
 
 In this chapter I divide my account of Nietzsche’s hundreds of remarks concerning 
women, femininity, feminism, gender, sex, etc., into four parts preceded by my own biographical 
sketch. I divide this chapter according to Nietzsche’s periods of work, namely the early, middle, 
and late periods, concluding with a brief section on Nietzsche’s Nachlass. I choose to divide the 
chapter on women according to this method in order to determine whether or not Nietzsche’s 
views on women change over the course of his publishing career, as some philosophers claim.6 I 
do not wish to dwell on the Nachlass for long at the end because I associate myself with the camp 
of Nietzsche scholars who view his unpublished works as secondary to his published works. If 
claims about Nietzsche’s philosophy cannot be substantiated primarily by reference to his 
published texts, I am of the opinion that it is very difficult at best to substantiate those claims. 
Thus, if any of Nietzsche’s commentators rely heavily or primarily on the Nachlass, I suspect 
                                                          
6 For example, see Young (Forthcoming), p. 4-5.  
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those commentators of being unreliable in their scholarship. Within this chapter I hope to address 
whether and how Nietzsche sexualizes women as exemplars of embodiment in contrast to treating 
men as exemplars of rationality, as well as the claim that for Nietzsche the animalistic or 
biological-physical aspect of our humanity is not a negative trope. 
Chapter Four 
 
I again move through Nietzsche’s texts in chronological order to continue determining 
whether or not Nietzsche’s treatment of perspective changes over the course of his publication 
history. Following this, I attempt to offer a summary and synthesis of the forty remarks Nietzsche 
published about perspectivism, and then defend it against the charge of relativism. In addition, I 
look at the problem of metaphors generally and more specifically the problems caused by 
Nietzsche’s use of metaphors like optics and femininity to explain his position with regards to 
truth, knowledge, and value. I conclude by explaining how both ‘truth’ and ‘women’ are ideals, 
and how a perspectivism of value is consistent with feminism.  
Chapter Five 
 
For my final chapter, I attempt to account for the differences and similarities 
perspectivism shares with feminist standpoint theory and pragmatism, and I will attempt to 
distinguish Nietzsche’s anti-Wilhelmine-feminism from naïve anti-feminism as well as more 
critical anti-feminism and sexism broadly speaking. I also hope to provide an account of what 
Nietzsche scholarship can offer feminist philosophers, and what feminist philosophers can in turn 
do for Nietzsche scholarship. I conclude by acknowledging any remaining unresolved problems, 
and discuss future lines of research both others and I may pursue.  
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In summary, in this dissertation I hope to address two main questions: first, the question 
of whether or not Nietzsche is a sexist and a misogynist philosopher; second, the question of 
whether or not Nietzsche’s axiology is relativist philosophy. I hope to show how my exegetical 
strategy can lead to negative answers for both of these questions, as well as showing how these 
questions are necessarily and inextricably tied to each other. In particular, it is my hope to 
demonstrate that a careful reading of Nietzsche’s discussion of truth and perspective leads to a 
clearer understanding of Nietzsche’s criticism of Wilhelmine feminism as well as the 
understanding that Nietzsche is at least not unequivocally misogynist in either his philosophy or 
his personal psychology, and that Nietzsche’s commentary regarding women is neither 
philosophically irrelevant nor inherently sexist. Nietzsche’s philosophy and feminism have a lot 
to offer each other, and it is my goal to strengthen this relationship for the benefit of both. While I 
am likely to conclude that there is no developed feminism in Nietzsche, I hope to develop a 
feasible Nietzschean feminism by the conclusion of my dissertation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Problem of Nietzsche’s Supposed 
Misogyny  
   
  §1  Two Received Views: Misogyny and Relativism 
  §2 The First Received View: Nietzsche as Misogynist 
  §3 Diethe on Nietzsche’s ‘Woman Question’ 
  §4 Diethe on Nietzsche's Women: Part One 
  §5 Diethe on Nietzsche's Women: Part Two 
  §6 Other Accusations of Misogyny and Anti-Feminism 
  §7 Conclusion 
 
§1  Two Received Views: Misogyny and Relativism 
 
 I would like to begin by establishing what the received views are with regards to 
Nietzsche’s supposed misogyny and his supposed relativism. To do so, I will provide descriptive 
summaries of the works of two prominent Nietzsche scholars: Carol Diethe and Arthur C. Danto. 
I will supplement their views in part with the works of other scholars as necessary, particularly in 
the case of arguing that Nietzsche is a misogynist. In this chapter, it is my explicit goal to strive 
for as much charity as is possible in my treatment of two philosophers with whom I disagree 
strongly. I will for the most part not respond to the accusations and misnomers these philosophers 
have applied to Nietzsche’s writings, as my more fully-fleshed responses will better fit in later 
chapters of the dissertation.  
Instead, I will note what the primary problems are with their research methods and with 
the arguments they provide in support of their primary theses, namely that Nietzsche is a 
paradigmatic misogynist (Diethe) and that perspectivism is a nihilistic relativism (Danto).7 I will 
begin with the view of Nietzsche’s commentary regarding women, namely the claim that 
                                                          
7 Note that Danto does not explicitly specify whether this perspectivism is broadly axiological, ethical, or 
epistemic, or whether it pertains exclusively to value, truth, knowledge, or belief. 
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Nietzsche is misogynist either personally, philosophically, or both; this misogyny may be 
characterized in a number of ways, including but not limited to conventional sexism, support for 
male dominance and female subservience, biological gender essentialism, anti-feminism, 
biological determinism, and sexual as well as gender dualism. Further, different authors accuse 
Nietzsche of both hypocrisy with regards to his own established standards of value and plagiarism 
with regards to the specific things he writes about women. I will also make note of the several 
interesting and informative moves each author makes in an attempt to better understand – or 
excoriate – Nietzsche, and indicate the replies I will explore in later chapters. 
 
§2 The First Received View: Nietzsche as Misogynist 
Different philosophers historically have had different approaches to Nietzsche’s supposed 
misogyny; some ignore it while others treat it as integral to Nietzsche’s philosophy, and yet 
others attempt to salvage parts of Nietzsche’s work at the expense of dismissing large portions of 
his texts as irrelevant, thus rejecting Nietzsche’s own holistic claim that understanding one of his 
books requires being familiar with all of his published texts (GM P §8, p. 22). One of the 
canonical apologists’ claims regarding Nietzsche’s misogyny and justifying ignoring Nietzsche’s 
misogyny comes from Walter Kaufmann in his seminal biography Nietzsche: Philosopher, 
Psychologist, Antichrist: “Nietzsche’s writings contain many all-too-human judgments – 
especially about women – but these are philosophically irrelevant” (Kaufmann, p.  84). Thus 
Kaufmann wants to dismiss all of Nietzsche’s remarks concerning women as unimportant to the 
rest of Nietzsche’s philosophy.  
Kaufmann takes Nietzsche’s commentary about women at face value, and assumes that 
Nietzsche merely has several “unjust and unquestioned prejudices of a philosopher” from 
nineteenth-century Europe that “may be of interest to the historian as well as to the psychologist,” 
but Kaufmann believes that “Nietzsche’s prejudices about women need not greatly concern the 
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philosopher” and furthermore that “ad hominem arguments against any philosopher on the basis 
of such statements seem trivial and hardly pertinent” (Kaufmann, p. 84). In addition to this 
dismissal of Nietzsche’s apparent misogyny as philosophically irrelevant although historically 
appropriate for a European male of Nietzsche’s socio-economic class, in a footnote Kaufmann 
goes on to state that “Nietzsche’s epigrams about women may have been connected with his own 
experiences, but also […] were copied from Chamfort, La Rochefoucauld, and – of course – 
Schopenhauer” (Kaufmann, p. 84, fn. 13). Thus Kaufmann not only dismisses Nietzsche’s 
commentary about women as obviously and uninterestingly sexist, Kaufmann also dismisses 
Nietzsche’s commentary about women as plagiarized sexism. Carol Diethe makes a similar claim 
about plagiarism below. 
Before moving forward to Diethe’s treatment of Nietzsche, it is important to say a few 
words about Kaufmann: his claim that Nietzsche’s views on women are irrelevant to his 
philosophy is to my mind patently absurd; even Nietzsche’s most scathing feminist critics argue 
that Nietzsche’s views on women are extremely important to Nietzsche’s philosophy,8 and 
Nietzsche himself says that one’s sexuality reaches to the pinnacle of one’s spirit (BGE §75).9 
Our own subjective views of the sexes are at least one component of human sexuality; therefore, 
understanding Nietzsche’s views of the sexes will definitely lead to at least a partial 
understanding of the Nietzschean philosophical spirit. In particular this is interesting because of 
the historical concern over Nietzsche’s own sexual orientation: as a white male of his class, most 
scholars have assumed without question Nietzsche’s heterosexuality, but some have suspected 
Nietzsche might have been homosexual or even bisexual, and this has influenced their readings of 
                                                          
8 See for example Diethe 1989, p. 871. 
9 Kaufmann translates “Grad und Art der Geschlechtlichkeit eines Menschen reicht bis in den letzten Gipfel 
seines Geistes hinauf” as “The degree and kind of a man’s sexuality reach up into the ultimate pinnacle of 
his spirit,” but I think a more accurate translation of “Menschen” would substitute ‘person’ or ‘human’ for 
‘man,’ and I will take this tactic throughout my dissertation. This is a common problem throughout the 
history of Nietzsche translation. 
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his personal life and his philosophy as well; I will speak more on this in the biographical sketch at 
the beginning of Chapter 2.  
Also, it is extremely important not to take Nietzsche’s remarks about many things, 
particularly about women, at face value as Kaufmann, Diethe, Oliver, Lorraine, Singer, and 
Schutte frequently do, because of Nietzsche’s admonition to his readers to learn the art of 
exegesis; as an example, Nietzsche offers a twenty-eight part essay to decipher even a short 
passage from his Zarathustra.10 Thus a thorough-going exegesis of each of Nietzsche’s remarks 
about women would require attention not only to the context in which Nietzsche places each 
aphorism, but also to Nietzsche’s published writings as a whole body of work. However, it will 
also be important for me to clearly establish how we can tell when Nietzsche intends us to take 
him literally, if ever, in order to avoid relativism in my own reading of Nietzsche. That is to say, 
if my interpretation is to be more accurate than any other interpretation, I must establish clear 
grounds for why Nietzsche is best read from my perspective rather than other perspectives, such 
as Kaufmann’s, Diethe’s, or Danto’s, and why my exegetical strategy is better than others. I hope 
to demonstrate by example that the best method to avoid this relativism and preserve the accuracy 
of my interpretation is twofold: contextualizing what Nietzsche meant based on the position of 
aphorisms in relation to one another in his published works, and contextualizing what he meant 
with regards to his explicit statements of intention. 
By contrast to Kaufmann, there are at least five feminist critics of Nietzsche who 
approach Nietzsche’s philosophy on the grounds that Nietzsche is an avowed misogynist, and 
who attempt to respond to and critique Nietzsche’s remarks about women. The first and most 
prominent of these is Carol Diethe, a founder of the British Friedrich Nietzsche Foundation, who 
argues in several places that while it is right to say that Nietzsche’s remarks about women do 
                                                          
10 “An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been ‘deciphered’ when it has simply been read; 
rather, one has then to begin its exegesis, for which is required an art of exegesis. I have offered in the third 
essay of the present book an example of what I regard as ‘exegesis’ in such a case – an aphorism is prefixed 
to this essay, the essay itself is a commentary on it” GM P §8, p. 23. 
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indicate that Nietzsche is a virulent misogynist and chauvinist par excellance, it would be wrong 
to simply dismiss Nietzsche’s commentary about women as philosophically irrelevant as 
Kaufmann does. Diethe discusses Nietzsche’s supposed misogyny in her 1989 essay “Nietzsche 
and the Woman Question”11 and updates and supplements these views at greater length in her 
1996 book Nietzsche’s Women: Beyond the Whip. To evaluate Diethe’s lengthy discussion 
concerning Nietzsche’s misogyny, I will begin by exploring Diethe’s 1989 essay, and then move 
on to her 1996 book. Rather than saying Nietzsche’s misogyny is philosophically irrelevant, 
Diethe argues at length that Nietzsche’s misogyny fits perfectly logically with his philosophy and 
hence is intrinsic to his philosophy in general. Following my discussion of Diethe’s work, I will 
briefly touch upon the arguments made by Kelly Oliver, Tamsin Lorraine, Linda Singer, and 
Ofelia Schutte, as each author offers a glimpse of other avenues for research into the problem of 
Nietzsche’s misogyny. 
 
§3 Diethe on Nietzsche’s ‘Woman Question’ 
At the beginning of the 1989 essay, we see that Diethe uncritically assumes that 
Nietzsche’s position on women as articulated in his many aphorisms is explicitly sexist, noting 
that Nietzsche is wholly conventional in his acceptance of the nineteenth-century Wilhelmine12 
veneration of the maternal instinct and the housewife role for women in the religious form of 
Mary as opposed to the usually more villainized form of Eve, representative of particularly sexual 
sin and degradation. Diethe does point out that Nietzsche differs from his contemporaries because 
the “raw sexuality” in the form of Eve is not “bad in itself” for Nietzsche and is even valuable for 
his goals (Diethe, p. 865). Despite this, Diethe describes Nietzsche as “clearly terrified of female 
sexuality at a personal level” and following his relationship with Lou Andreas-Salomé Diethe 
                                                          
11 A gruesome phrase reminiscent of the Nazi’s ‘Jewish question,’ and perhaps ideologically related, 
Wilhelmine feminists wrote texts with the offending phrase in the title. See, for example, Marie Stritt’s Das 
bürgerliche Gesetzbuch und die Frauenfrage [The Legal Code and the Woman Question] (1900). 
12 The period of German history extending approximately from 1871 to 1918. 
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believes that he was “prepared to pour his feelings of sexual inadequacy into his writing” (Diethe, 
p. 866).  
Although Diethe sees Nietzsche as praising the birth process in some places,13 “elsewhere 
his ambiguous stance is apparent” in that he seems to denigrate birth in other places (Diethe, p. 
867).14 This “oscillation” regarding birth is crucial for Diethe because it demonstrates in her mind 
that, like his contemporaries, Nietzsche was unable to distinguish between female sexuality and 
female reproduction; thus Diethe accuses Nietzsche of being a biological essentialist and 
determinist with regards to women, regarding all women as defined solely by their reproductive 
capacities, and ultimately sees Nietzsche as inventing “a confused new species, a female predator 
whose sole instinct is to crave for children” (Diethe, p. 867). For Diethe’s Nietzsche the infamous 
whip passage15 entails that men must keep control over cunning women; the picture of Lou 
holding the whip symbolizes for Diethe what she thinks is Nietzsche’s fear of dominant women 
and indicates therefore the reason why Nietzsche engages in “pronouncements on the need for 
male dominance; it is an extremely recidivist aspect of his thought and echoes Rousseau’s 
ambivalence in a similar context a full century earlier” (Diethe, p. 868).  
Further, Diethe agrees with Kaufmann16 that Nietzsche abandons his own thesis that 
‘good’ and ‘evil’ are inadequate and arbitrary concepts whenever Nietzsche makes such sexist 
claims: “Man is told how he ‘can’ and ‘must’ think; there is no hint at a revaluation of values 
except in the regressive sense that liberal views towards women must be repressed” (Diethe, p. 
868). Even further, Diethe proposes that Nietzsche is only mimicking his predecessors in much 
the same way Kaufmann accuses Nietzsche of copying other philosophers: “Moreover, Nietzsche 
contrasts the superiority of male gravitas with woman’s innate frivolity, again echoing 
                                                          
13 For example, TI X “What I Owe to the Ancients” §4. 
14 Here Diethe refers to TSZ IV:13 “On the Higher Man” §12. 
15 From TSZ I:18, see p. 65-67, particularly “ ‘ “You are going to women? Do not forget the whip!” ’ ” – 
the nested quotes here indicate that I am quoting Zarathustra, who is himself quoting an old woman he 
encountered the previous evening.  
16 See Kaufmann’s footnote 23 in BGE §232, pg. 353 in The Basic Writings of Nietzsche. 
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Rousseau’s view of woman as ‘coquette par état’” (Diethe, p. 868).17, 18 Not only does Diethe 
feel Nietzsche echoes Rousseau, she also states quite clearly that Nietzsche’s commentary on 
women is virtually identical to Schopenhauer’s own notoriously misogynistic writing (Diethe, p. 
868).  
In addition to claiming that Nietzsche sees women as inherently inferior to men, Diethe 
also claims that Nietzsche believes women “should not try to deepen their knowledge, but should 
remain on the level of instinctive sexual proclivity” and that even genuine quests for knowledge 
on the part of women are strategies for outwitting men or are merely indicative of the need for “a 
new adornment” (Diethe, p. 868-9, cf. BGE §232, p. 353). Diethe calls this a “sexist joke” 
wherein the “problematic mystique” of Goethe’s ewig Weibliche19 is “downgraded to include 
woman’s love of finery,” and which obscures Nietzsche’s inability “to construct a proper theory 
to justify ‘das Aufklären’20 as a male province” (Diethe, p. 869). Yet further, Diethe describes 
Nietzsche as particularly abhorring women’s scholarly pursuits primarily because they “could 
open up the argument on sexual equality in a way which he refused to face because it would 
challenge all his ideas on the Übermensch” whereas the dominance of the hypothetical and male 
Übermensch “depends as much on the subservience of the female sex as it does on the 
subservience of the inferior male herd” such that a “proper woman, then, exultant in her 
instinctive drives, but still the coquette, reads as little as possible and even then she feels guilty 
about it” (Diethe, p. 869).21 Diethe takes Nietzsche to be explicitly saying that “an academic 
woman is actually maladjusted” sexually and that barren women are ‘mannish’; she also sees this 
passage as culminating in an “ironic jibe about animals” that “barely disguises the authorial sigh 
                                                          
17 “Flirt by nature.”  
18 Diethe cites the German here: “Nichts ist von Anbeginn an dem Weibe fremder, widriger, feindlicher als 
Wahrheit, – seine  grosse Kunst ist die Lüge, seine höchste Angelegenheit ist der Schein und die 
Schönheit,” or “From the beginning, nothing has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman than the 
truth – her great art is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty” (BGE §232, p. 353 in 
Basic Writings). I would note that ‘mere’ does not appear in the German at all.  
19 “Eternal Feminine.” 
20 “Enlightenment” or “education.” 
21 Diethe cites TI I “Maxims and Arrows” §20 here. 
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of relief that man does not bear the young,” which she takes to be additionally indicative of 
Nietzsche’s oscillation of affect with regard to birth caused by his fear of female sexuality 
(Diethe, p. 869).22 
Although Diethe makes the attempt to be charitable to Nietzsche by recognizing that “he 
had some uncomplimentary things to say about herd men and indeed about male scholars,” she 
still thinks that “the sexual slur is reserved for women” because “even when he wants to insult a 
man – Ibsen – Nietzsche does so by calling him an old maid, a slur which actually rebounds on 
women rather than on men” (Diethe, p. 870).23 These passages from Ecce Homo represent for 
Diethe Nietzsche’s “evangelical fervour” in that “he firmly believes that natural sexual instincts 
will be damaged by female emancipation” because of “his views on women’s biological destiny” 
but she finds great irony highly ironic the fact that Nietzsche was so dogmatic about what female 
sexual instinct should be when he insisted so strongly on the value of instinct in the first place 
(Diethe, p. 870). In other words, Diethe is saying that Nietzsche is dogmatic about the importance 
of pregnancy and birth as central to female sexual behavior while simultaneously and 
evangelically insisting that female emancipation would damage these reproductive instincts. 
While Diethe finds Nietzsche’s views on the importance of childbearing respectable to a 
degree, she finds “unforgivable” Nietzsche’s so-called sexist joke because “it devalues his own 
arguments on woman’s status” (Diethe, p. 871). The reason why Diethe thinks Nietzsche relies on 
sexist jokes is because “sexual discourse is vital to Nietzsche’s canon; he constructs a virile male 
and must keep woman servile. Sexist jokes are an efficient tool to use to that end” (Diethe, p. 
871). Diethe recognizes that Nietzsche does not deny the existence of female sexual urges as 
                                                          
22 Diethe cites BGE §144: “When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is usually something wrong 
with her sexually. Sterility itself disposes one toward a certain masculinity of taste; for man is, if I may say 
so, ‘the sterile animal.’” Kaufmann’s translation in Basic Writings (on p. 279) is identical to Diethe’s 
translation.  
23 Again citing EH III §5, see p. 723 in Basic Writings: “One whole species of the most malignant 
‘idealism’ – which, incidentally, is also encountered among men; for example, in Henrik Ibsen, this typical 
old virgin – aims to poison the good conscience, what is natural in sexual love.” The German word is “alten 
Jungfrau,” most commonly translated as “old maid.”  
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many of his contemporaries did, but states that Nietzsche’s admittance of female sexual urges is 
not much better than his peers’ de-sexing of women because while “Nietzsche is saying that 
women do have sexual urges” he additionally reduces women so that “they are little more than 
the embodiment of a sexual urge” (Diethe, p. 871). Diethe concludes her essay by claiming that 
Nietzsche’s ideas on women “might well be unfortunate, but they are not an aberration: as we 
have seen, his views on female sexuality and gender division are crucial to his thesis and remain 
constant throughout his work” (Diethe, p. 871).  
 
§4 Diethe on Nietzsche’s Women: Part One 
Diethe’s 1996 book, Nietzsche’s Women: Beyond the Whip, begins by arguing that 
Derrida’s Spurs especially has slanted Nietzsche scholarship regarding women towards treating 
all usages of ‘woman’ as metaphor. This can be problematic for a number of reasons, not the least 
of which is because it means that some scholars dismiss readings of Nietzsche’s misogyny on the 
basis of the supposed metaphorical nature of his every use of ‘woman.’ Diethe finds that despite 
the fact that postructuralism and deconstructive practices were reactions to dogmatic patriarchal 
thinking, they have in turn become dogmatic in their own right. For Diethe, it is far more 
important to look at the women with whom Nietzsche interacted, for these gave him the raw 
material for his claims. However, Diethe will argue, Nietzsche lives a double life with regards to 
women: in particular, she makes three claims: 1) That Nietzsche desired women to live lives of 
cloistered domesticity; 2) That Nietzsche viewed the destiny of women as espousal and 
motherhood; and 3) That Nietzsche based these views on his youthful studies of ancient Greece, 
which he preferred as the model for social order. 
Further, Diethe claims that Nietzsche sounds paradoxical in at least two respects: namely 
for refuting socialism in favour of aristocracy, and likewise when he insults feminists while 
supporting female sexual liberation. Based on Nietzsche’s unpublished early essay “Homer on 
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Competition,” Diethe claims that Nietzsche’s views were thus contradictory in that the ancient 
Greeks cared very little for the sexual desires of the women, and it is precisely this insensitivity to 
the needs of others that attracted Nietzsche to the Greeks (Diethe, p. 2). Diethe states that 
Nietzsche’s failure is to recognize that his own Wilhelmine society was rather like the ancient 
Greek in its oppression of women, perhaps because of the new form of oppression: enforced 
leisure. Middle- and upper-class women were expected to spend most of their time in leisure, but 
this not only institutionalized the secondary status of women, it also perpetuated an ideology 
idealizing role of wife and mother. Thus, for Diethe, Nietzsche contradictorily was both 
iconoclastic and conventional. 
Diethe describes Nietzsche’s stance on matters concerning women as “mercurial” and 
“remarkably complex” (Diethe, p. 11). Due to the fact that his behavior was “impeccably 
chivalrous” he attracted the friendship of many women, some of them the “New Women” who 
had university educations. They do this by as a rule willfully ignoring Nietzsche’s misogynistic 
remarks about women who read, and his vision of a world ruled by male Übermenschen who 
force women to be domestics and mothers. Diethe reconciles their interest in Nietzsche by 
pointing out how they focused on freedom, and claiming that these women like many men before 
and after just took what they wanted from Nietzsche.  
Among many contradictions within Nietzsche, Diethe finds that Nietzsche is a 
Wilhelmine gentleman and a critic of Wilhelmine Germany. Nietzsche is conservative regarding 
woman’s role as breeding stock, but liberated with regards to women’s sexuality. Nietzsche 
advocates freedom, but wants to enslave women. With her focus on Nietzsche’s family life in the 
midst of this discussion, Diethe strongly implies that Nietzsche’s upbringing had great influence 
on his views of women and womanhood. This familial structure – particularly because it was 
matriarchal – inclined Nietzsche initially to prefer the company of younger, ‘caring’ mothers like 
his sister and older motherly types like Mawilda von Meysenbug. Mawilda in particular was 
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instrumental in introducing Nietzsche to younger, independent women, beginning with Salomé 
and moving on to others.  
Diethe claims that both Nietzsche & his father were accustomed to women’s familial 
control. Erdmuthe, Carl Ludwig’s mother and Franziska’s mother-in-law, ran the house. 
Erdmuthe’s oppression of Franziska resulted from Carl Ludwig’s failure to get the Erdmuthe to 
give Franziska the front rooms as was her due, and Erdmuthe treating Franziska like a guest and a 
servant. Many works catalogue the damaging influence of Franziska’s religiosity on Friedrich and 
Elisabeth, noting the emotional blackmail, invoking God in the place of the late Carl Ludwig, 
divine wrath threatened for disobedience, and the withholding of affection. Now here some 
interesting things happen: First Diethe points out that these authors criticize Franziska’s profound 
faith while noting that for the middle-class female in the nineteenth century such was a desired 
norm. Then she points out that education such as George Eliot’s was necessary to become an 
informed skeptic. Next she points out that Nietzsche, supposedly so handicapped by his religious 
mother, had little sympathy for women like Eliot and had a reactionary attitude toward women’s 
education. 
The paradox, then, is that Nietzsche disliked ignorant women but “refused to support 
those who wished to educate women out of their ignorance” (Diethe, p. 17). As we shall see in 
my biographical sketch, this is an outright falsehood. Diethe’s conclusion is that we cannot blame 
Franziska for just repeating what she had learned or for being ignorant. Note that no woman close 
to Nietzsche receives even a fraction of the education he did, regardless of how he excoriated his 
educational system. Note also that growing up with a Lutheran parson for a father would likely 
not have reduced the quantity of religious influence throughout Nietzsche’s childhood, and so I 
am inclined to agree with Diethe that Franziska is not solely to blame. At the same time, however, 
I feel Diethe may be stripping Franziska of some agency in her own adherence to her religious 
beliefs.  
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Diethe goes on to critique how various biographers treat Franziska misogynistically, how 
they also should and fail to critique the men who would have given him the same religious 
upbringing. Nietzsche loved his mother, respected her sacrifices, and rejected her faith as well as 
condemning its resultant errors of judgment. Another paradox: Nietzsche is hostile to 
Christianity, but makes exceptions for pietist Lutherans like his childhood and early adulthood 
friends. Pietism & revivalism were both dominant in Basel, and influential for Nietzsche’s friend 
Franz Overbeck. And yet growing up the way he did was not conclusive for Nietzsche’s 
intellectual development; during puberty Nietzsche goes from an all-female atmosphere at home 
to the all-male atmosphere of school at Schlupforta, “an institution of Spartan discipline” (Diethe, 
p. 22). This leads Diethe to make remarks about various biographers’ accusations that Nietzsche 
is a homosexual, and how his childhood and education repressed his homosexuality, though this 
repression was alleviated by studies of Classical Greece. Diethe mentions Nietzsche’s praise of 
the cloistered life of Greek women in a unpublished fragmentary essay The Greek Woman 
because of the sons they produced, because of the lifestyle possible for Greek men, the “passion 
for naked male beauty!” (D 170).24  
From Diethe we learn that Nietzsche was infuriated off when Wagner contacted his 
doctor and implied he was a pederast.25 Freudian analysis indicates frequent masturbation is a 
sign of neurosis; Wagner’s analysis based pederasty on the assumption that Nietzsche was an 
onanist because of his increasing blindness. Diethe does not think Nietzsche is “convincingly 
indignant”  in his correspondence during this dispute (Diethe, p. 23) and thinks Nietzsche is 
hostile towards ‘abnormal’ people of either sex who are not conducive towards breeding (cf. GM 
II:14 wherein he appears to be scornful of “moral onanists and self-gratifiers”). This is central to 
                                                          
24 Note that this passage is entitled “Different perspectives of feeling” and discusses how different “our” 
(presumably 19th c. European) perspective on art, male beauty, female beauty, reverence and despising are 
from those of the Ancient Greeks.  
25 I only note here that pederasty or pedophilia, also known as child abuse and sexual assault, is distinct 
from homosexuality and it would behoove Diethe not to conflate the two. 
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Diethe’s argument that Nietzsche’s primary objection to emancipation for women was “sexual 
inversion” it causes (Diethe, p. 24).  
However, Diethe thinks tracing Nietzsche’s misogyny to putative homosexuality is 
improvable and tendentious (and I would add tedious), and that rather Nietzsche was influenced 
by a particularly Wilhelmine feminine self-hatred in a world where ‘feminist’ was an ugly word 
in polite society; thus Nietzsche’s anti-feminism has its roots in the beliefs of his mother and the 
other women in his childhood home. While Nietzsche accepted the mother role, he rejected the 
sexual hypocrisy which held women to be helpless during courtship. At the same time, however, 
he rejected the unmarried life which could provide women with educational and occupational 
opportunities outside the home because of the loss of status accompanying such a social move. 
Note also that Diethe associates such a value system with Augusta, Rosalie, and Franziska’s 
interpretation of the das Ewig-Weibliche, though it is unclear whether their interpretation of this 
key phrase in any way mirrors Nietzsche’s.  
Diethe explains the connection to Goethe’s Faust: In Faust, Gretchen’s purity is what 
Faust needs for his redemption. Gretchen is both a ‘Madonna’ as well as the archetypal fallen 
woman. Nietzsche mocks “self-righteous Wilhelmine women” who presented themselves as 
‘saving graces’ when they were actually “(in his opinion) morally and spiritually bankrupt” 
(Diethe, p. 24). However, Nietzsche never wholly rejected the notion nor the phrase, which 
Diethe claims is evidenced by his focus on Ewig Wiederkehr or the eternal recurrence. This 
certainly resembles the eternal feminine or “Eternal-Womanly,” and further his discussion with 
Salomé enhanced his notion of eternal recurrence greatly (Diethe, p. 25). However, Diethe 
surmises, their relationship foundered because he wanted a helpmeet or muse and Salomé dashed 
Nietzsche’s hopes. Ultimately, Nietzsche’s defense of the sexuality of Madonnas shocked the 
sexless women of his family; his mother had only six years of too-early marriage, whereas 
Elisabeth’s four years of marriage came too late.  
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Thus Diethe segues into Nietzsche’s relationship with his sister, Elisabeth Förster-
Nietzsche. Prior to the break with Salomé, Elisabeth and Friedrich were very close and helpful 
towards each other. Friedrich introduced Elisabeth to the Wagners and Cosima liked her so well 
she used “Du” rather than the formal “Sie” in their letters. During these visits & in their 
correspondence, they discussed Nietzsche’s marriage options at length, about which Diethe 
provides a discussion of suppositions, probabilities, and the likelihood of Nietzsche’s attitudes 
towards these women despite his chivalry and model manners in person and by letter. Diethe 
agrees with Klaus Goch26 that Elisabeth’s & Friedrich’s household in 1875 was a kind of sibling 
marriage for a time (Diethe, p. 27).  
Diethe makes no apologies for Elisabeth’s fascism. Although her passion for her 
brother’s work was laudable, her poor scholarship and penchant for propaganda was not. 
However, it is sad that a woman of Elisabeth’s drive and intelligence would waste her energies on 
a failed colony and to spend her energies scrupulously on bending the facts about her brother so 
he could become famous. The break over Salomé was a watershed moment for both siblings, 
though they eventually bridged the divide somewhat. It seems Elisabeth married Förster out of 
rebellion against Friedrich, who objected specifically to the kinds of anti-Semitic nationalistic 
views Förster published. Diethe then goes into great detail concerning Nietzsche’s friendships 
with Sophie Ritschl, Ida Overbeck, Cosima Wagner, Marie Baumgartner, and Louise Ott, and 
notes that Nietzsche tended to gravitate towards women who were unavailable: married women, 
women with children. The Overbecks were especially important following the break with Salomé. 
Ida Overbeck also spoke out against Nietzsche’s misogyny, though like von Meysenbug she 
thought it was not Nietzsche’s true self and was a result of his quarrel with Elisabeth rather than 
with Salomé. 
                                                          
26 Goch, Klaus. Nietzsche über die Frauen (Frankfurt am Main und Leipzig: Insel, 1992), p. 141. 
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Concerning the Wagners, Diethe thinks the religion of Cosima is a private matter unlike 
her anti-semitism and nationalism, and thus should not be condemned. Further, Diethe thinks it is 
objectionable that Nietzsche would place “questions of taste on a par with matters which are more 
deserving of censure” (Diethe, p. 34), particularly because Nietzsche objected more publicly and 
vociferously about things like Parsifal than he did about things like the Wagners’ public anti-
semitic slurring of Paul Rée. For Diethe, Nietzsche’s earliest and closest relationships thus 
demonstrate how he shared in the idealization and respect for young mothers, although his 
relationship with older women was more complex and built around taboo, such that Nietzsche 
recoiled from women who were actually interested and available.  
Diethe provides a historical account of the attitudes in Germany during Nietzsche’s time: 
During the Biedermeier27 period, Germans idealized motherhood particularly in the form of the 
middle-class wife of leisure. Diethe refers to this as the cult of family life. Such idealization of 
motherhood led to the suspicion and hostility directed at career-oriented women. In particular, 
Diethe suggests that Nietzsche’s BGE §144 is evidence that he accepted the popular belief “that 
book-learning would affect the sexuality of a woman and weaken her natural moral goodness and 
nurturing qualities” (Diethe, p. 41). For contrast, Diethe refers to the essay “The Greek Woman” 
to argue that Nietzsche prefers that women be cloistered, though she backtracks by saying that 
insulting women is not his actual point, but “actually concentrating his attention on the Hellenic 
woman within the context of Plato’s remarks…without drawing conclusions about Wilhelmine 
Germany, though later in his oeuvre, of course, he looked back to the culture of Ancient Greece 
with a good deal of nostalgia” (Diethe, p. 42). Diethe recognizes the fragmentary nature of this 
early, unpublished piece, but contends nonetheless that this characterized his early opinion and 
that Nietzsche never changed his mind.  
                                                          
27 Approx. 1815-1848, characterized by growing urbanization and industrialization, a growing middle-
class, and restrictive policies leading to the a-politicization of the arts, which thus tended to focus on the 
domestic rather than the public (see Encyclopedia of the Romantic Era, p. 27). 
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She bases this claim on the later BGE §238, wherein she reads Nietzsche as saying that 
Greek and Asian cultures flourished because of how they oppressed women, and goes on to say 
that it is clear where his sympathies lie based on his tone. Specifically, Diethe makes the 
following claim: “Nietzsche’s disapproval of woman’s right to participate in society as man’s 
equal can thus be viewed as remarkably consistent” (Diethe, p. 42). The surprising thing for 
Diethe is that Nietzsche can be such an iconoclast but still blend seamlessly with conventional 
misogyny insisting on women having only a domestic role, believing that bluestockings were 
unfeminine, and suspecting that feminists were lesbians. Diethe goes on to show how many men 
used Nietzsche to further their own misogynistic ends, but this proves little to nothing; despite 
what the Nazis did with Nietzsche, he was never an anti-semitic nationalist, and so the fact that 
men like Otto Weininger based their writings on Nietzsche’s is extraneous to the argument, 
though Diethe seems to ignore this and uses Weininger to connect to her discussion of 
Persönlichkeiten in the introduction.  
Diethe now moves to discuss Nietzsche’s claims regarding female sexuality within the 
context of Wilhelmine attitudes to the same, in combination with Lou Salomé’s theories. An 
important unconventionality for both Nietzsche and Salomé is that they both reject the idea that a 
respectable woman is disinclined to engage in sex. Similar to Victorian woman who learned to 
endure sex by lying back and thinking of England, Wilhelmine women also learned to view sex 
as a duty rather than a pleasure. Wilhelmine Germans thought unmarried women were potentially 
unhealthy because of their (presumed) lack of opportunity to fulfil marital duties, and Nietzsche’s 
aunts did not escape casual diagnoses of hysteria or Nervosität. Diethe agrees with Nietzsche’s 
contempt of the doctors who did this to so many people (GM I:6). Interestingly, Wilhelmine 
society saw married motherhood as essentially sexless and hence non-threatening, which Diethe 
points out is illogical (Diethe, p. 44). The Eternal-Womanly dictates that woman’s role is as 
“helpmeet to man” despite the fact that this is contrary to Goethe’s original work (Diethe, p. 44, 
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see p. 24 fn. 37: “Das Ewig-Weibliche zieht uns hinan (The Eternal-Womanly draws us aloft)”). 
This ideology permeated even the working classes where it was economically impossible for 
women to meet such aspirations. 
Diethe claims that despite the fact that Nietzsche was not a friend of the Wilhelmine 
regime, he attacks “neither the Goethean concept itself nor the manipulative force which 
Wilhelmine patriarchy set behind it, but the women who upheld the values enshrined in it, who 
were sanctimonious in their patriotic moralising and superficial in their tastes and aspirations” 
(Diethe, p. 45). Interestingly, Diethe seems to accept Meta von Salis’s bitter critique of 
contemporary women who fit such a description, but rejects Nietzsche’s. This may have to do 
with the fact that Diethe recognizes that von Salis “did so much for women’s emancipation” 
(Diethe, p. 45) but cannot recognize what Nietzsche offered towards the same end. Diethe 
emphasizes that “It should not go unobserved that Nietzsche’s (and Meta’s) criticisms always 
relate to better-off women who, whether they liked it or not, had to play by the social rules, which 
often forced them to be duplicitous and artificial; moreover, they were in direct competition with 
each other in the marriage mart” (Diethe, p. 45). 
With reference to BGE §232, Diethe points out how Nietzsche recognized the severity 
with which women judged each other, but “he links the idea of women’s antipathy with each 
other not with the social factors which marginalized women unfairly…but with the wrong-headed 
attempt by some women to actually change that situation, which they could only do by entering 
the world of men” (Diethe, p. 45). Diethe’s reading of Nietzsche has him trying to have it both 
ways: women are superficial, but this should not change, because BGE VII defends the claim that 
women are and should be “feather-brained dependents” (Diethe, p. 45). Thus concludes Diethe’s 
proof; the only difference Diethe sees between Nietzsche’s view of sex and that of the 
Wilhelmines is Nietzsche’s defense of female libido.  
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
27 
 
However, Diethe turns Nietzsche’s attitude towards women and sex into a double-edged 
sword as she argues that Nietzsche is only concerned with the ‘right’ sexual activities, and that 
emancipated women had not engaged in the appropriate affirmation of their sexual desires (cf. 
EH III:5). This appears primarily to be because such women are incapable of having children, and 
Diethe emphasizes the connection to Zucht or breeding. Under this interpretation, feminism 
becomes degenerate, life-denying, even sterile, de-feminizing women. Further, Diethe claims 
Nietzsche’s remarks about the Eternal-Womanly are all “humorously dismissive rather than 
analytically critical” (Diethe, p. 46). She points out Nietzsche’s claim that women should allow 
the Eternal-Masculine28 to lead them higher, his definition of the Eternal-Womanly as a liking for 
adornment, and his declaration in a letter that the first priority of the Eternal-Womanly was 
laughing with a head full of nonsense (Diethe, p. 46). Diethe basically says Nietzsche is a liar 
when he claims to disavow the Wilhelmine idealization of the domestication of women through 
the Eternal-Womanly because he supported certain aspects thereof (Diethe, p. 46). She finds this 
further evidenced by Nietzsche’s attraction to motherly women, a claim also supported by Brann 
(Diethe p. 46).29  
Still, Diethe insists we credit the importance of Nietzsche and Salomé’s challenge to 
conventional received misogyny in the form of praising women’s sexual drive. In particular, she 
notes his railing against the ignorance about sex which society enforced for young women (GS 
§71), and compares this compassionate Nietzsche with the one who attacks Christianity in its life-
negating form of denying sexuality (TI X:4) and for its control of women (A §53). Diethe then 
asks a strange question: What went wrong? This seems to imply that something changed between 
Gay Science and Beyond Good and Evil, although we see that even Diethe points out that 
Nietzsche maintains similar attitudes in later works Twilight of the Idols and Antichrist. She 
                                                          
28 An strange inconsistency in Diethe’s translation is that one is the Eternal-Womanly, but the other is the 
Eternal Masculine. 
29 Brann, Henry Walter, Nietzsche und die Frauen (Bonn: Bouvier, 1976) [1931], p. 32.  
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implies that Nietzsche was on his way to emancipating himself “from the Schopenhauerian view 
of sexual intercourse as a manifestation of the Wille zum Leben (will to life), in spite of his 
repeated criticism of Schopenhauer throughout his work” and instead she claims that Nietzsche 
stayed trapped within the view that female sexuality was “inextricably and ineluctably bound up 
with child-rearing” (Diethe, p. 47), a view he shares with Salomé. Basically then, Diethe ends this 
section by implying that Salomé is the reason Nietzsche never overcame his supposed sexism at 
the same time that she recognizes that Nietzsche did go beyond Wilhelmine standards by 
affirming not only female reproduction but female intercourse as well. 
Diethe describes Nietzsche and Salomé’s ‘affair’ at great length, a discussion which I will 
refrain from including for this is so complex that I cannot do it justice here, and it is only 
peripherally relevant. Regardless, Diethe finds that Nietzsche’s correspondence had changed such 
that “a tone of what can only call spitefulness is evident” based on things like his crossness with 
Ida because of her “prim moralizing” (Diethe, p. 52). Further, Diethe finds that the misogynistic 
statements increase in Nietzsche’s work from this point on, though she provides no evidence for 
this claim. This will be Diethe’s frequent pattern: sweeping claims regarding the development of 
Nietzsche’s thought, or the persistence of misogyny over the course of his work, but with little to 
no evidence to support such broad conclusions.  
I would like to take a moment to note that it is extraordinarily problematic to blame any 
person’s misogyny on the behavior of women in general or on the behavior of a particular 
woman. Misogyny in the individual arises from the heuristics of the patriarchal hegemony; that is 
to say, one person learns to be misogynistic because of the way society trains persons, both male 
and female, to view women, which training in turn arises from centuries of trial-and-error at 
oppressing women. This is no less true for a man raised in a household of deeply indoctrinated 
women as Nietzsche was than it is for a man raised by indoctrinated men, and it is to Diethe’s 
credit that she repeatedly emphasizes the similarities in upbringing Nietzsche would have had 
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were his father to have lived. However, it is deeply troubling that Diethe among others implies 
that Nietzsche’s “deepest misogyny” resulted from his relationship with Lou (Diethe, p. 54).  
Diethe’s Nietzsche agrees with many contemporaneous German women that career 
interfered with motherhood and hence was damaging to Nietzsche’s goal of populating the world 
with a new race of males. Salomé’s secret was that she was liberated in actuality without 
admitting allegiances to women’s liberation movements. Other feminists such as Hedwig Dohm, 
however, described such Lou as anti-feminist precisely because of her stance (Diethe, p. 59). 
Apart from the fact that Lou did not enact her own principles, her stance was full of 
contradictions: namely that she agrees that feminists are freaks and abominations, that women are 
stupid for seeking careers; she argued with Dohm extensively about women’s writing, which she 
condemns with faint praise according to Diethe (Diethe, p. 60). Lou’s radical differences from 
Nietzsche include the fact that “her ideal woman emerges as a quasi-detached being enshrouded 
in mystique,” the fact that she agrees with Wilhelmine society that woman’s erotic desire is 
fulfilled with childbirth and goes no further, ending when no further children are wanted, though 
she differs from society in that she does believe such desire is very weak. Nietzsche’s big 
difference from Lou here is that he views women as permanently sexually motivated (though he 
agrees with the goal of childbirth) rather than tapering in desire as the number of born children 
increases. In short, Diethe believes that Nietzsche’s position with regards to female sexuality is as 
follows: “the big difference is that Nietzsche does not join in the cant about the genteel woman’s 
lack of sexual inclination. He roundly asserts that woman, as a highly-sexed creature, is 
permanently out to attract the male with the sole end in view of becoming pregnant” (Diethe, p. 
61), an idea to which she will return in the penultimate section of this chapter.  
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Stating that Nietzsche views female sexuality as the “will to pregnancy” (Diethe, p. 61), 
Diethe discusses what I think Kaufmann rejects:30 Nietzsche’s elitist breeding program designed 
to strengthen humanity to prepare us for the Übermensch. She describes “the great health of the 
new race” of Übermenschen in terms of a foray into eugenics, despite the fact that she recognizes 
that “Nietzsche did distance himself from Darwinism and positivism in general” (Diethe, p. 61). 
With reference to Nietzsche’s fragmentary essays, Diethe defends Nietzsche’s attitude regarding 
sexual desire in women as non-nymphomaniac, but at the same time decries the fact that he 
accepts concubinage as an acceptable solution for a wife’s inability to satisfy her husband’s 
sexual needs. Diethe sees Nietzsche’s attitude towards prostitution as indicative of the claim that 
passionate, satisfying wives do not educate the new race of Übermenschen and hence as 
contradictory to what Nietzsche says about women’s sexual liberation.31  
According to Diethe, the most important thing Nietzsche said about women, then, was the 
fact that he granted woman her sex drive thus giving “even the best bred, carte blanche for as 
much sexual enjoyment as they liked – providing the goal was pregnancy” (Diethe, p. 62). Diethe 
construes later feminists’ adoption of Nietzsche for this reason as an understandable, since they 
mistook him as a forerunner for their own neue Ethik or New Morality movement. Rather than 
seeing passages such as BGE 239 as mocking the attitude that woman’s first and last profession is 
birthing children and that work disables women for such work, Diethe takes this as a clear 
statement of Nietzsche’s support for Wilhelmine views about women. I would say that what 
Nietzsche really says in this passage includes things like scholarly asses of the male sex should 
not tell women how to act, particularly if they are telling her to imitate male sickness; Nietzsche 
                                                          
30 See Kaufmann’s chapter 10, “The Master Race,” wherein he demonstrates that if Nietzsche has any 
breeding program at all, it revolves around racial mixing instead of racial purity.  
31 In response, I would have to suggest that Diethe has misunderstood the connections between 
motherhood, childrearing, sexual partnership, prostitution, and sexual liberation, or at least how these 
things are connected in lived experience, whether or not this is an appropriate understanding of Nietzsche. 
A sexually liberated woman might be more comfortable having a concubine around so that she can pursue 
her own interests – including her sexual, non-pregnancy interests – without undue preoccupation with an 
insensitive spouse. Whether such a relationship is exploitative or harmful depends largely on the culture, 
the established nature of the relationship, and the sexualities of the individuals involved. 
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rejects the so-called free-thinkers and scribblers, and no man or woman of value would want to 
imitate them. Finally, I also note it is interesting that Diethe points out Nietzsche’s many women 
writer friends, and Diethe casts aspersions on their understanding of Nietzsche’s relevance and 
usefulness to feminism, and possible the individual motivations of such women.  
Diethe addresses the infamous picture of Nietzsche, Reé, and Salomé, wherein the two 
men are positioned in front of the cart where the dray beasts would go and Salomé is seated in the 
cart, holding the whip. Nietzsche did the arranging. Diethe says “This photograph appears to 
contrast starkly with the comment by the old crone” from Zarathustra. Diethes recognize that the 
old woman’s words acquire greater weight because she speaks so little. She says that the initial 
reading is of a subservient response to Zarathustra’s description of masculinity and dominance 
and machismo. The problem acquires even further difficulty as Diethe points out that the German 
says ambiguously “the” whip and not “your” whip as Hollingdale had translated the passage. 
Pieper states that the woman could hold the whip, making certain that men strive for the 
Übermensch, and then we arrive at a symbol of self-overcoming, the circus whip, self-
chastisement, etc., a whole variety of possible meanings (Diethe, p. 64).32 Because this passage is 
so key in what most people believe about Nietzsche’s misogyny, Diethe is right to describe 
Hollingdale’s mistranslation as unfortunate.  
However, Diethe does not appear to believe that this section of Zarathustra actually 
describes Nietzsche’s personal position with regard to women. Many of Nietzsche’s female 
friends found his views on women troubling, some referencing the passage from Zarathustra 
explicitly, though Diethe thinks Elisabeth’s attempt to correct this issue by pointing out that the 
infamous line is the old woman’s advice to Zarathustra is a valuable contribution to the 
discussion. More problematic for Diethe is Zarathustra’s statement that man is always a means to 
                                                          
32 Pieper, Annemarie. “Ein Seil geknüpft zwischen Tier und Übermensch.” Philosophische Erläuterungen 
zu Nietzsches ersem ‘Zarathustra’” (“A Rope Tied Between Animal and Man.” Philosophical 
Expostulation of Nietzsche’s First ‘Zarathustra’” (Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta, 1990), p. 312.  
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a child for woman (also from Z I:18), because Nietzsche repeats the same claim in an “anti-
feminist diatribe” in Ecce Homo (Diethe, p. 65). Where Diethe sees a stress on the claim that this 
is Nietzsche’s answer, I instead see the emphasis and the scare-quotes on the notion that a child is 
a cure or a redemption for woman. Diethe sees Nietzsche making a jeer and oblique insult against 
women, where I see Nietzsche jeering and insulting those who imply women need curing or 
redeeming. She hears the tone of a sexist joke, I hear cunning subterfuge. Precisely because she 
thinks Nietzsche so highly valued woman’s ability to bear offspring, she thinks this is an 
unfortunate betrayal of his own principles. Note how Diethe states that Human, All-Too-Human is 
subsequent to Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Diethe, p. 66), and that she does not say why she thinks 
Nietzsche rejected equality in marriage despite the fact that he wanted respect and friendship in 
them; but most interesting for me is the fact that Diethe says the following:  
However, in the light of Zarathustra’s comment on the solultion to the riddle of woman, 
which in terms of humour backfires badly, readers of Thus Spoke Zarathustra who have 
so persistently ‘got it wrong’ when it came to understanding the reference to the whip can 
be excused for not quite knowing when Nietzsche was joking or not, or speaking in his 
own voice or not, or advocating male aggression and female passivity – or not. 
Diethe, p. 66.  
This is a fascinating attitude on Diethe’s part, since she seems to get it wrong as well; more 
interesting and relevant is the fact that she offers us no reason for why her exegetical methods 
reveal the true Nietzsche. I hope to avoid this pitfall in my own research by clearly establishing 
the merits of my methods at the end of this chapter.  
Diethe goes on to connect Rousseau’s misogyny to Nietzsche’s. While she acknowledges 
that Nietzsche “excoriated all those who admired Rousseau and emulated him” and that 
“Admittedly, there is a big distinction between Rousseau’s version of woman’s nature, where the 
ideal woman is constructed as ‘man’s better self’…and Nietzsche’s notion of the predatory 
woman propelled by the ‘will to pregnancy,’” she still argues at length that “Both men, however, 
start from the premise that there is a separate female ‘nature’ which can be analyzed without 
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recourse to social factors” (Diethe, p. 67). Diethe notes a few parallels between Goethe and 
Rousseau: both had relationships with lower-class women despite admiration on Rousseau’s part 
for society women and what Nietzsche called ‘nobility’ in Goethe (Diethe, p. 67, cf. AOM §298); 
however, Thérèse and Christiane seem to Diethe to offer a compromise in the midst of the Eve-
Mary dichotomy of womanhood. Both relationships result in negative social repercussions.  
Diethe suggests that Nietzsche’s most overt misogyny is visible in remarks that 
apparently refer to society women rather than lower-class women (e.g., BGE §237, reference to 
the tailoress) and connects such remarks to journals which would publish sexist jokes, such as 
Simplicissimus and Fliegende Blätter, and include references to höhere Töchter (‘higher 
daughters’ or unwed ‘young ladies,’ cf. p. 68); such jokes reinforce prejudices concerning female 
mental capacity. Other journals in this time put forth liberal views, by contrast, so it is 
problematic to say that conservative views were the only product of the time. For Diethe, “Part of 
the problem of interpretation,” of Nietzsche’s sexist jokes “is caused by the social factors during 
the period which…can be summed up in one phrase, the ‘double standard.’ This distorted the 
behaviour of both men and women – with Nietzsche operating his own version in which he 
purported to attack conventional society, but in terms of sexism at least, often did no such thing,” 
(Diethe, p. 69).  
Given Nietzsche’s own modest background and his preference for older women from the 
higher echelons of society, it is interesting to note that Nietzsche likely would not have been as 
minimally successful as he was without the support of patronesses like Cosima Wagner and 
Malwida von Meysenbug. One important dissimilarity: though Nietzsche tried the patience of 
both Cosima and Malwida, he never saw the vengeance Rousseau did from Mme d’Epinay. 
Diethe’s conclusions include the claim that Nietzsche is similar to Rousseau in that “some of 
Nietzsche’s remarks appear to suggest a cunning guile in women, more specifically society 
women, in line with the dishonest streak which Rousseau had identified as women’s innate and 
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characteristic feature” (Diethe, p. 69, cf. BGE §232, supposedly parallel to Émile Book V, 
wherein woman is a “coquette by profession”).  
Regardless, both authors admired ancient Greek culture and used it to support their 
claims about the importance of women’s role as nurturing mother, educator, and helpmeet, 
particularly with reference to the women Guardians in Plato’s Republic. Similarly, Nietzsche’s 
pronouncement “Let woman be a plaything” (TSZ I:18) seems to echo Rousseau’s attitude 
towards Sophie’s role in conjunction with her brother – nurse, helper, and amusement. However, 
Diethe thinks such roles in no way resemble what Plato suggests for Guardian women. Likewise, 
Diethe offers a final comment on Zarathustra and the whip: “Nietzsche’s probable desire to 
expose Wilhelmine preconceptions through Zarathustra’s bluster has been discussed in the 
previous section, but again we can note that in the absence of any direct stress from Nietzsche 
(who could certainly hammer a point home when he wished ) to the effect that the remark is 
intended to be ironic, it has been more than possible to couple this statement by Zarathustra with 
Nietzsche’s own misogynic [sic] and take it at face value as indicative of his own naked 
misogyny and whole retroactive stance on women’s issues” (Diethe, p. 70).  
At any rate, the point is that claiming that men are enslaved to women ignores the real 
power men held and still hold over women, and Diethe accuses Nietzsche of also ignoring “the 
real hardships caused to [sic] women by the lack of women’s rights in Wilhelmine Germany” 
(Diethe, p. 71). Diethe includes some of Adorno’s criticisms of Nietzsche, namely that Nietzsche 
had a “second-hand and unverified image of feminine nature from the Christian civilization 
which he otherwise so thoroughly mistrusted” and “he fell for the fraud of saying ‘the feminine’ 
when talking of women. Hence the perfidious advice not to forget the whip: femininity itself is 
already the effect of the whip” (see p. 71, cf. Minima Moralia, p. 96).33 To finish, note that Diethe 
sees Nietzsche’s discussion of women as “lop-sided from the outset” because she thinks he 
                                                          
33 At this point, I can only speculate that Nietzsche’s point might actually lie within this criticism. 
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refuses to account for femininity outside of what is inherent, and completely disregards the social 
construction of gender:  
When Nietzsche speculates as to whether woman wants to gain mastery over man, it is 
both a retrospective reference to the type of principles held by Rousseau, the complexity 
and duplicity of which we have discussed, and a forward reference to the leveling-down 
which Nietzsche feared would take place if woman pursued her quest for enlightenment 
and emancipation; a common fear at the time which was expressed amid general 
skepticism towards democratisation in conventional circles. Nietzsche’s comments are 
therefore predictably vitriolic. 
Diethe, p. 71  
Note also that Diethe sees both Nietzsche and Rousseau as “uncompromising” in their attitudes 
against women’s education being equal to men’s, although she sees Nietzsche’s prefacing of his 
remarks in BGE as “my truths” (§231) as a caveat to this lack of compromise. Regardless, 
Diethe’s attitude is that no matter how many times he shifts in his position, “Nietzsche was at 
least consistent in this area: he remained from first to last a convinced opponent of female 
emancipation in general, and of women’s equal opportunities for education in particular, 
believing that equality would lead to mediocrity” (Diethe, p. 71). For my purposes, this attitude is 
problematic for several reasons.  
First of all, we have to ask whether equality leads to mediocrity. For example, we might 
reference Kurt Vonnegut’s short story “Harrison Bergeron,” wherein the strong are literally 
weighed down to make them ‘equal’ to the weak, and wherein the intelligent are constantly 
distracted to make them ‘equal’ to the unintelligent. We must also ask whether Nietzsche feels 
that equality leads to mediocrity, and whether Nietzsche’s apparent rejection of egalitarian 
political ideals is based solely or primarily on a rejection of mediocrity. We must also ask 
whether the belief that equality leads to mediocrity necessarily entails a rejection of feminism, or 
a misunderstanding about the meaning of equality, or some other thing. Finally, if it is not 
mediocrity which motivates Nietzsche’s rejection of equality, we must also ask whether 
Nietzsche is more concerned with a motley society than a mediocre one, for this could become a 
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problem for my and other pluralistic readings of Nietzsche should such pluralism lack a 
Rangordnung or order of rank.  
Diethe’s third chapter begins with a discussion of women’s education during Nietzsche’s 
time in Wilhelmine Germany and elsewhere: Various factions in the women’s movement 
disagreed about a lot of things, but all agreed that women’s and girls’ education needed 
expansion. Europeans highly regarded Wilhelmine boys’ education, no matter what Nietzsche 
said about it.34 German women lacked most basic civil rights, including suffrage as well as the 
right to attend political meetings and join trade unions, so many believed that it was preposterous 
to allow women to attend school. However, other European universities had opened admissions 
for women, particularly in Switzerland, Britain, and France in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, so Germany lagged behind other countries in this regard; on the other hand, it should be 
noted that this did not mean that the “New Women” were any more welcome elsewhere. Further, 
note that they frequently referred to themselves as die Emanzipierten or die Frauenrechtlerinnen; 
finally, note that while “neues Weib” was a pejorative term in Wilhelmine Germany,  “neue 
Frau” in the subsequent Weimar period indicated the newly-independent working girl. 
Zurich admitted first Hörerinnen (“listeners” or female students allowed to attend 
lectures) and then allowed female students to enroll; Diethe states that this process occurred 
mostly by accident and less because of any sustained effort on behalf of women’s rights, and they 
seem to have not realized how much interest they would receive from foreign female students not 
allowed to study in their home countries. The situation was also even worse in Russia than it was 
in Germany, which is probably one of the reasons Lou Salomé enrolled as a Hörerin. 
Interestingly, it is Malwida who introduces Lou to the Wagner circle in Bayreuth in July 1882, 
and it is to Malwida’s role in aristocratic society that Diethe turns next. Diethe goes into great 
detail about Nietzsche’s relationship with each of these women.  
                                                          
34 So we might ask whether this speaks more to how wrong Europeans were about education or about 
Nietzsche’s evaluation of his educational experiences. 
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Diethe characterizes as “catty” the remarks Nietzsche writes to Elisabeth that he “had 
sufficient humanity to adapt myself to these basically uninspiring [unerquicklichen], though also 
worthy, females [Weiblichkeiten] as best I could” (15 October, 1887), while I think it is possible 
to recognize that Nietzsche did view Meta and her friend Hedwig Kym as both worthy and 
uninspiring, as well as unpleasant about his own family behind their backs, without being 
automatically the condescending misogynist Diethe describes. I argue that it is possible to not 
love and adore every single woman alive and still not be a misogynist; even hating a specific 
woman or five does not make one a misogynist unless one hates them precisely because they are 
women. Hating a liar who happens to be a woman does not make one a misogynist if what one 
despises is the lie. The same holds for other features, such as being uninspiring, backstabbing, etc. 
The problem of misogyny comes in when one attributes such despised features exclusively or 
primarily to the bearer’s femininity, and Diethe has assumed but not shown that this is what 
Nietzsche is doing, and I think it is therefore unfair of Diethe to accuse Nietzsche of indulging in 
behavior which does not tally “with the prescriptions for higher health which we expect from the 
creator of the Übermensch” (Diethe, p. 90).  
Diethe concludes this section with accusations that Nietzsche’s “ideal woman should be 
physically attractive, but with as little intelligence as possible” which contrasted with the 
“evidence that he was more than ready to spend considerable amounts of time with intelligent 
women, several of whom might have been prepared to take him seriously as a match” but 
Nietzsche attempted to avoid this and “deceive himself…[by raising] the stakes by insisting upon 
youth and beauty in a potential wife” (Diethe, p. 95). Diethe basically says Nietzsche was 
inventing reasons to not marry because subconsciously he had no intention of doing so;35 the only 
                                                          
35 Cf. Chapter One in Diethe’s book. Since Diethe ends the chapter with Nietzsche’s 1884 declaration in a 
letter to Elisabeth that he consciously has no intention to marry, it seems disingenuous to construe his lack 
of interest in marriage as subconscious here. 
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reason the break with Salomé was as troubling as it was had nothing to do with the loss of a 
spouse, but rather with the loss of a disciple and friend. 
Helene von Druskowitz was another of Nietzsche’s female acquaintances. Diethe 
describes Helene as ‘feisty,’ saying she was willing to challenge Nietzsche’s ideas, which neither 
Meta nor Resa did. She completed school and then a doctorate at an early age, and Nietzsche 
briefly thought she would replace Lou as his disciple. I interject here to state that because Diethe 
states clearly that Nietzsche considered these younger women disciples, it is highly problematic 
for her to believe that Nietzsche had no use for women as students, wives, or friends. Regardless, 
Diethe describes Helene’s literary works as “lightweight” (Diethe, p. 96) and Helene herself as a 
“poetaster” (Diethe, p. 99). She then goes on to “surmise that if Nietzsche had not become 
mentally ill when he did, he would have made some acid comments about Helene von 
Druskowitz’s dramatic output”; at this point, Diethe feels she has already demonstrated that 
Nietzsche has rejected women’s writing “out of hand” (Diethe, p. 97). However, given the fact 
that Diethe has several times made claims with no or insufficient evidence, confused the order of 
his works, and generally approached the task with no spirit of charity whatsoever, I find this 
conclusion of Diethe’s to be especially suspect.  
Despite the fact that Helene was a lightweight, “his negative criticism is reserved for her 
philosophical essays, though he had nothing but praise for her critical work on English 
Literature” and until 1886 Nietzsche maintained that “She’s a noble, well-made creature who 
does no harm to my ‘philosophy’” (Diethe, p. 97, cf. 22 October, 1884). However, when she 
began attacking his philosophy in her own publications, Nietzsche declared that “[t]hat little 
literary-goose Druscowitz (sic) is anything but my pupil” (Diethe, p. 98, cf. 17 September, 1887, 
cf. also TI I:20). I disagree with Helene that all of Nietzsche’s writings are incomplete and vague, 
though I will concede that many of them are; I find it no surprise that Meta would sympathize 
with Nietzsche’s criticisms of Helene, namely that she was clumsy and judgmental, though I 
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agree with Diethe that it is condescending of Meta to say that she “went mad long ago” (Diethe, 
p. 98, cf. Philosoph und Edelmensch, p. 40).  
Based on Diethe’s description of Helene’s philosophy, I find it unsurprising that 
Nietzsche would find her philosophical writings a disappointing departure from his own work. In 
particular I cite Diethe’s claims that Helene posited “a basic knowledge of good and evil in 
human beings which they understand intuitively and which forms the basis of their acceptance of 
responsibility” (Diethe, p. 97), the fact that Helene attacked the vision of the Übermensch as 
seeking an eternal stationary point for humanity, and that she “argues for the development of 
moral responsibility along Darwinian (i.e. evolutionary) lines” (Diethe, p. 98), and finally that she 
believed nature would bring about an ethical world order. Thus von Druskowitz was an 
emancipated New Woman uncaptivated by Nietzsche unlike Meta and Resa – though Diethe 
accuses those two of suspending critical judgment entirely – and although Diethe feels Nietzsche 
would have been justified in finding fault with her philosophy, she seems to think Nietzsche was 
more disappointed that Helene was not more faithful specifically to his own ideas. 
Diethe accuses Nietzsche’s female friends of choosing “to brush aside the misogynic 
comments in his publications (though of course, they had no idea what Nietzsche was writing 
about them in his letters)” and instead focusing on his impeccable manners and the genteel 
courtesy with which he treated women in person (Diethe, p. 99). At the same time, she accuses 
Nietzsche of not reciprocating the friendships these women offered, particularly in terms of the 
kind of friendship necessary for marriage (Diethe, p. 100). Again, I question Diethe’s 
characterization here. For one, she presumes that Nietzsche valued absolute honesty in 
friendships and somehow betrayed this through his ‘disloyal’ and ‘deceptive’ comments about 
how unmarriageable or unphilosophical he finds certain prospective wives and female friends. 
For another, I have no doubt that Nietzsche could tell that none of the friendships he shared with 
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women were of the marrying kind. Finally, I would note that Nietzsche found that lies were of 
value in several circumstances (see, for example, HATH 40 & 104, as well as UM II:10).  
 
§5 Diethe on Nietzsche’s Women: Part Two 
From the second part of the book, I have a few remaining concerns. For one thing, 
motherhood is an important theme for Nietzsche as well as the women he influenced. One of the 
fascinating things about motherhood and gender is the fact that while men may choose to take on 
maternal roles, and may even have biologically rooted caretaker behaviors or socially learned 
behaviors or whatever, there are very few cases of male-identified individuals also being mothers, 
and I speculate that many such cases involve individuals transitioning from their assigned birth 
gender to the gender with which they identify. Thus, there is good reason to believe that at least in 
the social construction of femininity motherhood has a legitimate parallel with womanhood (and 
sometimes girlhood or pubescence). This is not to say that there is or should be a moral obligation 
for women to become mothers, or that women who do not become mothers are failures at 
performing femininity, or that all women desire motherhood whether they realize it or not. All I 
mean to indicate here is that there are good, viz. non-arbitrary, reasons for humans to connect 
motherhood with the social construction of femininity. What I ultimately want to do with this is 
respond to Diethe’s emphasis here (Diethe, p. 111) on Zarathustra’s pronouncement that for 
women the end (possibly telos) is always the child. 
One of Diethe’s more interesting moves is that despite the fact that Modersohn-Becker 
disliked feminists as very ugly and unpleasant especially in groups, Diethe still says “Even so, I 
would argue that Modersohn-Becker practised her own brand of feminism by showing, for 
example, the nude mother as a natural figure, absorbed in her own ecstatic contemplation of her 
child, in a way that we are not used to seeing from male portrayals which are often voyeuristic” 
and it is this frankness which is so offensive to misogynists and dismissed as hysterical, trivial, 
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and truly female art (Diethe, p. 112). Now here, if Diethe were not so predisposed to see 
Nietzsche as a virulent misogynist, she might not be so confused as to why these women liked his 
work so much: “For the moment let it suffice to say that Nietzsche’s own comments on creative 
women were often as uncomplimentary as those made by Scheffler” and “We must remember 
that his intense admiration for ancient Greek art was largely based on the fact that Greek art was 
so sublime: more pertinently for this study, it was also exclusively produced by men” (Diethe, p. 
112, but Diethe again provides no citation to Nietzsche). Diethe sees this as being exactly 
Nietzsche’s point: 
The domesticated life of the Greek women had been decisive in allowing this cultural 
flowering to come about. None of these aspects of Nietzsche’s thought bothered any of 
the women under discussion in this chapter. They saw Nietzsche as a liberating force for 
them personally, paradoxical though this might sound. Certainly, Nietzsche’s ground-
breaking ideas on noble values and on the principle of individual freedom informed the 
way Modersohn-Becker actually lived her life. It is not going too far to say that the 
influence of Nietzsche was crucial in forcing her forward, press-ganging her into 
creativity. Like the new women in Chapter Three, who for a variety of reasons all chose 
to ignore Nietzsches’ [sic] misogyny, Modersohn-Becker simply selected what she could 
use from Nietzsche’s thought, and on the basis of that remained his enthusiastic and life-
long admirer  
Diethe, p. 112-113  
Generally then, Diethe is accusing Modersohn-Becker and other women of cherry-picking 
Nietzsche; whether this is an indictment against them for being bad scholars or not is not clear.  
Another accusation Diethe makes is that the following is “entirely commensurate with 
Nietzsche’s view on the matter: ‘This observer believes that the woman who destroys her 
harmonious unity and forces herself to will in a one-sided, manly manner nearly always has to 
pay for this decision with debility, sickliness or the drying up of sexual feeling, perversion or 
infertility (Impotenz)’” (Diethe, p. 114, and again, no citations from Diethe to support this). It is 
possible that Diethe does not see that Nietzsche is mocking the ideal of the subservient domestic 
female, that she really believes that he takes that ideal as his own (cf. p 115 & 115 fn. 41). What 
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is more confusing is how Diethe both sees how committed Nietzsche is to the transformation of 
values, and yet misses the more nuanced aspects of his discussion of gender (cf. p. 118-119).  
Ultimately, Diethe finds that many women, and not only the most conservative, were 
very hostile towards New Women; generally men and women objected to such emancipated 
women either because of their loss of femininity or their ushering in socialism. “Old school” 
women still affirmed female sexuality in a way most other women writers failed to do at the time; 
Diethe discusses Nietzsche’s influence on these women at length. Interestingly, Diethe finds that 
Nietzsche’s misogyny falls short of the ‘benchmark’ established by Carl Bleibtreu with the 
following remark: “Everyone today wants to speak with Zarathustra’s tongue … even Meisel-Heß 
showers out poems in Nietzschean mode in her rhapsodic masturbation” (Diethe, p. 128)36 – this, 
Diethe says “introduces a level of invective and vulgarity which is something of a bench-mark 
and outdoes even the worst insults Nietzsche hurled at the feminists” (Diethe, p. 128).  
In addition to looking at Nietzsche’s influence on the creative and artistic women who 
followed him, Diethe also writes on his influences on the feminists who followed him and. like 
the artists above, never met Nietzsche while he was sane or at all. In addition to this, she 
concludes her chapter with a discussion of “the relevance which Nietzsche’s ideas have, or could 
have for the present-day feminist if they were not filtered and diluted through post-structuralist 
theory to the point where much of Nietzsche’s challenge to feminism is dissipated by being 
funnelled into the discussion of ‘woman as such,’” a discussion which is problematic because it is 
a “biologically essentialist examination of woman’s nature as inherently different, which 
represents only one line of feminist enquiry, as Alcoff has argued, can lead to a neglect of more 
practical issues, a point put very strongly by Heidi Schlüpmann” (Diethe, p. 138). There is thus a 
major divide within feminism: those who said women were different from men and thus deserved 
                                                          
36 From Carl BLeibtreu, Geschichte der deutschen National-Literatur von Goethes Tod zur Gegenwart 
(History of German National Literature from Goethe’s Death to the Present) ed. By Georg Gellert, 2 vols 
(Gerlin: Herlet, 1912), I, p. 158.  
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honour and great recognition, and those who said such an argument was unhelpful in bettering the 
lot of women.  
In Diethe’s treatment of the development of the Bund Deutscher Frauen (German 
Women’s Association), she discusses the relationship between German and British feminism; 
note that some men in both countries did support women’s emancipation. Though Diethe does not 
say it, I want to emphasize the fact that we cannot just wave our hands at bigots from eras past 
and say they did not know any better precisely because there were men in these periods who did 
speak up on behalf of the oppressed. Therefore we cannot excuse a bigot’s thoughts as just being 
a product of the times because, as John Stuart Mill and others throughout history demonstrate, 
opposition to bigotry is also a product of the times. So, to be perfectly clear, I aim to never merely 
wave away problems in Nietzsche as merely being products of his time; indeed, if I find that 
Nietzsche really must be exhibiting bigoted thought, I hope to try to explain it as being a product 
of his time without excusing or forgiving it one whit. 
Diethe basically blames the failure of German feminism during the Wilhelmine and 
Weimar periods on the feminists themselves for accepting the maternal stereotype and trying to 
ennoble it – while I would point out that feminists have for a long time been trying to get us to 
see that motherhood is a valid social role with value for women beyond what value mothers have 
to men, and although we should not stereotype women as mothers, neither should we say that 
valuing mothering is damaging to feminism qua feminism. I do not know if Diethe is being a 
good or bad feminist here, but it does seem like she is blaming the victims a little.  
Diethe describes Helene Stöcker’s writings as apologetic in tone, saying that Helene 
“compensates by arguing that the gain from Nietzsche is greater than any loss, which – apart from 
the fact that it is brought in as a justification, is a wholly legitimate view” because of the freedom 
from Christianity Nietzsche brought (Diethe, p. 162). Helene also sympathized with noble rather 
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than socialist leanings. Diethe also seems to believe that Nietzsche does explicitly support racial 
breeding though she does not construe it as sinister (Diethe, p. 163). And lastly:  
When Stöcker spoke or wrote about Nietzsche and women, she nearly always began with 
a preamble on the actual women in his life who were important to him; there would 
always be the concession that some of his remarks have unfortunate connotations, before 
she took the argument further, to discuss how Nietzsche’s ideas could liberate women 
and ultimately have a positive effect on the future. At this point she usually listed the 
chief points of Nietzsche’s philosophy which were life-affirming and led to self-
transcendence and a revaluation of morality. A full century later, this is still, I believe, a 
valid approach to the topic of Nietzsche and women, especially as the philosophical 
approaches to Nietzsche’s metaphorical use of the trope ‘woman’, which currently 
constitute a veritable growth industry, have tended to eschew any discussion of real 
women. I feel that these discussions, however valuable in themselves, have tended to 
become increasingly obscure and remote from the issues which concern women in 
everyday life.  
Diethe, p. 163 
I am strongly inclined to agree with Diethe on this point. It is absolutely imperative for 
contemporary feminist discussions to focus on those concrete issues women must face in their 
lived daily experiences. In particular, I want to combat problematic readings of Nietzsche which 
perpetuate the kind of sexism which causes harassment and assault even within the hallowed 
walls of academia. Philosophers who read Nietzsche as a misogynist may well be more inclined 
to accept subconsciously pronouncements read superficially as orders to remove women from 
universities, to offer just one possible example. While I do feel it is important to explore the use 
of woman as metaphor, and how that usage affects research and the various aspects of 
Nietzsche’s thought, I also see how the metaphor has seen heavy employment and could do well 
to be retired for at least a while.37  
 Diethe states that she cannot deny the different physiology of women, but she hopes “the 
idea that women inherently think and react differently can and, for this writer at least, should be 
                                                          
37 See also Diethe’s review article of Paul Patten’s Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory (1994) in the 
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 8, Autumn 1994, 123-127 for Diethe’s critique on the use of deconstruction in 
feminist interpretations of Nietzsche’s views on women, and her belief that Derrida removed not only 
goalposts but also removed the goal. 
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challenged” (Diethe, p. 164).38 Diethe intended this book to provide context for debates on the 
contemporary philosophical readings of Nietzsche’s views of ‘woman,’ showing Nietzsche’s 
relationships with women and the discrepancies between his words and deeds, as well as showing 
how women of his generation “were prepared to overlook his misogynic remarks…or look 
beyond them” because of his liberalizing effect generally on their lives (Diethe, p. 165), and I do 
feel that Diethe did at least in part accomplish the goal of providing some historical context and 
some aspects of his relationships with and influences on women during his generation. However, 
the following conclusion I find very problematic:  
I think it should be accepted that his notion of maintaining women in domestic 
subordination was impractical, and led him to make statements about women’s role in 
society and women’s nature which were inconsistent with the views on individual liberty 
(and the responsibility of that individual’s self-overcoming) which are so frequently 
expressed elsewhere in his writings. This ambiguity at the heart of the topic makes the 
discussion of Nietzsche’s influence on the women of his generation peculiarly 
complicated. Nevertheless, as we have seen, a host of women who were leading figures 
in the artistic, pedagogic or political domain in Wilhelmine society believed – ironically, 
perhaps – that his invitation to affirm life included them. 
Diethe, p. 165  
Ultimately, the problem with Diethe’s arguments that Nietzsche is a misogynist is that she does 
not actually present arguments that Nietzsche is a misogynist. Rather, she assumes that he is a 
misogynist, and cherry-picks his biography and his writings to elaborate on this assumption just 
as she accuses Nietzsche’s feminist supporters of doing. At no point does she provide a 
demonstration for why her interpretative strategy is superior to those she derides, nor does 
explain how we can judge the quality of various exegetical processes despite plainly assuming 
that hers is the best. Further, most of her strongest claims against Nietzsche are based on little-
known fragmentary and unpublished works which lack context in the canon.  
                                                          
38 See also Diethe’s article “Nietzsche’s New Woman after a Century” read at Third International 
Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, Graz, 22-26 August 1994, in 
Journal of European Ideas. 
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 Therefore, what I want to do in this dissertation is to carefully comb primarily through 
Nietzsche’s published writings and explore the related themes of feminism and femininity, 
perspective and value, and the Eternal Feminine as a metaphor for Truth. I will use Chapters 2 
and 3 to provide the foundation for my own argument that my methods are if not the best, then at 
least better than Diethe’s and Danto’s, and hopefully closer to an interpretation congruent with 
Nietzsche’s own beliefs. I say ‘congruent’ rather than the loaded ‘consistent,’ ‘accurate,’ etc., 
because I seek a position which is relevant, harmonious, and fits well with whatever is valuable in 
Nietzsche, but I do want to avoid what pitfalls and disharmonies do exist within Nietzsche while 
not merely excusing or glossing over those problems but rather confronting them with an honest 
and critical though charitable39 eye.  
§6 Other Accusations of Misogyny and Anti-Feminism 
Several other feminist philosophers have also levied the charge of misogyny against 
Nietzsche, and many of these claims can be found in the collection of essays included in the book 
Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche. However, not all feminists read Nietzsche 
exactly the same way, and there are at least two possible approaches which characterize feminist 
interpretations of Nietzsche: “First, many debates have focused on how to interpret Nietzsche’s 
remarks about women and femininity […] Second, is his philosophy useful to feminist theory? 
Can we separate his philosophy from his seemingly derogatory remarks about women?” (Oliver 
and Pearsall, p. 2). Thus, there are feminists who are primarily concerned with how we should 
interpret Nietzsche’s comments on women, whether literally as Diethe and Nietzsche’s apologists 
read Nietzsche or ironically as many of Nietzsche’s defenders read him, and there are feminists 
who wish to make use of Nietzschean philosophy and thus are concerned with whether or not 
                                                          
39 I suppose ‘charity’ is not a particularly Nietzschean value when one views it from the Christian definition 
of giving to those impoverished. However, if we define ‘charity’ in this philosophical context, we might 
mean something like ‘the attempt to describe a philosopher’s position fairly and without rancor,’ which I 
feel could be construed as Nietzschean in the sense that fair play could be a value we retain after the 
revaluation of all values.  
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Nietzsche’s apparent misogyny is separable from the useful parts of his philosophy. Within this 
second group:  
There are two main approaches to the emphasis on sexual dualism in Nietzsche’s 
writings. The first camp sees his sexual dualism as incompatible with feminist 
principles. Those holding this view point to Nietzsche’s apparent privileging of 
masculinity and denigrating of femininity and his paradigms of domination such 
as the master/slave morality. They find that the Overman is masculine; woman 
can only be mate or mother. They cite his attack on the feminist demand for 
sexual equality. The second approach, while recognizing the insistence on sexual 
dualism in Nietzsche’s texts, find his distinction of masculinity and femininity 
compatible with feminism. They view his sexual dualism within the context of 
Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism and anti-dualism. They cite his ironic treatment of 
an ‘eternal feminine’ or essential woman. They see his perspectivism as 
questioning the fixity of sexual difference in favor of a social constructionism. In 
his critique of the will to truth or the ascetic ideal, some find affinities with 
feminist emphasis on the bodily and ‘playfulness.’ Others hold that Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism supports the transvaluation of value for women and the feminine.”  
(Oliver and Pearsall, p. 11-12) 
 
I will focus on those few authors from this collection who explicitly refer to Nietzsche or his 
writings as misogynistic, two of whom are concerned primarily with the interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s remarks about women and two of whom are concerned primarily with the separation 
between Nietzsche’s misogyny and the rest of his philosophy. Briefly, these are the four authors 
and their respective positions: Kelly Oliver argues that Nietzsche’s use of woman as a trope 
demonstrates a reappropriation of the feminine for and by masculine and masculinist philosophers 
while at the same time rejecting any objective femininity or objective truth, and most importantly 
identifying feminism as congruent with the kind of truth Nietzsche rejects; Tamsin Lorraine 
determines that there is no female Zarathustra extant or possible in Nietzsche and that feminists 
must create such a figure; Linda Singer argues at length that Nietzsche betrays his own feminist-
friendly principles by devaluing femininity uncritically; and Ofelia Schutte argues that 
Nietzsche’s dualism is incompatible with feminism and his writings reveal patriarchal thinking 
with regards to women. 
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Oliver offers a Derridean reading of Nietzsche which is reliant on Spurs and its treatment 
of woman as a metaphor for truth,40 and on Nietzsche’s own equation of woman and truth.41 
According to this reading, Nietzsche has three kinds of truth and women, identifiable with 
ascending or descending life: the feminist or castrated truth/woman, the artist or castrating 
truth/woman, and the affirming truth/woman (Oliver, p. 68). However, each of the three is a 
deception “employed by the ‘avidious will’ in order to ‘detain its creatures in life and compel 
them to live on’” (Oliver, p. 67).42 Regarding the feminist or castrated woman, Oliver’s Nietzsche 
identifies all feminism as an attempt to transform women into men43 and the corresponding kind 
of truth is as tyrannical as the progression from the Platonic realm of the Forms towards the 
Kantian thing-in-itself (Oliver, p. 68-9).44   
This truth is hostile to life45 and to the will to power,46 and mistakes the means for the 
end of life (Oliver, p. 69-70).47 Within the interpretive heuristic of contemporary feminism, 
Oliver argues, Nietzsche takes the inferior socioeconomic position of women to entail women’s 
inferiority as human beings (Oliver, p. 71). Nietzsche himself falls back onto this kind of 
                                                          
40 Note that woman is a metaphor for truth just as much as the optical metaphor is; in my account of 
perspectivism, I hope to identify and incorporate any other metaphors Nietzsche utilizes.  
41 See BGE Preface: “Supposing truth is a woman – what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that 
all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women?” 
42 Citing BT §18; in the Kaufmann translation in Basic Writings this passage is on p. 109: “It is an eternal 
phenomenon: the insatiable will always finds a way to detain its creatures in life and compel them to live 
on, by means of an illusion spread over things.” 
43 Citing BGE §239, see p. 359 in Basic Writings: “To be sure, there are enough imbecilic friends and 
corrupters of woman among the scholarly asses of the male sex who advise woman to defeminize herself in 
this way and to imitate all the stupidities with which ‘man’ in Europe, European ‘manliness,’ is sick…” 
44 Citing TI IV “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable: The History of an Error” (see p. 485 of 
Portable Nietzsche): “2. The true world – unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the 
virtuous man (‘for the sinner who repents’). (Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, 
incomprehensible – it becomes female, it becomes Christian.)” 
45 Citing WP §608, p. 328: “‘Wisdom’ as the attempt to get beyond perspective valuations (i.e., beyond the 
‘will to power’): a principle hostile to life and decadent…” 
46 Citing TI V “Morality as Anti-Nature” §2, see p. 487 in Portable Nietzsche: “The same means in the 
fight against a craving – castration, extirpation – is instinctively chosen by those who are too weak-willed, 
too degenerate, to be able to impose moderation on themselves; by those who are so constituted that they 
require La Trappe, to use a figure of speech, or (without any figure of speech) some kind of definitive 
declaration of hostility, a cleft between themselves and the passion.”  
47 Citing the entire fragment from WP §354, p. 194-5. 
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‘castrated’ truth whenever he talks about ‘my truths,’48 and thus he “falls prey to the will to truth” 
(Oliver, p. 72). Regarding the artist or castrating woman, Oliver’s Nietzsche uses the will to 
illusion to unbalance and undermine the will to truth, but the artist and the will to illusion cannot 
and “do not destroy truth altogether” (Oliver, p. 75). Finally, regarding the affirming woman, 
Oliver’s Nietzsche identifies a woman outside of the discourse of truth, who has no need for truth, 
as she is a “self-perpetuating Dionysian force who has no need for a foundation” (Oliver, p. 76).49 
Each of the latter two women/truths are less misogynistic, so in my response to Oliver in the fifth 
chapter I will focus on the first, the castrated woman/truth, which Oliver analogizes with 
feminists.  
Lorraine chooses to neither ignore nor fixate on Nietzsche’s misogyny but rather to both 
confront and go beyond it. A serious feminist ideal of non-oppressive society may require some 
of Zarathustra’s teachings, she argues, and she identifies four possible positions for female 
subjectivity in Zarathustra: the woman desired by men, the disciple, the representative of life, and 
Zarathustra’s own role as role-model and ideal (Lorraine, p. 120). With the woman desired by 
men there are two possibilities: either Zarathustra wants from women what he wants from men, or 
Zarathustra wants something different from women than what he wants from men. Lorraine goes 
with the latter because women are incapable of friendship50 and have a different kind of 
happiness from men51 (Lorraine, p. 120-1). Like many of Nietzsche’s commentators, Lorraine 
assumes that the whip to which the old woman refers is Zarathustra’s or a man’s whip52 and 
Lorraine reads Zarathustra as saying that woman should be faithful to men and not the earth or 
herself by evoking children and the creative will from men rather than attending to her own body 
and its needs (Lorraine, p. 121).  
                                                          
48 See BGE §231, p. 352. 
49 Citing BT §16, p. 104, as well as TI I “Maxims and Arrows,” §16, p. 468, AOM §286, p. 279, and TSZ 
II:12 “On Self-Overcoming,” p. 115. 
50 Citing TSZ I:14 “On the Friend,” see p. 57.  
51 Citing TSZ I:18 “On Little Old and Young Women,” see p. 67. 
52 Again from TSZ I:18, p. 67 “‘“You are going to women? Do not forget the whip!”’” 
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Further, Lorraine reads Zarathustra as having very little to say to women as disciples, 
calling out to his brothers but never to his sisters, but Lorraine sees Nietzsche’s female readers as 
refusing to just be recreation for warriors53 and instead choosing to be warriors themselves 
(Lorraine, p. 122). According to Lorraine, it is the feminine in the form of Life and Wild Wisdom 
that Zarathustra seems to take the most seriously and perhaps the least sexist although he cannot 
maintain a relationship with her because he cannot keep up with Life (Lorraine, p. 124-5). 
Finally, noting that “nothing is impossible with woman” (Lorraine, p. 126),54 Lorraine derives 
what she thinks Zarathustra’s advice for women reading the text would have to be: affirm 
Zarathustra “in light of one’s own vision for the future” (Lorraine, p. 126).55 From Zarathustra, 
Lorraine finds that “If I can read Nietzsche as a feminist, it is because Nietzsche himself gives me 
some suggestions as to how to transform the often ugly and nauseating ‘truths’ that are my 
cultural resource into something I can affirm in the present” (Lorraine, p. 126). Lorraine 
concludes by offering a picture of her feminist and female Zarathustra, an artist who dances, 
cooks, and builds a community of like-minded artists. 
Singer begins by rejecting Kaufmann’s apologetic stance regarding Nietzsche’s position 
on women, saying that it indicates an attitude which is phallocentric and unacceptable in 
Nietzsche studies because it is “inappropriate to the spirit of philosophizing that Nietzsche 
himself mapped out” and further if we are going to take Nietzsche’s powerful and fecund thought 
seriously, we must clearly disclose the irresponsibility of his discussion of women (Singer, p. 
174). Thus Singer’s Nietzsche describes women as animalistic and paradigms of undesirable 
                                                          
53 See TSZ I:18, p. 66: “Let woman be a plaything, pure and fine, like a gem, irradiated by the virtues of a 
world that has not yet arrived.” 
54 See TSZ I:18, p. 67: “It is strange: Zarathustra knows women little, and yet he is right about them. Is this 
because nothing is impossible with women?” I strongly suspect that here Nietzsche may have been punning 
on the Bible: “With God nothing shall be impossible” (KJV Luke 1:37).  
55 See TSZ III:12 “On Old and New Tablets” §3, p. 198: “…I taught them to work on the future and to 
redeem with their creation all that has been. To redeem what is past in man and to re-create all ‘it was’ until 
the will says, ‘Thus I willed it! Thus I shall will it’ – this I called redemption and this alone I taught them to 
call redemption.”  
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qualities like shallowness and superficiality.56 As an example of Nietzsche’s very bad opinions of 
women, Singer references Nietzsche’s claim that pregnancy is the solution to all of woman’s 
problems,57 a claim she calls both cavalier and an oversimplification of female human existence 
that is particularly problematic given Nietzsche’s more fine-grained treatment of human existence 
elsewhere (Singer, p. 173).  
Singer’s Nietzsche also denies self-creation to women in that for women amor fati means 
love of oppression because while the Eternal Feminine is a destiny determined by nature, there is 
no Eternal Masculine and male nature is therefore determined by will alone (Singer, p. 175).58 
Singer’s Nietzsche thus espouses a biological determinism with regards to women in that he sees 
women as naturally and biologically indispensable only as mothers, functioning as servants to 
men because they are naturally subservient and passive (Singer, p. 176).59 Singer’s reading of 
Nietzsche claims that there is a natural division of power between women and men and that this is 
an unquestionable feature of the human condition and further testimony to female inferiority 
(Singer, p. 176). Nietzsche therefore misconstrues as natural what is socially conditioned, and 
dooms the sexes to an eternal and unwinnable war (Singer, p. 177). Further, Singer’s Nietzsche 
judges women harshly for their values60 and says women are responsible for their own condition 
and should be ashamed of it (Singer, p. 178).61 Nietzsche even discredits female claims to truth 
                                                          
56 Citing as examples BGE §84, 86, 115, 131, 232-39; GS §64-66, 67, 69, 72, 74, 203, 312, 361; GM III:1 
and 14; TSZ I:13 “On Chastity,” 14 “On the Friend,” III:11 “On the Spirit of Gravity,” 15 “The Other 
Dancing Song,” and IV:13 “On the Higher Man.” 
57 See TSZ I:18, p. 66: “Everything about woman is a riddle, and everything about woman has one solution: 
that is pregnancy.”  
58 Citing EH III “Why I Write Such Good Books,” and BGE §232-39. Note: the claim that there is 
absolutely no Eternal Masculine in Nietzsche’s writing is an outright falsehood; see BGE §236, p. 355: “I 
do not doubt that every nobler woman will resist this faith, for she believes the same thing about the Eternal 
Masculine.”  
59 Citing GS §119 and 363; BGE §85, 131, 145, and 238. 
60 Citing BGE §139 and EH III:5. 
61 Citing BGE §85, 232, 239; GS §65. 
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because they have a natural aversion to truth,62 which explains Nietzsche’s advice to philosophers 
and Europeans to avoid women and become virile (Singer, p. 179).63 Further, Singer’s Nietzsche 
designates the female human condition as a Catch-22 which is doomed to failure (Singer, p. 180-
1); 64 and on the same note, Singer’s Nietzsche wants women to remain ignorant and 
disempowered (Singer, p. 181).65  
Finally, Singer reads Nietzsche as “committed to a normative theory of sexual difference 
in which masculinity is the privileged or dominant form of humanness” (Singer, p. 183) and to a 
picture of philosophy as masculine wherein the masculine metaphors do “more harm than good, 
because of both their erroneous assumptions about sexual essentialism and the positive practices 
they suggest to philosophers” (Singer, p. 184). However, what is valuable in Nietzsche is that “his 
emphasis on the power of individuals to create themselves through a process of commitment and 
will offers one road past an essentialist conception of masculinity and femininity,” and further 
“its reproduction as an arbitrary system of privilege in both the social and philosophical spheres” 
but ultimately Singer concludes that “Nietzsche’s sexual politics betray his best insights, as well 
as what is best in the Western tradition of which he and we are a part” (Singer, p. 185). Thus 
Singer’s Nietzsche ultimately fails the feminist enterprise. 
Schutte begins by addressing “in particular, how Nietzsche defended the exploitation of 
the masses for the advantage of the ‘higher’ individual as well as the exploitation of so-called 
‘feminine’ values for the sake of a ‘masculine’ cultural ideal” (Schutte, p. 283-4). While we may 
interpret Nietzsche as playful or ironic sometimes, Schutte believes that we must still recognize 
that “it is also the case that Nietzsche’s statements fit logically into a well-defined political 
ideology regarding what special groups and power structures ought to control the future of 
                                                          
62 See BGE §232, p. 353: “But she does not want truth: what is truth to woman? From the beginning, 
nothing has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman than truth – her great art is the lie, her 
highest concern is mere appearance and beauty.”  
63 Citing GM III:8 and GS §363. 
64 Citing BGE §127, 144, 232, 233, 238, and 239. 
65 Citing EH III:5. 
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Europe,” namely the group of men and patriarchal power structures (Schutte, p. 284).66 Schutte 
further argues “that Nietzsche’s defense of exploitation cannot be entirely separated from his 
other theories” and that “as a part of his intended transvaluation of all values he expects to see a 
rebirth in society’s appreciation for a tyrannical type of government” (Schutte, p. 285).67 Even 
further, Schutte claims that just because Nietzsche sought a rebirth of human spirit does not mean 
he was always correct in specifying how to attain such a goal (Schutte, p. 285). Democracy, 
socialism, organized labor, and the emancipation of women all represent modern decadence for 
Nietzsche, and while he was antagonistic to nationalism, this was only because he rejected the 
kind of nationalism which espoused democratic and especially Christian ideals; ultimately, 
Nietzsche’s elitism lead him to a kind of supra-nationalism devoted to the production of ‘higher 
men’ (Schutte, p. 288-9).68  
While Schutte agrees with Kaufmann that Nietzsche was not anti-Semitic, Schutte does 
think that a kind of racism certainly is Nietzschean and that Nietzsche’s critique of traditional 
morality still favors an order of rank and the rejection of ethnic pluralism (Schutte, p. 288-9).69 
While Nietzsche rejected the good-versus-evil kind of dualism, Schutte finds that Nietzsche is 
subject to his own criticism with regards to his higher-versus-lower dualism, and additionally his 
“counterproposals to democracy do not take him any farther along the road to a non-alienated, 
non-fragmented conception of human reality than the dualistic and reductionist structures of value 
that he himself attacked” (Schutte, p. 292-3). However, if Nietzsche is not seeking a non-
alienated, non-fragmented conception of human reality, then Schutte’s critique seems irrelevant. 
Specifically with regards to women, Schutte’s reading of Nietzsche employs a criticism 
of this higher-versus-lower dualism with regards to the power relations between higher men and 
lower women. First, she notes that Nietzsche praises intolerance in the aristocracy as a virtue, 
                                                          
66 Citing BGE §252-3. 
67 Citing BGE §44 and 242. 
68 Citing TI IX “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” §39, WP §957, and BGE §242 and 251.  
69 Citing TSZ I:11 “On the New Idol.” 
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namely justice, with regards to marital arrangements,70 and that his ideal family structure in 
Twilight reproduces the inequalities evident in the aristocratic governmental structures, wherein a 
departure from the will to tradition is a sign of decadence (Schutte, p. 294-5).71 Because Schutte’s 
Nietzsche believes that the rationality of marriage lies in its structural domination, Nietzsche 
further claims that modern marriage has lost its rationality (Schutte, p. 295-6).72 For Schutte’s 
Nietzsche, the nature of love is reduced to the impersonal sex and property drives, the husband is 
the center of power in rational, masculine marriage, and short-term marriages are a viable 
alternative to prostitution; all of this leads to a more authoritarian family structure than 
Nietzsche’s own insufferable one (Schutte, p. 296-7).73 Schutte’s Nietzsche suppresses not 
sexuality but rather love in his family structure thanks to his “rigid adherence to fixed categories” 
in his order of rank regarding the sexes (Schutte, p. 298-9). Finally, Schutte’s reading of 
Nietzsche has him likening men who lack the ability for friendship on Zarathustra’s model to 
women and animals, thus presenting an inherently dualistic picture of higher men versus lower 
humans, namely inferior men and all women (Schutte, p. 299).74 
Schutte’s conclusions are that while it is a mistake to take Nietzsche as either a capitalist 
or imperialist generally, he is certainly elitist and an imperialist of rank; this is revealed by the 
fact that when we apply Nietzsche’s ideal of a society lead by the highest philosophical types, 
“we are led to unmask the elevated rhetoric as an empty effort to make a political and ethical 
myth out of a few banal and destructive attitudes, such as considering oneself a member of a 
highly select group or devaluing others so that, by contrast, one appears to be heroic” (Schutte, p. 
300). Weeding out Nietzsche’s “thoughtless” or “inessential” claims as apologists like Kaufmann 
and Danto are wont to do counts as “either self-deceit or censorship, and that, in any case, this 
                                                          
70 Citing BGE §262. 
71 Citing TI IX:39. 
72 Citing TI IX:39 again, but see also BGE §238.  
73 Again citing TI IX:39 and BGE §238; see also WP §733. 
74 Citing TSZ I:14 “On the Friend.”  
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practice keeps us from understanding the whole of Nietzsche’s vision” (Schutte, p. 301). 
Likewise, Schutte finds that Nietzsche’s “politics of unspecified prejudice” applies to women and 
slaves and thus reveals a Nietzsche who is anti-liberal and anti-critical to the point of malice 
(Schutte, p. 301-2).75 Furthermore, this malice is logically tied to his other positions in that 
“thanks to his uninhibited articulation of the extreme he has exposed the logic of patriarchal 
domination in its essence” while at the same time “insisting upon an honest self-examination of 
the origins of our claims to knowledge and of our conception of being” and challenging “the 
dualism of good and evil which he found to be so damaging to human fulfillment and the creative 
life” (Schutte, p. 303-4).  
 
§7 Conclusion 
Lastly, I would like to note that Nietzsche himself wrote that neither he nor his 
philosophy was feminist, at least not by the Wilhelmine definition with which he would have 
been familiar, or perhaps by a new definition I will suggest in Chapter 3, and he makes this quite 
explicit: “All ‘feminism,’ too – also in men – closes the door: it will never permit entrance into 
this labyrinth of audacious insights” (EH III:3, p. 720). Nietzsche goes on to indicate that 
feminism by this definition would require one to spare oneself, be soft, not cheerful, and in poor 
spirits in the presence of hard truths, but in good spirits otherwise. Further, under the rubric of 
feminism Nietzsche includes the desire for “higher education, slacks, and political voting-cattle 
rights,” which are “the instinctive hatred of the abortive woman, who is incapable of giving birth, 
against the woman who is turned out well” (EH III:5, p. 723). Likewise Nietzsche appears to 
generally oppose scholarship amongst women, for he describes a “vain” and “goose” female who 
is educated but ultimately absorbed with herself and hence uninterested in truth (TI VIII:27, p. 
531). Thus concludes my initial brief description of the first received view, wherein even 
                                                          
75 Citing BGE §236 and TI IX:40. 
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Nietzsche gives us explicit claims about his anti-“feminism” which must be answered should we 
attempt to read him as a non-misogynist. However, because it is perfectly possible to critique 
feminism from within, it is one of my goals to explore whether and how Nietzsche represents 
common attitudes towards even Wilhelmine feminism, whether and how this situates him 
amongst later feminist critiques of feminism, and lastly whether and how Nietzsche is guilty or 
innocent of these specific charges of misogyny. 
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Chapter 2: Introduction to the Problem of Nietzsche’s Supposed 
Relativism 
  §1  The Second Received View: Nietzsche as Relativist 
§2 Danto’s Nietzsche 
§3 Danto's Interpretive Strategies 
§4 Danto's Treatment of Art 
§5 Danto's Perspectivism 
§6 Danto's Psychologies, Religion, and Moralities 
§7  Danto on the Übermensch, Eternal Recurrence, and the Will-to-Power 
§8 Conclusion 
  
§1 The Second Received View: Nietzsche as Relativist 
 
The second received view relevant to my research is the claim that Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is relativism, particularly when treating Nietzsche’s epistemological perspectivism 
or his alethiological perspectivism. Nietzsche’s commentators differ widely in interpreting 
perspectivism as either relativistic or not. Leiter identifies the ‘Received View’ of perspectivism76 
as the position that perspectivism does entail relativism, based on four claims: i) the world is 
indeterminate, ii) our concepts do not correspond to the world because of its indeterminacy, iii) 
our concepts are mere perspective, and iv) no perspective is privileged above any other, the final 
claim being the one which effectively reduces perspectivism to relativism (Leiter, p. 334).  
Likewise, Clark identifies a ‘falsification thesis’ commonly attributed to perspectivism, 
namely the claim ‘All beliefs are false’ (Clark, p. 135).77 Clark claims that Nietzsche’s 
antifoundationalism78 concerns justification and certainty, but not truth or falsity, and therefore it 
                                                          
76 From Danto, Nehamas, and others.  
77 A claim Kelly Oliver seems to accept; should perspectivism prove to be non-relativist, as I hope to show, 
Oliver’s critique of Nietzsche (and that of related work) appears to be built on misunderstanding the text. 
78 The rejection of metaphysical correspondence involves the antifoundationalist claim that “there is no 
foundation outside of our beliefs that could justify them” (Clark, p. 35). See also Clark, p. 130: “To 
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need not entail accepting the falsification thesis (Clark, p. 131). This received view in particular is 
exemplified by the argument Arthur C. Danto makes in his 1980 book, Nietzsche as Philosopher: 
An Original Study. To provide a comprehensive understanding of this argument, and in order to 
scrupulously avoid straw-manning this position, I will now embark on a detailed discussion of 
Danto’s position. 
 
§2 Danto’s Nietzsche 
Note first of all how much Danto buys into the “central teaching” of analytical 
philosophy “that the problems of philosophy are au fond problems of language, however heavily 
disguised” (Danto, p. 8) and second of all that he ascribes the same position to Nietzsche 
unequivocally: “Nietzsche’s own view, that the structures of language determine what are the 
structures of reality for those whose language it is, and that the deep order of the world, so sought 
by philosophers of the past, is but the cast shadow of the deep order of their grammar” which 
leads in turn to “the startling thesis that a change in human reality cannot be expected until there 
is a change in language – that we shall not get rid of God, as he says in Beyond Good and Evil, 
until we get rid of grammar” (Danto, p. 8-9, note the lack of specific citation to aphorism or page 
number). Indeed, Danto does not even believe that Nietzsche understood exactly onto what novel 
philosophy of language he had stumbled, and that “It took an independent development of 
contemporary philosophy to render it logically visible” (Danto, p. 9).  
Danto provides some commentary about how offensive the title is, because some 
academics did not see Nietzsche as a real philosopher in 1965 when Danto published the first 
                                                                                                                                                                             
consider knowledge nonperspectival would be to insist that it must be grounded in a set of foundational 
beliefs, beliefs all rational beings must accept no matter what else they believe, beliefs that could therefore 
constitute a neutral corner from which the justifiability of other beliefs might be assessed. In calling 
nonperspectival knowledge ‘an absurdity and a nonsense,’ Nietzsche suggests the impossibility of such 
self-justifying foundations for knowledge.” 
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edition, and some might even have felt that by comparison, other philosophers were not the real 
philosopher Nietzsche was:  
So I wanted to show that whatever else he was or was not, he was certainly a philosopher 
in just the way that everyone who is one is one: that he thought systematically and deeply 
about each of the closed set of questions which define what philosophy is, and that he 
gave serious, original, and coherent answers to them all”  
Danto, p. 9  
Note how interesting it is that Danto claims here that Nietzsche’s answers were coherent and 
original, while throughout the book he accuses Nietzsche as lacking both coherence and 
originality in major areas, particularly when it comes to his own moral values. Danto remarks that 
“There were lots of Nietzsches,” and he is trying to rescue Nietzsche for philosophy from the 
various other disciplines such as “poets, politicians, potheads, and photographers from Princeton” 
(Danto, p. 10). Likewise, I will be dealing with a lot of Nietzsches. Danto’s Nietzsche is very 
different from Diethe’s Nietzsche, and both are virtually unrecognizable in the face of Clark’s 
and Higgins’s Nietzsches.  
Danto discusses the technicality of philosophical language and how it is difficult to 
translate between ordinary language and technical language; how this is similar to Nietzsche. 
Danto’s guiding interpretive strategy can be discerned in the first sentence of the second 
paragraph:  
Nietzsche’s philosophy is often expressed in sentences which sound such dissonances 
when taken in conjunction with ordinary language, and some of his most celebrated 
utterances acquire their pungency through the stresses and strains of using the same word 
simultaneously in a wide and a narrow context. 
Danto, p. 11  
Danto returns to this theme repeatedly throughout the book, referring to the wide and narrow 
contexts of terminology like ‘art,’ ‘religion,’ ‘philosophy/philosopher,’ ‘truth,’ and ‘science.’ 
However, Danto does not believe this was an intentional or conscious strategy on Nietzsche’s 
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part, at least not every time he does it, and furthermore, Danto accuses Nietzsche of being as 
frequently “misled by what he wrote as his puzzled readers must have been” some of the time 
(Danto, p. 12). Changing contexts rapidly could sometimes have an infelicitous effect; other times 
it could seem silly or downright absurd.  
With regard to Nietzsche’s penchant for philosophizing with a hammer, Danto says that 
Nietzsche’s purpose:  
…was in part to crack the habitual grip on thought in which language holds us, to make 
us aware of how much our minds are dominated by concepts from which we can hardly 
escape, given the rules our language follows. Then, realizing the conventional nature of 
our language, we might try to create fresh concepts and so whole new philosophies. The 
violent chemistry of subtle linguistic incongruities yielded a prose that was sparkling and 
explosive at its best, and a means to the liberation of the human mind. Men had to be 
made to understand that everything was possible if they were to be moved to try anything 
at all, Nietzsche felt, and his philosophy, therefore, is one of total conceptual 
permissiveness 
Danto, p. 12  
This is probably the first statement in which Danto reveals his relativistic interpretation of 
Nietzsche, for this conceptual permissiveness extends in Danto’s Nietzsche to the various 
axiological judgment schemas, beginning with aesthetics, moving through epistemology, and 
concluding with morality and religion, all closely intertwined.  
Despite the fact that Danto sees Nietzsche as attempting to construct a fairly systematic 
philosophical structure, he nonetheless also characterizes Nietzsche’s writings as “piecemeal 
elaborations” in “loosely structured volumes” which require taking “the trouble to eke his 
philosophy out” because “Nietzsche seems distrustful and almost officially defiant of philosophic 
rigor” and thus has a “not altogether undeserved reputation as an intellectual hooligan” (Danto, p. 
12-13).79 The important thing to carry away from this portion of the preface is the fact that Danto 
                                                          
79 Note this first instance of victim-blaming behavior from Danto; I would rather state that Nietzsche does 
not deserve such a reputation because he is more honest and true to his own methods and principles than 
most other philosophers. However, I suspect that the scholars who favor most other philosophers would 
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himself cannot decide whether to believe Nietzsche when he says he mistrusts all “systemizers” 
(TI I:26) and what to make of that belief. On using the Nachlass, Danto strongly feels that much 
of it would have been eventually published if Nietzsche had not descended into madness and 
died, which is the only justification he offers for his dependence on those unpublished writings.  
Danto characterizes Nietzsche’s philosophy as nihilistic, relativistic, and pragmatic, and 
does not appear to see these as conflicting labels for the same program. While I see how someone 
may arrive at pragmatism after accepting a nihilistic or relativistic worldview, my primary 
objection is that it makes no sense whatsoever to say a given philosopher is both a nihilist and a 
relativist. Essentially, the problem is this: a nihilist denies meaning or value or whatever data 
supposedly exists, while a relativist does say such data exist in one form or another, just relative 
to the group or individual. To say it slightly differently: a nihilist might say that there is no 
meaning in the universe, but a relativist would say meaning definitely exists, despite its relativity. 
Both are dogmatic positions, though the relativist is a positive dogmatist, and the nihilist is a 
negative dogmatist.  
Perhaps Danto’s confusion on this issue has something to do with the fact that nihilists 
deny both objective and subjective existence of the object in question, whereas relativists only 
deny the objective existence but do affirm the subjective existence of the object, whether meaning 
or value or what have you. If what objectively exists is the only kind of existence that matters to a 
contemporary analytic philosopher, then I can easily see how he came to confuse the two 
positions. Regardless, I want to suggest that Nietzsche is far more of a pluralist than either nihilist 
or relativist. In my research I have found that Nietzsche is far more likely to be accused of 
relativism than nihilism, and I find the former accusation to be far more damaging an 
interpretation of his philosophy precisely because it is the more difficult problem to address.80 
                                                                                                                                                                             
find such a statement highly contentious, and thus defending said statement would require more space than 
is feasible in this volume. 
80 For example, I personally find creating value to be a good antidote to the claim that no value exists. 
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The very fact that Nietzsche offers his own notions of valuation and philosophical principles 
seems prima facie to refute the claim that he is without question a nihilist, though it would be 
interesting to pursue this separate issue in greater detail after I have settled the issue of relativism 
to my satisfaction. 
 
§3 Danto’s Interpretive Strategies 
The major interpretive difference between Danto and I is that while I feel that Nietzsche 
did construct his texts in such a way that one aphorism leads to the next, and that the corpus of his 
work is at least somewhat structured by Nietzsche’s intellectual development, Danto feels 
strongly that the opposite is true. Specifically, Danto claims:  
Any given aphorism or essay might as easily have been placed in one volume as in 
another without much affecting the unity or structure of either. And the books 
themselves, except for their chronological ordering, do not exhibit any special structure 
as a corpus. Although there undoubtedly was a development in Nietzsche’s thought and 
in his style, his writings may be read in pretty much any order, without this greatly 
impeding the comprehension of his ideas”  
Danto, p. 19 
To this I retort that it is because of Danto’s attitude towards Nietzsche’s work that he has had his 
own comprehension of Nietzsche’s ideas so greatly impeded. Danto applies this same strategy to 
Nietzsche’s unpublished works, saying that “it would be difficult even for a close reader to tell 
the difference between those works he saw through the press and those pieced together by his 
editors” with the exceptions of The Birth of Tragedy and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which 
nevertheless lack ordered development and direction of argument according to Danto’s reading. 
Danto finds Nietzsche in large doses cloying and repetitive, and ultimately to “make no heavy 
demands on his readers’ intelligence or learning” for the most part (Danto, p. 21).  
 In the first instance of Danto’s use of wide and narrow senses Danto describes Nietzsche 
as a philosopher in the narrow sense of having specific identifiable doctrines (namely eternal 
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recurrence, amor fati, the Übermensch, the will-to-power, and the Apollinian and Dionysian 
artistic styles). Also in this first chapter we see the first case of Danto contradicting what he said 
previously: “these doctrines do not give the sense of fitting together in any systematic and 
coherent way, nor do they, either individually or as a group, fall readily under one or another of 
the convenient and unavoidable headings with which we identify philosophical ideas. They do not 
seem to be solutions to what we would acknowledge as philosophical problems” (Danto, p. 21, cf. 
p. 12-13). Thus, in fewer than ten pages Danto goes from claiming that Nietzsche is coherent to 
claiming that he does not appear to be a coherent thinker. It is Danto’s task, then, to present as 
coherent a picture as possible, a picture he does not believe exists within Nietzsche’s works.  
Danto claims that Nietzsche is a nihilist but does not cite any passage where Nietzsche 
makes implies such a claim (Danto, p. 22). Danto sees himself as drawing the systematically 
connected doctrines out of Nietzsche’s messy assembly of aphorisms, explaining how the 
surrounding passages do connect to these doctrines by way of explaining or illustrating them, and 
connecting these doctrines to conventional philosophical categories. So, despite the fact that 
Danto believes such a system of doctrines exists within Nietzsche’s work, at the same time he 
claims “There exists no place in which this system – as I shall prematurely regard it – appears in 
Nietzsche’s writings” and that the reason therefore is Nietzsche’s “singular lack of architectonic 
talent” which is exhibited not only in his writings but also in his musical compositions, though 
Danto does recognize his “flair for improvisation” (Danto, p. 22).  
Danto sees Nietzsche’s philosophy as “built up…scrap by scrap” but he claims that “A 
philosophical system does not ordinarily grow by accretion” (Danto, p. 23) which I suspect 
Nietzsche might dispute, and I in fact dispute myself. After all, it does seem that many 
philosophers ascribe system to their thought long after they have already worked through much of 
it both consciously and subconsciously. Likewise, I’ve heard some scientists note that their own 
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insights occur suddenly, with the explanations and justifications coming after the fact81 and I have 
little doubt that this is how many philosophers also work in actuality, no matter how our 
memories trick us into seeing our behavior as intentionally systematic. It is a feature of the human 
mind that we draw recognizable patterns out of random noise; pareidolia, such as seeing a face in 
the grains of wood on one’s desktop, is just one example among many of how we do this.  
Regardless, Danto sees Nietzsche as unconscious of creating a system, though this does 
not entail that he was creating a system unconsciously. Rather, Danto sees this unconscious 
system as stemming from two causes: the systematic nature of philosophy and the retroactive 
unification that historical understanding imposes. Thus, Danto realizes that “To say that the 
system I wish to discuss was truly Nietzsche’s raises some complicated questions concerning the 
integrity of the history of philosophy” not the least because he believes that Nietzsche would have 
disavowed any system (Danto, p. 25). But he feels his theoretical reconstruction “has a certain 
predictive power; that is, it allows us to know more or less what Nietzsche is going to be saying” 
(Danto, p. 26) which is far more than I think is possible or desirable. Thus Danto is not so much 
interpreting Nietzsche as he is attempting to draw out the logical consequences of Nietzsche’s 
unconscious system. 
If new information, such as undiscovered texts, presents itself then we might change our 
minds, “But the sheer mass of his posthumous writings – the Nachlass – together with his 
seeming total inability to impose any but the most external form upon his work, virtually 
guarantees that there would have been no integrating systematization even if he had retained his 
mind. The vastness of the Nachlass, together with the size of his published work, guarantees 
something else” (Danto, p. 26). At any rate, we must recognize Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche’s 
depredations on the Nietzsche corpus and that “The life and work of Nietzsche is the most heavily 
                                                          
81 Cf. for example the anecdote of Archimedes leaping from the bath to shout “Eureka!” naked in the streets 
after having the sudden insight that different materials displace differing quantities of water. 
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falsified phenomenon of modern literary and intellectual history” (Danto, p. 26-7).82 Danto is of 
the opinion that Elizabeth’s worst falsehoods concerned her relationship with her brother or 
saving his reputation among the people she valued, and both because of this and because of the 
fact that “she had barely a child’s comprehension of philosophical ideas, and would not have 
known one to distort it” as well as the fact that Danto sees Nietzsche’s work as “loosely federated 
aphorisms, fragments, and essays,” we need not worry about how much she has affected the 
textual purity of his philosophical thought: “His message appears over and over again, so much so 
that from any random sample of his writings the entirety of his philosophy can almost be 
reconstructed” (Danto, p. 27). I reiterate that I reject this interpretive strategy, and instead believe 
that it is possible that Elizabeth might have altered aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and that 
she was perhaps at least somewhat capable, no matter what sexist assumptions Danto has 
accepted. Until I obtain the ability to read Nietzsche’s crabbed, archaic German script, however, I 
shall have to trust the many scholars who have devoted themselves to attempting to remove 
Elizabeth’s influence from the text.  
Danto notes some partial resemblance between Nietzsche’s so-called nihilism and that of 
the Nihilism of Emptiness, which he attributes to Hinduism, Buddhism, and Schopenhauer’s 
Oriental pessimism, as well as the Nihilism of Negativity, which he attributes to Russian Nihilists 
in the St. Petersburg style. The main thesis of the Nihilism of Emptiness seems to be that the 
world of appearance is a meaningless illusion and the only salvation lies in escaping life; by 
contrast, the main thesis of the Nihilism of Negativity seems to be that we should reject the 
dogmas of our elders while also accepting a crudely materialistic scientific faith, thus replacing 
one faith with another rather than rejecting faith wholesale. Danto finds Nietzsche more negative 
than his contemporaries in this fashion, but construes his nihilism as a metaphysics rather than an 
ideology. This nihilism, however, sounds rather pragmatist more than a rejection-and-
                                                          
82 Danto quoting E.F. Podach, Friedrich Nietzsches Werke der Zusammenbruchs (Heidelberg: Wolfgang 
Rothe Verlag, 1961), p. 430.  
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replacement-of-previous-faiths form of nihilism: “Science he regards not as a repository of truths 
or a method for discovering them but as a set of convenient fictions, of useful conventions, which 
has as much and as little basis in reality as any alleged set of fictions which might be thought to 
conflict with it…an instance of what he termed Will-to-Power” (Danto, p. 30). Danto wants to 
have Nietzsche both as a negative nihilist and as an empty nihilist: both denying former 
definitions of things like ‘truth’ while also denying the existence of truth altogether; he 
accomplishes this by construing this as a difference between senses of ‘truth’ (Danto, p. 31).  
Danto sees the two non-Nietzschean forms of nihilism as derivative of the same attitude, 
namely that there ought to be purpose to the world, whereas he finds that Nietzsche believed that 
“It is a general tendency of the human mind, which, to Nietzsche, is ultimately as disastrous 
disposition, to imagine, and to seek to identify a purposive armature, a basis for significance, in 
the world itself, something objective to which men may submit and in which they may find a 
meaning for themselves” and yet I would say Nietzsche is a great purpose-seeker or purpose-
maker himself; after all, we find ourselves in the world and so can use ourselves in some way as 
the basis for significance (Danto, p. 31-2). The ‘final form’ of nihilism is one wherein the 
adherent acquires “a disbelief in any world alternative and metaphysically preferable to this one. 
At the same time, he regards this world as the only one, however unstructured and purposeless it 
may be, and however valueless” (Danto, p. 32). Note the confusingly unspecific ‘he’ in the 
second part of the quote: within the context of the paragraph, this ‘he’ could refer to humanity 
generally (though no doubt Danto would use the word ‘mankind’ were he writing this sentence), 
to a Buddhist or other Nihilist of Emptiness, or to Nietzsche himself. The offending pronoun 
allows Danto to segue into a context-less portion of the Nachlass which seems to support the idea 
that Nietzsche believes that the world is not a thing capable of being categorized within value 
schema, and more simply that “all our beliefs are false” (Danto, p. 33). While I agree with Danto 
that Nietzsche rejects the correspondence theory of truth, and I hope to support this working 
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primarily from Nietzsche’s published works, I do not believe that this means Nietzsche eliminates 
or rejects the concept of truth or ceases using it in a meaningful fashion. 
Thus Danto takes amor fati to be an embracing of meaninglessness and cosmic 
insignificance, eternal recurrence to be the view that the world did in fact actually, physically 
recur and will recur eternally, and that this all connects to the Übermensch in a systematic 
fashion. In conclusion, Danto sees Nietzsche’s position as the claim that “There is then no true, 
rational, orderly, permanent, or benign universe fore us. Our entire mode of thinking, [Nietzsche] 
believed, is based on the assumption that there is such a universe; it is far from simple, 
accordingly, to work out a form of thought adequate to the nullity of things as they are: a total 
revolution in logic, science, morality, and in philosophy itself would be demanded. Nietzsche 
sought to achieve at least the beginning of such a revolution” (Danto, p. 35). Danto thus opens the 
framework for exploring what he calls “the diagnostic part” of Nietzsche’s philosophy, namely 
that regarding the division between the Apollonian and the Dionysian in The Birth of Tragedy.  
Danto also introduces another method I reject: “I do not propose to follow any 
chronological order in my exposition of Nietzsche’s philosophy, nor do I intend to relate it in any 
special way to events in his life. My concern is with the reasons for rather than the causes of his 
doctrines” (Danto, p. 37). For one thing, I do not understand what distinction he is trying to make 
between reasons and causes, particularly since he emphasizes later how Nietzsche’s psychology 
and understanding of psychology were so important for his philosophical methods. For another, I 
have every intention of attempting to follow chronologically the development of connected ideas 
as well as relating these ideas to Nietzsche’s life in certain special ways. In particular, for 
example, I will connect Nietzsche’s thoughts on education, and the education of women 
especially, to his own behaviour and experiences in the educational system. Lastly, note that 
Danto restricts discussion of Nietzsche’s aesthetic philosophy to what he calls Nietzsche’s 
“earliest period of genuine productivity – when he was a young professor at Basle, brooding on 
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the art and philosophy of the ancients, and when his sympathies with Wagner were profound and 
uncontaminated and, to a measure, reciprocated by the composer himself” (Danto, p. 37). 
Interestingly, Danto both recognizes that Nietzsche’s thought develops over time and recognizes 
that despite this, “the dominant philosophical preoccupations of his mature thought were present 
and insistent, and though the immediate subject of his interest was art, the logic of his ideas 
already had a wider implication” (Danto, p. 37).  
 
§4 Danto’s Treatment of Art 
Danto discusses at length Nietzsche’s theory about the cognitive import of art and 
whether it provides special knowledge/truth/objectivity/intellectual benefits. Danto identifies the 
primary component of Nietzsche’s radical character as the fact that “he is indeed prepared to 
allow that art has no less a claim than sense or science to objective truth. But this is because 
neither sense nor science can make any stronger claim to truth than art” (Danto, p. 37). This I am 
willing to grant. However, I disagree with the direction Danto takes this thought: namely that this 
is because there is no such thing as truth. Regardless, Danto connects this all to an 
epistemological analysis he finds similar to that of Bertrand Russell, “according to which our 
perceptions are said not to resemble their causes, so that the language we employ, learned in 
connection with the having of perceptions, does not describe the world as it really is. Language 
rather describes – insofar as, in Nietzsche’s view, we may think of language as descriptive at all – 
the illusions we take for reality” (Danto, p. 38). Furthermore, Danto goes on to claim that during 
this early stage of Nietzsche’s thought, “given his ideas concerning the origin and function of our 
language, we could not say what the world might in fact be like, even if, per impossibile, we were 
in a position to experience whatever causes our perceptions” (Danto, p. 38).  
The primary distinction between truth and art, then, has to do with the fact that art 
provides fresh illusions, while the illusions of established truth are stale and worn. This argument 
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Danto supports with reference to Nietzsche’s unpublished essay “On Truth and Lie.” Indeed, 
Danto finds that the question “What is truth?” “occupied him throughout his entire philosophical 
life, and the answer that he gave here, apart from its rhetoric and to some extent apart from the 
reasons he advanced in its favor, was one that he never saw fit to modify in any essential respect” 
(Danto, p. 38). Danto takes Nietzsche to claim that language can express routine but not deviant 
experiences, and that his account thus differs from Kant’s claims in a number of ways. Where 
Kant sees experience conforming to our categorical structure, Danto’s Nietzsche finds conceptual 
schema differing from one society to the next and possibly from person to person, thus blurring 
the line between a more cultural relativism and an absolute subjectivism. This difference between 
societies and individuals makes possible the occurrence of experiences which fall outside our 
own scheme “so that language which is deviant her and now may sometime and somewhere else 
be plain speech” (Danto, p. 41).  
Deviant speech and experiences are dangerous in two ways: to society if they threaten 
conceptual schemes which house us within the world, and to the individual if they lead one away 
from safety as defined by one’s society. Due to the fact that Nietzsche increasingly saw himself 
as an outsider and hence a danger to society, it is little wonder he would find such a problem so 
important, despite the fact that it was accompanied by “a hopeless feeling that any set of 
metaphors he might formulate would be misunderstood by the society in which he lived and, at 
the very best, would degenerate into stale ‘truths’ in any new society they might help make 
possible” (Danto, p. 42). What I find troubling about Danto’s reading here is that he believed that 
Nietzsche worried that his own metaphors “would yield concepts different from the ones he 
contested, but they would be no less binding, if successful, and no more true” (cf. BGE 296) and 
thus “saw inevitable failure for himself” (Danto, p. 42). Lastly, Danto commits an error of 
confusing the list of at least two with a list of only two; he ascribes to Nietzsche the belief in two 
types of humans – the rational and the intuitive – again with reference to “On Truth and Lie.” The 
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difference is ultimately relative, according to Danto. Artistic/intuitive activity becomes the basic 
way humans explore, despite the fact that such metaphysical activity results in the arbitrary, 
fantastic, and empty (cf. BT P §5).  
Now comes Danto’s criticism of a semi-straw man, to which he replies with what 
Nietzsche might have said. Danto finds absurd the claim that “every sentence is metaphorical, 
each sentence is deviant,” and says that Nietzsche might reply by saying “Metaphors are 
sentences which, at the very least, are never literally true; no sentence ever is literally true of what 
it is about; hence every sentence is to some extent metaphorical” and that “The demand that in 
addition it be literally true is a philosophical not a realistic or practical demand. The one-to-one 
correspondence between sentence and fact, sometimes entertained as the ideal relationship 
between an ideal language and the world it isomorphically mirrors, is more than will ever be 
required or, as he would later have said, more than is theoretically possible” (Danto, p. 43). 
Further, Danto claims that Nietzsche says that “every sentence is literally false” (Danto, p. 43) 
without citing or providing any reference to where “later” in his work he makes such a claim. 
Danto additionally finds that Nietzsche’s notion of metaphor is ill-defined, and that he nowhere 
asks what literal truth would entail for a sentence, while also claiming that Nietzsche could reply 
that we (presumably Danto means this ‘we’ to refer to all of humanity) lack a clear idea of literal 
truth and “manage well enough with our notion of metaphor” (Danto, p. 43).  
Danto also makes what he characterizes as a sly suggestion “that Nietzsche’s general 
proposition has semi-paradoxical consequences” (Danto, p. 44). This is not sly. This is a mealy-
mouthed formulation of one of the basic problems of perspectivism and related ideas. To wit: “To 
say that all sentences are metaphorical entails that the thesis itself is metaphorical, hence not 
literally true, hence literally false. So, if he is right, he is wrong,” (Danto, p. 44) despite the fact 
that the abolition of literal truth would also entail the abolition of literal falsity. More 
interestingly, Danto goes on to say that not only does he believe “Nietzsche would have 
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acknowledged this criticism” but he further thinks Nietzsche would have “underscored it” (Danto, 
p. 44). This is what seems to lead Danto’s Nietzsche to a kind of pragmatic nihilism: because 
there is no such thing as literal truth, “He then could ask only that men try his way, and see 
whether it did not enable them to get on in the world by means of it” (Danto, p. 44). Thus art in 
the narrow sense of paintings, music, sculpture, and such becomes merely one instance of art in 
the wider sense of a “transformation of experience through metaphor and analogy, image and 
illusion,” (Danto, p. 44). Danto goes on to presume that Nietzsche might have pointed to this “in 
indication of his most radical insight” (Danto, p. 44).  
However, Danto seems to find this objectionable, in that it would water down and 
“stretch this concept [of art] to the point of ultimate debasement” despite the fact that this is 
frequently how philosophy deals with ordinary-language concepts (Danto, p. 44-45). While he 
recognizes that Nietzsche uses language in this way “to demolish barriers, to emphasize 
similarities that had been overlooked, and, more important, to draw attention to the real nature of 
the activity or thing which was typically contrasted with the activity or thing it is now said to be” 
and to attack conventional thought structures, Danto feels that Nietzsche “presupposes the precise 
concept which is under attack,” thus turning Nietzsche’s criticism of language into a circular 
argument. Despite this, Danto finds Nietzsche has determined a “singularly interesting idea” 
which he fails to deeply exploit, namely the notion that “our original and most fundamental 
involvement with experience is artistic and transforming” such that we are “artistically creating 
subject[s]” (Danto, p. 45, cf. OTL §1).  
More interesting is Danto’s assertion that “it is hard to see how language could have 
originally been imaginative” if it is in fact the case that fantasy relies on standard usage, and that 
“nothing counts as a poetic response if nothing counts as a prosaic one” (Danto, p. 46). I am not 
entirely sure why Danto believes that imaginative use must rely on or presuppose ordinary use; 
this seems more like a wholesale rejection of Nietzsche’s claim that language begins as metaphor 
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than an argument against it. In fact, Danto asserts without equivocation that “The first sentences 
uttered simply could not have been metaphors” when I have to ask how they possibly could have 
been anything other than metaphors. Danto only sees Nietzsche’s possible response as a weaker 
“they could not have been literal descriptions either” and so it is less than surprising that Danto 
believes such a claim would be unsupportive of his Nietzsche’s belief that “metaphors and 
straightforward uses are conceptual interdependencies” (Danto, p. 47). Following this, Danto 
offers an analogy between dreams and painting because of imagery, as well as analogies between 
Cartesian and Freudian accounts of dreams, and imaging and wish-fulfillment.  
The way in which philosophers and others contrast dreams with waking life is apt to 
cause problems, not the least because we tend to equate waking life with veracity and dreams 
with illusion. Since Descartes we have attempted to discern the difference between the two, with 
the primary objective being the search for a proof that there is at least some experience which is 
not illusory; even ordinary people distinguish between the two states freely and treat dreams as an 
interruption of real life: “The real business of life is conducted in the intervals between dreams’ 
(Danto, p. 53). Danto goes on to connect this to Nietzsche’s work through BT 4 especially; saying 
that “‘empirical reality’ has no ultimate existence anyway, being our own creation” and that 
because of this “The question as to whether we experience reality or suffer illusion is gratuitous, 
and the difference which vexes us is between illusion pure and simple, which is what our waking 
life is, and illusions within illusion, which is what dreams are” (Danto, p. 53-4). From BT 4, 
Danto concludes that dreams are more valuable than life because they meet some unarticulated 
need for illusion, and which in turn explains the value of art that similarly meets this need. 
Interestingly, Danto finds that Nietzsche is sometimes more specific about what he means when 
Danto’s Nietzsche says that all experience is illusory (a claim I reject), “only that temporal, 
spatial, and causal concepts have application to it or, to put it another way, that we perceive 
things in space and time” (Danto, p. 54), an over-simplification of the Kantian treatment of space 
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and time wherein the two forms of intuition become ‘mere illusions’ rather than the very 
conditions for our ability to know objects at all.  
Danto further construes naturalism as aesthetic Socratism. Socrates’s mistrust of the poets 
was because of their inability to give reasons, or instinct without insight. Socrates may have been 
the turning point of human history but he was still causing the decline of Greek tragedy because 
the two were interconnected. Interestingly, at this point Danto states this: “Despite the artistic (or 
anti-artistic) consequences of Socratism, Nietzsche expresses an almost unqualified admiration 
for its rational achievement” (Danto, p. 59) because without it humankind would have weakened 
and become mere barbarism (cf. BT 15). This is important to remember because Danto explicitly 
states that “because neither here nor in any later work was Nietzsche ever hostile to rationality or 
to science, and he never regarded either of them as inimical to ‘life’” and “never opposed art in 
the narrow sense against art in the wide sense – the latter counting science as one of its forms” 
(Danto, p. 59-60) – a rather sweeping claim to let go without citations, but we all know the 
trouble of trying to prove a negative.83 However, Danto later does state that there were 
circumstances in which reason could be opposed to life (Danto, p. 81), which directly contradicts 
this statement.  
At any rate, instead of reason and science contrasting with life, Danto sees the contrast as 
“always between suffering and exultation, between barbarism and civilization” because science is 
always for enhancing life just as much as art (Danto, p. 60). The problem with Socratism, then, is 
the fact that it reserves this instrumentality for reason alone, to the exclusion of art and all else, 
                                                          
83 I refer here to the anecdote regarding the philosopher who claimed there were no black swans; I believe 
European colonialism in Australia eventually revealed this claim to be false. The problem, then, is that a 
negative statement always looks true until counterevidence arises, though I feel sure there is a more 
rigorous treatment of this problem elsewhere. My point here is simply that a different reading may find 
some of Nietzsche comments to be exactly hostile to science and rationality, and to find both inimical to 
life, and in fact I do think such readings exist and could be feasible, particularly given Nietzsche’s critique 
of the will to truth where such can be at the expense of life-affirmation (BGE, I think), and given his 
suggestion that some falsehoods might be necessary for life or at least certain forms of life (see also BGE, 
probably near the beginning?).  
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for all else is illusory; the fact that Nietzsche sees science as similarly illusory to art means that 
art and science must be judged on a different scale from the Socratic distinction between illusion 
and reality. Danto’s Nietzsche thus sees reason as merely one tool among many for coping with 
the fearful nature of life, and hence as a limited tool; further, Danto’s Nietzsche is already 
“singularly skeptical” of “our cognitive claims” and accepting of the Nihilistic doctrine that “the 
world, in contraposition to an old empiricist idea, is in effect a blank tablet upon which we make 
imprints” (Danto, p. 61). However, due to Nietzsche’s falling out with Wagner, Danto believes 
we see Nietzsche’s estimate of the arts decline, in part because of the high demands Nietzsche 
makes for art in his first book: “In the end, Nietzsche was left with his own skeptical conclusions, 
and one might truly describe his intellectual activity from this point on a s a quest for a 
philosophy to fill the space left empty by art” and which religion could not fill, so Nietzsche 
turned to the natural sciences (Danto, p. 61) and entered what Danto and others have called his 
positivistic period or phase (Danto, p. 69, see also Young, p. 221-2).  
Danto’s conclusion transitions into a discussion of perspectivism, and how Birth of 
Tragedy leads into it: quote from end of BT P2, “to view science through the lens of art, and art 
through the lens of life.” Danto takes this to mean that Nietzsche aimed “to appreciate the role 
human practice plays in the furtherance and enhancement of life” despite its illusory nature 
(Danto, p. 67). However, “All of life rests upon appearance, art, illusion, optics, the necessity of 
error and the perspectival” (cf. BT P5), and Danto reads this as meaning “We score the blank 
surface of reality with the longitudes and parallels of concepts, but the concepts and ideas are 
ours, and they have not the slightest basis in fact” (Danto, p. 67), which strikes me as taking a 
deflationary thesis about metaphysics and turning it into a concrete metaphysical dogmatism, 
much the way Danto turns eternal recurrence into a physics and an ontology. Danto takes this to 
be Nietzsche’s doctrine of Perspectivism, central to his early book and never repudiated by 
Nietzsche.   




§5 Danto’s Perspectivism 
Before beginning Danto’s third chapter, “Perspectivism,” I have to point out that it 
baffles me that Danto writes this whole book without ever referencing GM III:12. It has always 
seemed to me that Nietzsche makes his ideas concerning perspective most explicit in this passage, 
and while Danto does reference other portions of the Genealogy, he never once hits on this key 
section. I suspect this could be the primary reason Danto mistakes perspectivism for a nihilistic 
relativism.  
Danto begins the third chapter by establishing that for Nietzsche, all humans, even the 
supposedly tough Greeks, have needed the consolation and healing provided by various means. 
Art, religion, even philosophy, each of which is untruthful, still have been instrumental for this 
need. Nietzsche considered science for a time during his positivistic period as a means to the real 
nature of the world and a way of giving meaning to life (Danto, p. 69, see HATH 24 and 29). 
Furthermore, Danto’s Nietzsche sees himself as a scientist of the origins of thought,84 with one 
working proposition that “religion, metaphysics, morality, and art rest on errors and originate in 
fear” (Danto, p. 69), and therefore we need not take them seriously. Additionally, we neutralize 
their poisons “by showing how the problems and solutions to which they gave rise ever came 
about,” a “methodological device” Nietzsche “employed constantly” (Danto, p. 70).  
Therefore, much like the Pyrrhonian skeptics of ancient Greece,85 Nietzsche sought not to 
solve the metaphysical problems of the ages, “but rather to show how these quarrels might have 
arisen,” such that “a philosophical problem is a question not to be answered but to be overcome,” 
and at the time Nietzsche believed he could do this through science (Danto, p. 70). Danto states 
that Nietzsche sees the value of science, even describing himself as a scientist, because of 
                                                          
84 We might call this science the genealogy of thought. 
85 See Berry, Jessica. Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011.  
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science’s uniquely dry & clear atmosphere for thought, but Danto is careful to point out that 
“Nevertheless, science was not immune to the corrosiveness of his analysis, and he became 
increasingly persuaded that science, as well as its cultural rivals, rested on errors, accepted (as it 
has to) fictions which it took for truths and metaphors which it honored as description” (Danto, p. 
71, cf. BGE 204). To think that science is truthful is just as naïve as thinking that art or religion 
is, and with each of these “alternative modes of thought” Nietzsche considered replacing “with 
science, the question became for him whether one could deny the basic propositions of science 
and still manage to survive. This was the problem, essentially, of viewing science ‘through the 
lens of life’” (Danto, p. 71).  
Now Danto does something academically disingenuous: he explicitly refers to Birth of 
Tragedy but cites the Nachlass instead. This is at least accidentally misleading, and is a 
demonstration of poor scholarship if not something worse. Despite this, I do agree with the 
following remarks Danto makes: “The criterion86 was always and only whether any of the 
structures which science exemplified enhanced and facilitated life. More than this, he felt, one 
could not claim, and more than this one should not need” (Danto, p. 71-2). Whether Danto means 
that ‘should’ in the sense of moral imperative or psychological likelihood is unclear, but I feel 
Nietzsche may have meant both.87 Furthermore, Danto goes on to find that “To demand that 
science be true is to expose oneself to question whether ‘truth’ means anything more than the 
facilitation of life” and that Nietzsche later advances “a pragmatic criterion of truth: p is true and 
q is false if p works and q does not” (Danto, p. 72). At this point, I am still uncertain if this is 
really all there is to Nietzsche’s criterion for truth, but I will explore this issue at length in my 
final chapters.  
                                                          
86 By which Nietzsche suggests we judge science and art among other things. 
87 Nietzsche indicates that our pursuit of science morally should facilitate and enhance life in GS §12 and 
that it psychologically should do so in GM III §23. 
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Danto seems to want to characterize perspectivism as a “peculiar form of skepticism 
which is not only central to his thought but also exceptional in the extremes to which he carried 
it” (Danto, p. 72). Danto’s Nietzsche says “that no distinction which we make, even the plainest 
distinction between thing and thing, has the slightest basis in reality,” and that “There are no 
distinctions between things because the concept of thinghood is itself already a fiction,” and 
further that he considers this belief a “Dionysiac insight” (Danto, p. 72). However, attaching 
value to life means we must also attach value to whatever makes life possible, and “this is the 
only criterion he would allow” (Danto, p. 72). Anything failing to meet this criterion must be 
thrown away because “the question is not whether they are true but whether we should believe 
them, and why” (Danto, p. 72), which some might characterize itself as a Socratic, reason-seeking 
motivation, and which Danto characterizes as always psychological.  
Danto next explains the Ordinary View of Truth, also known as the Correspondence 
Theory of Truth, and Nietzsche’s rejection thereof (with which I agree, more or less):  
Philosophers and plain men alike are inclined to believe that there is an objective order in 
the world, which is antecedent to any theories we might have about the world; and that 
these theories are true or false strictly according to whether they represent this order 
correctly. The conception of an independent and objective world structure, and the 
conception of truth which states that truth consists in the satisfaction of a relationship of 
correspondence between a sentence and a fact, are views which Nietzsche rejects. 
Danto, p. 72  
Further, Danto thinks Nietzsche is unique in the lengths to which he carried these views, perhaps 
because for one he would question the contrast other philosophers might make between 
commonsense and philosophical questions, as well as because other philosophers might suppose 
philosophical theory unimportant for practical life, whereas Nietzsche took the connection 
between the two much more seriously. Especially important for Danto’s Nietzsche is the fact that 
many philosophers take the commonsense world for granted as a starting point, when they should 
have looked at the possibility that we humans are the creators of this commonsense world of 
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appearance rather than the discoverers: “So common sense is an interpretation (as Nietzsche will 
call it), not something with which interpretations contrast” (Danto, p. 74). Like all else, 
commonsense is one more metaphor made routine.  
In particular, Danto’s Nietzsche has “a complicated attitude toward commonsense” 
because it is “a tissue of errors and false beliefs, an interpretation only, without the slightest 
correspondence to reality” but at the same time it is the kind of error without which we cannot life 
and therefore “relative to any other interpretation we are obliged to say that common sense is 
true” (Danto, p. 74, cf. NL 814, 915). Therefore, rejecting common sense in favor of other 
schemas will fail to work inasmuch as common sense is what allows humans to survive, and 
alternative schemas could either less dangerously be something we can survive without or more 
dangerously be something we could not survive having. I would interject here that just because 
common sense works does not mean all other systems will fail to work; this kind of dualistic 
reduction is characteristic of Danto’s treatment of Nietzsche. 
Danto defines Nietzsche’s characterization of ‘truth’ as follows: a set of errors without 
which our kind of organic creature could not survive (Danto, p. 74, rephrasing Danto’s explicit 
definition of falsity). However, Danto goes on to say that Nietzsche therefore believes that 
nothing is true and everything is false in the “more conventional sense of expressing what is the 
case” (Danto, p. 75), and while Danto claims Nietzsche says this time and again, he again 
provides no citation. Thus, with regard to conventional truth, common sense is false because 
everything is false, but with regard to survival, common sense is true in the only sense that 
matters. I do agree that there are such multiple uses of truth and falsity within Nietzsche, but I 
think Danto is off-base to presume that it all reduces to a binary system.  
Interestingly, for Danto’s Nietzsche “It is a mistake to say that the problem of truth is 
exclusively of philosophical import. It is of most vital significance to get it right” (Danto, p. 75). 
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Likewise, Danto recognizes that the dismissal of the apparent world in favor of some other world 
has had many forms:  
This other world may be the noumenal world, the kingdom of heaven, Nirvana, Brahma, 
the universe of pure Forms, or what you will. Insofar as metaphysicians demand that, as a 
price for a different world, we turn our backs on this one, they are, Nietzsche insists, 
demanding that we turn our backs on life. Even though this world is made by us, and has 
certainly no more substance than any proposed alternative, it is the one in which we are 
able to live.  
Danto, p. 75  
I would add that this is only so far as we know right now. Nietzsche’s experimental attitude 
inclines me to believe that we could create other survivable worlds as well, such as the world of 
the Übermensch. Thus the importance philosophical questions have is one of immediate 
relevance to practical life, and the different struggles to answer those questions Danto relates to 
Nietzsche’s vision of will struggling against will which is at the bottom of his doctrine of will to 
power.  
Unlike many philosophers, Nietzsche does not defend commonsense against philosophy 
but sets it up as one of many possible interpretations; Danto uses an analogy with different 
geometrical systems to illustrate his take on this point:  
The question sometimes arises to which of these geometries [including but not limited to 
Euclidean geometry] correctly describes the geometry of the physical world; a 
Nietzschean answer would be that not one of them does, for the world has no geometry to 
describe. So with philosophies, including that of common sense. There is no real world 
structure of which each of these is an interpretation, no way the world really is in contrast 
with our modes of interpreting it. 
Danto, p. 76  
Danto moves on to quote NL 903 “There are no facts, only interpretations,” and NL 705 “As 
though there would be a world left over once we subtracted the perspectival!” Properly speaking, 
then, we cannot even say that interpretations ‘distort’ reality, “for there is nothing that counts as a 
veridical interpretation relative to which a given interpretation could distort: or every 
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interpretation is a distortion, except that there is nothing for it to be a distortion of” (Danto, p. 77). 
Thus, the analogy with geometries demonstrates that correctness has to do with what works, or in 
other words, Danto’s Nietzsche’s sole criterion for truth is instrumentality.  
Now begins one of the most worrisome paragraphs in this book: “The doctrine that there 
are no facts but only interpretations was termed Perspectivism,” (Danto, p. 77, cf. again NL 903) 
whereas I see the central doctrine as GM III:12: all knowledge is necessarily from a perspective. 
Danto goes on to note some of the “logical features” of perspective, namely that “we speak of 
seeing the same thing from different perspectives, and we might allow that there is no way to see 
the thing save through a perspective and, finally, that there is no one perspective which is 
privileged over any other,” though he does not cite these elaborations, and then again does not 
cite when he claims that “The only difficulty here is in talking about the ‘same thing’ on which 
these are different perspectives” (Danto, p. 77). I note now only that the absence of privilege for 
any perspective is what reduces this treatment of perspectivism to a relativism. 
Danto’s conclusion that this is because “We can meaningfully say nothing, then, about 
whatever it is on which these are perspectives” (Danto, p. 77) is troubling, because it seems to me 
that Nietzsche finds meaning only existing within perspective; to try to establish meaning outside 
of perspective is nonsensical at best. Further, the fact that Danto goes on to conclude that 
“Because we cannot appeal to any fact independently of its relation to the perspective it is meant 
to support, we can do little more than insist on our perspective, and try, if we can, to impose it on 
other people,” (Danto, p. 77) is troubling as well, for several reasons.  
First of all, it is inconsistent with his own claim that there are no facts and even if they 
were they could not be used to ‘support’ perspectives, whatever that means. Secondly, Danto’s 
wish to connect everything to will-to-power has led to a barbaric sort of ‘blonde beast’ treatment 
of how he thinks Nietzsche would have applied perspectivism practically, despite the fact that 
Danto recognizes that Nietzsche did not wish to retrogress to such an ideal. It would have been 
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better if Danto had continued with the practical and the biological themes of what keeps human 
beings alive, and thus expressly clarified that Nietzsche had at least one moral value he 
considered significantly non-relative (or what I might call multi-perspectival rather than 
objective). Thirdly, “true” redefined as use for life does allow us to speak of true perspectives and 
wrong or false ones do sometimes prevail over true in this sense (cf. Nietzsche’s many 
discussions of how religious morality is antithetical to life in Twilight of the Idols among other 
texts). Lastly, at the end of this disconcerting paragraph, I note that it seems perhaps dismissive 
and elitist of Danto to call common sense a herd perspective, but that may well be an accurate 
supposition; at this time I am unsure, but that by no means implies that herd perspectives are 
always bad perspectives, especially if our criterion is life. After all, herd morality has often kept 
herds alive, and Nietzsche knew this. 
Danto does provide one citation in this paragraph – again to NL 903 – which does 
support a claim I believe is supportable with reference to the published work, namely that “we 
cannot say what it [the ‘same thing’ we discuss] is except from one or another perspective, and 
we cannot speak about it as it is in itself” (Danto, p. 77) because Nietzsche wrote “We cannot 
establish a fact an sich, and it is perhaps non-sense [ein Unsinn] to wish to do so.” This claim that 
we cannot talk about the an sich I believe to have corollaries entailing that we cannot determine 
whether or not the an sich has any ‘causality’ as we understand it. We may not claim positively 
that it does or negatively that it does not, since of necessity the an sich is unknowable, knowledge 
being defined as from perspective, and the an sich as existing outside perspective entirely. 
Beyond that we can really say little else at this time, and it is hard to predict how we can move 
beyond this issue, short of adding new sensory perception capacity to the human body by genetic 
or technological implant.88  
                                                          
88 This perhaps demonstrates the importance of science fiction to philosophy, but I digress. 
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Danto next does something with which I am ready to agree: he seems to hit upon the 
importance of connecting perspective to lived, and maybe even embodied, experience. To wit: 
“We cannot speak of a perspective, of course, without relating it to the conditions of existence of 
the one whose perspective it is” (Danto, p. 77). While Danto may have had Kant more than 
feminism in mind, I think this insight may apply well to the kind of standpoint-influenced reading 
of perspective. However, I again disagree when Danto claims that “the only world we can 
significantly speak of is the world from where we are” (Danto, p. 78) because Nietzsche does 
speak of adopting multiple and different perspectives (GM III:12); it would be more accurate to 
say that we cannot significantly speak of a world viewed from no perspective or from a 
perspective we have not been able to adopt yet. However, I do agree that we cannot significantly 
speak of the ‘other’ or ‘after’ worlds of the noumenal realm, realm of the Forms, Heaven, etc., 
precisely because these demand the impossible non-perspective of God-like objectivity, and 
Danto’s citation to HATH 9 is apt: “For concerning the metaphysical world nothing could be said 
except that it would be a different world, but an inaccessible and incomprehensible one” (Danto, 
p. 78).  
It baffles me that Danto now sees that common sense is of use and “not to be lightly set 
aside” based on his earlier claim that Nietzsche considered it herd thinking (Danto, p. 77), and I 
also note a poor citation-out-of-context misstep, wherein Danto seems to assert that all common 
sense is errors, when the passage he cites from HATH 33 only attributes erroneousness to the 
belief in the value and dignity of life within a certain context (Danto, p. 78). Also problematic is 
Danto’s uncited claim that we can only oppose common sense with dangerous alternatives, but I 
am inclined to accept his claim that “there remains the possibility – a dangerous [and exciting] 
one – that if we were differently constituted, a different perspective might be ours” (Danto, p. 78). 
Danto does, however, see Nietzsche as attempting to turn away from the herd in the name of life, 
and that he tried to demonstrate how to do so through his philosophy (Danto, p. 78-9). This 
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placed Nietzsche in a “complicated polemic situation” that makes it difficult for his readers to 
follow, because “He had at once to criticize common sense (the philosophy of the herd) and to 
defend it against all the traditional philosophical and religious criticisms” (Danto, p. 79).  
Puzzling is the fact that Danto wants to identify both wide and narrow usages of truth, but 
he still characterizes this as a “seeming inconsistency” in Nietzsche’s usage, basically accusing 
Nietzsche of failing to keep the distinct usages separate and clear because of an inability to 
develop a new language to transition between the old and the new thought (Danto, p. 79-80). 
Erroneous is Danto’s claim that Nietzsche spoke from an “extraperspectival standpoint about 
perspectives” (Danto, p. 80); rather, I would say Nietzsche attempted to speak from plural 
perspectives, but the extraperspectival or nonperspectival perspective is by definition impossible 
for humans as we are right now at an absolute minimum. Again, Danto has Nietzsche as a Nihilist 
with no order or moral order in the world; only this time, Danto adds that Nietzsche wants to say 
what the world is actually like, namely that it “is made up of points of origin for perspectives” 
and that these points are the beginning of the doctrine of will-to-power, complete with a positive 
metaphysics (Danto, p. 80). Danto also attributes a “twofold sense of metaphysics, just as there is 
a double sense of truth” (Danto, p. 81), which I find to be reductively dualist, and I would like to 
suggest that “Nietzsche’s more infuriating paradoxical utterances” would be clearer to Danto if he 
did not treat everything as a pair of two, but as existing on a scale or spectrum instead. 
The central problem to most accusations of relativism, I think, can be encapsulated in the 
question Danto asks here: “Does Perspectivism entail that Perspectivism itself is but a 
perspective, so that the truth of this doctrine entails that it is false?” (Danto, p. 80), essentially an 
ourobouros of a logical paradox. In response, I must say that I think the question actually 
misunderstands what Nietzsche is saying about truth as definable by perspective. 89 Precisely 
                                                          
89 I am going to invent a word here to make my meaning more clear. “Pruth” is the quality of having truth-
from-a-perspective, or perspectival truth, and “palsity” is the quality of lacking it. When a claim has truth-
from-a-perspective, not only does this mean that someone would say “Yes, I agree or assent to such a 
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because all beliefs and knowledge claims are necessarily from perspectives, anyone who does 
believe in perspectivism necessarily does so from a perspective. Because truth can only be a 
measure from within a perspective, we can no longer use ‘false’ in the same way to refer to 
objective reality, but only in terms of perspectival knowledge and value. Perspectivism may turn 
out to be more or less palse or prue, then, dependent on how much evidence we gather that it 
helps perpetuate, extend, and improve life, and further may be palse for some while prue for 
others without devolving into relativism precisely because the same value scheme may dictate 
different beliefs for different people; what belief keeps you alive might kill or injure me, and vice 
versa. One question we might ask, then, is whether other value schemes can dictate different 
behaviors (including belief) for different individuals without lapsing into relativism. 
Danto notes that while many classify Nietzsche as an anti-rationalist, “Nietzsche in fact 
opposes reason only when reason is opposed to life, or to whatever makes life possible” (Danto, 
p. 81). Danto also makes Nietzsche over into a Humean, believing reason should rule the 
passions; however, unlike many philosophers who have advocated a life of reason, Nietzsche 
opposes theories of reason which result in depreciation of the body and the senses. Hence 
Nietzsche is not so much an anti-rationalist as he is against the sole worship of reason to the 
exclusion of all else, particularly the living body. As examples of philosophers prone to this 
depreciation of the body or the senses, Danto indicates the Eleatic philosophers and Plato as well 
as Descartes. Further:  
                                                                                                                                                                             
claim,” but we might also assume that such a claim has psychological efficacy in that person’s behavior 
and worldview, and frequently explicit and implicit belief in such claims may derive from what some of 
Nietzsche’s predecessors, the modern philosophers, might have called empirical experience, namely the 
experience that such a belief helps them stay alive and well.  
Therefore, a claim may be “prue” when it has perspectival truth and likewise a claim can be “palse” when it 
fails to have perspectival truth. Thus, we can now say that a given claim may be both prue and palse at the 
same time, even for the same person (who is capable of adopting different perspectives and frequently 
does); claims are the most prue when the most perspectives agree on the truth of such claims, and claims 
are most palse when most perspectives agree on the falsity of such claims. Pruth is exhibited in degrees, 
whether or not old-fashioned objective “Truth” could be. Because Nietzsche did not take the (somewhat 
questionable) step of simply inventing a new word, and tried to play with the various meanings of the old 
word ‘truth,’ I agree with Danto that he ended up obscuring what he meant some of the time, and it is 
frequently tricky to follow his various steps.  
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Even empiricists, who denied that we had access to any truths not based on sense 
experience, were sufficiently in the shadow of the rationalistic tradition to take a dim, 
skeptical view of the scant, uncertain knowledge afforded us only by the senses. 
Empirical propositions were deprecated, even by empiricists, by applying to them criteria 
which have proper application only to rational propositions, and which empirical ones 
can only fail to satisfy 
Danto, p. 82 
While Danto doesn’t classify Nietzsche as an empiricist “in any reductive sense of the term,” at 
the same time he recognizes Nietzsche’s belief that “reason could not seriously be accepted 
should it propose theses contrary to the senses’ evidence – even though the relationship between 
our beliefs and sense experience is a complicated one”; and interestingly Danto also claims that 
this was Nietzsche’s belief throughout his works, and not merely in the ‘positivistic’ period of 
Human, All-Too-Human (Danto, p. 82, cf. TI III:3)90 
Danto finds it banal that we divide thought into the two irrationalist and rationalist trends 
of Existentialism versus Logical Positivism and their outgrowths. What he wants to emphasize is 
that “Nietzsche, who is so naturally taken as a predecessor of the irrationalistic tendency in 
contemporary philosophy, in his own writings exhibits attitudes toward the main problems of 
philosophy which are almost wholly in the spirit of Logical Positivism” (Danto, p. 83). These 
include Nietzsche’s policy of putting metaphysical claims ‘on ice’ (EH III HATH), or in other 
words undermining rather than refuting philosophical claims, precisely because refuting one 
claim about a problem often requires accepting another claim about a problem when what needs 
doing is actually extirpating the problem itself, a process which Danto finds very similar to the 
Positivistic claim that metaphysical problems are nonsense and pseudo-problems. Additionally, 
Danto claims that Nietzsche’s criterion of meaningfulness is the same as that later advocated by 
Positivists, namely that meaningfulness comes in terms of verifiability through sense experience 
                                                          
90 “We possess science today strictly insofar as we have decided to accept the testimony of the senses – to 
the extent that we sharpen, arm, and learn to think through them…The rest is miscarriage and not-yet-
science. I mean metaphysics, theology, psychology, and theory of knowledge. Or else: formal science, 
sign-theories: Like logic and that applied logic, mathematics” – to which my conclusion is: A theory of 
knowledge becomes science to the extent of acceptance of testimony of the senses. 
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and certifiability through the meanings of the words alone; Danto supports this claim with a 
single citation to HATH 20: “The Ding an sich is worth a Homeric laugh, since it seems to be so 
much, to be everything, when really it is empty – empty of meaning” (Danto, p. 83, emphasis 
Nietzsche’s).  
Most important for Danto is Nietzsche’s preoccupation with language and how this 
demonstrates Nietzsche’s affinities to contemporary analytic philosophy and not just parochial 
Positivism; this is especially significant given the connections Danto draws between common 
sense and how it is expressed in ordinary language. In particular, Danto cites WS 55 “Every word 
is a preconceived judgment,” to support the claim that “in speaking the language we have learned 
from infancy, we are implicitly prescribing how the world is to be viewed and comprehended” 
(Danto, p. 83). More interesting is the idea that speech perpetuates philosophical errors, and 
Russell’s claim that we must develop new language to avoid committing ourselves to such errors 
before we even begin reasoning (Danto, p. 83-4). While Danto recognizes that Nietzsche did not 
anticipate these later discussions, he still sees Nietzsche as “unquestionably a predecessor” 
because of his attacks on “misleading modes of expression” and the seduction of grammar to 
accept certain implicit beliefs, particularly the belief that language describes the world (Danto, p. 
84). Quoting WS 11: “There lies hidden in language a philosophical mythology which breaks out 
at every moment, however careful one might be,” as well as HATH 11, D47, and HATH 519, 
Danto’s Nietzsche further concludes that this and other such errors have led to the fortunate (for 
us) development of humans out of mere animals. 
Further, language’s role in developing philosophical concepts shows when we note how 
philosophical concepts all grow in interconnection with one another (citing BGE 20), family-
resemblances, etc., and so Danto’s Nietzsche concludes that “any world view different form our 
own could not be expressed in any language with the same [grammatical] structure as ours” as 
well as noting that we might address the “certain grammatico-philosophical elements of our 
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linguistic family” which strike us “as being especially pernicious intellectually, however 
indispensable in practice” (Danto, p. 85). Two such elements include the tendency to posit 
entities based on subject-verb structure and the tendency to think in terms of things (quoting TI 
III:5 “unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, and being”) based on verb-object 
structure. Along these same lines, Danto also cites TI III “I am afraid we shall not get rid of God 
until we get rid of grammar.” 
All of this is to explain that by making the assumption “that there are objects which 
continue to exist between our perceptions of them, and the existence of which does not depend 
upon anyone’s perception,” Danto’s Nietzsche states that “common sense is asserting, implicitly, 
a philosophical proposition of the most audacious sort” (Danto, p. 86), and language assists 
through every sentence we speak (TI III) when what we should really conclude is that things are a 
fiction as well (NL 776), despite the fact that we need these fictions in both daily life and science 
(GS 112). So, while the ideas are useful, they do not denote the world, and therefore “sentences 
which make an essential use of them are not true because there is nothing for them to be true 
about” (Danto, p. 87) which seems to me to miss the point.  
For example, if I point to a rhinoceros that happens to be vomiting and say “That unicorn 
is sick” then the sentence is not false because there is no such thing as a unicorn, but rather 
because the term ‘unicorn’ does not refer to the creature in question. Sentences which make 
essential use of things and thinghood are not false (or true) in the objective or non-perspectival 
sense because of the absence of things from the world, but rather because one is trying to discuss 
the world using terms (or more properly grammatical structures) that do not refer91 to the world in 
question. Furthermore, it is perfectly possible to have true sentences about things that do not 
exist. “Unicorns are equine creatures with a single horn protruding from the top of the head and 
                                                          
91 This was the first verb I selected, but I am not sure ‘reference’ is the appropriate way to talk about how 
perspective works in this context. Other candidates include structure, organize, disclose, and reveal.  
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various magical properties” is a true sentence, regardless of the fact that to my knowledge no 
unicorn has ever existed beyond the pages of fiction books.  
Danto’s Nietzsche also finds that such sentences have no explanatory value because they 
are only interpretations (BGE 14), and that even discussing atoms requires such essential 
reference to things which do not exist (NL 896). I am drawn to what Danto characterizes as a 
temptation, namely speculating “that what Nietzsche has in mind here is what philosophers of 
science today discuss as ‘theoretical entities’ – entities postulated by certain terms which play a 
highly systematizing role in the theories utilizing them, but which, if they denote any entities at 
all, denote unobservable ones” (Danto, p. 87). In particular, Danto wants to say that Nietzsche’s 
thesis is far more sweeping than this paltry claim, “Rather, all entities are in that sense 
theoretical, and any such reference to concrete particulars is fictive” (Danto, p. 87, cf. GS 121).92 
Then, in a footnote, Danto does something problematic: he states that the distinction between 
interpretation and explanation is “obvious enough” and existing “throughout Nietzsche in one 
way or another” citing Daybreak p. 428, which does not seem to exist, though §428 is about 
demonstration versus explanation, and does not in my translations refer to interpretation at all. 
Danto’s Nietzsche explains that primitive psychology leads to the grammatical structure 
of our language, which in turn becomes our survival mechanism or the condition for life for our 
species (GS 110), and so if we accept “the empiricist thesis that reliance upon the senses is 
indispensable for knowledge, knowledge must be understood instrumentally, and we cannot truly 
accept the simple empiricist account of how our knowledge develops” (Danto, p. 88, cf. BGE 20). 
At the same time, Nietzsche does reject some aspects of Kant’s revision of empiricism, 
particularly the notion of synthetic a priori judgments inherent in the human mind (BGE 11, GS 
111). Danto claims that it is a “weird argument” (Danto, p. 89) to claim that generalization 
                                                          
92 “Without these articles of faith [bodies, lines, surfaces, cause and effect, motion and rest, form and 
content], no one would be able to live! But this hardly constitutes a proof. Life is no argument. Among the 
conditions of life, error might be one” 
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requires abstraction but that abstraction takes us further from the truth of what each thing is while 
it make also make it easier to survive; with references to D 117, GS 110 and 265, and NL 727, 
Danto’s Nietzsche ultimately finds that human truth is constituted by irrefutable errors, and it is 
only those useful errors which allow us to stay alive and even flourish (Danto, p. 89).  
Danto points out Nietzsche’s “sly points about the unreasonableness of reason,” relying 
on “the principle of a minori ad majus, that the universe can hardly be very rational if the part of 
it consisting of human reason is as unreasonable as it is” (Danto, p. 89, cf. WS 2). This is of 
particular interest because “we are going to find the universe rational, or logical, only to the 
extent that we have made it so through imposition” of our human rationality (Danto, p. 89, cf. NL 
526). Logic and mathematics themselves are only psychologically derived and cannot be factual 
since there are no facts according to Danto’s treatment, though Danto merely states that they have 
“no basis in fact” (Danto, p. 89).  
Danto goes on to state that Nietzsche’s argument goes as follows: accepting the claim 
that there are no ‘things’ consequently entails accepting the claim that there is no such thing as 
equality or identity, though these are necessary for logical systems; applying these systems to the 
world misleads humans into accepting the belief that entities or things exist, may be equal to each 
other, self-identical, etc. Had we known from the beginning that there were no such relationships 
and things in the world, we would never have created logical systems in the first place (cf. HATH 
11), but philosophers should have known better (cf. NL 726). The problem with philosophy, then, 
is that it “turns back against the commonsense world in the name of concepts which are 
presupposed by the world of common sense – and then declares the latter to be illusory… But in 
fact the very things repudiated are projections of the categorical traits they are said not to 
exemplify. Metaphysics has repudiated the common-sense world on its own terms, by erecting a 
supernumerary world which is only the conceptual skeleton of the world to which it is said to be 
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superior and more real” (Danto, p. 90). Nietzsche’s somewhat eliminitivist response is to reject 
the notions of both the ‘true’ and the ‘apparent’ world (cf. TI IV).  
Danto now turns to a different contrast between the so-called common-sense and 
scientific pictures of the world, referring to Galileo and other scientists whose discoveries 
conflicted with what was perceivable by the unaided senses of common individuals; specifically, 
Danto lists the following examples: heliocentric theory, evolution, psychoanalysis, curved space, 
the fourth dimension, and the electronic theory of matter. Seventeenth century natural 
philosophers determined that observable predicates known as secondary qualities were not as real 
as unobservable predicates known as primary qualities; Danto connects this to Nietzsche’s 
attribution of the ‘true’ world of scientists in NL 704. Danto finds that nothing is “impervious” to 
Nietzsche’s utilitarian test of beliefs, and that the collapse of concepts would thus not dismay 
Nietzsche at all (Danto, p. 91), and I would only point out that this is not the usual sense of 
‘utility’ but rather one more connected to the survival and flourishing of specifically human life. 
However, Nietzsche would not tolerate science’s boast that it had found the ‘true’ world after all 
when in fact it had “an ontology equally suspect with that of common sense” (Danto, p. 92).  
Here is where Danto sees the main difference between Nietzsche and the Positivists, 
namely that Nietzsche saw science just as he did religion, art, and commonsense, as “a creative 
organization of the world, an arrangement which stands to observation in complicated ways,” and 
the scientist is no more “philosophically abreast of his own theories and discoveries” than the 
common individual (Danto, p. 92, cf. BGE 12), particularly because the scientist believes that the 
entities of scientific theory are “genuinely explanatory” (Danto, p. 93). The only significant way 
in which the scientist is better than a metaphysician is that the fictions of science are useful in that 
they “contribute to human vitality,” though Danto also believes that this means that they 
“increasingly make us masters over the world” because unlike metaphysics, science is not 
necessarily “hostile to life and this world, beckoning us on to another and better one” (Danto, p. 
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93). The only problem for Danto’s Nietzsche with science is when science claims to discover 
truth because “It has not done that. For there is none to discover” (Danto, p. 93).  
So it sounds like Danto wants Nietzsche to be both a pragmatist, claiming that there is a 
(kind of) truth and that truth is defined by usefulness, and a nihilist, claiming simply that there is 
no truth, full stop. To my mind, these are contradictory positions, even granting Danto the wider 
and narrower senses of ‘truth,’ because an alethiological nihilist denies the existence of truth, and 
not merely the truth of one’s forebears. Further, Danto repeatedly emphasizes Nietzsche’s full 
denial of the existence of any truth, and does not argue that Nietzsche’s narrow versus wide 
definitions of truth are counterevidence against this denial. The problem with also attributing 
pragmatism to Nietzsche in addition to nihilism is that alethiological pragmatism does seem to 
require belief that some working form of ‘truth’ exists, regardless of what non-useful definitions 
of ‘truth’ there might be. Nihilism rejects that baseline belief about truth, and thus the positions 
are inconsistent. When Danto addresses this and other seeming inconsistencies in Nietzsche’s 
thought, he attributes them more to a problem with Nietzsche than with a problem with his own 
interpretive strategy.  
Danto believes the third chapter suffices to clarify the general outlines of perspectivism, 
despite the fact that Danto recognizes that Nietzsche “did not work it out with any rigor, or in 
great detail, but he thought it through consistently in a number of areas and applications” (Danto, 
p. 93). Regardless, this leaves us with the many remaining problems of philosophy; Danto begins 
with a discussion of Nietzsche’s treatment of causality, which he finds strikingly similar to 
Hume’s. Note that there are few references to Hume in Nietzsche, and that there are several 
differences between the two authors Danto is careful to share, beginning first with a few 
similarities, and then stating: “Nietzsche believed, as Hume should have, that the concept of 
causality has no application outside our experience, so that the notion of ‘objective cause’ must 
be strictly meaningless if it suggests something any different from what the word has been 
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analyzed to mean in terms of experience. But, as so typically happened when Nietzsche wrote, he 
expressed his views in an objective mode by saying, simply, that there are no causes in the world” 
(Danto, p. 94, emphasis mine, cf. D 121). To this I would add the caveat ‘of which we know or 
are capable of knowing from current perspectives’ or something similar.  
Then Danto describes a deviation, from NL 876 and 501, wherein Nietzsche differs from 
Hume by conceiving of habit as not merely individualistic, and secondly because of Nietzsche’s 
tendency to find that we frequently reverse cause & effect, thinking of the effect as the purpose of 
the cause (Danto, p. 95). Danto takes this to an extreme, saying Nietzsche believes we are locked 
into our perspective; causality as derived from human self-projection is based on a mythopoetic 
process of generalization which allows us to create ‘things’ – hence “The concept of causality is 
therefore a fiction because it logically depends upon fictions” (Danto, p. 95). Referring to Beyond 
Good and Evil as always representing Nietzsche’s “maturest philosophy” (Danto, p. 95), and 
citing §21, Danto finds an extremely radical view exceeding even Kant: “the Ding an sich is 
precisely a notion Nietzsche wants to ‘freze,’ for it leads to a debasement of the ‘apparent world’” 
(Danto, p. 95). Similarly, Danto sees Nietzsche exceeding Spinoza by freezing substance along 
side the Ding an sich.  
Despite all this, Danto does not think Nietzsche was either an idealist or a phenomenalist 
because he still felt “that there was a world which remained over, tossing blackly like the sea, 
chaotic relative to our distinctions and perhaps to all distinctions, but there nevertheless” (Danto, 
p. 96). I disagree with Danto’s claim that Nietzsche was to any extent “seduced by his own 
arguments,” but I do recognize that there might be a problem if it turns out to be true that because 
Nietzsche “wanted to say that all our beliefs are false, he was constrained to introduce a world for 
them to be false about; and this had to be a world without distinctions, a blind, empty, 
structureless thereness,” a belief Nietzsche “never surrendered,” and contra Leiter, Clark and 
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others93 Danto believes that Nietzsche was in the end in fact beginning to speculate about what 
could be said about the real world after all (Danto, p. 96).  
Such a world would require a completely different language with a completely different 
metaphysical grammar, according to Danto’s Nietzsche, who “never sought for a new language,” 
and Danto says this despite what comes in his very next breath: “although I believe sometimes 
that his frenzied employment of poetic diction, his intentionally paradoxical utterances, and his 
deliberately perverted use of terms might be taken in the spirit of the Zen koan, calculated to 
crack the shell which linguistic habit has erected between ourselves and reality and to expose us 
to open seas” (Danto, p. 97). Danto goes on to claim that any such invented language would be 
impossible to understand and that there could be no bridges or translations between this and such 
a language (Danto, p. 97-8). Even new terms become difficult within the new language because 
ostensive definition requires pointing out things. At the same time, however, Danto’s Nietzsche 
still believes in a “primal, undifferentiated Ur-Eine, a Dionysiac depth” (Danto, p. 97). 
Regardless, I would suppose that one possible new kind of definition might get around the 
problem of ostension and a lack of things at which to point; in particular, stipulative definitions 
might help, especially given that the whole new language would have to be stipulated in toto. I do 
see Danto’s point that it would be exceedingly difficult to translate between a language which 
presupposes things and a language which does not, I just do not know that this means translation 
would be impossible, nor that Nietzsche suggests such impossibility.  
Danto believes Nietzsche had far more interest in pointing out the fictive nature of our 
core beliefs than in describing the world as it is: “He was less interested in saying what was true 
than in telling what was false” (Danto, p. 98). The end of the chapter includes the notion that 
Nietzsche believed we should experiment with new systems of thought, language, and 
                                                          
93 See Leiter (1994), Clark (1990), Anderson (1998), Cox (1999), and Wilcox (1974), for a few 
examples. 
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philosophy. Indeed, what Danto identifies as the ‘deep’ sense of truth, namely correspondence 
theory, “is perhaps not very important and possibly not at all useful,” (Danto, p. 99) citing GS 
110: “Truth is the most impotent form of knowledge. Instrumental truth, however, is crucial for 
life, and it is this more shallow meaning of truth which Danto sees both as liberating for 
Nietzsche and as his means for transforming humanity “into fantastically more vital creatures” 
(Danto, p. 99).  
Before moving on to the final chapters, I would like to first note that it is presumptuous 
of Danto to reduce the deep sense of truth to correspondence and to state that the pragmatist or 
instrumental theory of truth is a more shallow sense; it seems that one problem is that there are 
several alethiological theories competing to fulfill the deep and shallow senses of truth, though 
some of those theories may deny the value of multiple senses therefore. Second, we should be 
wary of attributing value to the deep and less or a lack of value to the shallow for Nietzsche, 
particularly given his praise or at least appreciation for the surface and superficial (see for 
example GS §13, 354, and 373). Third, we should also be wary of seeing the senses of truth as 
solely dichotomous as Danto seems to do; there are not merely wider and narrower or shallower 
and deeper senses of truth, there are also middling senses and extreme senses as well, or at least 
so I suppose.  
 
§6 Danto’s Psychologies, Religion, and Moralities 
Danto opens the fourth chapter with one more reformulation of his definition of 
perspectivism: “that what passes at any time for knowledge is but a confection of simplifications 
and falsifications, brought forth out of ourselves, by means of which we may house ourselves in 
the blank, indifferent universe” (Danto, p. 100), but Danto believes despite citing three examples 
that “There are surprisingly few arguments in Nietzsche’s writings to sustain these conclusions 
with which, by now, the reader hardly can be unfamiliar” and “Even when support of one or 
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another sort is offered, it often consists in an appeal to facts about which, outside the context of 
the argument, Nietzsche could, and sometimes does, raise at least as many doubts” (Danto, p. 
101). Where Higgins sees Nietzsche skillfully shifting perspective (see Comic Relief), Danto 
accuses Nietzsche of “irresponsible shifting of ground, and an infuriating skeptical jugglery” 
(Danto, p. 101). Further, Danto finds that Nietzsche has “ruled out” justification and so any 
justification whatsoever becomes possible without any rhyme or reason (Danto, p. 101). While 
we might agree with Danto that “Nietzsche was in no sense the circumspect epistemologist,” 
(Danto, p. 101), some of Danto’s judgments seem either too quick, too harsh, or both.  
More accurate is Danto’s recognition that Nietzsche saw a quest for certainty as a sign of 
weakness (cf. 347, p. 101), but it is baffling that Danto both sees that Nietzsche has his own new 
notions of truth and falsehood but still calls him a nihilist (Danto, p. 102). Nietzsche does not 
permit himself the “comfort” of bedrock assumptions which are impervious to doubt (Danto, p. 
102-3), and I find very interesting Danto’s supposition that “unless something is taken as certain, 
nothing can be seriously doubted” (Danto, p. 103). Danto describes Nietzsche’s self-identification 
as a psychologist, and as examples of “Nietzsche’s sure diagnostic hits” he mentions “Some of 
the things he says about sex, for example, that most canvassed of psychological topics, go beyond 
what many thinkers have come to believe” (Danto, p. 103-4). Whether this is an obscure 
reference to Nietzsche’s purported misogyny or something else is unclear, but Danto wants to 
focus more on Nietzsche’s analysis of so-called logical behavior, which Danto finds 
complementary to perspectivism, as well as religious and moral theses.94  
Despite Nietzsche’s self-identification as a psychologist, he still found contemporary 
psychology to be flawed due to moral prejudices (cf. BGE 23), and this problem existed even in 
                                                          
94 Note that Danto refers to these as “a cluster of circularities” – is this a logical criticism? “Our 
psychological theories are part of our perspective; but our perspective is to be explained with reference to 
psychological phenomena which are part of it. Our moral attitudes are responsible (in part) for the 
perspectives we seek to impose, including our psychologies; but psychology is appealed to in explanation 
of having the moral perspectives” (Danto, p. 104). It seems like causal rather than logical circularity, a 
feedback loop. 
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Descartes; psychic atomism as derived from Christianity led to meaningless oppositions and 
dualisms, and: 
It is always more or less Nietzsche’s predictable view that distinctions between inner and 
outer, between matter and mind, and comparable polarities, come to nothing; and that, 
being logically correlative with one another, any attempt to deny the reality of one pole at 
the expense of the other is meaningless. One must accept either both or neither of these 
antitheses; and Nietzsche always presses for neither, virtually as though it were his 
methodological directive to abolish distinctions whenever found. 
Danto, p. 104-5  
Rather, my position is that Nietzsche can be more accurately described as rejecting dualism in 
favor not of nihilism but rather of pluralism, though I agree with Danto that something similar to 
the following is true: “Whatever description [if any] he will finally give of reality as he sees it, it 
will at least have to be neutral to any of the distinctions we are accustomed to draw” (Danto, p. 
105). The upshot of this is that without the mind/matter distinction, there is no psyche for 
psychology; instead, psychology concerns itself with how we organize our lives.  
Ultimately, this view Danto finds to be the most harmonious with contemporary thought, 
in particular citing J. L. Austin, Wittgenstein, and P. F. Strawson. And while Danto states that “It 
is philosophical disingenuously to raise doubts about the external world on the basis of 
consciousness and our purported intimate relationship with, and epistemologically superior access 
to, our own states of mind. Yet Nietzsche draws some consequences from this analysis which 
later philosophers would disagree with in all likelihood” (Danto, p. 122). Nietzsche in particular 
differs from other philosophers in that he does not consider ordinary language a departure from 
more esoteric metaphysics; rather, Danto’s Nietzsche finds that philosophy “has been not so 
much a deviation from ordinary usage as a projection of the grammatical structure of ordinary 
language onto the neutral screen of reality” (Danto, p. 122). Thus we are all under great pressure 
to conform and are left without a means for communicating non-normative experiences (Danto, p. 
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123), a claim which all sounds rather like some feminist critiques of patriarchal linguistic 
structures.  
Thus Danto finds that “Nietzsche must then himself felt constrained, through the logic of 
his position, to develop new terms to give odd and special twists of meaning to old terms, to warp 
common speech or the hammer out a whole new tongue” (Danto, p. 123). Translation back into 
banal ordinary language would thus cheapen Danto’s Nietzsche’s thought, and he therefore felt he 
would be at best understood only poorly by his contemporaries. So Nietzsche tried to speak to 
future generations95 (Danto, p. 123-4). “Knowledge” can no longer mean the same thing; Danto’s 
Nietzsche’s definition of das Bekannte “is only ‘that to which we are accustomed, so that we no 
longer wonder at it; the commonplace, any kind of rule which is fixed, whatever we are at home 
with” (Danto, p. 124, cf. GS 355). Despite Nietzsche’s rejection of utilitarianism,96 Danto finds 
that Nietzsche defines both truth and knowledge with relation to utility (Danto, p. 124). 
Additionally, Nietzsche describes knowledge as ‘false’ when we treat it under the 
ordinary language definition of correspondence while he at the same time finds the errors of 
knowledge pragmatically ‘true’ insomuch as those errors are useful; this flexibility is both 
liberating and terrifying for Danto’s Nietzsche at the same time (Danto, p. 124). Nietzsche’s 
analysis of dreams also connected to the discussion of perspective and knowledge within 
psychology. In particular, note the discussion of ‘imaginary causes’ (Danto, p. 125, cf. NL 732, 
HATH 13, D 119, TI V:4, NL 442) and how it has a much wider application than merely to 
dreams; to be specific, Danto finds that these arguments also apply to the distinction between the 
real world and the world of appearance (Danto, p. 127, cf. NL 442, 673, TI P). The destruction of 
the duality shows that inner and outer are merely correlative, and hence Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism and psychology internally relate (Danto, p. 128, cf. NL 667, D 48).  
                                                          
95 My hope is that we have no begun to transition into these future generations. 
96 See GM I:2, p. 25-6. At a moral level, Nietzsche rejects utility as being too remote a concern to account 
for human action; similarly, at the epistemological level, Nietzsche rejects utility as equally too remote to 
account for human judgment. 
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Danto concludes by going too far: “The world has no rational structure other than what 
we have given to it, recapturing with a philosophical left hand what we have given with a 
psychological right one” (Danto, p. 128). Rather, I would say that we cannot know whether there 
is structure beyond our perception in part because we structuring perceivers. Where Higgins sees 
skill, Danto sees “lapses,” of Nietzsche’s critical insight, “sheer dramatization,” and “verbal 
perversity” as “tiresome philosophical jokes” when Nietzsche discusses the irrationality of reason 
and other such seeming contradictions (Danto, p. 128). Despite the fact that reason, truth, 
knowledge, etc. are all airy fictions of our own creation, Danto’s Nietzsche claims that we cannot 
abandon them and we are incredibly lucky to have made these mistakes. Ultimately our goal is to 
find out what moral prejudices still obstruct and deform our perceptions, as when the Church 
denied the elliptical as opposed to circular movement of heavenly bodies (Danto, p. 129). With 
this, Danto turns to Nietzsche’s moral critiques. 
Danto’s chapter on morality opens with two statements making very different claims: “It 
is not a criticism of the beliefs we hold regarding the world when one says that all of them are 
false” and “It is not the fact that they are false to which Nietzsche objects when he considers these 
beliefs critically” (Danto, p. 130). The first statement is very broad, the second very narrow; and 
while one might object to the first, I find the second to be true. Nietzsche’s primary objection, in 
my opinion, is that certain beliefs may be damaging to human flourishing and even to the survival 
of the species. Danto arrives at a similar conclusion first going by way of contemporary theory, 
finding that Nietzsche’s primary criticism of flawed beliefs has to do with second-order beliefs or 
beliefs about beliefs, particularly the belief that our beliefs should be true, that they ought to 
correspond to facts. Thus, Danto finds that “The fact that our beliefs are false relative to that 
theory of truth (the Correspondence Theory) in accordance with which we demanded that they be 
true, is perfectly irrelevant as to whether we should hold these beliefs” (Danto, p. 130). 
Correspondence ultimately does us little to no good in an anti-realist ontology, and the falseness 
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of a belief in correspondence theory is therefore not a good reason to abandon that belief. The 
pay-off comes when Danto reaches the claim that we should only abandon the expectation of 
correspondence, because the real value of beliefs lies in their perpetuation of life (Danto, p. 130, 
cf. BGE 4). Thus Danto finds that Nietzsche is not attacking common sense but rather the 
philosophical justifications added onto common sense beliefs; in short, “Nietzsche’s polemic has 
been with philosophers” (Danto, p. 131).  
Philosophers supposedly strive for rigor and caution, but Danto’s Nietzsche claims that 
especially the earlier philosophers failed to accomplish this goal: “earlier philosophers were 
slack: they never really succeeded in calling into question, or even recognizing for what they 
were, the deep falsehoods and unexpendable fictions which were worked out in the predawn of 
the human mind. Consequently, philosophers were locating their foundations upon foundations 
already there, so to speak, their edifices conforming to a conceptual geography laid down by the 
primitive mentality, and so familiar as not to have been detected as even present” (Danto, p. 131, 
cf. BGE 3, 5, and 6). Indeed, the claim that every philosophy is the confession of its originator 
seems especially true of moral philosophy for Danto’s Nietzsche, despite their attempts to make a 
science of morality. Part of the problem is that our moral claims are interpenetrated with our 
factual claims about perception, and vice versa (Danto, p. 132).  
Danto’s Nietzsche objects that it is our beliefs about our beliefs which are problematic: 
“Philosophers might acknowledge that they are lobbying and not reporting” when they moralize 
(Danto, p. 133). Of course, moralizing, preferring, and valuing are all just what life is, and our so-
called moral discoveries are just discoveries about ourselves rather than discoveries about the 
world because there is no such thing as moral phenomena, just interpretations thereof (Danto, p. 
133, cf. BGE 108, TI VI:1). Danto takes this to be a special instance of Nietzsche’s more general 
thesis that there are no facts at all, “But it is as though his entire general philosophy was a 
preparation for this application” (Danto, p. 133). Again, Danto’s Nietzsche’s goal is meta: he 
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wants us to jettison our meta-ethical beliefs concerning how we justify our moral beliefs, while 
still retaining those moral beliefs which survive revaluation.  
Despite the fact that Danto says Nietzsche wants us to abandon our second-order beliefs 
he still writes, point blank, that “There is no constraint to the abandonment of beliefs,” (Danto, p. 
134) presumably referring only to first-order beliefs. While I agree with Danto that Nietzsche 
sees in his revaluation the opening up of “the possibility that an entirely different kind of 
justification might allow us a choice among moralities far wider than we had imagined,” (Danto, 
p. 134), I disagree that this does not entail rejecting any of our current beliefs, precisely because if 
we find that other justifications allow us such a choice between moral systems, we would end up 
rejecting some previously held beliefs in favor of others.  
However, I do agree with Danto that “the critique of moral systems, which Nietzsche 
sustained during his productive period was not incompatible with his fierce and militant advocacy 
of the overthrow of one morality and the acceptance of another” (Danto, p. 134). In other words, 
criticizing morality is compatible with advocating overthrowing one moral system in favor of 
another. I would even take this further, and claim that criticizing axiology is just as compatible 
with advocating overthrowing on axiological scheme in favor of another, and this applies within 
feminist criticisms as well. Danto sees this as Nietzsche basically playing two roles, namely that 
of moral critic and moralist. As an immoralist or moral critic, Nietzsche scrutinized moral 
systems specifically and morality generally, but as a moralist he would sometimes advocate 
certain moral principles himself by condemning or endorsing various claims (Danto, p. 134-5). 
Thus Danto has Nietzsche as sometimes speaking from an extramoral position, and at other times 
speaking from contramoral positions.  
This is where Danto connects Nietzsche to Hume more extensively. First he reviews the 
naturalistic fallacy, wherein one derives a moral prescription from a factual (and presumably non-
moral) description; an argument is not fallacious according to this scheme if the facts from which 
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one derives the prescription are themselves moral facts. However, Danto’s Nietzsche denies the 
very existence of such moral facts, and finds that the distinction between non-moral and moral 
facts is metalinguistic (Danto, p. 135-6). Danto then proceeds to explain how Nietzsche 
accounted for moral interpretations, noting that Nietzsche was concerned with the “value of 
value” (Danto, p. 136, cf. NL 480, see also NL 485 and BGE 4). In particular, Danto cites the 
following claims: Morality is just obedience to custom (Danto, p. 136, cf. D 9), and custom may 
not have any intrinsic use, but customs qua custom are useful in a way because “Any rule is 
better than none” (Danto, p. 137, citing D 16). Morality, however, does not consist solely in a set 
of customs because it typically offers reasons for the rules. Nietzsche saw the actual practice of 
morality as the imposition of the will to power of one upon another, but this is not how morality 
typically justifies itself. Further, morality demands sacrifices of the individual, requiring her to 
conform, and the group adhering to a moral system will prune those individuals who fail (Danto, 
p. 137).  
Nietzsche identifies these reasons as “imaginary causalities” (Danto, p. 137, D 10, see 
also HATH 96) which ‘stupefy’ us (Danto, p. 138, cf. D 19). Further, while a moral system 
preserves the life of the group, it can also damage or even halt the life of the individual and 
“Instead of becoming a means for the successful conduct of life, it becomes a brake against the 
furtherance of life and fulfillment for the living” (Danto, p. 138). What is disappointing is that in 
response to Nietzsche’s claim that morality and religion belong “to a stage of ignorance at which 
the concept of reality, of any distinction between imaginary and real, is lacking” (Danto, p. 138, 
TI VI:1), Danto goes on to say very little that is enlightening or helpful: “In such comments one 
feels a tension in Nietzsche’s thought. How, after all, can he distinguish real from imaginary? 
What sense can he give to the notion of ‘reality’ at all except a negative and unspecifying one?” 
(Danto, p. 138). Following this “general reservation,” Danto moves on to conclude that we can 
easily connect Nietzsche’s views into a coherent account of morality. For one thing, the two 
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rhetorical questions do nothing justify the claim Danto is making, namely that Nietzsche only 
gives us a negative notion of reality, and for another thing, Danto provides no explanation of what 
this notion is.  
Contrary to Nietzsche’s seeming barbarism, Danto finds that in actuality, “It cannot be 
said that Nietzsche stood for the ‘natural’ discharge of emotional energy and a ruthless pushing 
back of emotional restraint. What he did stand for is plain enough, if less exciting. He is, as usual, 
employing language whose power is so in excess of the point he wishes to make that it drives him 
past his message into bordering conceptual territory” (Danto, p. 147-8). Rather, Danto’s 
Nietzsche advocates “a qualification on our attitudes toward the emotional and passionate side of 
men. He is attacking what he takes to be a tendency to extirpate rather than to spiritualize or 
discipline the passions. Philosophers, he felt, were frightened of the passions…But like any force 
in nature, their danger is compensated for by their utter necessity, and the problem is essentially 
how to give them form and purpose” (Danto, p. 148). So Nietzsche had two goals: one, making 
the passions less frightening, and two, making the passions less dominating (Danto, p. 148, cf. 
WS 37).  
Danto’s Nietzsche also deviates from the ancients in that “he was not seeking a ‘formula’ 
for leading a happy life…[but] in breaking through to a new metaphysics and a new morality, and 
he believed that this could be effected only through modifications in our emotional life and 
release within us of the ‘life-conditioning’ effects” (Danto, p. 149, Danto provides no citation for 
the quotes). Danto again concludes with victim-blaming: “He cannot, of course, be completely 
exonerated from the misinterpretations that have been given of him. He might have said what he 
meant more plainly and with less conflagrating a language…” and generally misled us about how 
difficult his thought was (Danto, p. 149-50).  
Nietzsche’s immoralism is thus more anti-Christianity than it is anti-morality, but I think 
Danto goes again too far by saying that Nietzsche finds all morality opposed to animality (Danto, 
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p. 160) because going beyond is not necessarily a movement in opposition. Danto further finds 
that Nietzsche’s primal horde/herd has little application to contemporary society, and that master 
morality is not identifiable with our own heroes who only illustrate rather than creating morality 
(Danto, p. 160). Danto wraps up the chapter by nothing that Nietzsche “Finally, as though 
forgetting completely his main perspectivistic message, he goes on to speak of aristocrats and 
slaves as natural kinds” (Danto, p. 161, citing BGE 259), as if the belief in nature subscribes one 
to belief in natural kinds, and as if perspectivism necessarily denies the existence of natural kinds. 
Further, Danto finds that “Nietzsche often falls into the stupidest errors of the social Darwinian, 
identifying survival with excellence,” (Danto, p. 161) when I would again say this is a failing on 
Danto’s reading rather than on Nietzsche’s writing, for Nietzsche frequently identifies cases of 
flourishing and prefers them to cases of mere survival. What happens when masters apply slave 
morality to themselves requires a trip into religious psychology, wherein Danto does find 
Nietzsche to be both “original and deep” (Danto, p. 161).  
Though he did not state it, Danto seems to be moving (admittedly haphazardly) through 
Nietzsche’s books somewhat in order of publication; Chapter Two addresses Birth of Tragedy 
and some of Nietzsche’s early unpublished writings for the most part, Chapter Three Human, All-
Too-Human, Daybreak, and Wanderer, Chapters Four and Five a mixture of Beyond Good and 
Evil, Gay Science, and Twilight of the Idols. This chapter appears to refer primarily to the 
Genealogy, Seven to Zarathustra and Ecce Homo, and Eight largely depends on the Nachlass. 
The Nachwort at the end only references BGE, and Danto appears to have left Antichrist out 
entirely. With the Genealogy, Danto’s Nietzsche introduces the idea that “moralities have a 
genealogy, which is to say that they descended and evolved and were not, as it were, handed 
down from on high by some supreme and superhuman giver of laws” (Danto, p. 162). 
While moralities have both use and function, Nietzsche brings up the possibility that a 
morality can outlive its original utility, the result of which can be stunting the growth of a people. 
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In such a situation, as Danto’s Nietzsche believed was the case for contemporary Europe, the 
people need a new morality. Danto accounts for Nietzsche’s tone shifts by noting both his hope 
that we, or superior humans, would develop a new table of values and his diagnostic aim of 
determining why humanity – or at least European culture – seemed to be in decline. In GM 
Nietzsche offers a “more refined psychological analysis” than he had previously given in BGE 
(Danto, p. 163), one conclusion of which is that what is best for the most powerful individuals 
may not perpetuate the longest survival of the group: “These ends are neither interdependent nor, 
for that matter, even compatible” (Danto, p. 164), though I would add the caveat “at least not 
necessarily.”  
Danto explores Nietzsche’s two psychological innovations, bad consciousness and 
ressentiment, as means for the slave revolt in morality; in particular, Danto’s Nietzsche explains 
how the slaves affect an “odd strabismus in moral optics” by getting masters to evaluate 
themselves from the perspective of slaves through religious doctrine (Danto, p. 164-5). Nietzsche 
is specifically discussing Judeo-Christian religious doctrine when he talks about slave morality; 
Danto takes care to note Nietzsche was not an anti-Semite but an anti-anti-Semite, but at the same 
time, Danto feels Nietzsche is once again to blame for his own misinterpretations: “If he was not 
an anti-Semite, his language is misleading to a point of irresponsibility” and it is no wonder, even 
plausible, that Nazis were drawn to Nietzsche.  
Further, Danto claims that “the subsequent disaster of Nazism, and the semiofficial 
adaptation of Nietzsche as the philosopher of that ghastly movement, have given to this negligible 
aspect of his thought an importance quite out of proportion to its systematic relevance” (Danto, p. 
166-7). By contrast, I would say that racism is highly systematically relevant for any philosopher, 
particularly if we take seriously the claim that philosophies are the biographies of their authors; it 
is no surprise we find Kantian moral theory so problematic given that it comes from the same 
thinker who perpetuated the notion of biological racial determinism. While I do not think Kantian 
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moral theory depends on racism any more than racism depends on Kantian moral theory, I 
suspect that the problems with both can be and frequently are interconnected. 
Contrariwise, with regard to Nietzsche’s purported misogyny, Danto is mum, saying only 
about Schopenhauer: “If some insane dictator had come into power on a program of misogyny, 
and consequently been responsible for the death of six million women, we should be disinclined, 
supposing this man had read and been inspired by Schopenhauer, to regard that philosopher’s 
antipathy toward women with the indulgence we now assign it” (Danto, p. 167). Thus we may 
deduce that Danto regards Nietzsche’s purported misogyny in a similar light, something admitted 
but to be indulged, perhaps because he was a product of his time, perhaps for some more 
substantial reason. Note again that I reject the idea that a philosopher can be forgiven the 
prejudices ‘of his time’ whenever there are those within that time and place who object to those 
prejudices. Complete and total ignorance of counter-arguments to prejudice only mitigates the 
blame of the prejudiced, it does not erase it, and it is hard to believe that most well-read 
philosophers could be wholly ignorant of such counter-arguments. 
Danto also claims must view Nietzsche’s ‘admiration’ for the aristocratic type as 
“something akin to the excesses we find in some of our contemporary writers on sex, who are apt 
to dramatize matters in proportion to the inertia they feel they must overcome as erotic reformers” 
(Danto, p. 169). Danto shudders at the notion of the ‘blond beast’ despite recognizing its 
reference to lions and Nietzsche’s inclusion of Romans, Arabs, and Vikings.97  
Now consider the grammar behind the discharge of drives: “If we assume that a drive 
simply is discharge (as Nietzsche’s theory seems to require), and not something which is the 
                                                          
97 It is strange to me that Danto thinks that if lions had been black Nietzsche would have been taken up as 
support for African rather than German nationalists. On the one hand, there is no single African nation but 
many, many African nations; had Danto said ‘Nigerian nationalism’ instead, he might have been more on 
point. But on the other hand, Danto is completely disregarding the historical European tendency to 
associate good with light, hence also gold and white, and evil with darkness. I find it highly dubious that 
Nietzsche’s hypothetical ‘black beast’ would have meant the same thing to Europeans or Africans that 
‘blond beast’ did for German Nazis. 
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subject of the verb discharge, then there will be discharging during the time the prohibition holds; 
if the prohibition is obeyed, the discharge will not be against an external object. This leaves only 
the possibility of an internal object, the person himself, as it were, who turns his aggressive 
discharges inward. Intensity remains constant, only direction changes” (Danto, p. 179, cf. GM 
II:16). This internalization or Verinnerlichung helps in turn to develop consciousness as it entails 
a struggle of the will against itself. But Danto’s Nietzsche does not see this triumph of morality 
over animality as a bad thing: “Nietzsche was not asking for release from its cage of the beast 
which morality hemmed in; he was not, in the name of some specious theory of happy 
savagehood, urging reversion to barbarity, or to an infantile immediacy in the reduction of drives. 
Nietzsche was asking that we go beyond what we are, not back to what we were” (Danto, p. 180). 
And I am inclined to agree with this characterization of Nietzsche, though I do not agree with 
Danto that this entails Nietzsche’s assent to the righteousness of conventional morality.  
What Danto takes as evidence that Christian morality caused much to live that should 
have died, I also take as evidence that humanity is not improving according to Nietzsche’s view 
(Danto, p. 186, cf. TI IX:14). Finally, note that Danto finds “truly incoherent” the fact that 
Nietzsche speaks “as though an objectively better type of being can be talked of, whereas it is 
wrong to take normative criteria as having the least bearing on the way things are to be judged in 
reality,” (Danto, p. 187). Had Danto recognized that Nietzsche was not speaking in this objective 
mode but rather referring to his own new standards of types of beings, perhaps Danto would not 
have seen this as “an unpleasantly tangled pocket in his system, and an aberration from the 
overwhelmingly dominant direction of his thought” (Danto, p. 187).  
Once humanity became conscious, we discovered that we were in constant danger; not 
only were we in disharmony with nature but we were in disharmony with ourselves: “we suffer 
from the disparity between what we are and what we hope” (Danto, p. 189). This suffering 
becomes meaningful when we create religion; and while Danto is right that Nietzsche believes 
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any reason is better than no reason, I would also add the claim that some reasons are better than 
others. Also note that our instincts do not decrease but are redirected through religion. Now onto 
the second topic introduced above: “The ascetic ideals are only exemplified in religious life; and 
religion itself, as Nietzsche wishes to see it now, is only exemplified through what would in 
common speech be called religions” (Danto, p. 190). This broad sense allows us to see how one 
can be religious in a broad sense while still being antireligious in a more narrow sense; a devoted 
medical doctor may object to Christian Science, for example. We are still pious “insofar as we 
continue to believe in truth” (Danto, p. 191). 
Danto proceeds to draw the inference that if God is dead, and God is truth, then truth 
must be dead as well, which Danto takes to be a Nietzsche’s clear statement of nihilism: “Is this 
not another way of stating that there is perhaps no truth, no objective order, nothing which we 
must acknowledge as higher than ourselves, as fixed, eternal, and unchanging? Which is 
nihilism?” (Danto, p. 191, cf. GS 344). By contrast, I would argue that Nietzsche’s end is not 
nihilism but the instatement of wholly new gods, truths, and idols. Danto also makes mention of 
his disagreement with Kaufmann’s claim that Nietzsche believed himself to also remain pious to 
the truth in a footnote on this page. Danto also cites GM III:24 and 25 to back up his claim that 
Nietzsche’s “ultimate question concerning truth” (Danto, p. 192) is whether we should even 
believe truth exists and has value; science is no help because it is just as much a mere perspective 
as religion is (Danto, p. 193). 
Here is where I think Danto makes his essential interpretive misstep: “He had hit upon 
the idea that for a statement to be true, nothing need correspond to it. Then he made a 
metaphysical principle of this ‘not’ by saying that nothing corresponded to our proposition, so 
that – since they were meant to say something – all propositions were false” (Danto, p. 193). I 
agree that Nietzsche hits upon the idea that truth need not be mere correspondence, but I don’t 
think that this necessarily entailed a commitment to this negative metaphysical claim, and instead 
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I would say that the statement “all propositions are false” only means ‘false’ in the sense of 
correspondence. Despite this misstep, I feel Danto gets back on track with his recognition that 
Nietzsche does not want us to regress but to become creative in the face of the death of 
correspondence truth.  
 
§7 Danto on the Übermensch, Eternal Recurrence, and the Will-to-Power 
In the seventh chapter, Danto defines Nietzsche’s Nihilism as “his idea that there is no 
order or structure objectively present in the world and antecedent to the form we ourselves give 
it” (Danto, p. 195), whereas I would argue Nietzsche’s claim is not this form of anti-realist 
dogmatism Danto presents, but instead the deflationary metaphysical claim that we cannot make 
claims about what is objectively present in the world and antecedent to the form we ourselves 
give it from the position of perspectival knowledge precisely because discussion of the objective 
requires aperspectival or non-perspectival knowledge, an oxymoron. It is Nietzsche’s rejection of 
aperspectival knowledge which leads to the consequences Danto explains next.  
The consequence of accepting this nihilism according to Danto’s Nietzsche is a lack of 
temptation to disesteem human life in favor of alternate worlds; Nietzsche’s sense of urgency was 
motivated by an attempt to get humanity to make more of itself than it had previously been 
capable because of its acceptance of false philosophies (Danto, p. 195). Thus Nietzsche’s 
philosophy seeks to provide affirmative ideas which motivate human flourishing; Danto identifies 
two primary ideas for this chapter, namely the Übermensch and eternal recurrence. Danto 
explains that Nietzsche selected Zarathustra as his spokesman because it was Zoroastrian 
religious philosophy which first made the error of supposing moral value to be an objective 
feature of the world; thus, to rectify this error, “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra announced the relativity 
of all values and moralities, saying, in various ways, that each people heretofore had adhered to a 
different schedule of values, worked out for them in connection with the local conditions of their 
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perdurance” (Danto, p. 196, cf. EH IV:3). In the face of this relativity, these thousand goals, 
Zarathustra proposes a single, unitary goal: the Übermensch (Danto, p. 196, cf. TSZ P3 and 1:15). 
Danto seems to find frustrating the fact that “it is a goal of singular indefiniteness and 
unspecificity” despite Nietzsche’s contrast of the Übermensch with the “Last Man” or der Letzte 
Mensch “who is and wishes to be as much like everyone else as possible, and who would be 
happy just to be happy” (Danto, p. 197, cf. TSZ P5). Part of Danto’s frustration may be caused by 
his inability to identify the ‘last men’ in contemporary society, variously comparing them to the 
complacent, the resigned, and those who leave well enough alone, as well as those who “feel that 
human beings are what they are, that human nature cannot be changed,” (Danto, p. 197), the last 
of which being a position that some might ascribe to Nietzsche himself, and which Danto has 
even implied in this text (see Danto’s discussion of Nietzsche’s treatment of drives and instincts 
as something that cannot be changed, p. 189, 150-2, 178-80). If anything, I would say the 
complacent and resigned fit the category of der Letzte Mensch better than the others, and I feel 
that those who primarily exemplify these last humans are dogmatists of all stripes, those who 
believe they have a monopoly on truth and hence happiness.  
Most important is Danto’s recognition that “The Übermensch is not the blond beast. The 
blond beast remains behind, hopefully forever. The Übermensch lies ahead” (Danto, p. 198). 
Danto feels it is insufficient for Nietzsche/Zarathustra to merely enjoin us to be better, and that 
Nietzsche ought to be blamed for leaving the specifics so open, given how Elisabeth convinced 
Hitler he was the Übermensch, and how later readers believed Nietzsche specifically meant one 
of his heroes, such as Goethe, Napoleon, or Cesare Borgia (Danto, p. 198). Danto feels Nietzsche 
should have made it clearer that there has never yet been an Übermensch, one Danto identifies as 
having great command over both intellectual and passionate internal life without the pettiness of 
mere humanity (Danto, p. 199, cf. TSZ II:4). 
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Danto identifies Nietzsche’s belief that the Übermensch was not inevitable as the reason 
why this ideal was not Darwinian (Danto, p. 200).98 Nietzsche makes much of the fact that 
humanity seems frequently to level off and enter stasis in the midst of its spiritual development, 
what I would characterize as Nietzsche’s recognition of cultural decadence or decay; at the same 
time, Danto’s Nietzsche believes that humanity cannot reach its final stage because no final stage 
exists, because if it existed humanity would have reached it already (Danto, p. 201). Danto 
identifies this claim as one of the consequences of eternal recurrence: “Eternal Recurrences is the 
idea that whatever there is will return again, and that whatever there is, is a return of itself, that it 
has all happened before, and will happen again, exactly in the same way each time, forever” 
(Danto, p. 201-2, cf. Ecclesiastes 1:9, see also TSZ III:2, III:13:2). This claim that time is a circle, 
without beginning or end, only the endless repetition of the same story, seems to me to contradict 
Zarathustra’s dialogue with his animals, but that would take a great deal of exploration to explain. 
Danto states that Nietzsche seemed terrified by this most important teaching, his “most 
scientific of hypotheses” as well as “the highest formula of affirmation that can ever be attained” 
(Danto, p. 203, cf. NL 856 and EH III TSZ:I). The only places Danto identifies pronouncements 
of eternal recurrence in Nietzsche’s published works are in Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, 
Ecce Homo, and The Gay Science. Furthermore, Danto finds no argument or proof of the doctrine 
in these places, though there is a sketch of a book concerning eternal recurrence in the Nachlass. 
Evidence for the eternal recurrence would not be evidence in any simple sense, as exact 
resemblance to the past precludes clues to its repetition; therefore, “A simple-minded 
Verificationist could thus rule out the teaching as meaningless,” though such a treatment of 
meaning would not be profitable here (Danto, p. 204).  
Danto finishes the chapter with a discussion of Nietzsche’s response to this doctrine and 
its position within the history of science and philosophy. Nietzsche swings between horror, 
                                                          
98 I feel Danto makes the error of many Darwinians, which is to mistake evolution for progress. 
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mania, and despair, because “there is no meaning to the universe if it has no end” and therefore 
we must give our world a goal (Danto, p. 211), hence Danto’s pairing of the Übermensch with 
eternal recurrence. Ultimately, Danto derives a moral imperative from these paired doctrines: “So 
act (or so be) that you would be willing to act exactly the same way (or be exactly the same thing) 
an infinite number of times over” (Danto, p. 212, cf. EH II:10, TSZ III:13:2, and related passages 
concerning eternal recurrence and amor fati). If we heed this doctrine, Danto’s Nietzsche believes 
humanity will cease feeling ressentiment and hence be liberated (Danto, p. 212-3).  
The final chapter on the “Will-to-Power” begins with Danto’s explanation that he uses 
the phrase “Will-to-Power” throughout the book prior to explaining it because he feels much of 
Nietzsche’s thought would be poorly represented without reference to this doctrine, despite the 
fact that Nietzsche offers little explanation or emphasis on it within his published works (Danto, 
p. 214). In particular, Danto believes that “Nietzsche hoped to write a truly systematic work” 
concerning the will to power, “the constructive idea with which he was to replace all of what had 
heretofore passed for philosophy and much of what had passed as science,” and that Elizabeth 
had some justification for trying to compose Nietzsche’s notebooks into such a systematic work, 
though she did not succeed (Danto, p. 214). Like amor fati, eternal recurrence, and the 
Übermensch, Danto’s Nietzsche sees the will to power as an affirmation. Further, Danto declares 
it a pitfall for readers to assume that the will to power is something only blond beasts have; 
rather, “It is a generic trait of living creatures and, more important, it is not a drive alongside 
others, as for example the sex drive: the sex drive, the hunger drive, whatever drives there might 
be, are but modes and instances of Will-to-Power” (Danto, p. 215).  
Thus Danto sees will to power as what drives are, their substance in a sense, and not 
something we possess but rather something that we are, and not just humans but all things: “The 
entire world is Will-to-Power; there is nothing more basic, for there is nothing other than it and its 
modifications” (Danto, p. 215). Danto’s Nietzsche is therefore the progenitor of a new ontological 
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concept designed to answer the question “What exists?” or “What is there?” (Danto, p. 215). 
Danto sees Nietzsche methodology as primarily motivated by a principle of parsimony Danto 
calls Methodological Monism: “Given any pair of allegedly distinct things, one must always seek 
to find some connecting principle in virtue of which one is licensed to treat them alike, … we 
press toward a single principle in connection with which all may be treated as of a piece” (Danto, 
p. 215-6, cf. BGE 13, 36).  
Thus Danto’s Nietzsche’s program is to reduce all problems to psychology, specifically 
the psychology of unconscious, instinctual life (Danto, p. 216). Unifying human life with non-
human life, Danto’s Nietzsche derives a universally unifying principle, namely the will to power 
(Danto, p. 217). Danto also notes that Nietzsche qualified his work as hypothesis and experiment 
he could not refuse, and that Nietzsche’s notion of will is not merely psychological. Danto’s 
Nietzsche views mechanics as fiction which did not touch upon the fundamental quanta of the 
world, namely will to power (Danto, p. 218-9, cf. NL 778). Danto claims Nietzsche’s use of the 
word ‘will’ might have been intended to permit an easy analogy for his readers (Danto, p. 219).  
Danto concludes by relating will to power to nihilism by explaining that nihilism clears 
away old idols and allows us to be creative, because while we do need some meaning, it does not 
matter what meaning we choose. Ultimately, based on Danto’s description, I find that this form of 
nihilism is actually a world-denying rather than a world-affirming end, something Nietzsche 
rejects as insufficient for human flourishing. Nihilism does not generate creativity but rather 
stultifies the creator, for it says all purposes are without meaning, rather than allowing for new 
meanings. The afterword contains Danto’s advocacy of the careful scrutiny of Nietzsche’s work, 
hoping we might exercise more mature restraint than Nietzsche possessed, and he states “I hope 
that I have not merely imposed my own will-to-system upon the galaxy of fragments and 
aphorisms of which his work is composed – a corpus which critics sometimes think of as an 
immense literary deposit left by a philosopher who expressed himself in shards, so to speak, there 
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never having been a parent body to which they all once belonged” (Danto, p. 229). Danto 
indicates that he would “not be dismayed” if we could argue that any systematicity were 
misguided, but he would “be amazed” if we found any other system than he discovered (Danto, p. 
230).  
Danto here also raises the problem of whether Nietzsche’s philosophy, too, was only “a 
matter of mere convention, fiction, and Will-to-Power,” and whether Nietzsche attempted to say 
something true by saying that nothing was true (Danto, p. 230). Danto feels that Nietzsche was 
aware of this problem, given BGE 22: “Supposing that this, too, is only an interpretation – and 
one will be eager enough to raise this objection. Well – so much the better,” and hence we should 
only judge Nietzsche by the criterion of “whether his philosophy works in life” (Danto, p. 230), 
whatever Danto means by that, and which Danto finds unsatisfying. Despite this, Danto does 
believe that “There are assumptions of a profound philosophical nature behind Nietzsche’s 
system, sunk so deeply into the form of his thought that he perhaps never became conscious that 
they were there” (Danto, p. 231). Danto focuses on one assumption, namely the claim that “will 
can only act upon will” (Danto, p. 231, cf. BGE 36). Danto connects this to Nietzsche’s physics 
of wills, and compares it to Berkeley’s ontology (Danto, p. 231-2). Danto concludes by doubting 
this connection between Berkeley and Nietzsche, saying that if Nietzsche can be characterized as 
having an idealist philosophy, then it is “a dynamic idealism” (Danto, p. 232). 
 
§8  Conclusion 
One of the reasons I want to argue that Nietzsche is not a relativist is in fact because of 
the principle of charity: I would like to demonstrate that a philosopher I value does not make one 
of what I consider the most basic and sophomoric ethical (/epistemological/axiological) mistakes 
in human history. The fact that different ethical systems exist does not mean that all systems are 
equal in value, though each may have value in specific contexts for specific purposes. Likewise, 
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just because each has some value for some context does not mean that we therefore cannot rank 
those systems according to some new table of values or from some new perspective, although 
perhaps rather than ‘new’ I should just say ‘new to me’ or ‘new to you,’ since some Nietzsche 
scholars argue that the doctrine of eternal recurrence entails that there is quite literally nothing 
new under the sun.  
At this point it has become clearer to me that a lot of Nietzsche scholarship involves 
pitting one author’s version of Nietzsche against another author’s version. This is why I talk so 
much about Danto’s Nietzsche or Diethe’s Nietzsche or Clark’s Nietzsche; when talking about 
each of these author’s interpretations, I am attempting to provide a summary of the image of 
Nietzsche each presents, which is somewhat different from the image Nietzsche presents of 
himself. Each author has her own vision or interpretation of Nietzsche, distinct from but 
frequently having a family resemblance to Nietzsche’s Nietzsche (as we might discern from his 
own self-commentary, such as the preface of Birth of Tragedy and most of Ecce Homo), as well 
as sharing that resemblance with other authors’ Nietzsches.  
When philosophers engage in philology, they frequently take their own vision of the 
author for (if you will forgive the pun) the author-in-himself, and this is no less true of 
Nietzsche’s reading of himself than it is of his subsequent readers. This is related to the central 
problem of perspectivism, and the central problem of this dissertation: why is my Nietzsche a 
superior image to the others? Why should we not just read Nietzsche and arrive at our own 
individual conclusions? – a remarkably Protestant attitude to take, as opposed to the more 
Catholic attitude of seeking the correct interpretation from a single holy source, and likewise a 
subjectivist approach in a field where so many seem to buy into objectivism and realism and other 
ontologically absolutist ideas.  
I do not know that my goal is to attempt what I consider the impossible task of revealing 
the author’s true intended meaning. I do not feel my role is either that of apologist or literalist or 
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high priestess of Nietzsche; perhaps I see myself more similarly to how Nietzsche sometimes said 
he saw himself – a psychologist, or a scientist, even a genealogist, but most of all I see myself as 
one of these who is trying to work out what comes next. What I am really trying to do here is to 
get to those ideas Nietzsche presented which I find extraordinarily useful or important for 
philosophy, feminism, and feminist philosophy. Regardless of whether Nietzsche’s own 
presentation is ultimately incoherent, bigoted, or whatever, I feel that he had a lot of those useful 
or important ideas, and my role is almost one of a facilitator, even a Socratic midwife and nanny; 
I want to generate a structure or perspective through which to understand these ideas and which 
makes them more accessible and useful to others or, more poetically, I want to assist Nietzsche’s 
troubled labor and provide a nurturing environment for the ideas to begin growing. These are two 
sides to the same act, and by being involved in the process, by optically lensing Nietzsche’s 
thought through my own perspectives, I hope to make the best parts clearer without obscuring 
anything significant.  
If my treatment is more accurate than any other’s treatment, then it would be for the 
following reasons: for one thing, I am attempting to be both as comprehensive as possible and to 
follow Nietzsche’s thought as chronologically as possible, both to account for any change in his 
ideas as well as to look for what remains consistent. In this way, I hope to avoid the pitfalls I have 
discovered in other authors’ works throughout my research; many authors make uncited claims 
about Nietzsche’s specific ideas, and at least one author on at least one occasion explicitly 
referred to a published work while citing the Nachlass. I have yet to encounter a single book 
which uses my methodology: working from the beginning to the end of Nietzsche’s published 
texts and searching for all possible references to relevant terminology. More importantly, I am 
approaching this project with the understanding that I am working from within not one but 
several different perspectives, not only concerning my lived, bodily experience, but also 
concerning my academic inheritance; I assent to Nietzsche’s claim that knowledge is not 
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objective but by definition always from some perspective, while at the same time having the 
training to want to avoid relativism, and likewise having the training to recognize how important 
a role the feminine metaphor plays in this discussion of truth while at the same time recognizing 
how important a role Nietzsche’s treatment of truth plays in his discussion of both women and 
feminism. Just as I have yet to see a book with my research methodology, I have also yet to see a 
book-length work by a single author which focuses primarily on the relationship between 
Nietzsche’s axiology and his treatment of women and feminism.  
However, the value of my work need not rest only on its uniqueness and comprehensive 
methodology; I also hope to demonstrate that my perspective makes a lot of Nietzsche’s ideas 
work better. In other words, what I mean to say is that I want to salvage Nietzsche’s best ideas 
from the worst interpretations which make those ideas appear bankrupt or self-undermining at 
first blush. I feel like Kaufmann did some of this work in his demonstration that Nietzsche was 
not a proto-Nazi and actually an anti-anti-Semite, and that Nietzsche’s philosophy reflects this 
coherently. I want to further this work to the best of my ability, standing on the shoulders of the 
giants who came before me to reach just a little bit further. I both want to demonstrate that 
Nietzsche’s ideas deserve to have a respectable place within the philosophical and feminist 
canons and perhaps to show by correlation that those philosophies and feminisms which ignore 
these ideas might just be lacking something important. At his best, I believe Nietzsche proves 
himself to be an anti-misogynist if not a kind of proto-feminist as well. 
I want to side with Clark and Leiter, among others, who reject the relativist interpretation 
of perspectivism as described by the Received View and the falsification thesis, and argue that 
Nietzsche gives us several reasons that perspectivism is not merely empty relativism precisely 
because it denies the falsification thesis and the Received View. The passage from the Genealogy 
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states that all knowledge99 is necessarily from a perspective, the core perspectivism claim 
according to Leiter, and it further states that one’s knowledge can be better or worse dependent 
on how many perspectives one can utilize, or at least this is implicit in the plurality claim that 
more perspectives means better, more complete knowledge (Leiter, p. 345); we could therefore 
take this as a pluralism rather than as a relativism claim, namely stating that because knowledge 
is perspectival, and because perspectives are plural, therefore knowledge is plural in its sources, 
and perhaps in other ways as well.100 Further, perspectivism entails a rejection of the Kantian 
thing-in-itself (Wilcox, p. 144) and arguably also a rejection of the Platonic Forms (see, for 
example, TI  IV “History of an Error,” p. 485), but neither of these positions necessarily commits 
Nietzsche to relativism.  
Contrary to Clark, I think perspectivism is a rejection of even minimal commonsense 
correspondence theory about truth (see Clark, p. 135), but I do think that perspectivism offers a 
standard for ranking knowledge from different perspectives in terms of pluralism. In rejecting 
disinterested knowledge, perspectivism still designates some beliefs as non-knowledge claims 
even for Nietzsche, but rather than being false because such claims fail to correspond to reality, 
such claims are false because they are disinterested and attempts at non-perspectival or 
aperspectival knowledge, what Nietzsche sees as an oxymoron. Thus there are at least two 
perspectivisms here: a perspectivism of knowledge and a perspectivism of truth;101 these entail a 
rejection of the axiological standard of disinterested objectivity with regards to both truth and 
knowledge, and a rejection of axiological relativism with regards to both as well. We can further 
extend perspectivism to describe a much broader axiological perspectivism, namely the claim that 
all assignments of value occur from some perspective or set of perspectives (Simpson, p. 9). 
                                                          
99 Arguably this claim is extendable to the different ‘knowledges’ addressed in standpoint theory. 
100 Such as its truth valuations; rather than either ‘true’ or ‘false,’ a knowledge claim can be ‘true for x’ 
where ‘x’ is some perspective, interest, or affective interpretation.  
101 There could also perhaps be perspectivism of belief, justification, coherence, reliability, etc., but these 
are not directly pertinent to the two paragraphs from GM III:12.  
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Finally, because Nietzsche rejects the Kantian noumenal realm and the Platonic realm of the 
Forms as making similar errors, I also think that perspectivism entails at least in part the 
deflationary metaphysical claim that we cannot make metaphysical claims about what truth and 
falsity entail for reality because we have no knowledge about our access or lack thereof to non-
perceivable realms, whether noumenal or intelligible. I will reserve my own interpretation of the 
passage from the Genealogy for the third chapter. I also hope to address the relationship between 
Nietzschean perspectivism and feminist standpoint theory, and possibly between perspectivism 
and pragmatism, in order to more fully develop perspectivism not only as an epistemology but 
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Chapter 3: An Account of Nietzsche’s Remarks Regarding Women, 
Gender, and Feminism 
   
§1  A Biographical Sketch 
  §2 Nietzsche’s Early Period 
  §3 Nietzsche’s Middle Period 
  §4  Nietzsche’s Late or Mature Period 
  §5 Conclusion 
 
Now I would like to transition to Nietzsche himself and his works. I will begin by 
offering a biographical sketch emphasizing those aspects of his life not covered by Diethe and 
Danto and which are particularly relevant to the charge of misogyny. The remaining sections of 
this chapter will be devoted to a comprehensive and chronological look at what Nietzsche says 
about women. My index on Women, Gender, and Intersections102 provides the groundwork for 
this chapter, covering all of Nietzsche’s references to women, including references that do not use 
either the German weib or frau but rather discuss mothers, goddesses, maidens, girls, etc. While 
this index also includes references to masculinity, race, and class, the discussion of these topics 
would extend this dissertation overlong, and so I will refrain and save these for future research. 
To be sure, should Nietzsche prove to be a paradigmatic racist or classist, this would cause 
problems for any reader seeking to classify him as a contemporary feminist, as many 
contemporary feminists adhere to principles such as intersectionality which rightly and strongly 
devalue racist and classist thought. 
I divide Nietzsche’s works into four sections: his ‘early period’ including Birth of 
Tragedy, the Untimely Meditations, and the unpublished essay “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-
Moral Sense” ; the ‘middle’ period including Human, All-Too-Human and its two additional 
                                                          
102 See Appendix: Index 2. 
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sections Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and His Shadow, as well as Daybreak 
(also known as The Dawn) and Gay Science; and the ‘late’ or ‘mature’ period including Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, the Genealogy of Morals, the Antichrist, The Case of 
Wagner, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Nietzsche contra Wagner. If I include a discussion 
of Nietzsche’s Nachlass beyond the essay “On Truth and Lie,” it will come in the penultimate 
section of this chapter. Different authors divide Nietzsche’s works a number of different ways; 
Brian Leiter even states that Daybreak is the first book of Nietzsche’s mature intellectual life.103 I 
place the beginning of Nietzsche’s ‘mature’ period at the start of Zarathustra because it is 
important for the purposes of this dissertation to distinguish between Nietzsche’s philosophy 
before and after the infamous Salomé events, and I start the ‘middle’ period with Nietzsche’s 
positivist turn in Human, All-Too-Human. 
 
§1 A Biographical Sketch 
 
 Friedrich ‘Fritz’ Wilhelm Nietzsche was born on the ides of October, 1844, in the village 
of Röcken, in Saxony, to Franziska Oehler Nietzsche (age 18), a young homemaker, and Karl 
Ludwig Nietzsche (age 30), a Lutheran pastor. As Diethe points out, other than his father, 
Nietzsche lived in a house of all women, and after the death of his father no men lived in the 
Nietzsche home (Diethe, p. 12); these women included the mother Franziska, the Aunts Rosalie 
and Augusta, the latter of whom died in 1855, Mine the maid, Fritz’s infamous sister Elizabeth 
Therese Alexandra Nietzsche, and until her passing in 1856 Ludwig’s widowed mother Erdmuthe 
Nietzsche, the matriarch of the family, described by Diethe as domineering (p. 13) but as kind 
and sickly by Young (p. 6). Unfortunately, Nietzsche was a tender four years old when his father 
passed away; and autopsy revealed that a quarter of Karl Ludwig’s brain was missing, so many 
                                                          
103 See Leiter’s Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Nietzsche on Morality (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2003), p. 33. 
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speculate his death was caused by some brain disease (Young, p. 9), and Kaufmann points out 
that this disease was probably not heritable, thus entailing that Nietzsche’s insanity must have 
been caused by some other problem (Kaufmann, p. 22). Nietzsche’s picturesque childhood 
suffered two further blows to its stability when first Joseph, his infant brother, also passed away, 
and when secondly the Vaterhaus or the Röcken vicarage had to be vacated for the next pastor, 
and the whole Nietzsche family moved to Erdmuthe’s hometown of Naumberg. 
 Nietzsche began experiencing blinding headaches in grammar school at the age of 10, but 
nonetheless was a devoted student (Young, p. 14) who intended to enter the priesthood like his 
father (Young, p. 18). At the age of 14, Nietzsche received a scholarship to the prestigious 
secondary school Pforta, where he remained until just shy of his twentieth birthday (Young, p. 
21-32). Following his time at Pforta, Nietzsche decided to apply to the University in Bonn, where 
he lived in the constant state of student poverty (Young, p. 51-3). Nietzsche fulfilled his civic 
duty as a conscript in war against Austria, until his myopia resulted in a nasty chest wound that 
kept him out of action for five months and had him temporarily declared unfit for service on his 
twenty-fourth birthday (Young, p. 74).  
 After his medical discharge, Nietzsche returned to Leipzig, where he first met Richard 
Wagner and began his tumultuous relationship. In 1869, the University of Basel invited Nietzsche 
to fill an assistant professorship, and promoted him to full professor only a year later (Young, p. 
78-9). Because the university required Nietzsche to give up his Prussian nationality, and because 
he never acquired Swiss nationality, his official status for the rest of his life was “heimatslos” or 
“homeless,” and so it is quite appropriate that he later described himself as simply European 
(Young, p. 80).  
 During his time in Basel, Nietzsche adjusted to Swiss life and survived a rather heavy 
teaching load until interrupted by the Franco-Prussian War (Young, p. 101). While Nietzsche did 
not initially appear to intend to involve himself in the Franco-Prussian War, despite having the 
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inclination to make use of his military training, he did eventually undergo training as a medical 
orderly in a precursor to the Red Cross (Young, p. 135-6). After less than a month of service, 
Nietzsche contracted a severe case of dysentery combined with diphtheria and spent over a month 
recuperating physically, though he continued to suffer from post-traumatic stress (Young, p. 138-
9). Though Nietzsche returned to teach at Basel in October 1870, by February of the next year he 
had to take sick leave because his health continued to be extremely poor after his wartime 
experiences (Young, p. 148).  
 During this period of his life, Nietzsche was frequently physically and psychologically ill, 
suffering both from depression and increasing ocular deterioration, as well as the after effects of 
dysentery. Nietzsche frequently had to take sick leave from his work as an educator, though he 
did begin to publish some of his own works, including Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely 
Meditations. Despite his own suffering, however, Nietzsche maintained friendships with many 
women and men through correspondence, and even on one occasion stood firmly in favor of the 
right of women to become educated. I will quote at length:  
What nearly all his women friends (Elizabeth excepted) have in common, however, is 
that they were intelligent, highly educated, and widely read. Biographically, therefore, it 
is no surprise that when the application of a Fräulein Rubinstein from Leipzig to enrol for 
a Ph.D. programme brought the question of admitting women to the university before the 
committee of Basel’s combined faculties on July 10, 1874, Nietzsche was among the four 
members who voted for their admission. Because, after a two-hour discussion, six faculty 
members (including Burckhardt) voted against admission, the motion was lost. But 
Nietzsche and the other three supporters of the motion must have been upset by the result, 
because they requested that their dissenting view be explicitly recorded. 
Young, p. 191 
Even Young notes how Nietzsche’s writings are “famously anti-feminist, even misogynistic,” by 
the time he reaches his mature phase, but what I want to ask at this point is whether Diethe was 
simply ignorant of Nietzsche’s defense of this female applicant during his tenure at Basel. While 
Diethe would not have had access to Julian Young’s biography, published in 2010, she should 
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have had access to C. P. Janz’s biography, published in 1978 which was well before even her 
1989 article, and so perhaps should have known about these events.  
 While I do not believe all or any of Nietzsche’s aphorisms about women can be simply 
brushed away on the basis of this single event, I do think this event is highly relevant to 
understanding Nietzsche’s implicit beliefs, particularly given the fact that he is so subtle and 
changes trains of thought so quickly in his writings. Any account of Nietzsche’s beliefs with 
regards to ‘scholarly women’ must address this event, whether to wave it away as the youthful 
indiscretion of an otherwise vehement misogynist, or to construct a complex narrative regarding 
education and gender. I will return to this point as I move through Nietzsche’s texts. At this time I 
only wish to emphasize Young’s claim that Nietzsche’s female friends and romantic interests 
were almost as a rule educated women, and to thus begin to challenge the notion that Nietzsche 
despised all women of learning. 
 Despite his reputation, Nietzsche’s remarks on women during this time seem frequently 
to be “extremely sympathetic to the plight of women in nineteenth-century, paternalistic society” 
because the butt of Nietzsche’s jokes and other remarks inevitably seems to be “not women but 
the male culture which forces them into devalued roles” (Young, p. 287). Indeed, Nietzsche 
himself writes that he does “not wish to present the appearance of diminishing women” and cuts 
out an entire passage which seems to do so because his “view of women should not be brought 
into contact with the word ‘domestic animal’” (Young, p. 287).104 However, as we shall see 
below, there are other instances in which Nietzsche aligns women with domesticated herd beasts 
such as cows when referring to democratic rights for men and women as cattle-rights,105 so it 
remains to be seen whether Nietzsche is intentionally diminishing women or some other group 
with such parallels. 
                                                          
104 Citing KGB 11.5 900. 
105 See, for example, EH III:5, p. 723. 
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 By the autumn of 1879, Nietzsche had decided that his worst afflictions were caused by 
extremes of climate and began seeking moderate climes by going to the warm sea in the winter 
and high into the cool mountain air during the summer in places such as Sils Maria (Young, p. 
289). Nietzsche actually spent his first summer in Sils Maria the same time he published his book 
Daybreak or Dawn in 1881, and despite extensive self-medication his health was worse than ever 
(Young, p. 316-17). However, even with his health in such poor sorts, Nietzsche also had perhaps 
his greatest breakthrough that summer in Sils Maria, namely the thought of the eternal recurrence 
which appears as a mere thought experiment in The Gay Science, published a year later in 1882 
(Young, p. 318-9). 
 Barely four months prior to the publication of Gay Science, Nietzsche had his fateful 
meeting with Lou Salomé through Paul Rée and Malwida von Meysenbug on or about April 26, 
1882 in Saint Peter’s Basilica in Rome (Young, p. 339-40). While different authors speculate 
about the motivation of the various players, a few facts emerge from all accounts, namely that 
Rée and Nietzsche both fell in love with Salomé, and she ultimately rejected both of them. 
Nietzsche proposed marriage twice, once through Rée and once himself, and both times Salomé 
declined him on the grounds that it would cause the loss of her financial independence (Young, p. 
341-2). Despite these rejections, the trio remained friends for a time, and their activities included 
a trip to Lucerne wherein Nietzsche himself posed the infamous ‘whip’ photograph with Lou 
perched in a cart brandishing a lilac sprig as a whip, and Friedrich and Paul as the ‘horses’ posed 
in front of the cart, albeit pulling in different directions (Young, p. 343).  
 Again, different authors have different accounts of the context of the whip passage, 
which I will discuss below, but Young in particular suggests a promising interpretation from Curt 
Janz, namely that the photograph is an allusion to the character Fricka in Wagner’s Ring cycle, 
“who is literally equipped with a whip and a horse-drawn chariot as well as almost always 
holding the whip hand over her husband, the supposedly supreme, but actually severely 
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henpecked god, Wotan,” thus implying that “Nietzsche’s point, in arranging the tableau 
vivant…is to give ironic expression to both his own and Rée’s enslavement to Lou” (Young, p. 
343).106 Unfortunately for Nietzsche and Rée, Salomé had no intention of marrying either of 
them, despite their protestations of love and devotion. However, solely unfortunately for 
Nietzsche, Rée was scheming to keep Salomé all to himself, and engaged in extensive and 
increasingly personal letter-writing towards this end (Young, p. 343-4).  
 Another party in the campaign to dissolve the friendship between Lou and Friedrich came 
in the form of Elizabeth Nietzsche, who by all accounts had a terrible time in Bayreuth in July, 
when and where she first spent time with Lou. Elizabeth claimed that Lou had been scornful of 
Friedrich to gain the favor of the Wagner circle, but Nietzsche eventually brushed these claims 
aside (Young, p. 346-7). In Jena in August, however, Elizabeth and Lou had a terribly violent 
argument regarding the purity of Friedrich’s character, and which ended only when Elizabeth 
began vomiting, perhaps at the horrific claims Lou made about Friedrich’s proposed 
‘concubinage’ or two year marriage, a plan Friedrich proposed to Paul and quickly abandoned in 
favor of a permanent marriage (Young, p. 348-9). When Lou arrived where Friedrich was staying 
in Tautenburg, she and Friedrich spent a great deal of time excluding Elizabeth; and, so as to 
assuage Paul’s jealousy, Lou kept a detailed diary of their time together which reveals deep 
intellectual connection between the two (Young, p. 349-50). 
 By the end of this sojourn, Elizabeth had become “Lou’s mortal enemy” because of the 
time in Bayreuth, Lou’s tendency to provocatively pass around the whip photograph, and the 
horrible argument in Jena (Young, p. 352).107 As any sibling would do, whether looking out for 
her brother or nursing her own injured pride, she gave their mother an account of these events 
which many biographers, Young included, refer to as ‘embroidered’ to put it mildly (Young, p. 
                                                          
106 See Volume II, p. 130 Friedrich Nietzsche: Biographie (3 Vols.), C.P. Janz (Munich-Vienna: Hanser, 
1978).  
107 Citing KGB 111.1 301. 
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352). Franziska’s response was also open horror at Lou’s disgraceful behavior, and the resulting 
family conflict sent Nietzsche packing; the breach with his family never fully healed (Young, p. 
353). To make matters even worse, Lou and Paul abandoned the plan of joining together in one 
celibate household with Friedrich, which left him completely distraught; Nietzsche spent the next 
few months tormented by the loss of his love, his friends, and his family (Young, p. 353-4).  
 Much of the scholarship on Nietzsche’s relationship with women and feminism is tied up 
with a discussion of Friedrich’s, Lou’s, and Elizabeth’s behavior during this time. Frequently, 
scholars assert that Nietzsche suddenly shifts into full-blown misogyny after their falling-out, and 
more often than not the women are blamed for Friedrich’s supposed sudden hatred of women, as 
if any single woman or group of women can be blamed for an entire system of sexism or an 
individual’s adherence to that system. No doubt the insulting letters Nietzsche wrote during this 
period were properly called all-too-human (Young, p. 356),108 and I would be shocked if there 
were no changes whatsoever to Nietzsche’s philosophy at this turning point, but it seems 
intellectually disingenuous to assert wide-spread changes without extensive evidence, and 
furthermore unrealistic to assert that all said changes pertain exclusively to one traumatic set of 
experiences. In my discussion below I will pay careful attention to whether and how such a shift 
occurs between The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  
 Following these events, Nietzsche fled to Italy where he suffered a tremendously ill 
winter and even considered suicide, overcoming the thought with his commitment to his work 
(Young, p. 357). In ten clear days of weather, Nietzsche produced the first part of Zarathustra; 
however, it took an exceedingly long time to get it published, first because of the publisher’s 
reservations about its anti-Christian content, and second because of the publisher’s absences on 
account of his virulent anti-Semitic activities (Young, p 358). The fourth and final part was not 
complete until May 1885 (Young, p. 383). During this time, Nietzsche lived a migratory lifestyle 
                                                          
108 Citing KGB 111.1 444. 
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alternating summers in Sils Maria and winters in Nice, and widening his social circle to include a 
number of women such as Resa von Schirnhofer, Meta von Salis, Helen Zimmern, and Helene 
Druskowicz (Young, p. 387-8, 390, 391, 395).  
 Like his other books, Beyond Good and Evil, published in August 1886, received a 
number of hostile and negative reviews (Young, p. 405). Summering in Genoa and wintering in 
Nice, Nietzsche completed a number of new prefaces, revisions, and even an entire new fifth 
section for Gay Science during 1886, and the whole Genealogy by November 1887 (Young, p. 
435-6, 460). Later in 1888, in Sils Maria again and then in Turin, Nietzsche completed The Case 
of Wagner, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Nietzsche contra Wagner and Ecce Homo, but 
only the first saw publication before Nietzsche’s collapse and the last was not published until 
after Nietzsche’s death (Young, p. 492, 497, 509, 524). During these last years Nietzsche had also 
been working on a project he called The Will to Power, and though the preparatory notes were 
never ready for publication and Nietzsche did abandon the project, Elizabeth had the audacity to 
edit Nietzsche’s notebooks into a volume with the same name (Young, p. 534-5). Though many 
authors discuss and speculate about Nietzsche’s mental condition during these final years, I do 
not feel that at this time I have anything fruitful to contribute which is also relevant to my main 
topic, and so I will instead encourage those who are curious to read Kaufmann’s and Young’s 
accounts, among others.  
 By all accounts, however, Nietzsche’s deterioration was rapid, moving from semi-private 
mad episodes in his boarding house to the famous incident where he collapsed weeping with his 
arms around a horse that had been beaten ferociously by its driver (Young, p. 531-2). Nietzsche’s 
friend Overbeck eventually succeeded in moving Nietzsche from Italy to a sanatorium in Basel, 
until the doctors transferred him to Jena (Young, p. 550-2). Eventually his mother took over his 
care and returned him to Naumberg but after Franziska’s death Elizabeth finally had sole control 
of her brother and his works, which she used to elevate herself politically and by almost all 
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accounts did so without the philosophical skill necessary to understand what she was editing 
(Young, p. 554-6).109 Nietzsche died on August 25th, 1900, following two strokes in 1898 and 
1899, in the Archive his sister established in Weimar (Young, p. 558). 
 
§2 Nietzsche’s Early Period 
 
 Again, I choose to leave out Nietzsche’s Jugendschriften and the rest of the Nachlass at 
this point because even Nietzsche derided his first published work, and explicitly wished for his 
notebooks to be destroyed rather than preserved after his death (Leiter, p. xvii).110 This includes 
three short essays of which Danto and Diethe make much, namely the two introductions “The 
Greek State” and “Homer’s Contest” written in 1872 and gifted to Cosima Wagner with three 
other introductions to books never written, and a fragment from 1871 commonly called “The 
Greek Woman,” though Nietzsche does not title this fragment in his notebooks. The only reason I 
am including the essay “On Truth and Lie” is because it has been so heavily read as one of the 







Birth of Tragedy (BT) 
 
                                                          
109 An entire book could be devoted to how Nietzsche scholars have treated Elizabeth horrendously. While 
I have little doubt that her behavior with regards to re-packaging her brother as a proto-Nazi is scurrilous at 
best, I also strongly suspect that scholars have been too quick to judge her as a philosophical imbecile and 
that some of their comments rank as misogynistic as Nietzsche’s reputation.  
110 Citing Nietzsche, the Man and His Philosophy by RJ. Hollingdale (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1985): 
166-72, 182-6. 
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 Nietzsche’s first work, The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music opens as an 
exploration of the science of aesthetics, and establishes the now well-known relationships 
between the Apollinian, Dionysian, and Socratic forms of art. The first reference to women in the 
work is two mentions of “Hexentrank,” translated as “witches’ brew,” in the second section, 
notable because it explicitly connects a horrific blend of sensuality and cruelty with Pan rather 
than Dionysus, perhaps implying that sensuality without cruelty, or blended more skillfully with 
cruelty, is superior to the motley madhouse assortment found within Pan and his festivals (BT §2, 
p. 39-40). This may become significant as an initial glance at the difference between the motley 
and the plural: Nietzsche seems to indicate that the Dionysian festivals skillfully maneuver 
through plurality111 towards the oneness behind the veil of māyā while the lesser festivals of Pan 
feverishly engaged in utter abandon. Nietzsche clearly states that harmony, rhythm, and dynamics 
are necessary for the symbolism of music, the Dionysian art, and thus distinguishes Dionysus 
from Pan on the grounds of certain guiding principles. Similarly, in the third section, Nietzsche 
references Orestes’s matricide as one of the horrors of “the sylvan god” or Pan which the Greeks 
overcame “with the aid of the Olympian middle world of art” or the world structured by tales of 
the hierarchical Olympian gods (BT §3, p. 42). If this holds true for further distinctions between 
the plural and the motley, we may assume that the primary reason the plural is superior to the 
motley is because of the fact that it is ruled or ranked by certain principles. 
  The fifth section only offers a glancing reference to Archilochus’s proclamation of mad 
love and contempt to the daughters of Lycambes and the similarity this event shares with 
Dionysus and the Maenads (BT §5, p. 49), but the eighth and ninth sections offer more material. 
Nietzsche here compares the chorus of Attic tragedies to a pale imitation of true Bacchants, 
themselves only imitations of satyrs, that are yet still only imaginings of the sexual omnipotence 
                                                          
111 In this passage, Nietzsche explicitly discusses duality, but given his later warning against dualism (BGE 
2) and the fact that the Apollinian and Dionysian are not a strict dualism because of the Socratic, I choose 
to read this duality as a twosome open to the possibility of more. 
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of nature (BT §8, p. 61-3). For comparison, Nietzsche offers the image of Apollo’s holy virgins 
proceeding solemnly while singing processional hymns; these women who maintain their names 
and statuses stand in stark contrast with the nameless and status-free members of the dithyrambic 
choruses (BT §8, p. 64). In a sense, this chorus is the Dionysian womb birthing the Apollinian 
dialogue of tragedies and stage drama, which is interesting because Nietzsche poses the birth 
process as a parallel for “the shattering of the individual and his fusion with primal being,” and 
hence birth-giving as shattering the paradigm of the principium individuationis (BT §8, p. 65). 
 As we will see, Nietzsche frequently discusses birth and uses it as a metaphor. While this 
may be appropriative, and hence a kind of conceptual violence, I find that there are many more 
marks in Nietzsche’s favor here: to begin with, I would point out that Nietzsche is unusual within 
his generation for not only speaking about birth, but also treating it with some respect. That he 
sometimes additionally demonstrates disgust with the process need not be misogynistic, as birth-
giving is frequently sufficiently disgusting for the women physically performing biological birth 
as well as the men and women mentally performing conceptual birth. This is not to say that just 
because women have similar or the same beliefs about birth (or anything else) as men do, that 
makes men’s thoughts non-misogynistic; but I feel strongly that all or most humans share feelings 
of disgust when faced with so-called ‘natural’ bodily functions, though the expressions and 
manifestations of this disgust probably vary from culture to culture, and that this disgust may well 
be perfectly healthy given the bacterial content of and health risks from contacting bodily fluids 
and other excreta. Disgust with the body becomes problematic and misogynistic in particular 
when people treat the body and bodily functions as exclusively or primarily female, and 
downgrade either women or corporeality as a result. At this point, Nietzsche does not appear to be 
engaging in such behavior, and later appears to prefer to prioritize the corporeal over the 
intellectual. 
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 Nietzsche considers the mythological character Admetus grieving the loss of his wife 
Alcestis, who has a vision of a veiled female figure moving towards him, and compares 
Admetus’s trembling excitement with that of the spectator viewing the approach of his masked 
god-substitute on the stage (BT §8, p. 66). This is the first instance in Nietzsche’s works of a 
veiled female figure representing some hidden truth, revealed to the eyes “in continual rebirths” 
as the veils drop away, but already we get the sense that behind the veil is another veil, so that 
there are no ‘deeper’ truths, but only more and more surfaces to be found. I will continue to 
attend to this distinction between depth and superficiality, and note how Nietzsche appears to 
value each. In this instance, he hints that depth does not exist and that only surfaces are real, but 
at the same time that there are many, many surfaces available.  
 These mediatory symbols and images allow the ancient Greeks to tolerate their suffering 
and instead have the kind of uniquely ‘Greek cheerfulness’ Nietzsche identifies (BT §9, p. 67). In 
particular, Nietzsche focuses on the myth of Oedipus and the various literary depictions of his 
story; what Nietzsche finds is that Oedipus’s violations of nature – namely murdering his father 
and marrying his mother – are a Sophoclean means for compelling nature to “surrender her 
secrets” (BT §9, p. 68). By contrast, Nietzsche shows how Aeschylus’s telling of the Prometheus 
tale elevates the Moirae or the female goddesses known as the Fates above the gods, even Zeus, 
in a profound demand for justice, and Nietzsche sets up the pairs of playwrights Sophocles and 
Aeschylus and their characters Oedipus and Prometheus as progenitors of the characters of two 
peoples with myths that “are related to each other like brother and sister,” namely the Semites 
with their myth of the fall and the ‘Aryans’ with the Promethean mythos (BT §9, p. 70-1).  
 Nietzsche goes on to establish that these mythological backgrounds explain why Semites 
despise sin as feminine, but the Aryans respect sacrilege as masculine, a claim he further supports 
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with reference to the witches’ chorus from Goethe’s Faust.112 Interestingly, Nietzsche describes 
the Aeschylean Prometheus as having a dual nature, both Apollinian and Dionysian, and hence 
both masculine and feminine, but this does not seem to satisfy or please him when he finds that 
Prometheus’s “nature…might be expressed thus in a conceptual formula: ‘All that exists is just 
and unjust and equally justified in both.’ That is your world! A world indeed!–” (BT §9, p. 72).113 
Given that Nietzsche ends this section here, however, it is very difficult to say exactly at what his 
dissatisfaction or displeasure might have been directed. However, I will also point out that 
Nietzsche demonstrates great acuity and sensitivity here in pointing out the social constructions 
of sin and sacrilege as feminine and masculine respectively. Furthermore, he does not imply that 
either such construction is appropriate or accurate, though omitting his opinion in this regard does 
not commit him to either approve or disapprove. 
 Nietzsche also first implies that truth is a female goddess in this work, and the first 
instance comes in the midst of a discussion of how one myth dies and gives way to another; in 
particular, “wild and naked nature beholds with the frank undissembling gaze of truth the myths 
of the Homeric world as they dance past: they pale, they tremble under the piercing glance of this 
goddess – till the powerful fist of the Dionysian artist forces them into the service of the new 
deity,” Dionysus, and then the process begins again when the Dionysian myths die and Euripides 
decides to systematize them all (BT §10, p. 74-5). Again, Nietzsche has a problematic tendency 
to ascribe femininity to a number of different ‘entities’ starting here with truth, but also including 
Greek tragedy, the predecessor, mistress, and mother to New Attic Comedy, and sister to a 
number of other arts Nietzsche leaves ambiguous (BT §11, p. 76).  
 This tendency to name things as women, even though her respects and loves Tragedy, 
Truth, Wisdom, and Life, seems initially problematic if Nietzsche devalues these entities on the 
                                                          
112 Lines 3982-85. Note that Goethe uses “Frau” in these lines, but Nietzsche uses “Weib” throughout this 
section. 
113 The last two exclamatory statements are line 409 from Goethe’s Faust.  
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
133 
 
basis of their femininity, or devalues femininity on the basis of its relationship with these entities. 
One such devaluation, however, may exist for femininity in this section: Nietzsche describes 
“flight from seriousness and terror” as “womanish” or “weibische,” though it is unclear if this is 
his adjective or the adjective of Greeks denigrating Christians (BT §11, p. 78). Either way, such a 
usage could be to my mind misogynistic if it implies that flightiness is a uniquely or primarily 
female quality which either lacks positive value or possesses negative value. However, Nietzsche 
does later on associate seriousness with the spirit of gravity, a demonic entity (see Zarathustra in 
particular), and hence this flightiness, being womanly, may rather have positive value or at least 
lack negative value. It will not make Nietzsche non-misogynistic if he places femininity on a 
pedestal, but it does count against the charge of misogyny if he repeatedly emphasizes positive 
values for what he considers to be feminine traits.  
 The naked goddess shows up once more during Nietzsche’s discussion of the difference 
between theoretical and artistic men, who are distinguishable through their reactions to the 
uncovering of truth: the theoretical man obsesses about the discarded veils, but the artist focuses 
on the skin and surfaces revealed but still yet concealing what lies beneath (BT §15, p. 94). 
Furthermore, Nietzsche states, “There would be no science if it were concerned only with that 
one nude goddess and with nothing else” because her devotees would be endowed with a purely 
Sisyphean task such as if two people were digging holes in the same patch of earth and 
unintentionally filled each other’s holes as they dug; the image seems intentionally comical, even 
what we might now call cartoonish, as Nietzsche goes on to point out the “sublime metaphysical 
illusion” that humans can use “the thread of causality” to “penetrate the deepest abysses of being, 
and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it” (BT §15, p. 95). 
Thus even in his earliest published book Nietzsche connects the feminine truth and her unveiling 
with a deflationary claim about metaphysics, namely that due to the nature of human knowledge 
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we do not and cannot substantiate various metaphysical claims, and he ties it all to his critique of 
the Platonic Socrates.  
 The next few remarks Nietzsche makes connected to women include two references to 
the Mothers of Being, an allusion to Goethe’s Faust,114 or “the innermost heart of things” which 
Dionysus makes available by destroying the Apollinian spell of individuation (BT §16, p. 99-
100), and whom he later names “Delusion, Will, Woe” or “Wahn, Wille, Wehe” (BT §20, p. 124). 
With this destruction, Dionysian art cries out in the voice of nature herself, claiming the status of 
“the eternally creative primordial mother” and ceaselessly impelling existence (BT §16, p. 104). 
The last few remarks on mothers include references to music as the mother tongue as if learned 
within the womb (BT §21, p. 126) and the notion that the loss of myth constitutes the loss of the 
“mythical maternal womb” in a similar sense (BT §23, p. 136). Again, note that Nietzsche does 
not devalue the womb or the mother and, if one reads him as favoring Dionysian mythos, he even 
appears to affirm this female nature. Furthermore, the fact that he ties this femininity to a male 
god seems to at least in some way defy a gender essentialist reading here: the womb and feminine 
primordial creativity seem to belong at least in part to both halves of the traditional gender dyad, 
Nature herself and her son Dionysus.  
 Nietzsche has only one additional remark in Birth of Tragedy which refers to women 
explicitly, namely in discussing how art critics rather than aesthetic listeners fill audiences 
because “the student, the school boy, and even the most innocuous female had been unwittingly 
prepared by education and newspapers for this kind of perception of works of art” (BT §22, p. 
133). While we might read this as dismissive of ‘innocuous’ women, I think it demonstrates that 
Nietzsche did not see all women as copies of each other; in particular, I believe he has his 
paternal aunt Rosalie Nietzsche in mind, as she was a highly religious woman who, despite that 
conventionality, read newspapers and was active as a member of a charitable women’s 
                                                          
114 Lines 6216ff. 
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organization115 (Diethe, p. 18). No doubt, given the lack of education available for women in 
Nietzsche’s time, it makes very good sense to assume that many such ‘innocuous’ women did not 
have the skill or training to be good aesthetic listeners; and the fact is that Nietzsche’s turn of 
phrase here leaves open the possibility of women who could achieve such a status, though he 
does not explicitly state so once again.  
 
Untimely Meditations: David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer (UM I) 
 
 The first of Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations concerns a discussion of the theologian and 
philosopher David Strauss as a means to address the uncultivated and complacent Prussian 
philistines and chauvinists. Nietzsche’s remarks on women throughout tend to fall into two 
categories: those which treat of women as part of mundane family and business, and those which 
discuss more mythical feminine beings. Nietzsche’s first salvo concerning women comes in the 
form of a critique of the cultural philistine, who keeps the ‘serious’ part of life separate from 
pleasure; in particular, this philistine keeps “profession, business, wife [Weib] and child” 
segregated from art (UM I §2, p. 11).  
 A few passages do not fit this neat dichotomy of mundane and mythical women, and the 
first of these is a translation issue in a criticism of Schiller as a chilled version of Kant: 
Hollingdale and Ludovici both translate “sondern als GrossOnkel-Einfall aus dem Mutterleibe 
kam” as a statement entailing the birth of something prematurely aged. Hollingdale translates this 
statement as “it came into the world already old,” and Ludovici as “it was senile at birth,” and 
neither translation is able to preserve the connotation of ‘mother-love’ associated with ‘coming 
into the world’ or ‘birth’ (UM I §4, p. 20). After this trickier section, Nietzsche explicitly 
associates a specific woman’s words to another specific woman with the philosophy of the 
                                                          
115 These kinds of charitable organizations provided the ideological core of the ‘moderate,’ bourgeois 
feminism of the Bund Deutscher Frauen which were more concerned with the development of a uniquely 
feminine Persönlichkeit associated with the rôle of women as mothers and homemakers. 
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cultural philistine and the Straussian, namely claiming that “what the duchess Delaforte said to 
Madame de Staël: ‘I have to admit, my dear friend, that I know of nobody who is always right 
except me’” could at any time have been said by the Straussian or the philistine (UM I §5, p. 24). 
 The more mythical feminine aspect does not appear until the philistine Strauss finds it 
necessary to call in “the sorceress, that is to say metaphysics” to soothe the fear of those who 
cannot understand a miraculous god because they have never worked miracles (UM I §7, p. 33). 
However, the mythical female flits away again as the mundane women show up once more. 
Those same fearful philistines appear later in their “full domestic ease and comfort” when “we 
discover them with their women [Frauen] and children engaged with their newspapers and 
commonplace chatter about politics,” especially regarding “marriage and universal suffrage, 
capital punishment and workers’ strikes” (UM I §9, p. 44-5). This time, however, Nietzsche 
brings in the mythical female very closely upon the heels of the more mundane variety. 
 Nietzsche notes that Strauss claims his work is “lightly clad,” a euphemism for the naked 
truth (UM I §10, p. 46). Nietzsche appears to accept the myth: “Of the goddess truth, the few who 
have seen her affirm that she has been naked; and perhaps in the eyes of those who have not seen 
her but accept the word of those few who have, nakedness or lightly-cladness is in itself proof of 
truth, even if only circumstantial proof” (UM I §10, p. 47). However, at the same time, Nietzsche 
rejects Strauss’s claim and instead states that Strauss’s genius is only “disguised as a lightly clad 
goddess,” (UM I §10, p. 47) a disguise which by definition is not nudity at all, for disguises are 
layers, masks, even wholly new identities atop older ones.116 
The final appearance of women in this text, and one which does not fit the 
mundane/mythical dichotomy is a reference to prostitution, though the passage in which this 
reference occurs is not usually translated into English as it is a part of a long series of examples 
                                                          
116 Interestingly, Nietzsche also associates Strauss’s claim about “Rothhäute” (translated unapologetically 
as the slur against Native Americans it is, namely ‘Redskins’) with thoughtless similes and metaphors 
implying that ‘new’ = ‘modern’ (UM I §11, p. 51).  
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concerning poor grammar amongst other issues Nietzsche finds problematic in Strauss’s writings. 
In particular, Nietzsche appears to be accusing Strauss of not being able to answer certain 
questions regarding the ‘world-historical humbug’ of this erring God to whom Strauss prostitutes 
the nobler passions out of fear.117 This accusation that Strauss ‘prostitutes’ the passions does 
seem to imply a negative judgment against prostitution. However, this need not be an absolute 
position on Nietzsche’s part, and I believe it would be going too far if we were to conclude based 
on this one claim that Nietzsche negatively judged all prostitution and all prostitutes or that he 
believed that all women were prostitutes who sold their bodies and selves for money or children 
(Diethe, p. 65).  
 
 
Untimely Meditations: On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life (UM II) 
 
 The second Untimely Meditation was the first book Nietzsche wrote without the direct 
influence or express enthusiasm of Wagner and primarily concerns the relationship between 
humanity and history as well as a criticism of the unexamined and whiggish teleology usually 
accompanying a complacent form of historicism (UM p. xiv-xv). Note first of all that there are no 
uses of “Frau” throughout this text. Second, note that the Hollingdale translation renders several 
women Nietzsche mentions invisible: in particular, I note “the best teacher” Polybius has in mind 
in the beginning of the second section (UM II §2, p. 68),118 perhaps better translated as “best 
schoolmistress” though some might find ‘schoolmistress’ pejorative by comparison to the more 
gender-neutral ‘teacher’; the “unique master, nature” from the final section (UM II §10, p. 
118),119 perhaps better translated as the “unique mistress, nature”; and finally the statement from 
                                                          
117 “Da uns auf diese Frage Strauss gar keine Antwort geben kann,—falls er sich scheuen sollte, seinen 
Gott, das heisst den aus nobler Passion irrenden Gott als diesen Schwindler zu prostituiren—so bleiben wir 
zunächst dabei, den Ausdruck für ebenso ungereimt als geschmacklos zu halten.” 
118 “vorzüglicheste Lehrmeisterin” 
119 “einzigen Meisterin Natur” 
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the seventh section wherein “Mutterschooss” or “womb” is elided such that the statement “man 
müsste denn den sogenannten Protestanten-Verein als Mutterschooss einer neuen Religion” 
becomes “one is to regard the so-called Protestant Union as the work of a new religion,” (UM II 
§7, p. 96) thus losing the implications of maternal labor.  
 This Meditation also contains two references to goddesses, namely the “goddess of 
victory” who can balance “without growing dizzy and afraid” (UM II §1, p. 62) and “the honest 
naked goddess philosophy” who is the “most truthful of all sciences” (UM II §5, p. 85). The way 
Nietzsche lionizes these idealized women stands in stark contrast to a separate passage some 
might regard as derogatory towards women: “As the final and most natural outcome we have the 
universally admired ‘popularization’ (together with ‘feminization’ and ‘infantization’) of science, 
that is to say the infamous trimming of the coat of science to fit the body of the ‘general public’” 
(UM II §7, p. 99). However, I would argue that Nietzsche’s use of scare-quotes around 
‘feminization’ and ‘infantization’ implies that what is made falsely ‘popular’ is also made falsely 
‘feminine’ and ‘infantile,’ so that while we might associate popular science with girlish and 
immature thought, such an association is problematic. At the very least, Nietzsche intentionally 
gives us pause when considering what exactly he means by apparently devaluing pop science as 
part of the feminizing of culture, and I argue that he implies with his scare-quotes that these are 
not his terms but rather the terms of someone with whom he disagrees.  
 Nietzsche also indicates that a (heterosexual) man’s passion for women is comparable 
with a passion for great thoughts and notes how such passion can transform one’s perspective: 
“imagine a man120 seized by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea: how different 
the world has become to him!” (UM II §1, p. 64). To my mind, this indicates the worthiness of 
women as a preoccupation of equal value or at least of equal force as powerful and intriguing 
thoughts. While this may play into certain heterosexist stereotypes, I appreciate the fact that 
                                                          
120 “einen Mann” 
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Nietzsche does not dismiss thoughts of women as immediately and inherently frivolous. 
Similarly, Nietzsche attributes value to maternal origins at least metaphorically in the following 
section, wherein he describes how humans and their abilities are like plants which need careful 
transplantation because the lack of certain nutrients causes degradation: “the critic without need, 
the antiquary without piety, the man who recognizes greatness but cannot himself do great things, 
are such plants, estranged from their mother soil and degenerated into weeds” (UM II §2, p. 72). 
This extremely earthy metaphor demonstrates a third feminine value in addition to courage and 
honesty as represented by the goddesses above, namely, the virtue so commonly lauded by 
Wilhelmine feminists and overemphasized as a part of Nietzsche’s imago of femininity by 
Diethe: a nurturing disposition.  
 Lastly, Nietzsche also discusses the eternal feminine for the first time in this Meditation. 
In this passage, Nietzsche is drawing a parallel between those who have an “objective” approach 
to history to eunuchs or neuters. I will quote the passage at length:  
But, as I have said, this is a race of eunuchs, and to a eunuch one woman is like another, 
simply a woman, woman in herself, the eternally unapproachable – and it is thus a matter 
of indifference what they do so long as history itself is kept nice and ‘objective’, bearing 
in mind that those who want to keep it so are for ever [sic] incapable of making history 
themselves. And since the eternally womanly will never draw you upward,121 you draw it 
down to you and, being neuters, take history too for a neuter. But so that it shall not be 
thought that I am seriously comparing history with the eternally womanly, I should like 
to make it clear that, on the contrary, I regard it rather as the eternally manly: though, to 
be sure, for those who are ‘historically educated’ through and through it must be a matter 
of some indifference whether it is the one or the other: for they themselves are neither 
man nor woman, nor even hermaphrodite, but always and only neuters or, to speak more 
cultivatedly, the eternally objective. 
 UM II §5, p. 86-7 
There are many things happening here. First of all, Nietzsche is explicitly stating that those who 
take an ‘objective’ approach to history are incapable of ‘making history’ or ascending to greater 
                                                          
121 Allusion to Goethe’s Faust II: “Das Ewig-Weibliche/Zieht uns hinan” – “The eternal feminine draws us 
upward.”  
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heights. The metaphor plays out through the implication that eunuchs have no interest in women, 
and this disinterest is supposed to be similar to the disinterest of objectivity, particularly in 
historical studies but as we shall see later122 this also applies to the sciences and even aesthetics. 
Second, note that Nietzsche implies that the attempt to treat femininity objectively drags 
femininity down, which I argue demonstrates his recognition of the importance of intersubjective 
inquiry with regards to women as well as his recognition that treating women under the aegis of 
the eternal feminine actually does harm to living women.  
 Third and finally, I find it interesting that Nietzsche goes out of his way to claim that 
history has more to do with the eternal masculine than the eternal feminine. I strongly suspect that 
this eternally masculine history is a reference to the sterility of the distinterested objective history 
he appears to deride, primarily because Nietzsche often associates sterility with masculinity.123 
When we contrast this apparently negative valuation of masculinity as sterile with the apparently 
positive valuation of femininity as nutritive and fertile, what we find is a reversal of the classical 
positive valuation of masculinity as objective subject and negative valuation of femininity as 
subjective object. While Nietzsche does not appear to be advocating a strictly subjective approach 
to history here, he has strongly undermined the value of a simply objective approach and thus in 




Untimely Meditations: Schopenhauer as Educator (UM III) 
 
 Nietzsche’s third Meditation serves both to polemicize against mere academic philosophy 
and to characterize what genuine philosophy should look like, and spends virtually no time 
                                                          
122 See GM III:12. 
123 See for example BGE §144 
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discussing Schopenhauer’s philosophy at all (UM p. xvi). Thus, the education Schopenhauer 
provides for his readers has more to do with example his life provides, in particular, a certain 
image of humanity Nietzsche apparently derives more from his own imagination than from either 
Schopenhauer’s works or his biography (UM p. xviii). From his reflections on and eventual 
rejection of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche generates the notion that a true education requires liberation 
from those things which are incompatible with one’s self (UM p. xix). This liberation ties directly 
with the first of only six mentions of women in the text. 
 In his wish to distinguish sham education from true culture, Nietzsche describes culture 
as “liberation, the removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that want to attack the tender buds 
of the plant, an outstreaming of light and warmth, the gentle rustling of nocturnal rain, it is 
imitation and worship of nature where nature is in her motherly and merciful mood” (UM III §2, 
p. 130). Nietzsche places this idyllic flourishing combined with careful custodianship in direct 
contrast to nature’s “stepmotherly mood and her sad lack of understanding” that we see in “her 
cruel and merciless assaults” (UM III §2, p. 130). Thus we have an almost fairy-tale influenced 
contrast between the good and beneficent genetic mother and the evil and violent stepmother. 
Such a dualism could be arguably problematic, in that it parrots the standard Madonna/whore 
dichotomy of femininity, but on the other hand I find it intriguing that Nietzsche places both 
standards within the same vessel: Nature. At the very least we can say that this provides evidence 
that Nietzsche does not have an uncomplicated picture of femininity in the form of nature, though 
his quick and regular association of femininity with nature does raise an eyebrow. Given 
Nietzsche’s positive valuation of nature generally, however, it remains to be seen whether he is 
placing femininity on a pedestal, placing femininity outside of the ambiguously valued civilized, 
masculine world, or doing some other thing.  
 Nietzsche continues with stepmothers as a metaphor for the “false, idle and unworthy 
mother, his age,” the era which birthed Schopenhauer’s desire for “a healthier and simpler 
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humanity” (UM III §3, p. 146). This desire of Schopenhauer’s won out and hence “the intention 
of his stepmother age to conceal his genius from him was frustrated” (UM III §3, p. 146). As 
above, the problem with this passage is the implication that ‘false’ mothers are ‘idle and 
unworthy’ or even violent and evil. Nietzsche’s choice of family as a metaphor for 
Schopenhauer’s philosophical development is not straightforward; he speaks of both the 
metaphorical stepmotherly era, but also discusses Schopenhauer’s literal parents and how their 
contrary natures were exactly what is required for philosophical development:  
There is no lack of contrary conditions, to be sure: the perversity of the age came 
fearfully close to him, for example, in the person of his vain and culturally pretentious 
mother. But the proud, free republican character of his father as it were saved him from 
his mother and bestowed upon him the first thing a philosopher needs: inflexible and 
rugged manliness. 
UM III §7, p. 180 
Though Nietzsche does use the word “Männlichkeit” here, the traits of ‘manliness’ indicated here 
are not necessarily something he identifies as masculine: inflexibility and ruggedness both apply 
to his feminized nature when she does not draw a flattering veil over her ‘sad lack of 
understanding’ and instead unleashes a cruel and merciless storm. What Nietzsche appears to 
intend to emphasize in this passage is not that masculinity is required for philosophy, but rather 
strong contrasts in the conditions in which we grow and mature.  
 The influence of fairy tales on Nietzsche’s imagery of women is also echoed briefly in a 
reference to witches: Nietzsche describes the upheaval of his contemporary time as subject to 
“tremendous forces, but savage, primal and wholly merciless,” such that we might gaze “upon 
them with a fearful expectation, as though gazing into the cauldron of a witch’s kitchen 
[Hexenküche]: at any moment sparks and flashes may herald dreadful apparitions” (UM III §4, p. 
149). The imagery of the feminine power of witchcraft some might say signals Nietzsche’s fear of 
womanly power, or fear of the unknown female essence, or some such thing; they might also note 
the connection of this witchcraft to the primal forces of nature. And yet I do not believe this is 
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intended as negative on Nietzsche’s part; rather, he could be attempting in this passage to 
counteract the picture of femininity in his contemporary time as weak and dull, and so I instead 
would say this signals Nietzsche’s respect for natural forces and his recognition that women have 
strength possibly beyond his ken. 
 The fifth mention of women is actually a reference to girls’ high schools; in disparaging 
‘bad’ philosophers who will flee philosophy when the going gets tough, Nietzsche ticks off a list 
of places they will “seek a roof wherever they can find it; one will become a parson, another a 
schoolmaster, a third will creep into the shelter of an editorial job on a newspaper, a fourth will 
write instruction manuals for girls’ high schools…” (UM III §8, p. 190).124 To my mind this is 
not so much an indictment against writing for girls’ high schools as it is against bad philosophers 
and their willingness to take advantage of whoever needs a writer and educator, though at first 
glance it is easy to read this as quite dismissive of professional positions in charge of young 
women’s education. Instead, we should be suspicious of bad philosophers applying their trade in 
places where it can do great harm, such as in the education of girl children especially. 
 The final discussion of women comes on the very last page. Nietzsche describes 
Diogenes’ response to the praise of another philosopher: “‘How can he be considered great, since 
he has been a philosopher for so long and has never yet disturbed anybody?’” (UM III §8, p. 
194). Nietzsche says such a description would be a suitable epitaph for mere academic 
philosophy, that “‘it disturbed nobody,’” and that such an epitaph is not praise of the goddess of 
truth, but rather that of an old woman; and furthermore, “it is not to be wondered at if those who 
know that goddess only as an old woman are themselves very unmanly and thus, as might be 
expected, completely ignored by the men of power” (UM III §8, p. 194). I note first of all that this 
final passage in the third Meditation cements Nietzsche’s use of the feminine metaphor for truth 
well within his early period and, as we shall see, he continues to use this metaphor throughout his 
                                                          
124 “…the most sensible of them will take up the plough and the vainest will go to court.”  
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works. Thus we should pay careful attention to this apparently clumsy emphasis on masculinity in 
relation to truth. Nietzsche may have in mind a kind of romantico-sexual metaphor wherein the 
masculinity of men and the femininity of women draw each to the other in heterosexual courtship 
displays; perhaps the nature of the goddess and the nature of the philosopher is supposed to be 
similar here.  
 Second, I cede to Nietzsche the claim that those men who do not represent themselves 
within the constructs of masculinity will be ignored by men of power in a society which values 
those constructs positively. I also cede the claim that saying someone ‘disturbs nobody’ is not the 
praise of someone with strength, and it is possible that there have been many nice little old ladies 
who lacked the kind of strength Nietzsche probably has in mind, namely the strength to garden 
one’s self and cultivate one’s true nature. But the implication that all or most old women lack 
such strength is troubling. If one’s philosophy disturbs no one, one is likely to be ignored and live 
a quiet life. Such a life is not congruent with the superabundant flourishing Nietzsche seems to 
hold as ideal. However, we should not expect old women raised in human-all-too-human times to 
be overwhelmingly philosophers of the future, either, which is no harsh judgment against the 
elderly or elderly women in particular. 
 Nietzsche seems to want to say that an old, quiet truth differs sufficiently from truth in its 
full glory such that those who only attend to the quiet version would have a very different 
philosophy. It is plausible, and even evidenced in some cases, that quiet philosophies and 
philosophers attract little attention from those in power; we need only look at Machiavelli and 
Cesare Borgia for one historical example. It is also plausible that the rugged and inflexible 
characteristics of Männlichkeit identified above were more commonly represented by men than 
the women in Nietzsche’s social circles, as Franziska was a biddable girl rather than a force of 
nature in her own right; however, Nietzsche would have seen through his own grandmother 
Erdmuthe, who so oppressed Franziska, that old women can also be rugged and inflexible, though 
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she may have a quiet woman living a quiet life. It is also possible that associating the ‘unmanly’ 
with the negative is a false connection, though such a connection seems warranted on the grounds 
that power ignores the unmanly in this context.  
 At this point, this concluding passage from the third Meditation is the most troubling I 
have encountered; I am uncertain as to whether Nietzsche is simply writing under the influence of 
Schopenhauer’s misogyny, playing a deeper game I cannot discern, or simply being clumsy with 
his metaphors. It may be that I have no better explanation than to say that this may be one piece 
of evidence for my opposition, but it is the first good piece of evidence I have found so far, and I 
do not believe it is one of the many on which my opponents have focused. At the very least, we 
do see here one of the earliest forms of Nietzsche’s playful suggestion that philosophers must 
romance truth, though the possible implication that older women are beyond romance is ignorant 
at best. To strive for charity, I postulate here that what Nietzsche intends is not necessarily that 
old women do not deserve romance or any other critique of aged femininity, but rather that our 
tropes of masculinity and greatness ignore the quiet and the subtle, which could be to our 
detriment theoretically. 
 
Untimely Meditations: Richard Wagner in Bayreuth (UM IV) 
 
 The fourth and final Meditation is an uneasy book, balanced between Nietzsche’s desire 
to maintain his intellectual integrity as he begins moving away from Wagner’s ‘histrionic’ 
romanticism and Nietzsche’s wish to express publicly his admiration for the way Wagner had 
inspired him despite ultimately falling short of even Wagnerian ideals (UM p. xxii). We also see 
the reappearance of the term ‘Frau’ in this Meditation as well as the first appearance of 
‘Schwester’ since The Birth of Tragedy. Further, the references to women throughout this work 
are almost entirely positive or at least neutral, with little to none of the implicit misogynistic 
themes in the previous text. 
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 The first two references are both to sisters, the first noting the various kinds of loyalty 
possible, including the “most glorious and rarest among them: loyalty of brother to sister, of 
friend to friend, of servant to master…” and also including the loyalty of various fictional women 
to men such as Elizabeth and Tannhäuser or Isolde and Tristan (UM IV §2, p. 203). The fact that 
Nietzsche sees women as capable of loyalty certainly undercuts any adherence to misogynistic 
beliefs about the inherent treacherous nature of women an uncritical scholar might otherwise 
assume. Nietzsche’s other reference to sisters in this work comes in the form of a metaphor 
apparently belonging to Wagner concerning the “corresponding necessary shape in the world of 
the visible” with which music pairs, “that is to say, to its sister, gymnastics” (UM IV §5, p. 216-
7). This reference itself may be part of a dualism where the masculine music necessitates the 
more feminine gymnastics, but note that this dualism itself shatters the stereotypical tendency to 
class physical pursuits as primarily masculine and non-physical or less physical pursuits as more 
feminine. I also note that this dualistic picture is more properly Wagner’s than Nietzsche’s, and 
thus does not necessarily invest Nietzsche in a strict gender binary; far more evidence would be 
required at this point to demonstrate Nietzsche’s adherence thereto.  
 Wagner’s gender binary appears again in the distinction between the more “miraculous 
and serious manly nature” of myth and the “deeply debased and disfigured” nature of mere fairy 
tales which are “the plaything of the women and children of the degenerate folk” (UM IV §8, p. 
230). At this point in time, Nietzsche does not appear critical of this particular distinction 
between serious masculinity and debased femininity so much as he is critical of Wagner’s 
inability to answer the call to make myth ‘manly’ again, but I do note that the women of the 
‘degenerate’ folk stand in contrast with Nietzsche’s later mention of the “Fürsten und Frauen,”125 
who participated in Wagner’s attempts to masculinize myth (UM IV §10, p. 246).  Indeed, 
contrasts seem to be a predominant technique in gendered treatment of music, because when 
                                                          
125 Translated as “princes and women” but perhaps better translated along the lines of “lords and ladies.” 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
147 
 
musicians historically discovered the “charm of contrast” they engaged in “an antithetical ethos, 
for example by allowing a masculine theme to come into conflict with a feminine theme” (UM IV 
§9, p. 241).  
 The last three references to women are far more in keeping with Wagner’s romantic 
themes, and the first of these is one in which Nietzsche likens Wagner to the kinds of female 
characters in his works: “[Wagner] lives like a fugitive whose aim is to preserve, not himself, but 
a secret; like an unfortunate woman126 who wants to save the life of the child she carries in her 
womb, but not her own: he lives like Sieglinde, ‘for the sake of love’” (UM IV §10, p. 247). 
These kinds of women again appear near the end of the Meditation in the form of women who 
prefer death to unfaithfulness, or death to the loss of their beloveds’ souls, or who accept some 
new genius despite the outcry of traditionalists, or even those like Brünnhilde who sacrifice their 
wisdom only to gain the highest wisdom at all, namely that the deepest suffering opens one’s eyes 
(UM IV §11, p. 252, 254). Strikingly, these are women of action rather than passivity. These 
women make choices and take actions, albeit frequently the action of death or sacrifice, but 
choices and actions nonetheless, and hence these women are very unlike the stereotypes of the 
maternal nurturer or the tender, retiring wallflower more commonly associated with femininity by 
Nietzsche’s contemporaries. 
 The only remaining passage to discuss from the final Meditation is one which continues 
the theme from Schopenhauer as Educator which represents women as protectors rather than the 
protected, particularly in their maternal mode. In particular, Nietzsche is discussing a drive 
Wagner possesses which in this text appears to have a negative effect: “…the force of the drive, 
protective and as it were motherly, which he brings to every sacrifice draws him back into the 
atmosphere of the scholar and the cultivated to which as a creator he has said farewell for ever,” a 
culture whose language is inadequate for artistic communication (UM IV §10, p. 249). Thus, 
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Nietzsche appears to view negatively Wagner’s tendency to regress to a more infantile artistic 
period, and attributes this to one motivating force within Wagner’s character which has a 
maternally protective urge. While it is certainly the case that maternal protectiveness is necessary 
in nursing a new idea, regression thereto is not congruent with the healthy development of 
growing ideas and artistic forms. Therefore, I would not characterize this passage as negatively 
judgmental towards women, and in fact I rather appreciate the fact that Nietzsche sees the 
feminine capability for protection as opposed to the stereotypically masculine form of protection.  
 
 
“On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” (OTL) 
 
 Though commonly referenced in discussions of Nietzsche’s epistemology, “On Truth and 
Lie” is not one of Nietzsche’s published works. I have chosen to include it here primarily because 
of the preponderance of attention it has received in Nietzsche scholarship concerning 
perspectivism, to which I will return in the next chapter, rather than because of its significance to 
the discussion of misogyny. However, it does turn out that Nietzsche references women several 
times throughout this short work and each serves as a means to connect Nietzsche’s discussion of 
truth to his discussion of women. There are three passages which contain such references. The 
first of these is an early and quick observation about the arbitrariness of the German language’s 
assignation of gender to nouns: “We divide things up by gender, describing a tree127 as masculine 
and a plant128 as feminine – how arbitrary these translations are!” (OTL §1, p. 144). Thus 
Nietzsche demonstrates that while originally words may have derived from sensory perceptions, 
such as the hardness of a stone, words have flown far “beyond the canon of certainty” (OTL §1, 
p. 144). This remark indicates that for Nietzsche certainty is connected to empirical experiences, 
a connection we will explore more thoroughly in a later chapter.  
                                                          
127 Der Baum (masculine). 
128 Die Pflanze (feminine). 
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 Similarly, in the second passage referencing women, Nietzsche finds that concepts are 
removed from the words which are themselves removed from the initial sensory experience: 
“concepts too…are only the left-over residue of a metaphor, and that the illusion produced by the 
artistic translation of a nervous stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then at least the 
grandmother of each and every concept” (OTL §1, p. 147). This maternal, or perhaps more 
accurately grandmaternal, metaphor once again serves to connect femininity to truth, as truth 
itself is one such concept; in particular, truth is the concept of using metaphors according to a set 
of socially accepted129 rules: “Within this conceptual game of dice, however, ‘truth’ means using 
each die in accordance with its designation, counting its spots precisely, forming correct 
classifications, and never offending against the order of castes nor against the sequence of classes 
of rank” (OTL §1, p. 147). Thus metaphor is the mother of concepts, and sensory experience the 
mother of metaphor.  
 The final passage contains references to many different kinds of women, each of which 
serves as a connection between myth and nature. Nietzsche argues that the ancient Greeks’ 
waking lives must have been akin to dreams “If, one day, any tree may speak as a nymph, or if a 
god can carry off virgins in the guise of a bull, if the goddess Athene herself is suddenly seen 
riding on a beautiful chariot in the company of Pisistratus through the market-places of Athens” 
(OTL §2, p. 151). Indeed, for the Ancient Greeks, Nietzsche sees the entirety of nature as 
cavorting about humanity “as if it were just a masquerade of the gods who are merely having fun 
by deceiving men in every shape and form” (OTL §2, p. 151). This distinction between the so-
called sobriety of modern science and the implied intoxication of ancient myth serves to 
demonstrate the evolution of truth as socially accepted; while arboreal nymphs, god-besotted 
virgins, and market-place goddesses all may have followed the rules for truth in ancient society, 
such figments no longer fit within modern rules for the employment of concepts.  
                                                          
129 Arguably even socially constructed, but more on this later. 
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 At this point I will also suggest that Nietzsche is making very subtle moves towards 
classifying the notion of femininity as a myth unto itself. While there is no doubt that real human 
women exist, Nietzsche has begun to demonstrate an inkling of the idea that the essence of 
femininity as demarcated by concepts such as the Eternal Feminine (Ewig-Weibliche) may itself 
be a metaphor for which the corresponding sensory impressions are so far removed as to become 
meaningless and without proper employment within the rules for truth in modern culture. 
However, I grant that such a claim is only flimsily based on the preceding text, and I have a great 
deal of work remaining to show how this initial hint plays out in the middle and late periods of 
Nietzsche’s publications.  
 
 
§3 Nietzsche’s Middle Period 
 
 Nietzsche’s middle period as I construe it contains five published works: Human, All-
Too-Human minus the 1886 preface and plus its two sequels, Assorted Opinions and Maxims and 
The Wanderer and His Shadow, as well as Daybreak and the first four books of The Gay Science 
minus Book V published in 1887, also both minus their respective 1887 and 1887 prefaces. Each 
work references women well over twenty times. One thing I plan to attend to closely is how 
Nietzsche construes women and femininity in these works as contrasted with his later works, 
primarily because scholars claim repeatedly that Nietzsche’s attitude towards women changes 
drastically after his break with Lou Salomé in November 1882; if these scholars are correct, 
Zarathustra, the first book of Nietzsche’s late period, should demonstrate a particularly 
malevolent turn not seen in the early or middle periods. Based on my familiarity with Nietzsche’s 
works, I suspect such a turn does not exist, and I hope to be able to demonstrate this below. 
Further, because there are so many references to women from this point forward, I may be able to 
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offer only glancing remarks on some passages, but I hope to continue to be as comprehensive as 
possible.  
 
Human, All-Too-Human (HATH) 
 
 If we count each of the Untimely Meditations as individual books, Human is Nietzsche’s 
sixth published work, and the first wherein he devotes an entire chapter, specifically the seventh 
of nine, to the related issues of women and children. While the bulk of Nietzsche’s remarks about 
women lie in this chapter, Nietzsche also discusses women elsewhere throughout the text. Many 
of these remarks are simple examples in longer lists including men and gender-unspecified 
individuals.130 Other remarks are somewhat traditional characterizations of womanly roles in 
society without any particular judgment or valuation indicated regarding these roles; for example, 
Nietzsche’s comment that women are “the custodians of the ancient” who have preserved the 
relic of the noble’s cold glance for the servant “more faithfully” than men (HATH §64, p. 43-44). 
Other comments indicate a sympathetic willingness to mitigate judgment against women on the 
basis of “historical reasons” (HATH §356, p. 143), and that Nietzsche explicitly believes that 
women are capable of nobility as much as men (HATH §440, p. 162).  
 Several such comments refer to various goddesses, including the Moirae or Fates and the 
Catholic Holy Virgin (§111), Truth again, this time in youthful and aged aspects (§257), Health 
(§282), Destiny (§370), and Justice (§637). Nietzsche also makes passing references to witches or 
“sorcerers” (“Hexenmeister,” §627), “cultural mother’s milk” (§218), the “mother tongue” 
(§267), a love for religion akin to love for one’s mother and nurse (§292), “mother-love” (§363), 
and wealth enabling access to the “fairest women” (§479). Beyond such passing references, 
Nietzsche also discusses motherhood in more detail outside of the seventh chapter in terms of the 
pleasure of play between mother and young (§98), similarity of child to mother both in terms of 
                                                          
130 See §57, 72, 111, 113, 133, 373, 629. 
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human offspring and as an analogy for dogmatic inheritance (§110), another analogy between 
how children come to understand their mothers and how people generally learn to understand 
each other (§216), an ambivalent description of how the masculine ancient Greek culture treated 
women and mothers and benefited from such treatment (§259), and a third analogy between a 
prince who invents a casus belli in order to war with a neighbor and a father who foists a 
stepmother or “substituted mother” on his child (§596).131  
 Outside of the seventh chapter, only a few passages remain: a relatively heterosexist 
description of male and female sexual interest (§98), which in combination with Nietzsche’s 
claim that the ancient Greek homoerotic relationships were emphasized “to a degree we can no 
longer comprehend” (§259) could be construed as either a case of protesting too much and 
implying that Nietzsche does have homoerotic tastes or as indicative that Nietzsche does have a 
more traditionally heterosexist understanding of human sexuality. However, in the service of 
being as charitable as possible in my reading, I choose to read these cases as Nietzsche describing 
generally accepted attitudes towards human sexuality in his time without either explicitly or 
implicitly prescribing approval for those attitudes. Another troubling passage that becomes less 
problematic if we read it as description without prescription is Nietzsche’s statement that the 
beauty of architectural structures is “The same thing as the beautiful face of a mindless woman: 
something mask-like” (HATH §218, p. 101). While it might be easy to assume that Nietzsche is 
implying that mindful women are not beautiful, I do not believe Nietzsche uses this example to 
that purpose; rather, he states that such facades are masks, and hence implies that a beautiful face 
of mindlessness may conceal an active and aware mind. Further, this may be a play on the 
Kantian notion of disinterestedness in evaluating beauty, such that mindlessness rather than 
disinterestedness is something his contemporaries associated with feminine human beauty. 
                                                          
131 One could perhaps argue that Nietzsche implies that both such false but publicly declared motives and 
substitute mothers are to be negatively valued, but I feel such a valuation would be derived from very thin 
evidence indeed; Nietzsche’s aphorism is far more descriptive than it is prescriptive.  
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 Nietzsche also compares men and women in a way demonstrating an awareness that 
women’s history has lead to their current character, a strikingly non-essentialist view for a man so 
repeatedly accused of biological essentialism. In these aphorisms he notes that men and women’s 
speech behavior reflects their centuries of divided labor (§342); that a lack of female nobility is 
due to history (§356); that intelligent women may look harshly unpleasant under mass scrutiny 
but that tête-à-tête interactions reveal how pleasant they truly are (§374); that men learn to treat 
their profession as most important while women learn to treat their lovers as most important 
(§492); that all scholars, people of intelligence, and especially women, who have so long been 
excluded from education, must be especially careful when considering particularly exciting new 
hypotheses (§635), and that men and women often have different words for the same thing, for 
example “conviction” versus “faith,” both of which Nietzsche considers “shortsighted” (§636).  
 Of the fifty-nine passages in the seventh chapter, “Weib und Kind” or “Woman and 
Child,” §377-§437, twelve contain no explicit mention of women, though the majority of these 
twelve aphorisms imply women through a heterosexist lens because they discuss marriage and 
love or parenting. Three refer explicitly and exclusively to the relationship between fathers and 
their children, and one of these three explicitly refers to sons rather than children in general.132 
Some of these statements demonstrate Nietzsche’s prescient anticipation of Freud,133 others 
discuss motherly love or motherly wisdom,134 or girlhood,135 noble women and other women of 
consequence including wives and candidates for marriage,136 and so forth. Many of these 
statements can be interpreted in a number of ways, alternatively as praising or insulting various 
kinds of women for their adherence to (or failure to adhere to) social norms or biological drives, 
                                                          
132 This fact is obscured in §386 by translating “Menschen” as “man” and “sein” as a masculine possessive, 
rather than using a gender neutral option. See also 381 and 382. 
133 See for example §380, “Everyone bears within him a picture of woman derived from his mother: it is 
this which determines whether, in his dealings with women, he respects them or despises them or is in 
general indifferent to them.” See also 379, 384, 385, 387, 422, 423, among others. 
134 385, 387, 392, 404, 421, 424, 429, and 434. 
135 404, 407, 409, and 421. 
136 377, 383, 389, 391, 394, 398, 399, 403, 405, 406, 410-412, 414-417, 419, 420, 424-426, 428-435, and 
437. 
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but Nietzsche appears to set this chapter as an especial challenge to interpretation. I base this 
claim on context. 
Most significant for me is the passage proceeding this chapter and the second aphorism 
within this chapter; §376, the conclusion of “[The Human] in Society” or “Der Mensch in 
Verkehr,” is paragraph about friendship which contains a sage concluding that there is no such 
thing as friendship and Nietzsche responding that “yes, there are friends, but it is error and 
deception regarding yourself that led them to you; and they must have learned how to keep silent 
in order to remain your friend” and therefore that absolute truth destroys friendships, but 
maintaining deceptions allows the friendships to survive (HATH §36, p. 148-9). By contrast, the 
second passage in “Woman and Child” states that “The best friend will probably acquire the best 
wife [Gattin], because a good marriage is founded on the talent for friendship” (HATH §378, p. 
150). Thus heterosexual marriage, just like non-gendered and asexual friendship, must be based at 
least in part on a healthy dose of deception and error. Some of these errors might resemble the 
errors of noble women Nietzsche mentions, who “think that a thing does not exist if it is not 
possible to speak about it in company” (HATH §383, p. 150).137  
Some of these errors might also resemble the error Nietzsche offers in the first and final 
passages of this chapter; §377 states that perfect women are both higher and rarer than perfect 
men, and that this proposition is demonstrable by the “natural science of the animals” (HATH 
§377, p. 150). By contrast, the chapter ends with §437, which states that when fate contrives to 
give hemlock to the free spirit, as fate usually does, “the women” around “will lament and cry out 
and perhaps disturb the repose of the thinker’s sunset hours” as they did when they made Socrates 
finally cry out “do tell someone to take those women away!” (HATH, §437, p. 160). I believe that 
each of these claims is Nietzsche either intentionally or subconsciously presenting errors for our 
                                                          
137 I find this statement especially remarkable in that it explains psychologically a survival mechanism of 
silence about abuse and rape in circles of quality; if no one speaks about a thing, we can all pretend it is not 
happening. Nonetheless, a pretense at silence does not prevent such harm and frequently makes it worse; I 
will return to this theme and Nietzsche’s apparent sympathy in The Gay Science.  
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consideration, errors which could be construed as necessary for making conventional 
heterosexual marriages function in Wilhelmine society.  
The claim that perfect women are so much rarer and better than perfect men could have 
been a belief that made a long search for the best mate (or true love) more tolerable; in a similar 
fashion, the practice of sending voluble mourners away could help the dying husband cope with 
his own grief at parting from his wife and loved ones. I do not mean to suggest that Nietzsche 
believes either error is necessarily the best belief, but only that Nietzsche claims that such errors 
made certain relationships possible in his society, or at least that these errors facilitated smooth 
functioning. What is particularly interesting is the notion that constant contact and absolute 
honesty do not always make for the happiest marriages, perhaps because not all individuals can 
appreciate either, though maybe there are those who can. Furthermore, the insight that 
interpersonal relationships, especially between men and women, are based on deceptions and 
errors, provides us reason good to believe that Nietzsche considers much of what he writes about 
women and relationships with women to be based on deception and error as well. I believe this 
insight will color a great deal of Nietzsche’s further commentary on women. 
 
Assorted Opinions and Maxims (AOM) 
 
 The two sequels to Human, All Too Human, Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The 
Wanderer and His Shadow, discuss women with decreasing frequency, though Nietzsche will 
pick up the pace again with the two final books from his middle period. The first mention of 
femininity of any kind in Assorted Opinions and Maxims is in the prefatory discussion of 
Wagner’s cloying romanticism. Nietzsche states that he had grown “weary with disgust at the 
femininity and ill-bred rapturousness of this romanticism” and that “such music unnerves, 
softens, feminizes, its ‘eternal womanly’ draws us – downwards!” (AOM P§3, p. 211). Nietzsche 
echoes these sentiments later in this book when he refers to the “all too feminine nature of music” 
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as adhering to naturalistic art and language (AOM §134, p. 244). The immediate problem with 
this is the somewhat obvious association of femininity with the things Nietzsche appears to 
consider negative: being ill-bred, romantic, soft, enervated, and decadent or in decline.  
 At the same time, however, the obviousness of this association gives me pause: Nietzsche 
prefers playing with language to being obvious, and he intentionally puts ‘eternal womanly’ or 
Ewig-Weibliches in scare quotes, leading me to think there is more for us readers to unearth. This 
is a clue that Nietzsche does not accept the traditional characterization of the essence of 
femininity, the eternal feminine, at its face value or as necessarily valuable; at the same time, 
however, in this passage Nietzsche demonstrates his willingness to play along with traditional 
characterizations for the purposes of lambasting his former idols while simultaneously subverting 
some of those same traditions. Nietzsche goes on to explain that this attitude of his was his 
vengeance against romantic music (AOM P§3, p. 211) and even a turning against himself and 
towards pessimism, the antithesis of romanticism (AOM P§4, p. 211), which required that he 
reverse his perspective in order to restore himself to himself using optimism (AOM P§5, p. 212). 
Thus, I believe that Nietzsche is – perhaps unconsciously – indicating that his initial acceptance 
of the traditional notion of femininity has analogously been subject to various inversions and 
reversals of perspective, such that he has – this time perhaps consciously – rejected the notion of 
femininity and other so-called ‘eternal’ concepts as singular, pure, unitary essences. Therefore we 
as readers should make an effort to perceive the concept of femininity, among other concepts, 
from inverted and reversed perspectives, alongside Nietzsche’s attempts to do the same.  
 Nietzsche draws explicit parallels between women and artists in several places in this text 
(§30, 169, 173, 274, 284), noteworthy in connection with the preface if only because artists 
frequently toy with perspective in their work. Similar to artists, women also have a taste for 
knowledge as an ornament, as opposed to the masculine taste for knowledge as weaponry (AOM 
§290, p. 280). Nietzsche makes other comparisons between masculine and feminine ‘natures’ 
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(§95, 272, 273, 274, 287) or remarks about feminine ‘nature’ or ‘wisdom’ alone (§276, 278, 279, 
282, 286, 291, 292), or in conjunction with childishness (§265) and remarks about specifically 
maternal ‘nature’ (§36), that again seem obviously essentialist, but with Nietzsche’s earlier hints 
that femininity might only be inappropriately portrayed as an essence, I suspect Nietzsche may 
simply be playing with the false dualities here in an attempt to impose reversals of perspectives 
on his readers.  
Imposing reversals of perspectives on his readers may also be the reason Nietzsche  
employs so many metaphorical goddesses, mothers, sisters, and grandmothers as representatives 
of things he values strongly, whether positively or negatively: see for example the beings of 
excess (§77), spirit (§99), poetry (§111), moral monstrosity (§150), the Gothic period of the arts 
(§171), art more generally (§227), freethinking and presumption (§320), and rules (§392). 
However, some of Nietzsche’s references to mythical females do appear to be solely references to 
mythology, as in the nameless reference to the nymph Calypso and the human Penelope from the 
myth of Odysseus in §159, and as in the explicit reference to Penthesilea, the queen of the 
Amazons, and to apparently any one of the Muses in §100. Likewise, when Nietzsche offers 
women and girls as examples of various sorts I believe he sometimes uses them simply as 
examples existing as part of a diverse whole, such as kinds of artistic need (§169) or people with 
artistic needs (§173), theatrical talents (§170), sources of wisdom (§176), and as examples of bad 
taste in the bourgeois (§304) and Germans generally (§324); Nietzsche’s remark that witches 
need not actually exist for the belief in witches to have terrible effects is just another of this kind 
of example, and does not indicate any judgment either for or against women who identify as 
witches or are so identified by others (AOM §225, p. 270). 
 
The Wanderer and His Shadow (WS) 
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 The second sequel to Human, All Too Human has even fewer references to women than 
the first, and many of them are similar in kind to the references in Assorted Opinions and 
Maxims; however, some of these passages provide rich fodder for the discussion of Nietzsche’s 
misogyny. Pregnancy and motherhood in particular are dominant themes, perhaps problematic if 
we find Nietzsche making biologically essentialist claims about femininity on the basis of 
maternity. Nietzsche’s first mention of motherhood is a discussion of Schopenhauer’s thoughts on 
pregnancy and how it relates to different kinds of women, including ‘every woman,’ ‘women of 
more mature or the maturest years,’ ‘the cleverest and most intelligent women,’ ‘stupid 
women,’138 as well as to ‘younger women,’139 (WS §17, p. 309-10). Nietzsche’s criticism of 
Schopenhauer’s thoughts is particularly interesting, especially because he rejects the universality 
of Schopenhauer’s claims about women being ashamed should they be seen having sex, but 
‘displaying’ their pregnancies, the result of having unprotected sex, “without a trace of shame, 
indeed with a kind of pride” (WS §17, p. 309). Criticizing universalizing claims about women is a 
staple of contemporary feminist critique, so this passage, while dubious in other ways – 
particularly Nietzsche’s ableist implication that ‘stupid women’ have good reasons to be ashamed 
of bearing stupid children – nonetheless demonstrates a decidedly though not perfectly feminist 
line of thought.140 
 Nietzsche’s second and third references to motherhood come close on the heels of the 
first: Nietzsche draws an analogy between ‘acquiring’ children and ‘acquiring’ punishment in that 
mothers and criminals come to acquire these things after having performed the necessary actions 
hundreds of times without consequence (WS §27, p. 314). However, Nietzsche primarily focuses 
                                                          
138 All Weiber. 
139 The only Frauen in this passage.  
140 This will be the ‘No True Scotsman’ problem of identifying Nietzsche’s feminism. A perfect or ‘true’ 
feminist may not be elitist, racist, classist, ableist, nationalist, anti-theist, religious, shadeist, sizeist, or 
otherwise bigoted – but if this is the case, then no true or perfect feminist probably and provably exists. The 
solution to this problem, as I hope to demonstrate, is to provide clear cases of Nietzsche’s advocation of 
feminist values, and I believe his explicit rejection of Schopenhauer’s universalizing claims about women 
and femininity on the grounds of their false generalization here is one such clear case. 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
159 
 
on the criminal half of the analogy, and does not appear to find fault with such mothers here. 
Similarly, in his third reference to motherhood, he seems to be using the mythical Niobe’s 
abundant blessing of children just as an example without apparent negative judgment (WS §30, p. 
315). Nietzsche’s fourth reference to motherhood explains both Raphael’s idealization of noble 
and even not-so-noble femininity in the painting of the Sistine Madonna as well as Raphael’s 
‘honesty’ in his inclusion of the other two characters in the piece: the “lovely girl” on the right 
side of the painting who is much less devout in her expression than the “graybeard” on the left 
who adores the Madonna, represented as what might count as a noble young man’s “vision of a 
future wife, of a clever, noble-souled, silent and very beautiful woman bearing her first-born in 
her arms” (WS §73, p. 328). This passage is more of a comment on Raphael’s artistry than it is on 
femininity, but both the noble Madonna and the less-noble girl are valued positively; similarly, 
Nietzsche’s fifth mention of motherhood is more of a comment on language than on femininity, 
in that he criticizes dependence on one’s “mother tongue” (WS §132, p. 342), but this is because 
dependence is bad not because mother tongues are bad; and Nietzsche’s sixth mention of 
motherhood is more of a comment on art again, in that ambition is a ‘mother’ of the arts, but this 
too seems to be a positive valuation of femininity if any normative implications are present (WS 
§158, p. 346).  
One passage which might seem to indicate Nietzsche’s association of certain qualities 
with femininity comes in the midst of a discussion of the value of unselfishness; here he describes 
how different people bring the best they have to a demonstrably beneficial virtue like so-called 
‘unselfishness,’ including “the women” with “their gentleness” (WS §190, p. 358). However, 
Nietzsche does not imply one way or another whether these best qualities are inherent to each 
type, and so this passage is not definitive. Likewise, when Nietzsche states later that certain 
authors do not appear to have written for any particular group, and includes “young ladies” in a 
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list of Germans, Christians, children, dreamers, and others, this in no way confers definitive value 
for or against femininity, youthful or otherwise (WS §214, p. 363).  
Nietzsche’s description of how the European women of his social circles contrast in their 
approach and contribution to fashion also confers no definitive value on femininity in contrast to 
masculinity and reads more like a psychological profile than a moral judgment; indeed, he 
accuses both the men and women of Europe of being “still immature” because they have not 
repudiated national, class, and individual vanity (WS §215, p. 364). That America is the 
‘daughter-land’ of ‘mother’ Europe just goes to show how much more immature American 
fashion and culture must be by Nietzsche’s estimation, but only by virtue of her youth and not her 
feminine gendering (WS §215, p. 365). Further, Nietzsche seems to recognize just how much 
variation there is in femininity in that he contrasts women of his contemporary society with 
women of the past and other societies: in particular, it is important to note how Nietzsche 
emphasizes the importance of convictions on the behavior of women in his society. Nietzsche 
points out that it is only because these women are convinced “that men are terrified of intellect in 
a woman” that they are so “ready to deny they have any sharpness of mind at all and deliberately 
impose on themselves a reputation for shortsightedness” because they believe it will make 
themselves more inviting and men more confiding and trusting (WS §270, p. 376). Thus 
Nietzsche evinces his awareness that many attributes of femininity – including the disinclination 
to intellectual pursuits – are socially imposed rather than biologically essential.  
Therefore, when Nietzsche goes on to use the adoring gaze of “a pretty young wife” as an 
example of happiness (WS §271, p. 376); or to say that many women have “an intelletto del 
sacrifizio and can no longer enjoy life when her husband refuses to sacrifice her” (WS §272, p. 
376); or that stupidity is “unwomanly” (WS §273, p. 376); or again that male temperament is 
worse than female temperament (WS §274, p. 376) in the immediately following four passages, I 
cannot take these to be statements about the inherent properties of masculinity or femininity, but 
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rather must assume that Nietzsche intends these to be statements about his own contemporary 
socialization with regards to gender. 
The remaining comments seem less coherent thematically; Nietzsche uses an example of 
a woman for comedic effect, and perhaps with a modicum of respect. She is the wife of an old 
soldier who listens with him to the tale of Faust and who declares that the only thing Faust did 
wrong “was to have no ink in his inkwell! To write with blood is a sin” (WS §42, p. 321). 
Nietzsche’s desire for humor, even directed at objects of affection, is again evident when he 
suggests that friends of music should nonetheless be permitted to “make fun of [music] and 
laugh” at it from time to time, just a little, and this includes joking about “the woman in music” 
(WS §169, p. 349). We should also note that Nietzsche also makes reference to “truly good men 
and women,” (WS §20, p. 310) thus casually including women in the category of persons who are 
capable of being good and therefore leading me to believe that at least at this point in his 
intellectual development Nietzsche does not exclude women from moral agency or personhood, 
which leaves open the later possibility of women Übermenschen. The final mentions of women in 
Wanderer include a passing description of a “girl clad almost as a boy” in the midst of a passage 
describing an idyllic Arcadia (WS §295, p. 385) and a reference to circumspection as the “great-
grandmother and queen” of the virtues (§294, p. 384). Lastly, Nietzsche refers to the “proud 
mistress” of foreign policy, namely utility, though the Hollingdale translation obscures this 




 The fourth and penultimate book of Nietzsche’s middle period is Morgenröte, variously 
translated as Dawn and Daybreak, and it contains significantly more references to women than 
the previous two works. Many of these are innocuous and uninteresting passing references to 
family members and strangers, such as fathers and mothers (§128), grandfathers and 
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grandmothers (§35), wives (§42, 149, 262, 369), the mother of Odysseus (§562), a glancing 
reference to “all the women in the vicinity scream[ing] aloud” in reaction to a man collapsing in 
the street (§119), and yet another parallel between women and artists (§544).141 However, 
Nietzsche also begins to do some interesting work regarding women, femininity, and explicitly 
misogyny in this text. 
 Nietzsche’s first mention of gender in the text is actually a remark about gendered 
language reminiscent of “On Truth and Lie,” particularly in the sense that in some languages like 
German various nouns are ascribed some gender: die Sonne or the sun is feminine, for example, 
while der Mond or the moon is masculine and das Leid or grief is neuter. What Nietzsche does is 
to point out a parallel between our ascriptions of ethical significance and our ascriptions of 
gender upon the world: noting that we now consider it an error to give all things a “sex,” “In the 
same way humanity has ascribed to all that exists a connection with morality and laid an ethical 
significance on the world’s back. One day this will have as much value, and no more, as the 
belief in the masculinity or femininity of the sun has today” (D §3, p. 9). In other words, just as 
we no longer consider the gender of the sun important, so we will someday consider morality – or 
at least our tendency to consider everything under the lens of morality – no longer important. 
Nietzsche does not go on to address gender in language, but the rest of the text is full of 
pronouncements about women, their relationships, and their circumstances, which leads me to 
believe that the above parallel has a deeper meaning: namely, that Nietzsche believes that one day 
our emphasis on gender values will go the way of gendered language by falling out of use over 
time, and not necessarily by concerted effort.142  
                                                          
141 This parallel is a recurring theme which I consider non-misogynist given contemporary theories about 
the performativity of gender. See for example Candace West and Don Zimmerman’s “Doing Gender.” 
Gender & Society. 1, 2 (1987) pp. 125-151. 
142 I do not believe this is necessarily the problematic claim that we should become ‘gender-blind’ in the 
same way some claim to be ‘color-blind,’ but this is not the place to address that issue. 
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 Nietzsche’s next discussion of gender is more troubling. First, he claims that 
degeneration of the body and spirit through long subjection to custom causes one to grow 
increasingly beautiful, while exercising the organs of body and spirit and the disposition required 
for such exercise (as opposed to submission to custom) increases ugliness: “That is why the old 
baboon is uglier than the young one, and why the young female baboon most closely resembles 
man: it is the most beautiful baboon, that is to say. – One could from this draw a conclusion as to 
the origin of the beauty of women!” (D §25, p. 20). Now, we can critique the notion that all 
women are beautiful (and degenerate) humans; after all, the European paradigms of feminine 
beauty have tended to be suspiciously white, pale, upper-class, cisgender, etc., there is a long 
history of viewing women as less-than-fully-human in comparison to men, etc., and if this were 
Nietzsche’s meaning it would be plainly misogynist. 
However, a second reading reveals several things: first of all, Nietzsche’s use of 
‘degeneration’ is not as straightforward as it initially looks. While we might consider 
degeneration to be a decrease in value, Nietzsche complicates this picture by pairing physical and 
psychological lassitude with both increasing degeneration and increasing beauty, and increased 
effort or labor with both decreased degeneration and decreased beauty. The relative resistance of 
a person to cultural norms thus corresponds to relative ugliness; the young are beautiful because 
they have not yet resisted at all, and the compliant are the most beautiful out of their cohort 
because they resist the least. Correlatively, the old are ugly because they have had more time to 
resist than the young, and the rebellious and ornery will thus be the ugliest in each cohort because 
they resist the most. This only becomes a value judgment about gender when we assume that 
one’s beauty and one’s value are similarly correlative, or in other words that increasing beauty 
means the person is more civilized, desirable, moral, etc.; this is precisely the step I think 
Nietzsche leaves uncompleted to trip up his reader intentionally. 
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The ‘beauty of women’ here is supposed to point towards the next step ‘up’ from or 
‘past’ humanity, as humanity is apparently a step up from or past baboons; and while this beauty 
is not necessarily a matter of being most compliant with society, I think it is supposed to 
emphasize how the yet-to-be-named Übermensch will be the most degraded and thus most 
beautiful version of a human being which will overcome its ancestral all-too-human inheritance. 
This ‘degradation’ cannot be mere compliance with society, as the picture Nietzsche later 
presents of the Übermensch is certainly not a paradigm of social compliance. Thus we might infer 
that the appearance of degradation comes with the ability to project the appearance of 
compliance, and we might further infer that Nietzsche grants such an ability to women in this 
parallel. Such an inference might require that we also assume Nietzsche will grant parallel 
abilities between the most beautiful of baboons and humanity more generally, and while I cannot 
confirm that he does so here, I think it would be foolish to rule out the possibility.  
Next, Nietzsche discusses how some of us use our virtue as a refined form of cruelty 
against others; in addition to great artists who defeat their rivals, Nietzsche points to “The chastity 
of the nun: with what punitive eyes she looks in the faces of women who live otherwise!” (D §30, 
p. 23). Later on, Nietzsche also refers to a nun’s chastity as forgoing “the world without knowing 
it” (D §440, p. 442). Neither passage offers a particularly insightful or original picture of women 
who enter nunneries, but there is no reason to assume either is supposed to be a description of all 
nuns; in the case of those nuns who do fit such descriptions, and I doubt not that such nuns exist, I 
think Nietzsche’s claims do apply without rancor.  
The only remaining remark on women from Book I is remarkably racist and ignorant, and 
a testament to Nietzsche’s intellectual inheritance from Schopenhauer and others who ascribe to 
Orientalist stereotypes. Nietzsche should not be excused for parroting the words of his 
predecessors, however, and so I take the following to be frustratingly problematic:  
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Not European and not noble. – There is something Oriental and something feminine in 
Christianity: it betrays itself in the idea: ‘whom the lord loveth he chastiseth’; for in the 
Orient women regard chastisements and the strict seclusion of their person from the 
world as a sign of their husband’s love, and complain if this sign is lacking. 
D §75, p. 45 
I seriously doubt Nietzsche ever spoke to an Asian woman who spoke about her abuse without 
reserve, or even to German women who spoke explicitly about their own experiences with 
spousal abuse. I do not doubt that Nietzsche probably learned this canard from someone who 
believed it; and indeed, I have met and read about women who fear their husbands do not love 
them when these men do not yell at them, call them names, and otherwise abuse them, though 
many of these women later come to recognize the abuse for what it is. However, just because a 
woman accepts a belief about something does not make it either feminist or non-misogynist (for 
internalized misogyny can lead to a woman believing the most heinously misogynistic things and 
even that she has never experienced misogyny), and just because a victim believes abuse is a sign 
of love does not make physical and sexual violence, psychological torture, or relentless insult a 
sign of love (for internalizing the message of the abuser can lead to a victim believing the most 
heinous things about what is an appropriate expression of love). Even more worrying is the fact 
that Nietzsche seems to place the ‘feminine’ as the opposite of the ‘noble,’ granting that the 
European and the Oriental are similarly opposed in this passage.  
 I cannot deny the central premise: there is something similar between the notion that God 
punishes the ones he loves and the notion that an abuser abuses the ones he loves. However, 
Nietzsche’s use of racism to make this point here is deeply problematic. I cannot find evidence in 
the surrounding passages that Nietzsche is trying to use racial stereotypes to make some deeper 
point about knowledge or value, and while we can make arguments about how Nietzsche 
elsewhere includes women in the nobility, complicates femininity by presenting multiple aspects 
thereof, and even sometimes describes aspects of nobility as feminine or the feminine as noble, 
we cannot get around the problem of his racism. Thus, the first caveat to my thesis that Nietzsche 
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is not a misogynist has to concern race: if we can construe Nietzsche as a kind of feminist, that 
kind of feminism is not sufficiently intersectional to be inclusive of racism. 
 The next passage is significantly less troubling; though Nietzsche does discuss empathy 
in connection with women there is no reason to presume that he assumes that “the play on the 
faces of women” of the “continual imitation and reflection of what is felt to be going on around 
them” (D §142, p. 89) is either inherently feminine or negative; these women here serve as just 
one example of how “we always almost involuntarily [practice] this skill” whenever we exercise 
empathy “in the presence of another person” (D §142, p. 89).143 Should the reader take this to be 
a negative judgment on women, I believe that says more about the reader than about Nietzsche; 
should the reader take this to be an affirmation of gender norms, however, we have no reason to 
assume Nietzsche’s ascription to such on the basis of essentialism.  
 Books III and IV contain around a dozen remarks each on women, including the 
introduction of ‘little woman’ or Weiblein we see repeated throughout Nietzsche’s later works. 
The first such little woman is a place-holder for the stereotypical ‘hen’ who plucks “to pieces” the 
achievements of others, particularly men (D §150, p. 97). However, Nietzsche reserves his rancor 
primarily for the carelessness of these great achievers rather than for the little woman who picks 
at their laurels, and for the carelessness of their marital choices. Similarly, when ‘beautiful 
women’ appear in a list of “the good things of life,” these women seem to be little more than 
place-holders (D §153, p. 98). Nietzsche is not making a judgment about all beautiful women, but 
rather pointing out a flaw in the men who seek to make the prizes of valor “accessible also to 
cowards” (D §153, p. 98).  
                                                          
143 I debated whether or not to make note of the Lehrmeisterin or instructress (translated as ‘instructor’) in 
this passage, but I think it is sufficient to point out that the instructress of empathy, namely timidity or 
Furchtsamkeit is a feminine noun; hence I do not believe that Nietzsche is making a remark about the 
gender of timidity here, just using fairly typical German noun-constructing conventions to my knowledge. 
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 Book III is also one of the only places where Nietzsche explicitly connects perspective to 
our social constructions of gender, specifically regarding our different appreciations for male and 
female beauty. In particular, he points out that “Different perspectives of feeling” lead us to 
misunderstand the art of the ancient Greeks and their “passion for naked male beauty” and the 
fact that “It was only from that viewpoint that they were sensible of female beauty” (D §170, p. 
104). Hence, Nietzsche concludes, “their perspective on female beauty was quite different from 
ours. And similarly with their love of women: they reverenced differently, they despised 
differently” (D §170, p. 104). While it is certainly possible that Nietzsche never connected such a 
difference in perspective on despising women to his revaluation of all values, I find it hard to 
believe that he completely ignored the connection between the two, especially given passages like 
this. Thus, even if Nietzsche himself never explicitly suggests or addresses a revaluation of 
gender values, I believe he must be aware of the possibility.144 
 Nietzsche does emphasize the fact that there are gender differences by briefly noting 
Madame de Sévigné’s “accents of a woman” to contrast more strongly how the playwright 
Corneille was “a complete man”145 (D §191, p. 112). Further, Nietzsche does include a genuine 
gender expression among things which are noble and good, such as in the case of Madame de 
Guyon and her circle who have “a genuine, feminine, fine and noble old French naivety in word 
and gesture” (D §192, p. 113). However, noting that one can genuinely express gender in a good 
way does not necessarily mean that Nietzsche believes only such genuine expressions are good, 
nor that they are necessary, innate, or unchanging. I highlight this part because of his inclusion of 
femininity amongst things which are noble and good. I would also like to point out that Nietzsche 
demonstrates his awareness of misogyny or woman-hatred (Weiberhaß) when he acknowledges 
                                                          
144 Part of my dissertation may have to address the difference or similarities between the slave revolt in 
morality and the revaluation of all values; one key point is probably going to rely on the relative passive, 
reactive qualities of a slave revolt as opposed to the active qualities of a revaluation of all values, akin to 
the distinction between the knightly-aristocratic form of “I am good, you are not me, you are bad” 
reasoning and the priestly-slave form of “You are evil, I am not you, I am good” reasoning. 
145 Manne.  
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that he quotes from “the ancient misogynist Aeschylus” (D §193, p. 114), and while Nietzsche 
appears to simply drop in his quote about how ‘young women peep through their veils,’ we could 
make much of the fact that Nietzsche drops this quote into a passage discussing witty yet 
indiscreet inspirations. To say the least, we could argue that Nietzsche is hinting here that his own 
use of remarks on gender can be just such witty, indiscreet inspirational kernels as those which 
gave Hegel his style. 
 Nietzsche draws an apparently incidental but nonetheless explicit connection between 
truth and women in this text as well, noting that in several situations we choose rather to not tell 
the truth: “to talk of buffooneries with children and not of the truth, to talk of compliments to 
women who are later to become mothers146 and not of the truth, to talk of their future and their 
pleasures to young people and not of the truth” (D §196, p. 117) – Nietzsche criticizes the fact 
that we have time for these pleasant falsehoods and untruths but not enough time in all of our 
education to address the questions of “What am I really doing? And why am I doing it?” (D §196, 
p. 116-7). While this is more a criticism of European and particularly German educational 
systems than anything else, I find this a fruitful passage because Nietzsche identifies several ways 
in which we can fail to tell the truth – buffooneries, compliments, future speculation and 
uneducated self-reflection, while not straight-forward falsehoods all fall short of the truth in 
interesting ways. Nietzsche here also identifies three groups of persons who are commonly 
excluded from full epistemic agency, though not explicitly, namely young children, women (and 
especially future mothers or pregnant women), and young adults. We can draw further 
connections between the fact that our education leads us to not exactly withhold truth from such 
groups but at least to manipulate and massage the truth for these groups and the fact that these 
groups tend to be excluded from full membership in the epistemic community. 
                                                          
146 Such a roundabout way to say pregnant women! 
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Nietzsche also offers evidence that he believes that at least some things apply to all of 
certain human groups regardless of gender, particularly the fact that “A person of aristocratic 
habits, man or woman, does not like to fall into a chair as if utterly exhausted” (D §201, p. 119-
20). Again, I highlight this to note Nietzsche’s inclusion of feminine persons within the nobility, 
and feminine habits within noble ones. The final remarks on women from Book III come in the 
form of a reference to the “healthy mistrust” which “mother Europe has embodied in her sons,” 
namely the colonists who “could transform the disgrace of slavery into a virtue” and the “workers 
of Europe” who “ought henceforth to declare themselves as a class” and the corresponding 
tendency of such sons to reject “the dull old woman” because they are “in danger of becoming as 
querulous, irritable, and pleasure-seeking as she herself was” (D §206, p. 126-7). This whole 
passage is particularly interesting because of Nietzsche’s judgments that slavery is a disgrace, that 
the workers of Europe should unite, and his implication that pleasure-seeking is not a valuable 
trait. The gendering of Europe as a fitful old woman is little more than an uninteresting metaphor, 
as we could just as easily construe Europe as a querulous, irritable, and pleasure-seeking dull old 
man for the purposes of this passage.147 
Book IV reveals a number of very feminist moments for Nietzsche: to start, he counsels 
his readers to “Beware of all spirits that lie in chains! Of clever women, for example, whom fate 
has confined to a petty, dull environment, and who grow old there',” because while they appear to 
be “sluggish and half-blind in the sunlight” they will “start up and bite” at anything unfamiliar or 
unexpected and “take their revenge on everything that has escaped from their dog-kennel” (D 
§227, p. 138). First of all, Nietzsche acknowledges that women can be clever; secondly, he 
acknowledges the injustice of confining women in a way that prevents the exercise of their 
                                                          
147 An aside: one could criticize this point on the grounds of the fact that ‘Europa,’ the mythological origin 
of the name of the continent Europe, was a young woman; if Europa had been a young man, European 
history might have been dramatically different, not the least because Zeus’s rape of Europa is the primary 
feature of the myth. Gender-swapping Europa might necessitate a corresponding gender-swap of Zeus and 
of all his rapes, and it is very difficult for me to imagine a world in which the Queen of all Olympus is a 
serial rapist the way the male Zeus has been because female-perpetrated rape is so rare by comparison to 
male-perpetrated rape. 
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talents; thirdly, he acknowledges that the abused can and often do retaliate, and that victims may 
not direct their retaliation at the appropriate targets, but simply any passer-by. Each of these is a 
remarkable insight for a man who supposedly just parrots Schopenhauer’s misogyny. 
Nietzsche notes that dissimulation can be required by duty in some cases, and that 
frequently the “The lie is, if not the mother, then the nurse of goodness” (D §248, p. 143), once 
again demonstrating the connection of femininity to goodness. Also, I would like to take this 
opportunity to point out that Nietzsche has not set up truth and falsehood as a masculine/feminine 
dichotomy. While Nietzsche later indicates that truth is a woman in the preface to Beyond Good 
and Evil, here he describes lies or falsehoods as being a mother or (female) nurse. Thus both truth 
and its opposite are feminine for Nietzsche and the fact that he uses these metaphors consistently 
and repeatedly leads me to believe he is not merely incidentally gendering these ideas on the basis 
of the gender of the words die Wahrheit and die Lüge. 
 Nietzsche appears to judge harshly the empty-headed music appreciator who is content to 
be deceived and cannot even distinguish the approach of a beautiful woman from the approach of 
a beautiful horse (D §255, p. 144), and I would argue further that he harshly judges the married 
man who suddenly realizes that his “young wife”148 is dull but believes she is interesting as well 
as “those women whose flesh is willing but whose spirit is weak” (D §276, p. 150), thus 
demonstrating that his criticism for those who are slow to understand or control themselves is 
equal-opportunity in its fierceness. When Nietzsche describes the ‘danger in beauty’ as the 
exclamation “how much cleverer she would have become if she were not beautiful!” (D §282, p. 
151), I read this as a statement about society more than about beautiful women: for in a society 
which prizes a woman’s beauty over her intelligence, many women either learn to hide their 
cleverness or learn to actively avoid exercising it. Similarly, Nietzsche’s comments on “dear 
ladies” who “count the beauty of their children, their clothes, their dog, their physician, their town 
                                                          
148 Junge Gattin. 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
171 
 
to their own credit” demonstrate a problem with a society which also creates “great men” with 
great egos that appropriate all of time as their own as if “they were the head of this long body” (D 
§285, p. 151); a woman whose ego is large in a society which deems women inferior will spread 
her ego over her immediate surroundings, while a man whose ego is large in a society which 
deems men superior will spread his ego over all of history. Again, this is a statement about the 
social construction of gender rather than the biological innateness of gender expression, and this 
is a descriptive rather than prescriptive statement.  
 Nietzsche continues in his theme of criticizing men for their relationships with women 
rather than blaming the women for the behavior of men: for in the case of saints, Nietzsche 
remarks that “It is the most sensual men who have to flee from women and torment their body” 
rather than saying that women represent lustful temptations responsible for men straying from the 
path of virtue (D §294, p. 153). Nietzsche also cautions us against victim-blaming in a sense, 
because innocence corresponds to an ignorance which prevents innocents “from distinguishing 
between measure and excess and from keeping themselves in check in good time” (D §321, p. 
159); thus, when he calls young wives “ignorant” it is not a judgment against such women but 
rather a judgment about their innocence (D §321, p. 159). In another passage, Nietzsche notes 
amusingly that the appearance of adult children next to their mothers demonstrates how 
appearance is an argument against history, for given such an image it is hard to credit the claim 
that those children at some point emerged from the bodies of their mothers (D §340, p. 164); this 
claim is more interesting because of its epistemological implications – namely that appearance or 
sensory experience is contrary to inductive logic which in turn happens to be built on sensory 
experiences – than because of its connection to pregnancy, motherhood, and gender.  
 Perhaps the most explicit statement of Nietzsche’s opinion about misogyny, and one of 
the things I take to mark him at least as an anti-misogynist in the same way he is an anti-anti-
Semite, comes in a fairly brief aphorism which I shall quote in full: “Misogynists. – ‘Woman is 
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our enemy’ – out of the man who says that to other men there speaks an immoderate drive which 
hates not only itself but its means of satisfaction as well” (D §346, p. 165). Thus I take this to be 
Nietzsche characterizing misogyny as follows: misogyny is the voice of a (heterosexual or 
perhaps heteronormative) masculine sexual drive which hates its own sensuality as well as its 
means of satisfaction, namely women. We may find a parallel in the often-voiced opinion that 
homophobia arises from repressed homosexuality: like misogyny which hates both the desire for 
sexual satisfaction with women and the women desired, homophobia hates both the desire for 
sexual satisfaction with men and the (gay) men desired.  
 Nietzsche does not therefore appear to side with such men, though he is explicitly aware 
of and critical of their existence, just as he is critical of those “proud fellows” who “always 
require others whom they can dominate and rape149” in order “to produce in themselves a feeling 
of dignity and importance,” whether those ‘others’ dominated are dogs, friends, wives, political 
parties, or even whole eras (D §369, p. 169). I say he is critical of these fellows precisely because 
he construes this domination not as mastery and healthiness but rather as requiring one’s 
“environment to be wretched in order to raise themselves for a moment above their own 
wretchedness” (D §369, p. 169). Further, when Nietzsche designates some women of 
questionable value as “little” women, I do not think this smallness is gender-dependent because 
he also includes “little” men generally within the category of “anyone who is not an expert” who 
“starts to play the judge” (D §372, p. 169). 
 I struggle more with the meaning of the aphorism “Probable and improbable” which 
Nietzsche sets up as a plausible but nonetheless never-occurring scenario, wherein both a woman 
and a man secretly love each other and elevate each other far beyond their actual selves (D §379, 
p. 170-1). Upon simultaneously confessing this secret, the woman grows cold and declares that 
they have both falsely elevated each other – and so Nietzsche ends by asking why this never 
                                                          
149 Vergewaltigen – to rape or violate. 
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happens (D §379, p. 171). Arguably, one could say that ‘what never happens’ is that women 
never reject a compliment, but I am inclined to state that Nietzsche’s deeper meaning might be 
that neither men nor women are inclined to reject the high images our lovers have of us except 
perhaps in jest, that neither men nor women ever earnestly try to convince their lovers that their 
elevated image is an illusion, and that his use of a woman as the spokesperson in this hypothetical 
is to play with the heads of the misogynists he knows must be reading him. Thus when Nietzsche 
later discusses the behavior of women and their ‘different kind of pride’ from men, I do not take 
this as a remark about inherent difference, and given his earlier comments in this text I think we 
can construe this as a socially constructed gender difference once again (D §403, p. 174).  
 There are only four more remarks to discuss from Book V that I have not yet touched: 
first, Nietzsche offers a remark which demonstrates how Wilhelmine male friendships resembled 
Victorian male friendships in their romanticization of male friendships in antiquity and 
incidentally states that “All great achievements on the part of the man of antiquity were supported 
by the fact that man stood beside man, and that a woman was not allowed to claim to be the 
nearest or the highest, let alone sole object of his love – as sexual passion teaches us [modern 
Europeans] to feel” (D §503, p. 204-5). Nietzsche says all of this to demonstrate how much 
modern philosophy has changed, because his contemporaries would never object to the 
uselessness of philosophy to one’s friends, while in antiquity friendship was valued the way 
Nietzsche’s contemporaries valued sexual love.150 Thus this remark is not a judgment that women 
ought to be excluded from friendship or love, but rather a statement that living something to the 
fullest has a tendency to exclude other things. 
 Second, Nietzsche describes “Erlichkeit” or honesty as a temptress for all fanatics, 
including Martin Luther: “That which seemed to approach Luther in the shape of the Devil or a 
beautiful woman, and which he warded off in so uncouth a manner, was no doubt honesty, and 
                                                          
150 I find this amusing particularly now because we are now seeing a revival in the need to demonstrate the 
usefulness of philosophy to freshmen, to educational boards, and even to politicians. 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
174 
 
perhaps, in rarer cases, even truth” (D §511, p. 206). This characterization of honesty as a 
temptress corresponds to Nietzsche’s other uses of feminine personifications of entities pertaining 
to the Goddess Truth. Third, Nietzsche describes how love wants to do away with the feeling of 
otherness and replace it by “feigning a sameness which in reality does not exist” such that 
“women in love deny this dissimulation and continual tender deceit and boldly assert that love 
makes the same (that is to say, that it performs a miracle!)” and even sometimes so much so that 
both parties devote themselves to this sameness until “neither knows what he is supposed to be 
imitating, what dissimulating, what pretending to be” (D §532, p. 210-1). Precisely because 
Nietzsche describes both men and women as capable of this, I do not think it is problematic for 
the questions of feminism. Fourth and last, Nietzsche describes an old philosopher whose “age 
and weariness [are that] which permit him to ripen out in this way, to grow silent, and to repose in 
the radiant idolatry of a woman” (D §542, p. 215). Again, this idolatry seems to have no 
component value judgment attached to it or the gender to which Nietzsche ascribes it, and thus 
we close the final book of this text. 
   
The Gay Science (GS) 
 
 The last text from Nietzsche’s middle period is The Gay Science. This publication 
contains a number of references to gender and arguably “complicates any appraisal of Nietzsche’s 
alleged sexism” (Higgins, p. 73).151 To maintain chronological order, I will focus in this section 
on the original parts of the work and return to the additions of the 1887 preface, Book V, and the 
appendix when Nietzsche publishes them in his mature period. Interestingly, Nietzsche makes 
                                                          
151 Kathleen Higgins has already provided an excellent reading of gender in Book II in Comic Relief: 
Nietzsche’s Gay Science. I do not so much disagree with her reading as I diverge from it here in my 
methods and goals: her book primarily concerns illuminating various themes and controversies concerning 
one text, and only regards gender in depth for one of the five books of The Gay Science, whereas I seek to 
explore Nietzsche’s philosophy with regards to gender over the course of all of his published works. As 
such, my reading of The Gay Science will not be perfectly identical to Higgins’s reading, but in many 
respects will tend to parallel it.  
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references to women in every part of The Gay Science, including the preface, the prelude, each of 
the five books, and the appendix. Thus I anticipate that this text will be especially revealing 
regarding Nietzsche’s position with regards to feminism and misogyny. In particular, I hope this 
divided reading of The Gay Science reveals whether Nietzsche’s attitude towards women changes 
as dramatically after his break with Lou as some commentators maintain.152  
 The “Prelude in German Rhymes” contains four explicit references to women, if you 
include a remark about Minerva’s owl (GS F §53, p. 63). The first reference is in a couplet titled 
“The Involuntary Seducer”: “He shot an empty word, just for a ball, / Into the blue – it made a 
woman fall” (GS F §19, p. 47). How we read this poem depends on whether our sympathies lie 
with the ‘involuntary’ seducer or with the fallen woman, and more importantly where we believe 
Nietzsche’s sympathies lie. Given §68 and §71 which advise more ‘kindness’ for women, I am 
given to believe that Nietzsche feels more sympathy for the fallen woman than he does with the 
careless seducer. Thus also, in “Man and Woman,” when he states “Seize forcibly the wench for 
whom you feel! / Thus thinks a man. Women don’t rob, they steal” (GS §22, p. 49), I am inclined 
to believe he is not negatively judging women but rather recognizing a socially conditioned 
difference between women and men. Nietzsche does not assert that this is how men and women 
should behave, but rather how they do behave. Again, given the aforementioned passages in Book 
II, I do not believe Nietzsche’s sympathies lie with the man who forcibly seizes wenches. 
 The third reference to women is the quatrain titled “Lost His Head” concerning a man 
who loses his wits in love: “Why is she clever now and so refined? / On her account a man’s out 
of his mind, / His head was good before he took this whirl: / He lost his wits – to the aforesaid 
girl” (GS §50, p. 63). As this poem is written long before the falling out with Lou, I cannot read 
                                                          
152 See, for example, p. 21 of Carol Diethe’s Historical Dictionary of Nietzscheanism. I find it troubling 
that scholars wish to emphasize Salomé’s rejection of Nietzsche over the break with the Wagners; if the 
loss of Cosima’s love did not turn Nietzsche to virulent misogyny, it seems to me that the loss of Salomé’s 
love should not particularly do so either. The fact that Cosima was married to Richard seems no more of a 
hindrance to Nietzsche’s love than was Lou’s friendship with Paul during Nietzsche’s courtship, and thus 
the cases do not seem to be so different.  
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this as a degradation of the ‘girl’ involved, but rather a statement about how we perceive women 
given their relationships with men: I take Nietzsche to say that a girl appears more ‘clever’ and 
‘refined’ when society sees her through the lens of a young man in love, which is not to imply 
that she was neither refined nor clever before, just that no one noticed, or perhaps that she just 
seems to be more of herself than she already was. To say that the man ‘lost his wits’ does not 
imply that it is irrational to love this girl because she in reality lacks refinement and cleverness, 
but rather that love causes us to lose perspective with regards to the ones we love, and may cause 
us to attribute more to those we love than they otherwise have. 
 The last reference to women from the prelude is more of a self-reflection than a 
discussion of women or gender; Nietzsche offers a quatrain in which he evaluates “Human, All 
Too Human: A Book,” saying to himself “You’re sad and shy when looking at the past, / But trust 
the future when yourself you trust: / Are you some kind of eagle in pursuit? / Or just Minerva’s 
favorite hootootoot?” (GS §53, p. 63). The contrast between the eagle and the owl seems to be a 
contrast between an independent and prideful perspective and a dependent and privileged 
perspective, but properly understanding this would require more attention to Nietzsche’s usage of 
various birds throughout his work. At the very least, we should note the appearance of Minerva at 
the beginning of this text because she is the goddess of wisdom, crafts, and war. Nietzsche’s 
invocation of her here seems to indicate that the women of The Gay Science, which include 
mothers, sisters, and maidens again as well as goddesses, prostitutes, and witches, will be neither 
weak nor uncomplicated. 
 Book I contains six passages with references to women, and the first of these is the 
second passage in the book. Following the initial passage, which ends with Nietzsche’s question 
and exclamation: “Do you understand this new law of ebb and flood? There is a time for us, too!” 
(GS §1, p. 76), Nietzsche states something which leads me to conclude that women can be 
included in the ‘us’ for whom there is a time coming, or at the very least that there is no reason 
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women should be excluded. Again, this is because Nietzsche does see women as capable of 
possessing nobility, though this does not always come with every feature one may desire: “I 
mean: the great majority of people does not consider it contemptible to believe…without even 
troubling themselves about such reasons afterward: the most gifted men and the noblest women 
still belong to this ‘great majority’” (GS §2, p. 76). We know Nietzsche to associate nobility with 
‘higher’ types of humanity, including the highest type, and the fact that Nietzsche grants women 
their nobility thus leads me to conclude that there is no reason to exclude women from the highest 
category of humanity under Nietzsche’s later terminology, the Übermenschen.  
 It is also important to point out that these higher types are “more unreasonable, for those 
who are noble, magnanimous, and self-sacrificial do succumb to their instincts, and when they are 
at their best, their reason pauses” (GS §3, p. 77), or in other words that being ‘higher’ does not 
necessarily mean more ‘rational’ – a departure from the traditional modern philosopher’s view 
that men are more rational and hence better than non-men, including animals, children, and 
women – and hence a provides a counterargument to any suspicions that Nietzsche advocates rule 
by the intellectual elite. This applies also to male animals who die in the mating process or to any 
animal in the protection of their offspring; I will quote the passage in full because it demonstrates 
something interesting which I feel may be especially useful for later chapters:  
An animal that protects its young at the risk of its life, or that during the mating period 
follows the female even into death, does not think of danger and death; its reason also 
pauses, because the pleasure in its young or in the female and the fear of being deprived 
of this pleasure dominate it totally: the animal becomes more stupid than usual – just like 
those who are noble and magnanimous. They have some feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure that are so strong that they reduce the intellect to silence or to servitude: at 
that point their heart replaces the head, and one speaks of “passion” … The unreason or 
counterreason of passion is what the common type despises in the noble, especially when 
this passion is directed toward objects whose value seems quite fantastic and arbitrary. 
GS §3, p. 77-78 
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I quote this at length in order to emphasize this distinction between the noble and the common: 
the noble are passionate, while the common are less so and hence more reasonable. This does not 
mean that Nietzsche necessarily devalues all reason and rationality, but certainly that he is 
changing the weights of value here: where we used to despise the passions and prefer reason, 
Nietzsche is teaching us to see the value that the passions have. 
To take this a bit further than Nietzsche does, I will say the following: as women and 
particularly feminists are construed by misogynists and anti-feminists as ‘emotional’ or in other 
words passionate, we might be able to draw a parallel here between the noble and the common. 
Women and feminists are therefore nobler due to their passion, while misogynists and anti-
feminists are more common due to their lack thereof and their corollary high esteem for reason. It 
is little wonder, then, that misogynists and anti-feminists should despise women and feminists, 
“especially when this passion is directed toward objects whose value seems quite fantastic and 
arbitrary,” to misogynists and anti-feminists, such as wearing pants, working outside the home, 
receiving equal pay, etc. Without the passion for fighting oppression, including both sartorial and 
career options in the same list of goals would seem quite fantastic and arbitrary, but with that 
passion we can see more clearly how such disparate choices can be so closely related. 
The third mention of women concerns pity, namely that “Pity is praised as the virtue of 
prostitutes” (GS §13, p. 88). This declaration follows a discussion of the feeling of power, and the 
contempt the strong have for ‘easy prey.’ Nietzsche describes pity as “the most agreeable feeling 
among those who have little pride and no prospects of great conquests” and who are therefore 
enchanted by easy prey (GS §13, p. 87). Thus it would be easy to conclude that Nietzsche is 
suggesting that pity is the virtue of prostitutes because they have neither pride nor prospects. 
However, the use of the passive voice153 here is a clue that Nietzsche may not actually be 
                                                          
153 “Man rühmt das Mitleid als die Tugend der Freudenmädchen.” – “One praises pity as the virtue of 
prostitutes.” Though in German the structure is strictly speaking not passive, the ‘one’ doing the praising is 
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ascribing pity to the prostitutes: rather, he is saying that this is how society identifies prostitutes, 
whether as virtuous because they are pitiable or as virtuous because they are taking pity on their 
clients; thus Nietzsche leaves open the possibility that society is wrong here. Because even Diethe 
describes Nietzsche as being remarkably sex-positive, we may conclude that Nietzsche is not 
necessarily judging prostitutes negatively, whether with regards to their selling sex or with 
regards to their supposed virtue of pity. We might say Nietzsche has a negative view of 
prostitution, given his description of the commonness and “prostitution of the spirit” in his 
contemporary political sphere (GS §31, p. 103), but this negative view of metaphorical 
prostitution does not entail a negative view of actual prostitutes, for it is possible to imagine a 
world where sexual prostitution is treated as a rare and noble profession rather than a common 
and low profession, and hence where the word ‘prostitution’ does not have the same connotations 
that allow us to talk about the metaphorical prostitution of the spirit.  
 The fourth passage presents some problems. Nietzsche opens with a distinction between a 
“weak and quasi feminine type” and a “strong or masculine type” which is unsettling: the former 
type of ‘dissatisfied’ being “has a sensitivity for making life more beautiful and profound” while 
the latter metaphorical type “has a sensitivity for making life better and safer” (GS §24, p. 98). 
Nietzsche’s qualification of the former as merely “quasi feminine” helps to distance him from a 
strictly dualistic gendering of these two types, allowing for a third unqualifiedly feminine type, 
but the fact that he does not explore this possibility here leaves me troubled. However, he does 
indicate that the quasi-feminine was actually dominant in Europe for a long time, thus implying 
that many human men are quasi-feminine in this metaphorical sense, and further that the quasi-
feminine type lead to a European capacity for change, which Nietzsche does appear to value 
positively (GS §24, p. 99). Hence, a quasi-feminine dissatisfaction which manifests “by gladly 
being deceived occasionally and settling for a little intoxication” and which “suffers from the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
left non-specific, and Nietzsche places the action of identifying the virtue on the ‘one’ rather than the 
prostitutes, so I believe the explanation I offer works regardless of the translation. 
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incurability of its dissatisfaction” and “assures the continuation of real misery” (GS §24, p. 98-9) 
is not simplistically evil or bad, and may be either or both necessary and good for some purposes. 
After all, it is this “intellectual irritability” of the quasi-feminine type “that almost amounts to 
genius and is in any case the mother of all genius” (GS §24, p. 99). Thus we see Nietzsche 
connecting the quasi-feminine to the maternal, which may also leave some room between the 
unqualifiedly feminine and the maternal. In other words, this move on Nietzsche’s part reveals 
that he does not necessarily characterize the feminine as having a one-to-one relationship with 
motherhood. The significance of this move will be more apparent later on.  
 In the fifth passage, Nietzsche discusses the relationship between heresy and witchcraft; 
he points out that non-customary thought is not a sign of superiority but frequently a sign of 
“strong, evil inclinations that detach and isolate one, and that are defiant, nasty, and malicious” 
(GS §35, p. 104). Nietzsche describes heresy as no more harmless than witchcraft, and claims that 
both heretics and witches are “species of evil human beings” who “feel that they are evil” and 
“are impelled by an unconquerable lust to harm what is dominant” (GS §35, p. 104). This 
‘medieval spirit’ intensified in the form of the Protestant Reformation “at a time when that was no 
longer accompanied by a good conscience” (GS §35, p. 104). However, I do not take Nietzsche to 
thus be saying that witches (and heretics) should be stopped or eradicated from society, as this all 
seems rather tounge-in-cheek. Given the claim from the immediately preceding section which 
states “So many retroactive forces are still needed!” (GS §34, p. 104), I am inclined rather to read 
Nietzsche as describing the necessity of those who consider themselves evil and lust to harm 
whatever ideas or persons are dominant.  
 Nietzsche’s final discussion of women in Book I comes in the form of a discussion of 
how mortal sins and the penal code of a people indicate what that people finds to be foreign; the 
Muslim sect of Wahhabis who only recognize smoking and having any God other than Allah as 
mortal sins show that the Wahhabis only find idolatry and smoking foreign (GS §43, p. 109). 
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Similarly, Nietzsche mentions the Roman notion “that a woman could incur only two mortal sins: 
adultury and – drinking wine” (GS §43, p. 109). Drinking wine in particular could cause a woman 
to be executed not only because “women under the influence of alcohol sometimes lose the 
ability to say no” but also and more importantly because the Romans feared the invasion of “the 
orgiastic and Dionysian cult that afflicted the women of Southern Europe” (GS §43, p. 109). 
Hence Romans developed a custom of kissing relatives “only to keep women under control” in 
this combined matter of sex, religion, and nationalistic fears of invasion by foreign powers (GS 
§43, p. 109). This passage is interesting first because it reveals Nietzsche’s recognition that laws 
about women are not laws about women’s behaviors but rather laws about male fears, both the 
fear that male property (wives and daughters) might be damaged (by sexual assault) but also and 
more importantly the fear that this property might choose to stray. We could take this further to 
say that men attempt to control women not out of feminine inferiority and male superiority, but 
because of a male inferiority complex. Secondly, this is interesting because it demonstrates 
Nietzsche’s recognition of how alcohol can influence consent; women “lose the ability” to say no 
under the influence, but not necessarily the desire, and this recognition puts Nietzsche’s 
nineteenth century politics ahead of the politics of some twenty-first century American 
politicians. Further, it demonstrates Nietzsche’s recognition that some displays of affection, such 
as kissing, are not always expressions of affection but can express other things such as a need to 
control. We can take this further to say that this understanding parallels the claim that rape is not 
about sex but about power, an understanding many of us still lack today. The Romans thus feared 
that their women would be violated; the fear of the Dionysus cult, however, was a fear not of 
sexual violation but of sexual agency.  
 Book II contains the vast majority of Nietzsche’s remarks on women in The Gay Science. 
Many of these are remarkably forward-thinking for a man taken as a canonical misogynist, and 
many of them complicate the strictly dualist picture of gender common during the modern era of 
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philosophy. We also see a number of themes from his earlier works repeated: woman and artists, 
language, love, sex, pregnancy, and motherhood, as well as the reappearances of old women, 
noble women, goddesses, and little girls.154 As with Book I, Nietzsche wastes little time bringing 
women into the discussion; the first two passages are one section directed to realists which warns 
that “We are not nearly as different as you think” (GS §57, p. 121), and one concerning creators 
which ends with the reminder that creating “new names and estimations and probabilities” creates 
new ‘things’ in the long run (GS §58, p. 122). Following these, Nietzsche addresses his next 
section to artists: “When we love a woman, we easily conceive a hatred for nature on account of 
all the repulsive natural functions to which every woman is subject” and ultimately see these 
natural functions as “a horror and unthinkable, a blasphemy against God and love” (GS §59, p. 
122). This in turn serves as an analogy for how worshipers regard God’s omnipotence (GS §59, p. 
122-3), and initially reads as the kind of squeamishness that caused Ruskin to avoid intercourse 
because of his disgust with his wife’s pubic hair (Higgins, 2000, p. 80).  
 In addition to the epistemological concerns Higgins addresses, I think we can add some 
context which makes this passage more interesting than a mere expression of disgust. The fact 
that the first section of Book II warns that “we” are not so different as you might think inclines 
me to take Nietzsche to not be restricting “artists” to his male readers as Higgins suggests 
(Higgins, p. 80). Instead, we can flip the gender of this passage and see whether what Nietzsche 
says still applies, and I have little doubt that there is a sufficiently large number of women who 
would agree that the biological necessities of their lovers are disgusting, and that they too go 
through mental gyrations to avoid connecting ‘repulsive natural functions’ to the ones they love. 
Further, given the reminder that new words and estimations lead to new things immediately 
preceding this section, I find it hard to believe that Nietzsche intends for us to take this disgust as 
innate and rather read him as suggesting that this disgust was created by new words and 
                                                          
154 Given such a profusion of women and female figures, I am baffled as to why anyone would suggest that 
Nietzsche’s views on women are irrelevant to his philosophy, except for their own latent sexism. 
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estimations, which in turn implies that we can unlearn this disgust as well as learning a new 
disgust.  
 Similarly, when Nietzsche speaks of women and their “action at a distance,” gender-
flipping the script helps reveal that his claims do not only apply to men’s relationships with 
women, but also women’s relationships with men (GS §60 p. 123-4). Nietzsche again 
demonstrates that he does not separate women from men in how the world affects them: just as 
“warm, rainy winds” can inspire the artist and the churchgoer, they can also inspire the 
romantically-inclined woman (GS §63, p. 124-5). Further, even though Nietzsche implies that 
“old women” are superficial and skeptical about depth (GS §64, p. 125), this is no negative 
judgment against these old women but an alliance therewith, for he later describes himself as 
having become superficial through long exposure to profundity (GS P §4, p. 38). Nietzsche also 
demonstrates sympathy for those “noble women” who “know no better way to express their 
deepest devotion than to offer their virtue and shame” and whose lovers accept their sacrifices 
without returning the same devotion (GS §65, p. 125). Given this sympathy, I see no reason to 
judge Nietzsche’s next pronouncement about ‘all women’ negatively:  
The strength of the weak. – All women are subtle in exaggerating their weaknesses; they 
are inventive when it comes to weaknesses in order to appear as utterly fragile ornaments 
who are hurt even by a speck of dust. Their existence is supposed to make men feel 
clumsy, and guilty on that score. Thus they defend themselves against the strong and ‘the 
law of the jungle.’ 
GS §66, p. 125 
I do not read this as Nietzsche saying women are weak and deceptive creatures who only fake 
being sick and exaggerate being weak, particularly as he is offering here a reasoned deception for 
the purpose of self-defense. Rather, I read Nietzsche as saying that in a system of oppression, 
those who are oppressed must resort to subterfuge in order to survive. We might draw a parallel 
here with the way African slaves in the Americas engaged in various forms of resistance to ‘the 
law of the jungle’ by breaking tools, stealing food, etc.; just as white supremacists read this 
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activity as “indicative of clumsiness and stupidity,” (Yancy, p. 120) rather than a sign of agency, 
a misogynist might read a woman’s feigning illness as indicative of a lack of agency rather than a 
sign thereof as well. However, the fact that Nietzsche construes this not necessarily as resistance 
but definitely as a matter of inventiveness and self-defense indicates his recognition and positive 
valuation of female agency. Thus again, when Nietzsche describes a woman who no longer acts 
the way she did in courtship, and the fact that this disturbs her now-spouse (GS §67, p. 125-6), I 
take this to be more of a judgment against the husband for his foolishness than against the wife 
for her new-found stability.  
 Perhaps the clearest statement of Nietzsche’s sympathies for women, and one of the 
reasons I am coming to read him as an anti-misogynist, comes in the passage titled “Will and 
Willingness,” wherein his sage tells the people that “Men need to be educated better” rather than 
women because men are the ones who corrupt women (GS §68, p. 126). Further, the statement 
that “it is man who creates for himself the image of woman, and woman forms herself according 
to this image” (GS §68, p. 126) seems to me to indicate the following, though Nietzsche would 
never have used this terminology: first, the patriarchy controls the image of woman, and the 
‘laws’ of the sexes; secondly, this gender-imago of femininity is a social construction rather than 
some fixed biological essence; thirdly, women learn to internalize the patriarchal construction of 
femininity. Ultimately I would agree with Nietzsche’s sage that this is “truly, a hard law for 
women” (GS §68, p. 126). Interestingly, this rejection of gender essentialism puts Nietzsche in 
antithesis with the Wilhelmine feminists of his day but simultaneously puts Nietzsche in accord 
with some contemporary feminists.  
 Nietzsche appears to recognize equal capacities inherent in people regardless of gender, 
as evidenced by the claim that “we have little respect for anyone who lacks both the capacity and 
the good will for revenge – regardless of whether it is a man or a woman” and that this capacity to 
“wield a dagger (any kind of dagger)” against us or oneself is part of what enthralls us (GS §69, 
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p. 126). Why he feels it necessary to construe self-harm as “Chinese revenge” (GS §69, p. 126) is 
wholly unclear and suspiciously racist, once again.155 Again, however, we can read this as a sign 
of Nietzsche’s recognition of women’s agency, and perhaps further as a statement that whether or 
not men admit it, women’s agency is important, not only for love and sex but also in a number of 
other respects.  
 Nietzsche describes how agency and social constructions can fight against each other in 
“Die Herrinnen der Herren”156 in that, for example, the theater uses voices that make us think of 
agency, such as the “deep and powerful alto voice” that inspires thoughts of “women with lofty, 
heroic, and royal souls,” as the voices of romantic leads, which instead inspires thoughts of the 
socially constructed “motherly and housewifely” woman (GS §70, p. 127). Thus Nietzsche 
admits the possibility of higher women, but finds that media representations of women discourage 
society from seeing women as capable of higher things. This shockingly progressive claim 
written in the nineteenth century directly corresponds to the kinds of motivations which have lead 
to twenty-first century feminist projects like Miss Representation, which demonstrate how poor 
representation of women in the media is connected with women’s lived experiences social 
injustice.  
 Further, Nietzsche’s aphorism “On female chastity” is a remarkably sympathetic and 
forgiving discussion about the way women are trained to regard sex, particularly upper-class 
women for his era: “What could be more paradoxical? All the world is agreed that they are to be 
brought up as ignorant of possible erotic matters…And then to be hurled, as by a gruesome 
lightning bolt, into reality and knowledge, by marriage – precisely by the man they love and 
                                                          
155 Given Nietzsche’s apparent rejection of gender essentialism, there is no clear reason he should not also 
reject racial essentialism. Thus either I misunderstand his apparent racism, or Nietzsche demonstrates an 
inconsistency in his thought not unknown to so-called white feminism; again, however, I feel I cannot 
properly treat the problem of race in the space allowed for this project, and will have to return to this point 
in another work.  
156 Kaufmann translates this as “Women who master the masters.” If it were not for the unfortunate 
connotations of concubinage or sadomasochism associated with ‘mistress’ I would suggest that “The 
mistresses of the masters” might be a better title.  
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esteem most!” (GS §71, p. 127). Nietzsche recognizes this ‘education’ as “something quite 
amazing and monstrous” that causes many women to develop a defensive self-blindness, and for 
them to also see their children as an atonement for the question mark against their honor that their 
husbands come to represent (GS §71, p. 127-8). Again, Nietzsche repeats that “one cannot be too 
kind about women” (GS §71, p. 128), a curious refrain if we assume Nietzsche is a vicious 
misogynist.  
 Thus when we read Nietzsche’s remarks about how male animals treat female animals157 
in contrast with how men treat women158 (GS §72, p. 128-9), these are not intended as harsh 
judgments against human women or biological determinations. The notion that maternal love can 
be a form of dominance (GS §72, p. 129) is no objection to mother love, nor is the notion that 
pregnancy can in a sense gentle a woman or make her “more pleased to submit” (GS §72, p. 129) 
an objection to pregnancy. We might think of ‘spiritual pregnancy’ as appropriative, but 
Nietzsche’s intention is to draw out the ‘male mothers’ or “the character of the contemplative 
type, which is closely related to the feminine character” (GS §72, p. 129) that I take Nietzsche to 
be saying we socially construct as associated with pregnancy and motherhood. This notion of 
male mothers who are close to femininity I also take as evidence that Nietzsche rejects a strict 
gender binary, which is in keeping with his general tendency to avoid dualisms.159 I do not know 
that we can say that Nietzsche is engaged in a conscious project to universalize feminine 
experiences as a way to counter the universalization of masculine experience as the definition of 
humanity, but his repeated theme of pregnancy and maternal natures as not just feminine, as 
masculine and even as quasi-feminine, and generally as something not definitive of gendered 
boundaries even socially, would be a first step in this direction.  
                                                          
157 Weibchen. 
158 Weiber.  
159 §73 Is interesting because it calls for the infanticide of a misshapen newborn, but leaves women out 
entirely – instead two men talk to each other. If Nietzsche had written this today, I would call it a parody of 
how male politicians seem to debate women’s reproductive rights without ever involving women. As it is, 
we may take it as commentary on how men excluded women from any authority in decisions concerning 
their children. 
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 Nietzsche again voices his sympathies for the “poor women” who lose their composure 
and “fail” by chattering and hence failing to seduce the men they like (GS §74, p. 129-30). We 
could take this as an admonition to women to shut up if they want male attention, because that is 
the only thing that matters to women; but I think instead that Nietzsche is voicing his ability to 
recognize nervousness in social situations, and again reminding men that they cannot be too kind 
about women, if only they could see things from a woman’s perspective. Thus also, when 
Nietzsche says that “small females seem to me to belong to another sex than tall women” and also 
that “A small woman is never beautiful” in the mouth of “old Aristotle” the “dancing master,” 
(GS §75, p. 130), he is highlighting perspective: from the point of view of a tall man seeking a 
dancing partner, a small woman is never valuable. Nietzsche-Aristotle can say “A small man is a 
paradox but still a man” (GS §75, p. 130) because a small man is still supposed to lead the dance 
by virtue of his gender, which he shares with the tall man. But a small woman will be left to the 
side, because small men model their tastes after tall men, and so seek tall, valuable, ‘beautiful’ 
women.160  
 Though Kaufmann claims that after this “absurd aphorism” Nietzsche’s remarks on 
women “reach their nadir and end” (GS §75, fn. 12, p. 130), Nietzsche still has a few more 
comments on women to include before the end of Book II. A long discussion of art ensues, 
continuing Nietzsche’s theme of connecting women to art, and includes several references to 
goddesses, such as the fates (GS §84, p. 140), poetry (GS §92, p. 145), “Charm, the rural sister of 
the Graces” (GS §103, p. 158), and imperfections transformed by art (GS §107, p. 163). Further, 
Nietzsche discusses how an artist can be motivated by his mother’s feelings of hatred and revenge 
(GS §95, p. 148) and how style is strongly influenced by one’s mother tongue (GS §104, p. 160). 
Indeed, this style so influences a people that even “young officials, teachers, women, merchants” 
                                                          
160 Note also that Lou von Salome was not a particularly tall woman, and if Nietzsche was as enamored of 
her as we believe, we have no reason to believe that Nietzsche has any bias against the possible beauty of 
small women.  
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all strive to imitate the ‘elegance’ of their language such that “even little girls” imitate the popular 
“officer’s German” Nietzsche appears to dislike so strongly (GS §104, p. 161). This is no 
judgment against women and little girls, however, for Nietzsche recognizes that each of these 
groups acts in “good will” here (GS §104, p. 161).  
 Book III includes far fewer references to women than Book II, only six in total. Several 
of these considers women in their relationships with other people. The first mentions as an 
example of people who desire to be a function “those women who transform themselves into 
some function of a man that happens to be underdeveloped in him” (GS §119, p. 176), a nature 
we can construe alternatively as opportunistic, parasitic, or survivalist. Given §66, I am inclined 
to accept the latter. Likewise, when Nietzsche claims that “Fathers and sons have much more 
consideration for each other than mothers and daughters” (GS §221, p. 210), we should hearken 
back to §68 and remember that men corrupt women and so have socially constructed the 
relationships women are allowed to have with each other. Similarly again, the “poor woman” who 
wrongly “infers that it will be easy to control” a man who cannot control himself (GS §227, p. 
211), we may ourselves more rightly infer on the grounds of §71 that this is through no fault of 
her own but rather because of how society has taught her to behave.  
Another passage suggests that our contemporary efforts pale against those of the “old 
Meisterin – ancient humanity” (GS §152, p. 197).161 We also see Nietzsche again blurring the 
boundaries of the gender binary by suggesting that “a big man” may in fact be “merely a boy, or a 
chameleon…or a bewitched little woman” (GS §208, p. 208).162 This is no insult to little women, 
who are just as susceptible to bewitchment as anyone; the deeper meaning here is that greatness 
need not be attached to a particularly gendered nature, and that we sometimes mistake other 
things for greatness. Lastly, witches make another appearance, and again it seems that Nietzsche 
                                                          
161 Again, the connotations of ‘mistress’ are problematic, so I leave the term untranslated, though 
Kaufmann translates it as “master.”  
162 Kaufmann translates Weiblein as “little female,” but I think ‘little woman’ is more in keeping with 
Nietzsche’s meaning here.  
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does not judge witches the same way society does, for “Although the shrewdest judges of the 
witches and even the witches themselves were convinced of the guilt of witchery, this guilt 
nevertheless did not exist” (GS §250, p. 216). Thus Nietzsche neither blames the witches for 
being convicted, nor does he appear to blame them for internalizing the guilt the judges pushed 
upon them.  
Book IV contains several more passages on women: again, Nietzsche draws parallels 
between women and artists (GS §293, p. 235). Nietzsche points out that the sciences would never 
have originated “if the way had not been prepared by magicians, alchemists, astrologers, and 
witches” (GS §300, p. 240). He also continues to note the plight of women, who are abused by 
those who vent their anger on “their dogs, servants, and wives” (GS §312, p. 250) and who learn 
virtuosity with regards to bearing suffering the way “even slaves” do, though Nietzsche claims 
that true greatness does not perish of suffering the way the weak do (GS §325, p. 255). In 
commenting about how American manners are affecting how Europeans associate “with friends, 
women, relatives, children, teachers, pupils, leaders, and princes” (GS §329, p. 259) Nietzsche 
manages to squeeze in another racist remark, this time regarding “the ferocity peculiar to the 
Indian blood” which influences the American lust for gold (GS §329, p. 258).  
A long aphorism titled “Long live physics!” includes a remark that compares our 
compulsion to listen to our consciences with “a woman who loves the man who commands,” but 
who does not appear to be any different from the “good soldier who hears his officer’s command” 
(GS §335, p. 263-4). Nietzsche also notes two ‘sisterly’ relationships, between the sublime and 
cruelty (GS §313, p. 250) and between happiness and unhappiness (GS §338, p. 270), the latter of 
which explains how the religion of comfort can be the mother of the religion of pity (GS §338, p. 
270). Finally, in the four passages from the end of Book IV, Nietzsche declares, “Yes, life is a 
woman” (GS §339, p. 272). Nietzsche associates this life-woman with veils and unveilings, and 
hence also with the superficial surfaces of veils, a theme of which I may make much, as so much 
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of survival is built on surfaces.  Thus concludes Nietzsche’s middle period, and the last of the 
work he wrote prior to meeting Lou von Salomé.  
 
§4  Nietzsche’s Late or Mature Period 
 Thus far, I have only encountered a few questionable issues with Nietzsche’s work with 
regards to misogyny: first and foremost is Nietzsche’s apparent racism. Unfortunately, I find no 
reason in the text to dismiss this racism as the same kind of ploy his suspicious commentary on 
women seems to provide. Nietzsche never suggests that the truth is a raced woman, just a veiled 
woman, and since her race is unremarkable she is probably white; and so far whenever he has 
mentioned race it has been subject to various stereotypes which appear uncritically employed: see 
for example his remarks about Chinese women and domestic abuse in Daybreak and the comment 
about ferocious Native Americans in Gay Science. Secondly, Nietzsche does appear to present a 
largely heterosexist picture of gender relations, namely that men are sexually attracted to women 
and vice versa, and no other relationships are (any longer) normal in European society. However, 
much of this heterosexism is built in the framing of his discussion of romantic love rather than 
any explicit homophobia or hatred for GLBTQI persons at least so far. Thirdly, we might also 
note that some remarks about old women in particular may show evidence of ageism particularly 
with regards to women, fourthly note apparent ableism with regard to ‘stupid’ women, and fifthly 
question how fine a line Nietzsche walks between valuing femininity as positive versus placing it 
on a pedestal.  
 Further, if Nietzsche is the anti-misogynist I want to claim he is, I can also challenge how 
his winking, jocular, and subtler aphorisms contrast with his more bombastic and explicit 
aphorisms: it seems that Nietzsche could have made his allegiances far more explicit than he 
frequently chooses to do, and continually relying on the thesis that his anti-misogyny is all 
intended as an exercise for the reader to extract through the art of exegesis would weaken my 
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argument if I failed to provide explicitly sympathetic passages concerning women, and if 
Nietzsche ever made repeatedly explicit a single consistent political view. However, I have 
already provided a number of explicitly sympathetic passages, and Nietzsche only rarely offers 
normative political statements explicitly, so I feel this criticism is less important than it seems at 
first glance. 
 Nietzsche’s Late or Mature Period as I construe it contains eight published whole books, 
four new prefaces, and an additional section appendix for a book: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
Beyond Good and Evil, new prefaces to Birth of Tragedy and Human, All-Too-Human, followed 
by The Genealogy of Morals, after which Nietzsche published new prefaces to Daybreak, Gay 
Science, and also Book V and the appendix to Gay Science; then The Case of Wagner, Twilight of 
the Idols, Nietzsche contra Wagner, and lastly Ecce Homo. Given the vast quantity of material 
remaining, I see no benefit to a deeper exploration of the Nachlass for the purposes of the 
dissertation, and so will not include it. 
 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (TSZ) 
 
 Nietzsche claimed to have produced each part of Zarathustra in about ten days (TSZ, p. 
xiii); the first of these following not far on the heels of his falling out with Lou von Salomé in 
January 1883, though he did not publish it until August that year (Young, p. 358). The delay in 
publishing was due to the anti-Semitic activities of the publisher Schmeitzer which continually 
distracted him from his work, and sparked a good deal of Nietzsche’s anti-anti-Semitism during 
this time (Young, p. 358). During this time, Nietzsche’s ex-idol Wagner died of a heart attack, 
and Elizabeth took advantage of Friedrich’s heartache to verbally assault Lou in a vicious letter-
writing campaign (Young, p. 359-363). Nietzsche’s commentators claim that Zarathustra served 
for Nietzsche as a great ‘bloodletting’ following the torment of the Salomé affair (Young, p. 366), 
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but overall while there might be some increase in the viciousness of his barbs, I do not think this 
book particularly marks a sharp shift towards misogyny.  
 The preface does not explicitly refer to women, though they might be included in the 
unnumbered people in the marketplace; the first book contains nine out of twenty-two sections 
which discuss or mention women, the second eight of twenty-two, the third ten of sixteen, and the 
fourth eleven out of twenty. In Book I, the first mentions of women are in passages where 
Nietzsche again anthropomorphizes and feminizes desirable qualities: in this case, instead of 
truth, “the fair little women” are the virtues (TSZ I §2, p. 28); similarly, wisdom “is a woman and 
always loves only a warrior” who is “brave, unconcerned, mocking, violent” (TSZ I §7, p 41). 
Contrast this woman with the “little girls”163 in “On War and Warriors”; Zarathustra tells us to let 
little girls say “To be good is at the same time pretty and touching,” but instead that the good is 
bravery (TSZ §10, p. 47). I am uncertain whether this is ageist or a healthy distancing from 
childish things. What is more interesting to me is the notion implicit here that feminine desire can 
and does provide legitimate motivation for male behavior; assuming Nietzsche is continuing in 
his presumably heterosexist mode, a woman’s love can motivate her masculine lover to great 
heights as a warrior. Nietzsche does not portray this as foolishness on the warrior’s part, either, 
which to me indicates some legitimacy to the rationale.  
 However, desire seems to be troubling for Zarathustra, particularly when humanity is “in 
heat,” whether masculine or feminine: “It is bad to live in cities: there too many are in heat. Is it 
not better to fall into the hands of a murderer than into the dreams of a woman in heat? And 
behold these men: their eyes say it – they know of nothing better on earth than to lie with a 
woman” (TSZ I §13, p. 54). Animals, by contrast are perfect in their innocence and do not appear 
influenced by “the bitch, sensuality”164 who “leers enviously out of everything” humans do, 
                                                          
163 Mädchen. 
164 Die Hündin Sinnlichkeit.  
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particularly humans who make chastity a vice (TSZ I §13, p. 54-5). The fact that Nietzsche 
describes this ‘bitch’ as begging “for a piece of spirit when denied a piece of meat” (TSZ I §13, p. 
55) inclines me to believe he is describing a female dog, and not necessarily using the term in the 
sense Americans do today when they devalue human women by comparing them to female 
animals. However, we could make more of the distinction between the dog Sensuality who lusts 
for sufferers and the goddesses Truth, Wisdom, etc. who we could characterize as seeking health 
instead. This lust165 is sexual, but for Nietzsche being chaste does not appear to mean being 
celibate, given how celibacy can become a vice, but rather to have an innocence about sexual 
bodies even when not abstaining from sex. The lack of innocence in turn seems correlated to the 
suffering so tempting to the hound, Sensuality. Given Nietzsche’s otherwise positive attitude 
towards the body and sex, I believe it is the suffering and the desire to create more suffering 
which Nietzsche is negatively portraying here.  
 Nietzsche also connects suffering to heresy and witchcraft; the connection to witchcraft is 
interesting because thus conjoined to heresy we can interpret it commonly as a negative feminine 
concept close to nature much like the above analogy using female animals and human women 
who behave like them. Though Kaufmann suggests “On the Pale Criminal” reads like it is about 
Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov (TSZ I tn. 6, p. 6), I am inclined to believe it has more to do with an 
evaluation of Christ, Christianity, and the murder of God; either way, when Nietzsche describes 
how “the sick became heretics or witches: as heretics or witches they suffered and wanted to 
inflict suffering” (TSZ I §6, p. 39), this has more to do with what happens to sufferers in a 
religion which promotes suffering than it does with a negative evaluation of women. Rather, 
witchcraft and heresy are traditionally feminine and masculine outlets for sickness and suffering 
in a Christian context, and this by no means implies that all witches and heretics deviate from 
                                                          
165 Wollust. Kaufmann translates this as ‘lust,’ ‘sex,’ and even ‘voluptuousness’ – see Translator note 10 on 
Book III, p. 149 – but ‘sensuality’ is also a possible translation.  
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Christianity because they suffer and are inclined to inflict suffering, only that the sick find these 
outlets useful in such societies. 
 Witchcraft and heresy appear again in Zarathustra’s counsels to his ‘brother’ who seeks 
solitude and is “On The Way of the Creator”: “Lonely one, you are going the way to yourself. 
And your way leads past yourself and your seven devils. You will be a heretic to yourself and a 
witch and soothsayer and fool and doubter and unholy one and villain” before rising like a 
phoenix from the ashes again (TSZ I §17, p. 64). It is interesting that the soothsayer is included 
with the other six devils here, and that these devils are not relative to any overarching value 
system but completely subjective. Nietzsche thus does not only position witchcraft against 
Christianity given its subjective opposition to one’s self, nor yet does he oppose it to truth given 
its alignment with soothsaying or truthsaying, but rather seems characterize witchcraft as one of 
several possible methods for combating various alternative beliefs. Thus we could make the 
argument that witchcraft is an instrument of war, and can be employed wisely by the cunning 
warrior. Nietzsche only mentions witchcraft twice more in this text: once as an accusation against 
Life, that she is a “damned nimble, supple snake and slippery witch!” in “The Other Dancing 
Song” (TSZ III §15:2, p. 226), an insult which nonetheless reveals his respect for her as a worthy 
opponent and partner; and once as a supposition that a the approaching retired pope is a 
“Hexenmeister” or wizard (TSZ IV §6, p. 259).  
 Nietzsche’s discussion of women and friendship strikes me as an underhanded insult 
against all men rather than an attack against women: despite his claim that women are “not yet 
capable of friendship” because they know only love, and his associations between women and 
various animals, he concludes “But tell me, you men, who among you is capable of friendship? 
Alas, behold your poverty, you men, and the meanness of your souls!” (TSZ I §14, p. 57). I 
believe this conclusion is a harsher judgment against human men than it is against women, for at 
least women are capable of love, and Nietzsche does not seem to imply that men are capable of 
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even this, though by leaving this implication inexplicit he uses ambiguity as an exercise in 
exegesis for his reader. 
 Similarly, when the little old woman gives Zarathustra her truth “You are going to 
women?166 Do not forget the whip!” (TSZ I § 18, p. 67), I believe Nietzsche quite deliberately 
leaves the ownership of the whip ambiguous for the purposes of a complex exegesis. It is easy to 
misinterpret Zarathustra’s long recital of rules for women and the old woman’s response as a call 
to spousal abuse and worse if you see the whip in the hands of men only, and if you envision only 
women and wives as the recipients of pain at the end of the whip, but I caution against a 
superficial interpretation here. For one thing, from Nietzsche’s life we have the photograph of 
Lou von Salomé holding the whip in the back of the cart Nietzsche and Reé are ‘pulling.’ For 
another, in “The Other Dancing Song,” Zarathustra uses a whip to keep time in a dance. Thus I 
think the best way to see the whip is not as a sign of Zarathustra’s (or the old woman’s) desire for 
male supremacy, but rather as a symbol of rule-keeping which can be employed by all genders. 
History indicates that especially men enforce the rules of the patriarchy, true, and that there are a 
number of women who internalize misogyny and ‘keep time’ in the patriarchy as well. However, 
it is very difficult for me to imagine that Nietzsche writes the all-too-human Zarathustra as here 
enforcing the laws of the future Übermensch concerning gender, particularly since future laws are 
unknown; rather, this passage reads more as a warning that traditional gender roles will change 
when the new time-keeper enters the dance.  
 This seems particularly true given Zarathustra’s discussion of the tablets of overcoming 
peoples hung up over themselves in “On the Thousand and One Goals”: for example, “‘To honor 
father and mother and to follow their will to the root of one’s soul’” was a tablet of overcoming 
which one people used to become “powerful and eternal thereby” (TSZ I §15, p. 59). As creators 
change, values change, and destruction is a necessary part of the process of creation: “Whoever 
                                                          
166 Interestingly, Nietzsche uses “Weib” throughout §18 except in this question and one other statement 
(“Go to it, women, discover the child in man!” (TSZ I §18, p. 66)) where he uses “Frau” instead. 
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must be a creator always annihilates” (TSZ I §15, p. 59); thus, when we create a new tablet of 
gender values for our people, we will have to destroy the old tablets. This destruction almost 
certainly will require some kind of war against those who uphold the tablets of the old regime 
and, to carry a metaphor perhaps into madness or perhaps into a neat circle, those on each side 
shall march on rather different measures.  
 Lastly from Book I, “On Child and Marriage” reads as a call for more worthy marriages 
which “produce something higher” than merely yourself (TSZ I §20, p. 69). Nietzsche’s 
judgments about bad marriages do not read as necessarily misogynistic, given the plethora of 
examples from Gay Science in which women get the short end of the marital stick, though he 
does here focus more on how men suffer in marriages to women who are not the best matches. 
After all, a man may seem worthy until you know his wife, because the results of his search for a 
mate can reveal how bad he is at judging for himself what the truth is, what good taste and 
company is, what virtue is (TSZ I §20, p. 70). However, in each of these brief vignettes – the 
truth-seeking hero who conquers a lie, the reserved and choosy bachelor who spoils his own 
company, the seeker of angels who would be better off an angel himself now – Nietzsche is not 
so much judging the women for their flaws as he is the men for their bad judgment. My own 
feminism is capable of admitting that women and men both have flaws, so this is not a troubling 
claim. Indeed, Nietzsche seems to focus on the men’s responsibilities and flaws here more, and 
claims that the real problem with man’s “love of woman, and woman’s love of man” is that there 
is no “compassion for suffering and shrouded gods” because “for the most part, two beasts find 
each other” (TSZ I §20, p. 71). However, two fully-fleshed humans, though yet all-too-human, 
can through a holy marriage and the best love arouse longing for the Übermensch. Nietzsche thus 
does not hate marriage or women or exclude them from the pursuit of his ultimate goal, but 
neither does he claim or imply here that women’s only role in his picture is to give birth to little 
Übermenschen. 
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 Book II only mentions women in eight of the twenty-two sections, the fewest and least 
dense discussion of women out of all four parts in Zarathustra, and it is not even until section 5, 
“On the Virtuous,” that women first appear in Book II. Zarathustra is critiquing those who claim 
to be virtuous while still desiring to be rewarded or paid for their virtue, for they claim to love 
their virtue “as a mother her child; but when has a mother ever wished to be paid for her love?” 
(TSZ II §5, p. 94). I can see how some might read this as a false idealization of maternal love, 
particularly given contemporary knowledge and policing of mothers who are neglectful or even 
abusive. This idealization may seem to be reinforced by one of Zarathustra’s concluding claims: 
“Oh, my friends, that your self be in your deed as the mother is in her child – let that be your 
word concerning virtue!” (TSZ II §5, p. 96). However, I suspect his apparent valorization of 
maternal love is subterfuge, given Zarathustra’s remarks criticizing the ‘virtuous’ between these 
two comments about mothers and children, and given this emphasis on the word ‘your,’ as if to 
imply that this is not Zarathustra’s – or Nietzsche’s – ‘word concerning virtue.’ One’s self can be 
in one’s deed as the mother is in her compliant child or her rebellious child, and Nietzsche is 
deliberately ambiguous about what kind of ‘child’ the deed of the virtuous self is. 
 Zarathustra mentions mothers twice more in Book II: once in reference to “fatherlands 
and motherlands” he seeks from mountain tops, but away from which he is driven (TSZ II §14, p. 
121); and once in the question “Is not hurt vanity the mother of all tragedies?” (TSZ II §21, p. 
143). Zarathustra’s claim that he cannot find home in fatherlands or motherlands handily becomes 
a metaphor for the fact that Nietzsche can find value in neither the patriarchal male supremacy 
nor the bizarrely self-abnegating maternal Wilhelmine feminism of his time: the ‘fathers’ of his 
era fit his taste no better than do the ‘mothers.’ Further, the notion that hurt vanity mothers 
tragedies provides a useful counterpoint to false valorization of motherhood: while women can 
and do ‘mother’ many good things in Nietzsche’s texts, he does not present a one-sided 
uncomplicated idealization of women. However, neither of these remarks seem especially nasty 
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devaluations of motherhood either, and so provide no evidence that Nietzsche unhealthily over- 
or under-appraises the aspects of femininity as maternal.  
 Likewise, in “The Dancing Song,” Zarathustra proclaims that he is “no enemy of 
girls,”167 or maidens, and sings while Cupid, “the little god whom maidens like best,” dances with 
the young women; and Zarathustra’s song is about wild Life and wild Wisdom and revisits the 
theme from Gay Science that speaking all truths about a person to that person is not correct 
behavior (TSZ II §10, p. 107-9). Zarathustra also appears to complicate the notion of virtue and 
evil when he sings both that life is “not virtuous” (p. 108) and that wisdom “is evil and false and a 
woman in every way”168 (p. 109). For one thing, usually philosophers and theologians take 
wisdom to be a virtue, and though life itself may be virtueless or a-virtuous, philosophers also 
frequently take virtue to be a better way to live than other options; a cursory familiarity with the 
history of world philosophy and religion can reveal this to be true of Confucians, Christians, and 
Platonists alike. For Zarathustra to call two ‘women’ he loves evil and not virtuous could indicate 
that Nietzsche hates the women he loves, but I think it is more plausible that he rejects and mocks 
the values philosophers historically attribute to many so-called pure ‘virtues’ and ‘goods.’  
 Zarathustra/Nietzsche continues his mockery of purist ideals in “On the Land of 
Education” when he jokes that the pale scholars of this land are so sterile and thin about the ribs 
that one of them invented the notion that “Probably some god secretly took something from me 
while I slept. Verily, enough to make himself a little woman!169 Strange is the poverty of my ribs” 
(TSZ II §14, p. 120-121). Likewise, Nietzsche mocks ‘immaculate perception’ with his fancy that 
the moon was pregnant with the sun when she rose yesterday: “But she lied to me with her 
pregnancy; and I should sooner believe in the man in the moon than in the woman” (TSZ II §15, 
                                                          
167 “...kein Mädchen-Feind,” a play on Frauenfeind or ‘misogynist.’ 
168 “...und in Allem ein Frauenzimmer.” It is odd that Kaufmann chooses ‘female’ for ‘Frauen’ instead of 
‘woman’ here, when usually he reserves the animal adjective for Nietzsche’s uses of ‘Weib.’  
169 “Weibchen” – again, Kaufmann translates using the adjective “female” – from here on I will simply 
replace ‘female’ with ‘little woman’ whenever Nietzsche uses ‘Weibchen.’  
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p. 121). But women and their metaphorical fertility, changeability, and false faces represent 
something positive for Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the Eternal-Feminine in poets, with whom 
Zarathustra explicitly associates himself, despite the fact that he also describes poets as “bad 
learners” and people who “lie too much” (TSZ II §17, p. 127).  
 Provided this context, the following does not seem straightforwardly insulting as some 
might construe it:  
And because we know so little, the poor in spirit please us heartily, particularly when 
they are young little women. And we are covetous even of those things which the old 
little women tell each other in the evening. That is what we ourselves call the Eternal-
Feminine in us. And, as if there were a special secret access to knowledge, buried for 
those who learn something, we believe in the people and their ‘wisdom.’  
TSZ II §17, p. 127 
For one thing, though Zarathustra emphasize how young little women are pleasing when poor in 
spirit, this by no means implies that all young women or even all small young women are poor in 
spirit. Rather, this is a statement of inclusion of even those least loved by society – the smallest 
women, poorest in spirit, whether young or old. For another, Zarathustra is here stating that the 
Eternal-Feminine is not something reserved exclusively for women, and thus implying perhaps 
that the title “Feminine” is something of a misnomer. Thus again when Zarathustra emphasizes in 
“On Great Events” that “especially the old little women among the people say that [a volcano] 
has been placed like a huge rock before the gate to the underworld,” (TSZ II §18, p. 129) and that 
devils are beings “of whom not only old women are afraid,” (TSZ II §18, p. 131), these are not 
devaluations of these beliefs but complicated and sometimes self-contradictory valuations of 
these mytho-poetic concepts. However, self-contradiction is sometimes necessary and even good 
in poetry, myth and dream, as indicated by the final section. 
 Nietzsche concludes Book II with Zarathustra’s speech concerning his “stillest hour,” the 
name of his “angry” and “awesome mistress” (TSZ II §22, p. 145), yet another 
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anthropomorphicized mytho-poetic ‘woman’ to add to his budding pantheon including Life and 
Wisdom; she commands him back to solitude and there speaks to him in a dream, telling him that 
he must become more humble, and yet childlike and without shame “for you must yet become 
mellow”170 (TSZ II §22, p. 147). This sounds odd to the contemporary ear: usually we associate 
humility and shame; a person who is ‘shameless’ is rarely also recognizable as ‘humble.’ Another 
contradiction comes in the stillest hour’s statement “You are one who has forgotten how to obey: 
now you shall command….This is what is most unforgivable in you: you have the power, and you 
do not want to rule” (TSZ II §22, p. 146). To the contemporary political mind this seems odd: we 
tend to idealize politicians who have greatness thrust upon them rather than those who are power-
hungry. Thus again we see contradiction as a primary component for Zarathustra’s dream-myths. 
 Book III is the part of Zarathustra most densely packed with references to women, 
containing ten out of sixteen passages which reiterate and expand on previous themes. The first of 
these is yet another addition to Nietzsche’s womanly pantheon, Happiness: at the conclusion of 
“On Involuntary Bliss,” which addresses Zarathustra’s solitary joy in the ‘afternoon’ of his life 
and his rejection thereof because it “came at the wrong time,” Zarathustra laughs and says 
mockingly to his own heart, “Happiness runs after me. That is because I do not run after women. 
For happiness is a woman” (TSZ III §3, p. 160-163). The notion that women do not enjoy being 
‘run after’ is a far cry from our own contemporaries who claim that street harassment and other 
untoward forms of romantic pursuits are compliments, and so I find this claim to be a remarkably 
though obscurely feminist comment.  
Second, Zarathustra listens to Solitude, and finds home and maternal comfort in her: 
“Now you may threaten me with your finger, as mothers do; now you may smile at me, as 
mothers smile” before she speaks to him at length (TSZ III §9, p. 183). Another addition to 
Nietzsche’s pantheon is Number, of whom Zarathustra’s wisdom states “Wherever there is force, 
                                                          
170 I cannot resist remarking that Nietzsche never did seem to take this advice to mellow out.  
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number will become mistress: she has more force” (TSZ III §10:1, p. 187). I emphasize the 
existence of these goddesses, mistresses, etc. as counterevidence to the notion that Nietzsche does 
not see women as rightfully powerful and therefore that the title of Übermensch is reserved for 
men. Nietzsche even privileges “the most exquisite” women epistemically in matters of taste 
(TSZ III §11:2), something he has repeatedly emphasized as a component of more highly 
developed humans. Lastly, note that in “Before Sunrise” Zarathustra speaks to the pre-dawn 
heavens and asks, “Have you not the sister soul to my insight?” (TSZ III §4, p. 164). Though only 
a passing reference to a feminine component to the sky, I think this could provide an interesting 
contrast to traditional Western notions of the ‘Heavenly Father’ and ‘Father Sky.’ Further, 
Nietzsche does not set the sky and earth in duality with each other, as both can be feminine to 
Zarathustra given that “the earth is like the breasts of a woman: useful as well as pleasing” (TSZ 
III §12:17, p. 207).   
Several remarks in Book III are more mundane and discuss the various women 
Zarathustra encounters or considers in his journeys: there is a woman who tears her child away 
from Zarathustra because his “eyes scorch children’s souls” (TSZ III §5:2, p. 168); there are the 
“padded, rumpless daughters” of the city where Zarathustra’s ‘ape’ mocks Zarathustra with 
nonsense mimicry (TSZ III §7, p. 176); the young women from whom apostates seek love and the 
old women of whom apostates have grown weary (TSZ III §8:2, p. 181). However, Zarathustra 
also explores the social construction of gender and how the feminine and the masculine play 
against each other in the way men and women perform gender: in “On the Virtue that Makes 
Small” he notes of the ‘small’ people in this small town that “There are unconscious actors 
among them and involuntary actors: the genuine are always rare, especially genuine actors. There 
is little of man here; therefore their women strive to be mannish. For only he who is man enough 
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will release the woman in woman” (TSZ III §5:2, p. 169).171 To me this passage indicates that 
only those who perform masculinity can cause women to perform femininity, which I associate 
with the notion of the Eternal Feminine. Thus later in “On the Three Evils,” when Zarathustra 
refers to “all the priests, the world-weary, and all those whose souls are womanish and servile,” 
(TSZ III §10:2), I take this as a reference to performed femininity as a social construct and not to 
inherent biological femaleness. Given all these false faces, it makes a great deal of sense for 
Zarathustra to exclaim: “For too many is marriage promised, and more than marriage – to many 
who are strangers to each other than man and woman. And who can wholly comprehend how 
strange man and woman are to each other?” (TSZ III §10:2, p. 189). 
From “On Old and New Tablets” Zarathustra adds two more comments regarding women 
to the earlier remark about the earth Following a comment about how humans have stripped 
animals of their virtues and noting that their “rapaciousness”172 would find new heights if only 
humans could fly (TSZ III §12:22, p. 210), Zarathustra makes his famous proclamation that he 
wants man and woman just so:  “the one fit for war, the other fit to give birth, but both fit to 
dance with head and limbs. And we should consider every day lost on which we have not danced 
at least once. And we should call every truth false which was not accompanied by at least one 
laugh” (TSZ III §12:23, p. 210). The fact that Nietzsche concludes this proclamation with the 
notion that truths should also be accompanied by laughter implies to me that this gender-dualist 
picture is not precisely what he wishes to make canonical.  
At the same time he recognizes that biology can divide humanity, he also proclaims 
something that ought to unite us: dancing with ‘head and limbs,’ an image which implies a more 
or less equal cognitive capacity for all genders. Further, a desire for ‘fitness’ for birth is not the 
same thing as an obligation to actually become pregnant and give birth; I would argue that fitness 
                                                          
171 “…im Weibe das Weib.” For some reason Kaufmann does not translate this with the emphasis that exists 
in the original German. 
172 Raublust.  
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for motherhood is first predicated on being a good person, and I would hope the same would 
apply to fitness for war. It might be a bit much for Nietzsche to be expected to support women in 
combat explicitly, as I have no knowledge of even Wilhelmine feminists demanding to serve in 
the military; however, given his tendency to discuss metaphorical male pregnancies and births 
and his feminization of the traditionally masculine heavens  and thus to generally genderbend the 
world around him, I see no reason to assume that Nietzsche would have argued women should be 
forbidden from serving in various military capacities. No doubt he would have been inclined to 
valorize Spartan women, for one consideration.  
Nietzsche also does not appear to harshly judge women who violate various social 
restrictions for our gender; in particular, he seems sympathetic to women who ‘break wedlock’:  
Your wedlock: see to it that it not be a bad lock. If you lock it too quickly, there follows 
wedlock-breaking: adultery. And better even such wedlock-breaking than wedlock-
picking, wedlock-tricking. Thus said a woman to me: “Indeed I committed adultery and 
broke my wedlock, but first my wedlock broke me!” 
TSZ III §12:24, p. 211 
Zarathustra thus sounds more inclined to forgive the adulteress, not because he is a sinner himself 
but rather because of the implication that adultery does not occur in well-made marriages and 
hence is not really to be blamed on the victim of a bad marriage. 
 However, lest we think that Zarathustra uncritically feminizes the good or places 
femininity on a pedestal, note also in “The Convalescent” that his “abysmal thought” of the 
eternal recurrence of the smallest man which brings nausea and woe (TSZ III §13:1-2, p. 215-
221) is a “great-grandmother” he must awake from her sleep and bid remain awake eternally 
(TSZ III §13:1, p. 215). Thus also, in “The Other Dancing Song,” Zarathustra has not forgotten 
his whip for keeping time for Life to dance, for she is an “owl” and a “bat” who intends to 
“confound” him; a “damned nimble, supple snake and slippery witch” who has slapped him twice 
in the face (TSZ III §15:1, p. 224-226), rather than some ethereal, pure, angelic being. And so we 
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may conclude that Zarathustra/Nietzsche’s pantheon is more like the Greco-Roman pantheon than 
the Christian one; these beings are not perfect but given over to contradiction, trickery, and even 
violence.  
 Book III ends with a final addition to the pantheon of goddess-women, Eternity. “The 
Seven Seals (Or: The Yes and Amen Song)” is a hymn to Eternity, wherein Zarathustra repeats at 
the end of all seven subsections: “Never yet have I found the woman from whom I wanted 
children, unless it be this woman whom I love: for I love you, O eternity. For I love you, O 
eternity!” (TSZ III §16:1-7, p. 228-231). It is easy to read this as the bitter utterance of a rejected 
man, and that may be all there is to this: Nietzsche here could simply be the fox trying to 
convince himself that he never really wanted those sour grapes after all by means of repeating this 
refrain a magical or holy seven times. At the same time, however, I do think 
Zarathustra/Nietzsche is attempting to fight his own rejection of the thought of recurrence by 
means of wedding himself to eternity by ritually repeated proclamation. This would have to 
include Nietzsche’s attempt to not regret the Salomé affair but rather to affirm it as part of 
eternally recurring life, and hence I read the refrain of this song as catharsis and purging of 
bitterness rather than an ingrained and malicious hatred of all human women.  
 The discussion of women tapers off in Book IV, with women appearing in only slightly 
more than half of the passages, but strikingly they appear more varied in kind than in previous 
sections, and the first woman to appear in this part of Zarathustra is again connected to the truth: 
the Sibyl. Strikingly, she also appears in one of the few passages where Nietzsche mentions 
prostitution or prostitutes: as Zarathustra wanders his mountain seeking the source of the cry of 
distress, he encounters two kings driving a heavily laden ass who appear to understand his moral 
critique of mob virtues, and he describes the words of the Sibyl exclaiming “Now everything goes 
wrong! Oh woe! / Decay! The world has never sunk so low! / Rome sank to whoredom and 
became a stew, / The Caesars became beasts, and God – a Jew!” (TSZ IV §3:1, p. 247). That 
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Rome ‘sinks’ to whoredom implies that prostitution is a valueless profession (though we might 
note Nietzsche’s rancor for the motley cultural ‘stew’); in this however, the Sibyl’s words 
represent common social attitudes which would have been the norm in the ancient world – as well 
as among the Wilhelmine feminists. Note that neither here nor later in “The Voluntary Beggar” 
does Nietzsche make these negative words about prostitutes Zarathustra’s own – here he is 
quoting the Sibyl, and later the statement that in the cities there are women who are “obliging, 
lascivious, and forgetful…none of them is too far from the whores – mob above and mob below!” 
(TSZ IV §8, p. 270-271) comes from the beggar, and not Zarathustra again. Thus I do not think 
Nietzsche wishes to associate himself – or even his main character – with a particular hatred of 
sex workers. 
 If we skip past the ‘Hexenmeister,’ ‘wizard’ or literally ‘witchmaster,’ at the beginning of 
“Retired,” the next feminine allusion Nietzsche makes is to how the god the retired pope used to 
serve has grown “old and soft and mellow and pitying, more like a grandfather than a father, but 
most like a shaky old grandmother” (TSZ IV §8, p. 261). While there are many women who 
maintain their strength and vitality in old age these days, and even Nietzsche’s grandmother was a 
strong-willed woman, I suspect the historical difference in medical science and the gender 
differences in treatment and lifestyle during Nietzsche’s time would have meant that there would 
have been a great deal more elderly grandmothers who fit this depiction and contrasted more 
strongly with the grandfathers of the day. That Nietzsche emphasizes the gender resemblance of 
the elderly god to an elderly human implies to me that he is intentionally using the notion of an 
old woman seeking comfort, peace, and stability because such a archetype did not have a socially 
salient male counterpart for his contemporaries.  
 Aside from a subtle reference to truth’s feminine gender in “The Shadow,” namely “she 
kicked me in the face” (TSZ §9, p. 274), women do not appear again until “The Last Supper,” 
where Zarathustra lists “the most beautiful women” among the best things his kind will take when 
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they are not given (TSZ §12, p. 285).173 Unequivocally, this makes women objects to be acquired; 
however, I do not take it too seriously given the tone of this supper, and the implication that wine 
is liberally drunk, and that “in the course of it, nothing else was discussed but the higher human” 
(TSZ §12, p. 286). Let us remember that even the highest of humans is still all-too-human, and 
have not yet overcome their humanity as will/should the Übermenschen. Nietzsche/Zarathustra 
only values the higher humans in as much as they are steps towards the Übermensch, but beyond 
that, we need not think that the values he associates with higher humans are for his audience’s 
uncritical acceptance – I would even go so far as to suggest that he would have us reject many or 
most of these values, or at least to revaluate them. 
 This is the context in which I read “On the Higher Humans,” so when Zarathustra 
associates “What is womanish” with “what derives from the servile, and especially the mob 
hodgepodge” (TSZ IV §13:3, p. 287) we need not take this as a claim that all women/femininity 
is/are a servile, common, motley crew. And again when Zarathustra associates women and birth 
(TSZ IV §13:12, p. 291) this is not a claim that actual birth makes all women unclean (though it 
is amusing that he points out “one does not give birth because it is fun”), or that we ought to 
consider birth and creation to be dirty processes – just that the higher humans need to consider 
them this way for the benefit of their own all-too-human nature. Thus also, recognizing “folly” of 
reactionary chastity in response to one’s parents’ overindulgence (TSZ IV §13:13, p. 292) can 
additionally include a critique of our inherited attitudes towards women, namely that they 
associate women with wine, song, hunt, etc. 
 I find that the bombastic tone as well as the rote objectification of women in “On the 
Higher Humans” contrasts strongly and intentionally with the more subdued and gender-blurring 
“Song of Melancholy,” though this blur accompanies the “wicked spirit of deception” and 
“melancholy devil” belonging to the old magician (TSZ IV §14:2, p. 296). As Zarathustra leaves 
                                                          
173 Note that this is the only use of “Frauen” in Book IV.  
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his cave, the magician claims that he loves Zarathustra “for the sake of my evil spirit,” who now 
“has the desire to come naked; whether male or female I do not know yet…hear then and see, you 
higher men, what kind of devil, whether man or woman, this spirit of evening melancholy is!” 
(TSZ IV §14:2, p. 297), following which he proceeds to sing the titular song and in which he 
describes himself three times as a ‘suitor of truth’ (TSZ IV §14:3, p. 298). That he cannot 
determine the gender of this devil frustrates the old magician, just as the nakedness of dancing 
maidens and the men who lust after them seem to disturb the conscientious man (TSZ §15, p. 
301). However, these are the attitudes of the ‘higher’ men around the table – as is the wanderer’s 
description of postprandial melancholy as being seized by “feeble feminine spirits” after dinner 
(TSZ §16:1, p. 304).  
It is here that we see women with descriptions of their race appear, namely the “Oriental” 
maidens who are the daughters of the wilderness (TSZ IV §16:1, p. 304), later described as 
“wicked brown girls” (TSZ IV §18:1, p. 314), though I do not take the wickedness as a judgment 
against the daughters of the wilderness because of Nietzsche’s general zest for playfulness and 
rule-breaking, and because this wickedness is a reference to the conscientious man’s words in 
“On Science.” Further, contrast this “charming” wickedness that the wanderer associates with his 
“lusting / For the round mouth of a girl, / But even more for girlish, / Ice-cold, snow-white, 
cutting / incisors” like those belonging to the two “Girl-cats, / Dudu and Suleika” (TSZ IV §16:2, 
p. 307-9) with the evil intent of the ass reiterated throughout Book IV which seems more ominous 
and negatively valued by Zarathustra/Nietzsche. And again, when the wanderer sings that Europe 
is “more doubt-addicted than all / Elderly married women” (TSZ IV §16:2, p. 306-7), and roars 
“As a moral lion…before the daughters of the wilderness!” (TSZ IV §16:2, p. 309) this is the 
higher man playing on a contemporary theme, and not a value Zarathustra attributes to those who 
overcome their humanity. 
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In “The Awakening” Zarathustra notes that the words of the higher humans are not 
suitable nourishment for “children or for nostalgic old and young little women” (TSZ IV §17:1, p. 
311) when contrasted with what might nourish this great big nostalgic men and their great big 
egos. This is no judgment against children or women, just a note that different people need 
different words to nourish their souls, and what helps a small soul flourish is different than what 
is healthy for more expansive souls. Given the way we treat the young and the marginalized, 
however, it is no wonder that many of them rely on faith as a means of nourishment, so I take it 
as no parody when Nietzsche describes the higher men kneeling before the ass in worship as 
being “like children and devout little old women” (TSZ IV §17:2, p. 312), or when he accuses 
their behavior as being like “the worst blasphemers or the most foolish of all little old women” 
(TSZ IV §18:1, p. 313).  
The final feminine appearance in Zarathustra belongs again to the Sibyl, who earlier 
spoke “drunken[ly] without any drink” (TSZ IV §3:1, p. 247); Zarathustra’s “Drunken Song” 
includes a ‘verse’ dedicated to “this drunken poetess” and how “she speaks soberly now” while 
ruminating on joy and woe: “For joy, even if woe is deep, joy is deeper yet than agony” (TSZ IV 
§19:8, p. 322). Tying this to her earlier despair that Rome has become ‘stew,’ we might see out of 
this Zarathustra/Nietzsche’s hope that the overcoming of humanity – and not just masculine 
humans, but also the feminine ones and even the indeterminate ones that disturb the higher men – 
is possible and good. Thus, after a thorough and sequential evaluation of Zarathustra, I cannot 
see that women have been exceptionally criticized in this book – or at least no more so and not 
very much more viciously than in prior books. However, we must also look at the remainder of 
books in Nietzsche’s mature period to determine whether or not this pattern persists, or if he 
grows more misogynistic as he ages and the madness – whether physiological, psychological, or 
both – takes hold.  
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Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) 
 
 Nietzsche’s next book followed very quickly on the heels of the first, published a little 
over a year after the fourth section of Zarathustra, and contains a profusion of references to 
women: Nietzsche mentions women in every section of Beyond Good and Evil at least once from 
the preface to the final part excluding only the ‘aftersong,’ “From High Mountains.” Maudemarie 
Clark has already provided a discussion of some of these remarks in Part VII of BGE, “Our 
Virtues,” but mine differs somewhat and so I will bypass elaboration of her exegesis for the most 
part. Additionally, I strongly emphasize the importance of the preface to Beyond Good and Evil 
with regards to the connection between Nietzsche’s discussion of women and his discussion of 
truth and perspective. The preface sets the tone for the entire text, and to my mind is the set-up 
for the joke, the pledge which precedes the turn in the magic trick or, only slightly less 
metaphorically, the kernel of thought on which much rest an accurate exegesis of both 
Nietzsche’s views on women and his doctrine of perspectivism. 
 Nietzsche opens the second book of his mature period by challenging his predecessors; 
given the importance of this passage, it bears quoting in full:  
Supposing truth is a woman – what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all 
philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women? 
That the gruesome seriousness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually 
approached truth so far have been awkward and very improper methods for winning a 
woman’s heart? What is certain is that she has not allowed herself to be won – and today 
every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged. If it is left standing at 
all! For there are scoffers who claim that it has fallen, that all dogmatism lies on the 
ground – even more, that all dogmatism is dying. 
BGE P, p. 192 
Nietzsche goes on to connect the Platonic “dogmatist’s error,” or “the invention of the pure spirit 
and the good as such” with “standing truth on her head and denying perspective, the basic 
condition of all life,” and additionally connects Platonic dogmatism with Christian dogmatism 
(BGE P, p. 193) and later Kantian dogmatism (BGE §2, p. 200). Though there are significant 
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philosophical differences between the Platonic Form of the Good and the Kantian Ding an 
sich,174 there are sufficient parallels between the two concepts that I contend that Nietzsche 
demonstrates that the flaws of dogmatic axiology apply to both theories. Thus we have the 
following metaphor: If truth is a woman, then philosophers have been poor suitors because of 
their dogmatism. Though Nietzsche does not make this explicit, he seems to me to imply the 
following corollary over the course of the rest of this book: If ‘woman’ has any truth as a concept, 
then philosophers (and feminists) have been very poor theorists of gender again because of their 
dogmatism.  
 The primary metaphor elucidates the intellectual poverty of axiological dogmatism, most 
especially epistemological and alethiological dogmatism, and serves as the primary theme of Part 
I, “On the Prejudices of Philosophers.” There are only two passages with explicit references to 
women that I could find but both tie to the problem at hand: first, Nietzsche insults Kant’s “stiff 
and decorous Tartuffery” alongside Spinoza’s “hocus-pocus of mathematical form” as betraying 
the “personal timidity and vulnerability” of hermits daring “to glance at that invincible maiden 
and Pallas Athena,” (BGE §5, p. 203) or in other words, Nietzsche mocks the bad taste of 
hermetical philosophers who make a show of their bad taste before the goddess of Truth and 
Wisdom. Second, Nietzsche unsubtly demands “that psychology shall be recognized again as the 
queen of the sciences,” (BGE §23, p. 222) a demand that the knowledge of the self will preface 
all other branches of knowledge – almost Confucian despite his apparent previous disparagement 
of the Chinese.175  
 Part II, “The Free Spirit,” contains only one explicit reference to women, but it is 
remarkable in that it is Nietzsche’s only apparent reference to “Gouvernanten” or governesses 
throughout all of his published works. Nietzsche is in the process of demonstrating how dogmatic 
                                                          
174 As well as Christian philosophy/theology, whether broadly or narrowly construed.  
175 See previous sections on Daybreak and The Gay Science.  
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metaphysics tends to rely subconsciously on linguistic structures to justify abolishing perspective 
in favor of supposed objectivity (BGE §34, p. 236), and he connects this to the prim nature of a 
governess’s adherence to grammar and other beliefs: “Shouldn’t philosophers be permitted to rise 
above faith in grammar? All due respect for governesses – but hasn’t the time come for 
philosophy to renounce the faith of governesses?” (BGE §34, p. 237). Under the guise of a 
privileged schoolboy snarking at his childhood nurses, educators, and caretakers, Nietzsche 
appears to be making two points, one axiological and one feminist: axiologically, we should not 
pretend to objectivity of metaphysics and epistemology on the basis of childhood assumptions; 
with regards to feminism, we should not pretend to objectivity about women and women’s beliefs 
on the basis of childhood assumptions either.  
 Part IV, “What Is Religious,” also contains only one passage with explicit references to 
women, and it is herein that Nietzsche enumerates several different forms of ‘passion for God,” 
including peasant-like Lutheranism, ‘Oriental’ and slavish ecstasy like in St. Augustine, Madame 
de Guyon’s “womanly tenderness and lust,” as well as “a disguise for the puberty of a girl or 
youth,” and “even as the hysteria of an old maid, also as her final ambition,” in which case the 
church has several times “proclaimed the woman a saint” (BGE §50, p. 254). Though the pictures 
of womanly religious fervor are not exactly flattering, I would not expect Nietzsche to exude 
praise for the religiously fervent. Again we can note his degradation of the ‘oriental’ by his 
association of the non-occidental with slavishness. Lastly, I would emphasize that here he does 
provide at least a more complicated picture of femininity and masculinity, and that the variety 
here demonstrated belies claims of gender essentialism.  
 Part IV, “Epigrams and Interludes,” contains far more references to women than we have 
seen so far in this book: at least twelve, possibly thirteen.176 This comes as no surprise, given that 
                                                          
176 See §105 and the use of pia fraus and impia fraus, literally ‘holy lie’ and ‘unholy lie.’ I only mention 
these on the bare possibility that Nietzsche could intend a pun on pious or impious Frauen, but I suspect 
such a pun is not intended in this context.  
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Nietzsche precedes several of these women-specific epigrams with this statement: “The degree 
and kind of a human’s sexuality reach up into the ultimate pinnacle of one’s spirit” (BGE §75, p. 
271). The first salvo of remarks on women is a trio of statements sandwiched between an 
aphorism on instinct and an aphorism on free spirits with tethered hearts. Nietzsche begins with 
the claim that “Woman learns to hate to the extent to which her charms – decrease” (BGE §84, p. 
272). We could easily read this as a remark about women who grow more bitter as their youthful 
beauty ages, but I would note the verbs ‘learns to hate,’ which implies to me that Nietzsche is 
making a remark corollary to the adage “You catch more flies with honey’; thus my alternative 
reading is that women are practical social agents who learn to use the tools of hatred when their 
tools of seduction grow less effective due to ageism.  
 The second statement in the trio is that “The same affects in man and woman are yet 
different in tempo: therefore man and woman do not cease to misunderstand each other” (BGE 
§85, p. 272). If Nietzsche were a gender essentialist, we could read this as a biological or 
otherwise essentialist remark about gender difference, but given his repeated rejection of 
essentialism so far I instead must read this as a statement of how men and women are socially 
trained to follow a different tempo from each other. Given various divergences in Western and 
Eastern societies’ gender training, the remark that we do not cease to misunderstand each other is 
a plausible observation which concords with much feminist literature globally. Further, given 
Nietzsche’s rejection of essentialism, when he goes on to state that “Women themselves always 
still have in the background of all personal vanity an impersonal contempt – for ‘woman’” (BGE 
§86, p. 272), we might critique the implication that all women are non- or anti-essentialists about 
‘woman,’ and we might also view the connection to vanity as degrading if Nietzsche elsewhere 
demonstrates contempt for vanity,177 but the claim that at least some women are contemptuous of 
                                                          
177 Given aphorisms like §143, “Our vanity desires that what we do best should be considered what is 
hardest for us. Concerning the origin of many a morality” (p. 279), I am disinclined to believe that 
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the essentialist and reductive concept of the Eternal Feminine is congruent with Nietzsche’s own 
rejection of essentialist and reductive concepts generally, as well as being congruent with 
contemporary anti-essentialist feminisms.  
 The next pair of aphorisms explicitly about women follow an aphorism which sounds like 
it could be advice addressed to a woman: in quotes as though writing dialogue, Nietzsche writes, 
“‘You want to prepossess him in your favor? Then pretend to be embarrassed in his presence – ’” 
(BGE §113, p. 275). The following aphorism to me implies that Nietzsche views the quoted 
advice as perhaps only mediocre or even poor counsel for women: “The enormous expectation in 
sexual love and the sense of shame in this expectation spoils all perspective for women from the 
start” (BGE §114, p. 275). Teaching sexual shame leads to women significantly lacking 
knowledge, understanding, and perspective on relationships, copulation, reproduction, etc. 
Further, enough time spent maintaining a pretense, including a pretense of shame, can lead to an 
internalization of that pretense; thus if women internalize the advice to pretend to embarrassment 
in the presence of those they wish to attract, they will spoil their own perspective on their 
relationship and relations with that person because they will internalize that embarrassment. Thus 
also, given how women have internalized the social prescriptions for what pursuits are 
appropriate for women, when Nietzsche says next that “Where neither love nor hatred is in the 
game, a woman’s game is mediocre,” (BGE §115, p. 275), this is less of a judgment against 
women, who Nietzsche implies excel where they direct their energies, and rather more a 
judgment against society who so restricts women that they may only play at love or hatred. 
 The remaining remarks from Part IV are clustered near the end and begin with the 
statement that “Science offends the modesty of all real women.178 It makes them feel as if one 
wanted to peep under their skin – yet worse, under their dress and finery” (BGE §127, p. 277). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Nietzsche has a straightforwardly negative view of vanity, and more likely to assert that Nietzsche 
sometimes values vanity for various reasons. 
178 Rechten Frauen. 
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Given the context provided by the following aphorism, “The more abstract the truth is that you 
would teach, the more you have to seduce the senses to it” (BGE §128, p. 277), we can see that 
Nietzsche is playing at double meanings again: for one, ‘right’ women are offended by violations 
of their modesty; this is to me no insult because Nietzsche does not define what that modesty 
entails but rather emphasizes the fact that violating a woman’s boundaries is an offense. I am 
inclined to believe that most women have boundaries, though they may shift and contradict and 
vary from woman to woman, and women who lack boundaries are only not ‘right’ in the sense 
that someone has probably done something ‘wrong’ to disturb their sense for boundaries.179 
Secondly, Nietzsche is playing at the metaphor of Truth the woman/goddess by saying that Truth 
finds the scientists who make “objectivity” their faith to be arrogant violators of boundaries and 
surfaces that are there for a reason – a theme we will revisit when we come to the new prefaces 
published following Beyond Good and Evil. 
 Nietzsche’s next remark about women is actually more about the men involved with 
women: “The sexes deceive themselves about each other – because at bottom they honor and love 
only themselves (or their own ideal, to put it more pleasantly). Thus man likes woman peaceful – 
but woman is essentially unpeaceful, like a cat, however well she may have trained herself to 
seem peaceable” (BGE §131, p. 277). Again, given Nietzsche’s previous rejection of 
essentialism, and the suspicious emphasis he here puts on the word, I read him as saying that 
man’s false essentializing of ‘woman’ in herself as an unpeaceful animal leads him to deceive 
himself when he contradictorily wishes for a peaceful woman in his life. So also, when he says 
“In revenge and love woman is more barbarous than man” (BGE §139, p. 278), he precedes this 
with the statement that “When we are awake we also do what we do in our dreams: we invent and 
make up the person with whom we associate – and immediately forget it” (BGE §138, p. 278). 
                                                          
179 And if there are women or men who joyously celebrate an absolute lack of all boundaries and have 
never experienced a violation or did not experience violations which lead to their lack of boundaries, all I 
can say is that I have never met such people and find it hard to believe they exist. 
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This intentional juxtaposition implies that the statement about ‘woman’ is a statement about a 
fictionalized essence of femininity that has notion to do with living, breathing women.  
 One of the most-cited remarks Nietzsche makes about women is “When a woman has 
scholarly inclinations there is usually something wrong with her sexually”; however most 
commentators fail to continue the quote: “Sterility itself disposes one towards a certain 
masculinity of taste; for man is, if I may say so, ‘the sterile animal’” (BGE §144, p. 279). Again, 
several things are happening here: for one, we might recall the ‘feminine’ rejection of science’s 
impertinent plucking at Truth’s petticoats; for another, note that Nietzsche implies that people 
with scholarly inclinations, both male and female, are sterile. Thirdly, note the reversal of 
Aristotelian sexual dynamics; any familiarity with Historia Animalium or De Generatione 
Animalium reveals Aristotle’s identification of men as the fertile, active creatures and women as 
the sterile, passive recipients in sexual congress and reproduction. Here, Nietzsche flips the script 
and insults men and women scholars but also men generally as being the infertile and passive 
partners in intellectual and sexual activity. This is not to say that women and men who pursue 
intellectual goals are sexually sterile, only that scholarly pursuit in particular necessitates a form 
of sterility in contemporary Western/European educational practices.  
 The next remark is that when “Comparing man and woman on the whole, one may say: 
woman would not have the genius for finery if she did not have an instinct for a secondary role” 
(BGE §145, p. 279). The barb is transformed into a feminist insight when we remember that an 
instinct need not be inborn biologically but can be learned through social indoctrination; thus a 
womanly preoccupation with and talent for fashion and makeup is a sign of her secondary status 
in society for many reasons, though Nietzsche does not enumerate them. For one thing, we can 
say that ‘finery’ has a secondary status in our society because it is associated with women, and 
women are the ‘second sex’ even in the twenty-first century. For another, we can say that women 
have learned to develop a genius for ‘finery’ as a self-defense mechanism: when men the world 
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over repeat and enforce the primacy of a woman’s appearance, when mothers reinforce these 
lessons through internalized misogyny to their daughters, when a woman cannot even run for 
president without commentary on her hair, makeup, and dress, a learned instinct for beauty tips 
and tricks can be a healthy way to navigate social expectations. Likewise, so can the reasoned 
rejection of such unhealthy beauty standards be a healthy way to respond to social pressures. 
 Sandwiched between the two above and the two below aphorisms is probably the most 
quoted and most misquoted statement from all of Nietzsche’s bibliography, and I find it 
remarkable that no one appears to emphasize this positioning or regard it as at all significant. In 
full, Nietzsche states, “Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not 
become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you” (BGE 
§146, p. 279). Any half-awake Freudian could write a treatise on the genital metaphors, imagery, 
and connotations here, but I prefer a more modestly contextualized understanding of this 
aphorism. Preceded by the remarks about women’s self-defensive genius for finery, and followed 
by the little note from “old Florentine novels; also – from life” that “Buona femmina e mala 
femmina vuol bastone”180 (BGE §147, p. 279) that emphasizes how commonplace the abuse of 
women is, I take the famous abyss quote to be a caution to women and other fighters of 
oppression that we not lose ourselves by becoming reflections of our oppressors. This is a risk all 
free spirits face: in rejecting the behavior of the oppressive forces of our lives and attempting to 
fight back against them, we often have to fight fire with fire, so to speak. But, as Nietzsche earlier 
reminded us, pretense can lead to internalization – and fighting misogyny and abuse can lead to 
us internalizing misogyny and becoming abusive ourselves.   
 Nietzsche further emphasizes this point with the final aphorism in this cluster and in Part 
IV by asking “Seducing one’s neighbor to a good opinion and afterwards believing piously in this 
opinion – who could equal women in this art?” (BGE §148, p. 179-80). Again, he points out how 
                                                          
180 “Good and bad women want a stick.” 
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women in particular have learned pretense and internalization as self-defense mechanisms in 
society; men cannot equal women in this art precisely because they have not experienced the 
pressures necessary for developing the genius required.  
Nietzsche writes about women in seven more aphorisms in Part V, “Natural History of 
Morals,” including the very first of this section. Nietzsche begins by remarking that the notion of 
a “science of morals” is really too far-reaching “and offends good taste” and that rather the best 
we can hope for is a typology (BGE §186, p. 287). As an example of what is “almost venerable 
innocence” in this regard, Nietzsche offers Schopenhauer, and asks us to “then draw your 
conclusions about the scientific standing of a ‘science’ whose ultimate masters still talk like 
children and little old women” (BGE §186, p. 288). It would be easy to write this off as 
devaluation of the speech of children and elderly women, but Nietzsche does not say we should 
draw our conclusions about his personal opinions of science whose masters speak in this fashion; 
he only tells us to draw our conclusions about the standing of such speech in the scientific 
community. If Nietzsche accepted the scientific faith he is known for criticizing then the 
conclusion that he devalues such speech would be correct, but given that selfsame criticism I do 
not believe such a conclusion is warranted. Rather, Nietzsche leaves open the possibility for the 
value of the speech of children and little old women, but implies that such value is not recognized 
by the contemporary scientific community.  
Nietzsche’s next mention of a woman is parenthetical and involves more of a 
metaphorical woman, namely Nature. Nietzsche discusses the moral imperatives of nature and 
only genders her when he remarks that these imperatives are neither categorical “nor addressed to 
the individual (what do individuals matter to her?), but to peoples, races, ages, classes – but above 
all to the whole human animal, to humanity” (BGE §188, p. 292). Again, we can challenge the 
notion that women should be equated with nature, or that nature should be equated with 
femininity. Here I want to emphasize Nietzsche’s appraisal of nature as beyond good and evil and 
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claim that this is no way implies that women are immoral or amoral but rather that women are 
capable of the revaluation of values inasmuch as any other human animal, all of us being products 
of nature in one way or another. 
Nietzsche refers to women more explicitly though indirectly when he discusses the 
tablets of goods of various types of humans, particularly with regards to their attitudes towards 
women. Interestingly, he does not appear to use “man”/“Mann” or their plurals throughout this 
passage, leaving the heteronormativity of the passage more open: modest types see sex with a 
woman as possession of her; more suspicious types want “subtler tests” such as giving up the 
things she loves just for them; a third type requires even more, proof that they are capable of 
being loved down to their depths; a fourth wants to possess a whole people (BGE §194, p. 296-7). 
Each of these types speaks more about the persons seeking to possess women than it does about 
the women targeted for possession. This possession extends to the children born to different types 
of parents; Nietzsche remarks that “Deep in her heart, no mother doubts that the child she has 
borne is her property; no father contests his own right to subject it to his concepts and valuations” 
(BGE §194, p. 297). Not having been a parent, I cannot speak to this fully; however, I doubt the 
universality of these claims. Surely some mothers and fathers doubt and contest what Nietzsche 
says no parents do.  
However, Nietzsche himself throws some doubt on this universality only a few aphorisms 
later when he says of moralities addressed to individuals that “little and great prudences and 
artifices that exude the nook odor of old nostrums and of the wisdom of old women; all of them 
baroque and unreasonable in form – because they address themselves to ‘all,’ because they 
generalize where one must not generalize” (BGE §198, p. 299). Nietzsche also sees fear as “again 
the mother of morals” in the case of herd utility and love of the neighbor (BGE §201, p. 303), and 
finds the “cry and impatience of pity” and the hatred of suffering to be “almost feminine” (BGE 
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§202, p. 306).181 Given the common constructs of femininity as piteous, fearful, etc., it is no 
wonder Nietzsche sees a semblance to femininity, but note that he does not equate the stereotype 
with the feminine itself – just near femininity, “fast weiblichen.” 
Part VI, “We Scholars,” contains five passages referencing women. The first of these 
again associates women with artists: Nietzsche opens Part VI by speaking “out against an 
unseemly and harmful shift in the respective ranks of science and philosophy,” noting that he is 
“of the opinion that only experience – experience always seems to mean bad experience? – can 
entitle us to participate in the discussion of such higher questions of rank, lest we talk like blind 
men about colors – against science the way women and artists do” namely by sighing “their 
instinct and embarrassment; ‘it always gets to the bottom of things!” (BGE §204, p. 311, 
emphases his). I understand Nietzsche to be saying several things here: first of all, that we must 
not allow science to become independent of philosophy; this is supported by the immediately 
following statement that the scientist’s “declaration of independence, his emancipation from 
philosophy, is one of the more refined effects of the democratic order – and disorder” (BGE §204, 
p. 311), the implication being that such independence is a degradation and part of the decay of 
science rather than a sign of strength and value. Secondly, Nietzsche is saying that only 
experience allows us to deal with questions of rank, and he implies by interrogation that such 
experience is somehow necessarily or at least very frequently bad or negative experiences with 
problems of rank. Third, Nietzsche makes what we might construe as an ableist analogy, in that 
he explicitly suggests that speaking without experience is akin to a blind person discussing colors, 
and that this is further similar to the way artists and women speak against science in that they 
have no direct experiences with science. Fourth, Nietzsche notes that women and artists (and 
presumably women artists) have a distaste for science because it gets to the “bottom” of things, 
uncovers what is shameful and embarrassing.  
                                                          
181 Kaufmann inserts “unmanly” into the passage for no discernable reason.  
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As with his apparent racism, this apparent ableism would indicate that Nietzsche could 
not be construed as intersectionally feminist in any clear and straightforward way, a point to 
which I will return again. The notion that artists and women would be likely to have little or no 
direct experience with science is a factual matter; many women were scientists in the nineteenth 
century and had their accomplishments overshadowed by husbands or male scientists or 
otherwise ignored by the scientific communities in many regards, but by the numbers and because 
of the academic restrictions on women during this time there would have been significantly fewer 
women scientists than men scientists during this time. As for artists and their involvement in the 
sciences, I am somewhat willing to assent. Some artists use anatomical studies or biology for 
their art; others study physics and make that their subject matter; most artists employ one form of 
technology or another to create their art whether they understand the theoretical principles behind 
it or not. Generally however, I think many artists, including myself, would assent that the science 
is not always as significant to the artist as the effect. This would make an interesting line of new 
research.  
To argue that Nietzsche would completely and unequivocally exclude women from being 
scientists here would ring false, however, when Nietzsche regards Science as a woman at the end 
of this same passage: “Science is flourishing today and her good conscience is written all over her 
face, while the level to which all modern philosophy has gradually sunk, this rest of philosophy 
today, invites mistrust and displeasure, if not mockery and pity” (BGE §204, p. 313). The fact 
that he genders science as feminine implies that he sees no inherent reason women cannot be 
scientists, understand science, or that they all hate science either. In fact, he goes on to explicitly 
state that scientists do have a certain kind feminine quality in contrast with a different kind of 
feminine quality present in genuine philosophers (see §205):  
Compared to a genius – that is, to one who either begets or gives birth, taking both terms 
in their most elevated sense – the scholar, the scientific average man, always rather 
resembles an old maid: like her he is not conversant with the two most valuable functions 
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of humanity. Indeed, one even concedes to both, to the scholars and to old maids, as it 
were by way of a compensation, that they are respectable – one stresses their 
respectability – and yet feels annoyed all over at having to make this concession. 
BGE §206, p. 315 
Nietzsche goes on to closely examine this parallel between herd animals, dependent human 
beings, the average scholar toiling respectably, and the reproductively sterile male or female old 
maid, all who are unable to beget (masculine) or give birth (feminine) in the highest sense – 
which I would argue for Nietzsche must be the sense of producing higher forms of humanity, 
overcoming humanity, paving the way for the Übermenschen, etc. Thus by reference to old maids 
Nietzsche includes by implication actual physical pregnancy and birth-giving as part of the 
project of begetting and giving birth in the highest sense, as well as genius, deviation from the 
herd, and independence; hence I feel comfortable saying that Nietzsche does not see sterile 
humans as necessarily bad or without virtue or useless for his project of getting past humanity, 
only that he sees them as bad for sexual reproduction. 
 Nietzsche then goes on to criticize objective persons with “disinterested knowledge” 
(BGE §207, p. 316) as ultimately not even being persons anymore, and insomuch as they are still 
have some small portion of person remaining, it seems arbitrary and disturbing (BGE §207, p. 
317). Whether it is his health that torments him “or the pettiness and cramped atmosphere of wife 
and friend, or the lack of companions and company” the objective spirit reflects on his torments 
in vain; and if we ask him to love or hate in the sense that Nietzsche means, “I mean love and 
hatred as God, woman, and animal understand them” this objective person will try, but we 
shouldn’t be surprised when “His love is forced, his hatred artificial” (BGE §207, p. 317). Thus 
Nietzsche construes the understanding of God, women, and animals (including human animals, I 
must insist) as all being like each other and wholly unlike the purported objective and 
disinterested person. Such a person, Nietzsche says, is “for the most part, a man without 
substance and content, a ‘selfless’ man. Consequently, also nothing for women, in parenthesi. –” 
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(BGE §207, p. 318). This parenthetical conclusion implies to me that Nietzsche here again is 
hearkening back to the Preface and claiming that objective persons have no relationship with the 
truth, nor with actual human women.   
 The fourth reference to women in Part VI comes in a passage discussing by way of 
parable the “new warlike age into which we Europeans have evidently entered” and to what 
extent such an age “may also favor the development of another and stronger type of skepticism” 
(BGE §209, p. 321), a parable which offers evidence of Nietzsche’s rejection of German 
nationalism by the way. In a passage liberally peppered with literary references, Nietzsche 
explains the shudder of fear “warmblooded and superficial humanitarians” feel in the presence of 
a “virile skepticism”: 
…if we want to really feel what a distinction such fear of the ‘man’ in the German sprit 
confers – a spirit through which Europe was after all awakened from her ‘dogmatic 
slumber’ – we have to remember the former conception which was replaced by this one: 
it was not so long ago that a masculinized woman could dare with unbridled presumption 
to commend the Germans to the sympathy of Europe as being gentle, goodhearted, weak-
willed, and poetic dolts. At long last we ought to understand deeply enough Napoleon’s 
surprise when he came to see Goethe: it shows what people had associated with the 
‘German spirit’ for centuries. “Voilá un homme!” – that meant: “But this is a man! And I 
had merely expected a German.” 
BGE §209, p. 323 
If Nietzsche were a warmonger, considered himself and his fellow free spirits to be coldblooded 
and deep, if he valued only masculinity for men and only femininity for women, it would make 
sense to read this as virulently sexist. However, given Nietzsche’s repeated self-association and 
high esteem for surfaces and the superficial, the fact that as a warm-blooded creature he values 
cold thoughts, and the fact that he repeatedly values the feminine in men in a number of ways 
instead causes me to read this passage as a prescient warning of this virile German skepticism that 
“despises and nevertheless seizes,” that “undermines and takes possession” which is a “form of a 
continued Frederickianism that had been sublimated spiritually” hand which “brought Europe for 
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a long time under the hegemony of the German spirit” (BGE §209, p. 322). In short, I read this 
passage as a warning of German hegemony and rebuke against German nationalism. 
 The final passage referencing women contains some of Nietzsche’s speculations about 
the philosophers of the future, the “people of experiments,” critics rather than skeptics who smile 
perhaps in amusement at fools who believe that whatever elevates must be true, that whatever 
delights must be beautiful, that whatever makes us great is itself great, and feel “a genuine Ekel” 
– revulsion or disgust, though translated as nausea – “over everything that is enthusiastic, 
idealistic, feminine, hermaphroditic in this vein” (BGE §210, p. 324-5). Let us not be fooled into 
believing that Nietzsche shares this disgust for the feminine or hermaphroditic, however, for 
Nietzsche concludes by noting that “critics are instruments of the philosopher and for that very 
reason, being instruments, a long ways from being philosophers themselves,” including in 
particular “the great Chinese of Königsberg,” or Immanuel Kant (BGE §210, p. 325, see also fn. 
33).  
Part VII, “Our Virtues,” contains twelve aphorisms with explicit references to women, 
and perhaps one of the most famous sets of aphorisms on women from his published works. As 
with Kathleen Higgins’s discussion of various works above, I choose to elide Maudemarie 
Clark’s treatment of the passages here for various reasons, including consistency in tone and 
content. Before approaching his discussion of women, Nietzsche opens Part VII with an 
explanation of how even “We Europeans of the day after tomorrow” still have virtues of their 
own, including himself in this crowd, and how nonetheless “very soon – all will be different!” 
(BGE §214, p. 335). Further, modern humans are determined by many different moralities and 
virtues, “thanks to the complicated mechanics” of the various metaphorical suns and stars rising 
and setting for different peoples at different times (BGE §215, p. 336). Thus, humanity has 
learned well the lesson to love one’s enemies; so well, in fact, that “we learn to despise when we 
love” and come to find that “Morality as a pose – offends our taste today” (BGE §216, p. 336). 
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Hence we should beware of the morally tactful because they hold grudges for their own personal 
failings: “inevitably they become our instinctive slanderers and detractors” even under the 
pretense of friendship (BGE §217, p. 336). He recommends that psychologists therefore “vivisect 
the ‘good man’” (BGE §218, p. 337) as well as exploring the connections between high 
spirituality and ‘order of rank’ (BGE §219, p. 337-8).  
 Having said all this, Nietzsche finally arrives at the first two remarks about women in 
Part VII; to counter the notions of disinterested knowledge, beauty, etc., the problem of 
unegoistic love, and the selfless sacrifice, Nietzsche comments, “even now truth finds it necessary 
to stifle her yawns when she is expected to give answers. In the end she is a woman: she should 
not be violated” (BGE §220, p. 338-9), thus implying that if we seek ‘disinterested’ objectivity, 
truth will not be interested in the query. Nietzsche then goes on to remark on the nature of order 
of rank again, saying that moralities should bow thereto “until they finally reach agreement that it 
is immoral to say: ‘what is right for one is fair for the other’” and asks whether the moralistic 
pedant deserves “to be laughed at for thus admonishing moralities to become moral?” (BGE 
§221, p. 339).182 The last passing remark on women until the deluge comes in a passage on pity, 
“the only religion preached now,” and whose “first symptoms were registered in a thoughtful 
letter Galiani wrote to Madame d’Épinay” (BGE §222, p. 339-40).  
 This Nietzsche follows with a section on the “ugly plebian” and “hybrid European” (BGE 
§223, p. 340), one on historical sense (§224), one on suffering (§225), so-called immoralists 
(§226), honesty (§227), the soporific quality of moral philosophy heretofore (§228), late 
humanity (§229), and one on the basic will of the spirit (§230) in which he claims that we must 
“translate humanity back into nature” (p. 351), a reference to Nietzsche’s positing life as his new 
                                                          
182 I include this question here because later in this section it almost seems like Nietzsche is admonishing 
feminists to become feminist. 
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criterion of value metaethically,183 before finally offering us his infamous “few truths about 
‘woman as such’” (BGE §231, p. 352). Let me emphasize that: these truths Nietzsche offers are 
about the concept of ‘womanhood’ or ‘femininity’ or the ‘Eternal Womanly/Feminine’ or even 
‘woman in herself,’ das Weib an sich, which I take to be an intentional parallel with das Ding an 
sich or the thing-in-itself, as well as other ‘dogmatist’s errors’ based on the opening salvos in the 
Preface. Thus Nietzsche is critiquing herein not only the problem of an essential feminine nature 
but also the problem of essential, objective truth. Further, given the preceding passage containing 
the impetus to translate humanity back into nature, I see the following ‘truths’ as an experiment in 
translating das Weib an sich and his contemporaries’ attitudes thereto into something closer to 
nature, or at least closer to an understanding of humanity’s place in the order of rank. Nietzsche 
emphasizes “how very much these are after all only – my truths,” implying that they do not have 
the kind of “objective” truth erroneously ascribed to the various dogmatic errors of the past,184 
and that he is exploring these ideas as a kind of “spiritual fatum” in the sense that his answers are 
somehow already predetermined: “Whenever a cardinal problem is at stake, there speaks an 
unchangeable ‘this is I’; about man and woman, for example, a thinker cannot relearn but only 
finish learning – only discover ultimately how this is ‘settled in him’” (BGE §231, p. 352).  
Again, based on Nietzsche’s rejection of the “faith in opposite values” (BGE §2, p. 200) 
and the Preface wherein Nietzsche establishes woman as a metaphor for truth (BGE P, p. 192), I 
think we have no reason to believe that Nietzsche assigns the value of absolute truth to these 
truths on woman as such, but this need not entail the conclusion that Nietzsche assigns the value 
of absolute falsity to these truths on woman as such, either. Furthermore, the fact that §231 is 
about self-knowledge demonstrates that Nietzsche is proffering these truths which constitute 
                                                          
183 I believe Nietzsche sees life as a criterion for ranking the value of different truths, presumably not only 
for the purposes of survival but also for the purposes of the flourishing of higher forms of life up to and 
including the Übermensch.  
184 If they cannot have objective truth, I think Nietzsche must also deny them objective falsity – at least in 
the sense of ‘objective’ used by the erroneous dogmatists he critiques.  
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“steps to self-knowledge” (BGE §231, p. 352) as beliefs to be judged against the new criterion of 
value. I am optimistic that Nietzsche recognizes that “Learning changes us” at the opening of this 
passage even though he makes it fairly clear that thinks of some of his beliefs as incorrigible: he 
sees his and other thinkers’ beliefs about gender in particular as “signposts to the problem we are 
– rather, to the great stupidity we are, to our spiritual fatum, to what is unteachable very ‘deep 
down’” (BGE §231, p. 352). Nietzsche demonstrates here that he is aware that some of his beliefs 
are not only false but outright stupid, and he is furthermore willing to claim them as merely 
subjectively true for the stupid and incorrigible, rather than intersubjectively true or as wholly 
objectively true beliefs. 
Nietzsche’s first truth on woman as such is a description of the early German feminist 
movement, with which he had become familiar through his relationship with women like 
Mawilda von Meysenbug. Nietzsche initially proposes that the reason women are “beginning to 
enlighten men about ‘woman as such’” is because “Woman wants to become self-reliant” (BGE 
§232, p. 352), although he also considers the possibility that “woman seeks a new adornment for 
herself” in seeking self-enlightenment because he thinks self-adornment is “part of the Eternal-
Feminine” (BGE §232, p. 353). However, Nietzsche does not view this enlightenment as a good 
thing – rather it “is one of the worst developments of the general uglification of Europe” (BGE 
§232, p. 352) because of all the negative features woman as such possesses.  
Let me emphasize again that Nietzsche is talking about the concept of the woman as such 
and we therefore need not attribute to Nietzsche the belief that all or even most human women 
possess the “pedantry, superficiality, schoolmarmishness, petty presumption, petty licentiousness 
and immodesty” which “lies concealed in woman” as such (BGE §232, p. 353). Thus it appears 
that rather than accusing Nietzsche of despising women, we can more accurately say that 
Nietzsche despises the concept of woman as such, presumably because like das Ding an sich, the 
concept of das Weib an sich is inimical to life; and furthermore, Nietzsche himself claims “that 
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on the whole ‘woman’ has so far been despised most by woman herself – and by no means by us” 
(BGE §232, p. 354). Given the internalization of misogyny many women undergo, and further 
given second- and third-wave feminism’s anti-essentialism, I would say that this is a fair point on 
Nietzsche’s behalf – many women have despised the concept of woman as such because they 
have been taught to hate femininity, while many feminists have despised the essentializing 
concept of woman as such because it reduces all women to one universal and hence false 
definition; further, given the early German feminist inclination to valorize the Hausfrau185 above 
all other women (Diethe, p. 73), I would additionally say that Nietzsche was right to criticize 
what was his contemporary feminist ideal of femininity, and later feminists have done so with 
regards to their predecessors.186 Though my own feminist credentials might come into question 
by admitting as much, were my own contemporary feminists to advocate the seclusion of all 
women at hearth and home I might also counsel them “mulier taceat de muliere” (BGE §232, p. 
354).187  
Not being familiar with the works of Madame Roland, Madame de Staël, or “Monsieur” 
George Sand, I do not feel able to properly judge Nietzsche’s portrayal of them as “the best 
involuntary counterarguments against emancipation and feminine vainglory” rather than 
“anything in favor of ‘woman as such’” (BGE §233, p. 354), although such a reaction does seem 
extreme; however, if they advocated any form of essentialism, I would also consider their works a 
counterargument against feminism. Likewise, when Nietzsche criticizes the notion of “woman as 
cook,” it again is more of a criticism of the notion that women qua woman have any inherent or 
essential quality allowing them to be experts in the kitchen, regardless of what society dictates or 
assumes about a woman’s place therein (BGE §234, p. 354). Nietzsche also demonstrates that it is 
                                                          
185 Housewife. 
186 See for example Leela Fernandes’s “Unsettling ‘Third Wave Feminism’: Feminist Waves, 
Intersectionality, and Identity Politics in Retrospect.” From No Permanent Waves: Recasting Histories of 
U.S. Feminism. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010.  
187 Woman should be silent about woman. 
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not only the common but also the nobler types who buy into essentialist gender frameworks when 
he remarks that Dante and Goethe believed “the Eternal-Feminine attracts us higher” and 
furthermore that Nietzsche himself does “not doubt that every nobler woman will resist this faith, 
for she believes the same thing about the Eternal-Masculine” (BGE §236, p. 355). Thus even the 
noblest of people seem to find these ‘great stupidities’ insurmountable in certain cases. 
Note before Nietzsche goes on to offer his “Seven Epigrams on Woman,” that two 
passages above Nietzsche describes epigrams as such: “There are expressions and bull’s-eyes of 
the spirit, there are epigrams, a little handful of words, in which a whole culture, a whole society 
is suddenly crystallized” (BGE §235, p. 355). Thus, we can remember that Nietzsche’s epigrams 
here in §237 are crystallizations of his society. If we were to take these epigrams to refer to 
human women rather than the concept of woman, would be seem rather obscene, particularly to 
the first: “How the longest boredom flees, when a man comes on his knees” (BGE §237, p. 355). 
We could take the first aphorism to refer to the woman’s boredom fleeing when a man grovels 
before her, although more vulgar meanings are possible; however, because Nietzsche is 
intentionally nonspecific, it is quite possible that the boredom fleeing belongs both to the man and 
to the woman in such a situation, which would be consistent with the way the whip from 
Zarathustra and the lust in Gay Science were left ambiguous.  
The second epigram is that “Science and old age at length give weak virtue, too, some 
strength” (BGE §237, p. 355). If we take it to mean that inherently weak women become more 
cunning as they become more educated and aged, this could seem like a nasty remark. Yet that 
does not strike me as a particularly cruel observation as it could also apply to weak men and is 
once again presumably intended as a comment on woman as such, and not any or all women: 
once the concept of womanhood is old and becomes part of the sciences, even its weak 
connection to human women gains strength in the public mind. The third statement seems like an 
echo of “mulier taceat de muliere,” as Nietzsche remarks “Black dress and a silent part make 
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every woman appear – smart” (BGE §237, p. 355), and he repeats this connection to appearance 
in the fourth epigram, “Whom I thank for my success? God! – and my dear tailoress,” and again 
in the fifth, “Young: flower-covered den. Old: a dragon denizen” (BGE §237, p. 356). However, 
this emphasis on the importance of a woman’s appearance contrasts with the sixth epigram: 
“Noble name, the legs are fine, man as well: that he were mine!” (BGE §237, p. 356), wherein 
Nietzsche subtly points to the fact that beauty and youth seem a double-standard. A man can get 
away with not necessarily being young and beautiful, provided his name is noble and he is still 
mobile, whereas a woman’s value degrades as her age increases, her appearance is less 
manicured, or when she voices any opinion. Nietzsche points to this subtlety by warning his 
reader in the seventh and final epigram: “Ample meaning, speech concise – she-ass, watch for 
slippery ice!” (BGE §237, p. 356), thus implying that we must be very careful indeed with our 
reading here, or in other words, “dance with expertise” on such “smooth ice” (GS F §13, p. 47).  
Nietzsche goes on to describe men historically treating women “as something one has to 
lock up lest it fly away” (BGE §237a, p. 356) and appears to recommend that thinkers with 
“depth” to their souls ought to “conceive of woman as a possession, as property that can be 
locked, as something predestined for service and achieving her perfection in that” (BGE §238, p. 
257). I do not think this is as straightforward a statement about possessing women as property as 
some critics claim; for one thing, Nietzsche takes an unusual step in describing this kind of 
masculinity as “Oriental,” when in the nineteenth century it was far more common to associate 
Eastern Asia with femininity, and which Nietzsche has done elsewhere.188 For another, Nietzsche 
opens the first of these two sections by saying that this is how men have treated women “so far,” 
which implies that things can, and perhaps should, change. One psychological explanation for the 
backlash against feminism might be simple resistance to change, another could be fear on the part 
of men that they will lose what power they have over women. Not only does this explain why 
                                                          
188 As, for example, in GS §69, p. 126.  
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men would want to retain control of the concept of woman as such, but it also indicates a specific 
avenue of attack feminists can take in response to sexism, namely, disputing women’s status as 
property. Furthermore, again, we can take this to be a discussion to be about ‘woman as such,’ in 
which case so-called deep thinkers might consider the concept their property rather than actual 
human women. Properly speaking, the misogynistic essentializing of women is a concept 
belonging to the patriarchy. Finally, we might also remember Nietzsche’s appreciation for 
superficiality rather than depth, in which case his final statement about this severity towards 
women, “How necessary, how logical, how humanely desirable even, this was – is worth 
pondering,” (BGE §238, p. 357) seems to challenge rather than enforce the dictates of the 
misogynistic deep thinker.  
Nietzsche concludes Part Seven with a longer passage which superficially seems to argue 
that democratic emancipation of women is a social ill; however, this is not because Nietzsche 
considers it to be a bad thing for women to have influence in society. Indeed, Nietzsche says that 
“Since the French Revolution, woman’s influence in Europe has decreased proportionately as her 
rights and claims have increased,” and he implies that this is because women have lost “the sense 
for the ground on which one is most certain of victory” (BGE §239, p. 358). Thus, the reason why 
the democratic emancipation of women is a bad thing is because it actually diminishes the 
influence of women rather than increasing it. Therefore, Nietzsche is not proposing that women 
ought to have less impact on society but more impact, an idea consistent with his later claim that 
“the eternal war between the sexes, gives her by far the first rank” (EH 3:5, p. 723). This sounds 
less like anti-feminism and more like a form of feminism which advocates matriarchal rather than 
patriarchal rule, although I doubt the early German feminists would have considered it feminism 
at all.  
Part VIII, “Peoples and Fatherlands,” contains only three explicit references to women. 
The first of these is in a description of Schumann and his small rather than great taste: “a noble 
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tender-heart who wallowed in all sorts of anonymous bliss and woe, a kind of girl and noli me 
tangere189 from the start” (BGE §245, p. 372). Though this passage appears to disparage 
Schumann and his kind of maidenly femininity, I also note that here Nietzsche again connects the 
noble to the feminine, even the youthful, tender variety. That we can misunderstand this as a 
disparagement of women can be attributable to the social divides between the genders, who have 
a tendency to misunderstand each other because of those social divides, as Nietzsche reminds us 
again in his second reference to women in this section (BGE §248, p. 375).  
While some may take his division between masculine genius as begetting and feminine 
genius as being fertilized and giving birth (BGE §248, p. 374) to be a biologically essentialist 
division of two genders, I rather choose to emphasize the notion of feminine genius as extant in 
Nietzsche’s work in the first place – thus again leaving room for higher types of femininity and 
the possible place of women among a race of Übermenschen –and to also note that these types of 
geniuses belong not just to individual men and women but also to whole peoples by Nietzsche’s 
estimation. Thus a Greek or French man may be more likely to have a feminine genius, just as a 
Jewish or Roman woman might have a more masculine genius. Nietzsche concludes Part VIII 
with a poem in which he refers to the “nunnish ogling” of Wagner’s Parsifal (BGE §256, p. 388). 
Given the context, he could just as easily have used “monkish” instead of “nunnish,” though we 
might make much of the fact that priestly power is feminine here and that thus once again 
Nietzsche ascribes femininity to power or power to femininity.  
Part IX, “What is Noble,” contains five passages referencing women, the last ones in the 
book, for the “Aftersong” appears to contain none explicit, and only implies their inclusion 
through the repeated gender-neutral usage of “friends” throughout. The first is a parenthetical 
remark in a passage discussing how many humans, particularly the ignoble but also some of the 
noble, tend to accept and internalize the values ascribed to us by those higher in the social 
                                                          
189 A biblical reference, John 20:17, “Touch me not!” 
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hierarchy: “consider, for example, the great majority of the self-estimates and self-underestimates 
that believing women accept from their father-confessors, and believing Christians quite 
generally from their church” (BGE §261, p. 399). So also, when Nietzsche remarks in this 
passage, “how much ‘slave’ is still residual in woman” (BGE §261, p. 399), we can read this as 
an internalization of the biases of those in power.  
Thus also, when Nietzsche comments on the various aristocratic types, we should 
remember that “species accorded superabundant nourishment and quite generally extra protection 
and care soon tend most strongly toward variations of the type and become rich in marvels and 
monstrosities (including monstrous vices)” (BGE §262, p. 400). This is should be keenly 
remembered when at the bottom of the next paragraph he remarks that the aristocratic moralities 
historically have been “intolerant – in the education of youth, in their arrangements for women, in 
their marriage customs, in the relation of young an old, in their penal laws” and further that “they 
consider intolerance itself a virtue, calling it ‘justice’” (BGE §362, p. 400). Thus Nietzsche 
implies that such intolerance is a monstrous vice which nonetheless creates precisely the 
unfavorable conditions necessary to fix and harden a type as opposed to the superabundant 
nourishment which allows a species to vary (BGE §262, p. 401). Nietzsche concludes here by 
naming danger, rather than fear, the “mother of morals” (BGE §262, p. 402).  
Nietzsche then again uses the Chinese people as a rhetorical device, stating “a proverb 
that mothers even teach children: siao-sin – ‘make your heart small!” and remarking that this is 
the tendency of “late civilizations” that is recognizable in his contemporary fellow Europeans 
(BGE §267, p. 406). Thus Nietzsche offers some small evidence that he associates his own 
contemporaries with these stereotypical images of the Chinese; other evidence includes the final 
aphorism of the book, wherein he appears to include himself in “we mandarins with Chinese 
brushes” (BGE §296, p. 426). Perhaps we might note that the late civilizations lead to the birth of 
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new civilizations and presumably new moralities, and thus have a value for Nietzsche, though 
probably not as much value as he places on particular kinds of (new) civilizations. 
Nietzsche’s penultimate remark on women in this text comes in a discussion of 
psychologists and poets, love and pity; Nietzsche states: 
It is easy to understand that these men should so readily receive from woman – 
clairvoyant in the world of suffering and, unfortunately, also desirous far beyond her 
strength to help and save – those eruptions of boundless and most devoted pity which the 
multitude, above all the venerating multitude, does not understand and on which it 
lavishes inquisitive and self-satisfied interpretations. This pity deceives itself regularly 
about its powers; woman would like to believe that love can achieve anything – that is 
her characteristic faith.  
BGE §269, p. 409 
That women are “clairvoyant in the world of suffering” is an observation congruent with the 
notion that women have more experience with suffering in an oppressive society; that women 
desire far beyond our strength to help and save is no objection against women trying to help and 
save, nor is it an implication that women are necessarily weak, useless, or unhelpful. Rather it 
includes women with the rest of humanity whose desires often exceed our means. That our desire 
to act may lead us to deceive ourselves is another psychological truth about humanity. Lastly, the 
fact Nietzsche claims women’s characteristic faith is that love can do anything is no judgment 
against women, but rather can be interpreted as yet another remark about how society has 
constructed womanhood. Nietzsche’s final remark about women is more of a reference to the man 
“who is able to manage something, to carry out a resolution, to remain faithful to a thought, to 
hold a woman, to punish and prostrate one who has presumed too much,” in short, a man who has 
power in the hierarchy and who therefore has a kind of pity which is of value because it can be 
used to actually benefit those in need, as opposed to the pity of those who cannot help or worse 
(BGE §293, p. 420). Nietzsche thus distinguishes between a truer pity and a falser pity, one which 
helps and one which harms; the fact that he ascribes ‘unmanliness’ to the false pity (BGE §293, p. 
421) can again be interpreted as a part of the social construction of gender. Thus also with Beyond 
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Good and Evil I see continued engagement with the problems of gender without particular malice 
against women qua women. 
 
Preface to Birth of Tragedy and Human, All-Too-Human (BT P & HATH P) 
 
 From this point forward, following the flurry of comments on the feminine in Beyond 
Good and Evil, we see a slight decrease in the frequency of Nietzsche’s remarks on women. 
Nietzsche next wrote new prefaces for two of his earlier works, each of which mentions women 
only briefly. Birth of Tragedy makes two references to women in §3 of his preface “Attempt at a 
Self-Criticism”190: the first, in which he describes his book as “saccharine to the point of 
effeminacy” (BT P §3, p. 19) and the second, in which he describes his voice as “something like a 
mystical, almost maenadic soul that stammered with difficulty” (BT P §3, p. 20). The contrast 
between these demonstrates Nietzsche’s ability to recognize both the mundane social construction 
of effeminacy and the mystical nature-bound feminine mythos that he regularly utilizes in his 
works. Nietzsche re-imagines this womanly nature-goddess at the end of a passage predicting the 
arc of a ripened free spirit; specifically, Nietzsche concludes that “Solitude encircles and 
embraces him, ever more threatening, suffocating, heart-tightening, that terrible goddess and 
mater saeva cupidinum – but who today knows what solitude is?...” (HATH P §3, p. 7). That each 
preface discusses both perspective and femininity offers further incidental support to my thesis 
that these two concepts are intertwined throughout Nietzsche’s work.  
  
Towards a Genealogy of Morals (GM) 
 
  I would argue that the Genealogy has probably the most conventional narrative style out 
of Nietzsche’s mature works, as it contains a preface explaining the purpose of the three distinct 
                                                          
190 I also note: the remarks on women here precede by mere pages his remark concerning “the necessity of 
perspectives and error” P §5, p. 23 
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essays each with a connected topic to the others. Further, the final section of the preface contains 
my preferred source for an understanding of the authorial method for reading Nietzsche: namely, 
exegesis and rumination (GM P §8, p. 23). Though Nietzsche comments fewer times on women 
in the Genealogy than has been his wont in previous works, there are still at least twenty-five 
explicit remarks concerning or involving women, mothers, maidens and even once again witches.  
Further, Nietzsche explicitly states that the entire third essay, “What Is the Meaning of 
Ascetic Ideals?” is an example of the exegesis of the prefixed aphorism (GM P §8, p. 23); I 
emphasize here the fact that the prefixed quote is “Unconcerned, mocking, violent – thus wisdom 
wants us; she is a woman and always loves only a warrior” (from TSZ I §7, p. 41, though 
Nietzsche leaves out the first word ‘brave’). It strikes me that Nietzsche would rather write an 
essay about this particular quote on women from Zarathustra rather than the infamous whip 
quote, and I have no doubt that this choice is quite deliberate. For one thing, Wisdom as a 
goddess in his pantheon emphasized in connection to this preface to the Genealogy is clearly 
evocative of Truth as a woman in the preceding book Beyond Good and Evil. For another thing, 
by this time Nietzsche had attempted to convince Resa von Schirnhofer and other women he 
valued that there was no intended offense in the whip passage, as it was based on a reference to 
Elisabeth’s internalized misogyny, though he did not have this vocabulary to explain himsef and 
instead referred to it as a private joke.191 Thus, as if in response to his actual or perceived 
respondents on the subject of his treatment of women, Nietzsche explains by way of his third 
essay in the Genealogy that understanding either his cheeky whip remark or more important 
remarks like Wisdom’s womanly preference for warriors requires not merely reading an aphorism 
in situ but in context and with a familiarity with the aphorist’s body of work generally, as well as 
rumination on the thoughts throughout that work over some time, and finally the product of said 
                                                          
191 See Gilman , p. 123-5 where Elisabeth gives her version of the events, and see Gilman, p. 151 for Resa 
von Schirnhofer’s account. See also Oppel, p. 151-2; Oppel provides the context of the novel by Turgenev 
(First Love), and describes Nietzsche’s feigned surprise that Elisabeth counsels men to beat women. 
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rumination and an art for exegesis. Nietzsche offers by way of example for such ruminatory 
production and exegetical art a sixty-six page, twenty-eight section essay on what is really only a 
single line from a two page aphorism contained in a much larger work. Notably, the bulk of his 
comments about women in the Genealogy lie within this third essay. I cannot emphasize the 
significance of this enough: one line about women in Zarathustra leads to an entire essay which 
makes up a full third of the Genealogy and in which women are mentioned in over half of the 
sections. For anyone to suggest that women are less than significant to Nietzsche’s work seems 
philologically and philosophically inappropriate.  
Nietzsche only mentions women a handful of times in the first two essays of the 
Genealogy, as if to highlight his especial emphasis on women in the third essay by contrast. The 
first essay, “‘Good and Evil,’ ‘Good and Bad,’” remarks on women in only three sections, and the 
second essay, “‘Guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscience,’ and the Like,” remarks on women in only four. In his 
just-so story on the evolution of two distinct breeds of morality, Nietzsche includes in passing a 
remark demonstrating his awareness that women also have different values in different moral 
systems; in particular, his discussion of the ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ points out that a ‘pure’ man, in 
addition to other things, “does not sleep with the dirty women of the lower strata,” (GM I:6, p. 
32). These women contrast directly with the most pure women Nietzsche mentions also in 
passing twice late in the first essay: Mary, mother of Christ. First he notes that in Tertullian “the 
mother of Jesus” is the son of “quaestuariae,” translated as ‘carpenter’ but really meaning 
‘prostitute,’ which Nietzsche takes to be a Church Father’s insult against Mary’s Judaism (GM 
I:5, p. 51, see fn.1, p. 50 and Kaufmann’s bracketed comment). Nietzsche repeats this insight in 
response to his question about “Which of them has won for the present, Rome or Judea?” 
answering himself that it is “three Jews, as is known, and one Jewess (Jesus of Nazareth, the 
fisherman peter, the rug weaver Paul, and the mother of the aforementioned Jesus, named Mary). 
This is very remarkable: Rome has been defeated beyond all doubt” (GM I:16, p. 53). 
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The second essay includes a man’s wife one possession among many including his body, 
his freedom, and his life, which could be used to repay a debt (GM II:5, p. 64). Nietzsche also 
notes that when morality teaches disgust with our bodily existence we tend to find this teaching 
connected with as sense that “life itself has become repugnant” and Nietzsche recounts with 
horror how humanity learns to disapprove of our own so-called “repellent aspects (‘impure 
begetting, disgusting means of nutrition in [our] mother’s womb, baseness of the matter out of 
which man evolves, hideous stink, secretion of saliva, urine, and filth)” (GM II:7, p. 67). If we 
take this hatred of maternal physicality to be anti-woman or misogynist, then Nietzsche’s critique 
of moral systems which so hate maternal bodies is remarkably feminist, particularly during his 
mature and supposedly most virulently misogynistic period. By contrast, Nietzsche elevates 
artists and creators by connecting their creativity and self-justification in their work with the 
creativity and self-justification of “a mother in her child” (GM II:17, p. 87). Nietzsche’s last 
reference to women in the second essay is an additional use of the maternal metaphor and the 
pain of creation; by employing this metaphor, Nietzsche explains how an artist’s active bad 
conscience can serve and has served as “the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena” 
which can and has brought about “an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation, and 
perhaps beauty itself” (GM II:18, p. 87-8). 
Essay three, “What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?” opens with the quote from 
Zarathustra, “Unconcerned, mocking, violent – thus wisdom wants us: she is a woman and 
always loves only a warrior,” implying that the meaning of ascetic ideals has to do with 
Wisdom’s demand for our behavior – ‘us’ being presumably the readers and writers in the given 
aphorism. The themes in the speech from which this aphorism is taken – if indeed Nietzsche was 
not referring to the speech as a whole – include writing “with blood,” reading the blood of others, 
including idlers, and how the universalizing of reading degrades the spirit from God to human to 
rabble, the aphoristic writer’s desire to be learned by heart, the qualities of aphorisms (thin, pure 
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air, heights, mountain peaks, sarcasm, laughter, elevation), the dancing god, gaiety as opposed to 
gravity, running, and flight. Perhaps the most clearly relevant part of the passage immediately 
follows the quote Nietzsche provides:  
You say to me, ‘Life is hard to bear.’ But why would you have your pride in the morning 
and your resignation in the evening? Life is hard to bear; but do not act so tenderly! We 
are all of us fair beasts of burden, male and female asses. What do we have in common 
with the rosebud, which trembles because a drop of dew lies on it? True, we love life, not 
because we are used to living but because we are used to loving. There is always some 
madness in love. But there is also always some reason in madness.  
TSZ I §7, p. 41 
This notion that there is some reason in madness points towards an explanation of the meaning of 
the ascetic ideal, said explanation being Nietzsche’s goal in his third essay in the Genealogy.  
Nietzsche even provides a preview of his ultimate answer to the titular question at the end 
of the first aphorism in the third essay, namely, “That the ascetic ideal has meant so many things 
to humanity, however, is an expression of the basic fact of the human will, its horror vacui: it 
needs a goal – and it will rather will nothingness than not will” (GM III:1, p. 97). By including 
women amongst artists, philosophers and scholars, the majority of humanity, priests, and saints in 
his list of the multiple possible loci for meanings of the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche further signals 
that women will appear repeatedly throughout this essay. Indeed, women appear so often in the 
third essay that it would be shorter to list the aphorisms in which women do not appear, namely in 
2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 20, 22, 23, and 28. For women in particular, the ascetic ideal serves “at best as 
one more seductive charm, a touch of morbidezza in fair flesh, the angelic look of a plump, pretty 
animal” (GM III:1, p. 97). I note that Nietzsche makes clear that this is what the ascetic ideal 
serves at best for women and elides what the ascetic ideal serves at worst for women, though 
perhaps one could argue that at worst for women the ascetic ideal serves one of the other 
indicated purposes, depending on whether the women in question are artists, philosophers and 
scholars, members of the deformed and deranged majority of humanity, priests, or saints. 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
239 
 
Regardless, even in the case of becoming just one more seductive charm, the ascetic ideal still 
serves as a way to will nothingness rather than not willing at all; thus the ascetic woman, though 
she might seem attractive to various men because of her asceticism, is nonetheless a woman 
exercising her will. Nietzsche does not define these ascetic women as thralls to the male artistic, 
academic, literary, and religious communities in this exercise of her will, or at least no more so 
than the men in those communities. Such a woman appears here as remarkably independent even 
though Nietzsche portrays her as seen through the lens of a male predatory-type viewing her as 
one appealing morsel among many. 
Nietzsche again revives the themes of wombs and pregnancy in connection with the 
artist/creator. In particular, he describes the artist as “only the precondition of his work, the 
womb, the soil, sometimes the dung and manure on which, out of which, it grows  - and therefore 
in most cases something one must forget if one is to enjoy the work itself” (GM III:4, p. 100-1). 
Nietzsche draws an explicit parallel between the need to forget the preconditions of artwork and 
the need to forget the preconditions of a child; more specifically, he says that the artist can be 
spared the frightful aspects of creating art no more “than can a pregnant woman be spared the 
repellent and bizarre aspects of pregnancy – which as aforesaid, must be forgotten if one is to 
enjoy the child” (GM III:4, p. 101). Indeed, for all the love parents may bear their children, many 
readers may be able to refer to at the very least some anecdotal evidence even in our own time to 
see how common it is for parents, and especially pregnant mothers, to object strenuously to the 
“repellent and bizarre aspects of pregnancy,” such as morning sickness, increased mucous 
production, episiotomies, afterbirth, etc., or at least to gloss over and forget these in order to 
better enjoy their offspring. It may seem strange that Nietzsche seems so disgusted by the human 
reproductive process here, especially given his prior elevation of the body, but to my mind he is 
indicating common attitudes rather than referring to his own conception of and experience with 
pregnancy and pregnant women. It is not that pregnancy is bizarre and repellent, but rather 
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because society sees it to be so that such aspects must be forgotten by the individual. Arguably, in 
a more Nietzschean society (should such a thing even be conceivable), both creative and 
procreative pregnancies would be heralded as holy expressions of human embodiment rather than 
the disgusting reminders of our being trapped within base flesh that color human experience in a 
world still beholden to ascetic ideals. 
Nietzsche’s next reference to women is in passing, merely a description of one of the 
several roles to which Nietzsche ascribes to Wagner’s early music. In contrast with later work, 
Wagner made his early music “a means, a medium, a ‘woman’ who required a goal, a man, in 
order to prosper – namely drama!” (GM III:5, p. 103). Nietzsche thus ascribes to Wagner the 
opinion that music needs a goal to prosper as a woman needs a man to prosper; this parallel, 
properly speaking, belongs to the Schopenhauerian Wagner rather than Nietzsche himself, and it 
seems to me that Nietzsche here tries to make this distinction clear precisely by placing Weib in 
scare-quotes. Nietzsche goes on to criticize the Schopenhauerian concept of beauty, inherited 
from Kant, that objective determinations of beauty are disinterested; in particular, Nietzsche 
pokes fun at the notion that “under the spell of beauty, one can even view undraped statues of 
women ‘without interest,’” saying “one may laugh a little at their expense: the experiences of 
artists on this ticklish point are more ‘interesting,’ and Pygmalion was in any event not 
necessarily an ‘unaesthetic man’” (GM III:6, p. 104). Schopenhauer’s move is to say specifically 
that aesthetic contemplation “counteracts sexual ‘interestedness’” (GM III:6, p. 104). Nietzsche 
argues that this indicates exactly how much personal interest Schopenhauer has in supposedly 
disinterested aesthetic contemplation, precisely because it expresses the viewpoint “of a tortured 
man who gains release from his torture” (GM III:6, p. 105-6). Nietzsche describes 
Schopenhauer’s relationship with sexuality as one between a man and his enemy, who regards 
women as a tool of the enemy as well as enemies in themselves, included with Hegel and 
sensuality generally (GM III:7, p. 106). 
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Thus for philosophers like Schopenhauer the ascetic ideal becomes part of their irritation 
and rancor with sensuality, and their rejection of anything which detracts from their ability to sit 
in contemplation. Nietzsche illustrates the pervasiveness of this sentiment by asking “What great 
philosopher hitherto has been married?” and noting that “as for that exception, Socrates – the 
malicious Socrates, it would seem, married ironically, just to demonstrate this proposition” (GM 
III:7, p. 107). Given the context and the brevity of the list, I see this as Nietzsche again voicing 
Schopenhauer’s opinions; married philosophers include not only Socrates, but also (depending on 
how broad your definition of ‘philosopher’ is) Aristotle, Bacon, Calvin, Cicero, Confucius, 
Darwin, Dostoevsky, Goethe, Hegel, Luther, Malthus, Mill, Montesquieu, Montaigne, Paine, 
Pascal, Rousseau, Schelling, Schiller, Strauss, and Tolstoy, just to name a few with whom 
Nietzsche would have been familiar. Though Nietzsche might not have described these men as all 
being philosophers, much less great philosophers, I suspect that Nietzsche would include Goethe 
among the ranks of great philosophers and thus belie the implication that Nietzsche believes that 
great philosophers never marry except to be ironic.  
Nietzsche goes on to repeatedly emphasize the way a certain kind of philosopher avoids 
sensuality in the form of “fame, princes, and women” (GM III:8, p. 110) in the same way “an 
athlete or jockey abstains from women” (GM III:8, p. 111). Further, this abstention is again part 
of the creative ‘maternal’ and self-protective instinct which requires one to pay less attention to 
oneself as one focuses on the needs of others, whether children or ideas, and “has hitherto 
generally kept woman in a dependent situation” (GM III:8, p. 110), a dependence we may extend 
to cover philosophers. While there are several directions we can take this depiction of 
maternal/philosophical dependence, I do not think we need read this as a biological imperative; 
rather, Nietzsche demonstrates his awareness of how society values self-abnegation in the 
creative and procreative processes. We may also be able to draw out the implication that such 
self-abnegation may actually be counter-productive and foolish; after all, a mother who fails in 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
242 
 
her self-care will be less able to care for her children, and so philosophers who fail in their self-
care will be less able to care for their ideas. Nietzsche concludes this discussion by describing 
how aesthetic pleasure is ultimately derived from sensuality “just as the ‘idealism’ of adolescent 
girls derives from this source” (GM III:8, p. 111). I would argue that any perceived rancor against 
adolescent girls here lies within the reader; Nietzsche’s scare-quotes on ‘idealism’ to me only 
indicate that a teenager’s romantic idealizing is a distinct category from philosophical Idealism. 
Nietzsche also notes that Luther described reason as “Mistress Clever, the clever whore” (GM 
III:9, p. 112) before moving on to demonstrate how “every original sin has turned into an original 
virtue” with regards to marriage as originally being a “transgression against the rights of the 
community; one had to make reparation for being so immodest as to claim a woman for oneself” 
including jus primae noctis (GM III:9, p.113-4). Note that Nietzsche is not saying that women are 
community property, but rather that this was the common attitude before the institution of 
marriage made women private property.  
Nietzsche additionally points out how those most interested in or indebted to an ideal are 
oftentimes not the best defenders of that ideal: “the ascetic priest will hardly provide the best 
defense of his ideal, just as a woman who tries to defend ‘woman as such’ usually fails – and he 
certainly will not be the most objective judge of this controversy” (GM III:11, p. 116-7). 
However, Nietzsche is quick to demonstrate that so-called objectivity is an overrated quality in 
the very next aphorism, III:12; I will return to this passage in the next chapter when I discuss 
perspectivism, but can note here that Nietzsche in no way devalues women or ascetic priests by 
saying that the most interested are the least objective. Rather, we can say that such as statement is 
more or less simply a truism. Likewise, when Nietzsche identifies the “sick woman” as 
manifesting the “will of the weak to represent some form of superiority,” (GM III:14, p. 123), he 
is not devaluing sick women but rather in a sense praising their expression of will to power. 
Though women frequently are depicted as weak even in contemporary society, and sick women 
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especially, Nietzsche points out that “no one can excel her in the wiles to dominate, oppress, and 
tyrannize. The sick woman spares nothing, living or dead; she will dig up the most deeply buried 
things (the Bogos say: ‘woman is a hyena’)” (GM III:14, p. 123). Thus the supposedly powerless 
also partake of the will to power, even when they do not recognize such a will within themselves 
for what it is. 
People who suffer seek a cause for their suffering, particularly when the physiological 
source is unclear; Nietzsche makes a parenthetical remark detailing several possible outdated 
anatomical possibilities, including the “degeneration of the ovaries” among other things (GM 
III:15, p. 127). Nietzsche also describes how sufferers tear into themselves and those around them 
as a means for coping with their suffering, saying “they tear open their oldest wounds, they bleed 
from long-healed scars, they make evildoers out of their friends, wives, children, and whoever 
else stands closest to them” (GM III:15, p. 127-8). This inclination to not only dwell in suffering 
but to exacerbate it as a coping mechanism applies also to our concepts of sin and guilt, which 
Nietzsche describes as being interpretations of physical symptoms once again: “humanity’s 
‘sinfulness’ is not a fact, but merely the interpretation of a fact, namely of physiological 
depression,” and as an example he suggests we “Recall the famous witch trials: the most acute 
and humane judges were in no doubt as to the guilt of the accused; the ‘witches’ themselves did 
not doubt it – and yet there was no guilt” (GM III:16, p. 129). Thus also, when an ascetic man 
exercises his power over himself by dictating “no women, or as little as possible” (GM III:17, p. 
131), this has less to do with the actual sin or guilt of indulging in sexual congress and more to do 
with the beliefs and physiology of the ascetic individual.  
Nietzsche continues discussing the ascetic priest with reference to how he helps or 
handles various kinds of sufferers; I think it is interesting and fruitful to notice that Nietzsche 
parenthetically includes women with “sufferers of the lower classes, with work-slaves or 
prisoners” because women “are mostly both at once, work-slaves and prisoners” (GM III:18, p. 
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134). This comment elucidating women’s positions in society shows remarkable sensitivity and 
awareness about the feminine condition192 in the modern Western world. Further, it parallels 
many of the arguments people in the United States were making in connection to the Civil War; 
at least a decade before the publication of the Genealogy, feminists and anti-feminists alike were 
using slavery as an admittedly flawed analogy for women’s’ roles in marriage throughout the 
nineteenth century (Cott, p. 60). Given that feminism is no monolithic structure it should come as 
no surprise that there has apparently always been internal criticism, though this subtlety might not 
be clear to outsiders or objectors; within this context, Nietzsche’s criticism of feminism as “moral 
mawkishness and falseness” and as an “idealism” (GM III:19, p. 137) is not necessarily a simple 
and straightforward devaluation of all feminism qua feminism, but rather qua its ascetic morality 
as emphasized by Wilhelmine feminists in nineteenth-century Germany and other Victorian-era 
feminists. I would argue that Nietzsche’s dismissal of “equal rights for women” (GM III:25, p. 
154) and inclusion of feminism with indecency, dishonesty, mendacity, weakness, and cowardice 
(GM III:27, p. 161) apply to this Wilhelmine feminism specifically rather than feminism broadly. 
I point out here also that the notion of ‘equality’ is now rejected by many contemporary feminists 
on the grounds that women seek power in the political arena rather than mere equality, and that 
ultimately equity rather than equality should be our goal.  
The last two remaining remarks on women from the Genealogy are one more reference to 
witch hunts and a comment including Philosophy with Truth as one of Nietzsche’s feminine 
pantheon. First note that Nietzsche criticizes the ascetic priests’ ‘medication’ for the people in 
those cases where it makes the sufferer sicker; as one example among many, Nietzsche lists “the 
witch-hunt hysteria” as a symptom of those medicines which make the people more ill (GM 
III:21, p. 142). Finally, Nietzsche points out that science must come from philosophy and not vice 
                                                          
192 I never yet have heard the phrase “the feminine condition” used; I mean here to indicate a particular 
subset of the human condition applying to women particularly by virtue of their self-identification or 
position in society as women. 
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versa, and that “Whoever has the opposite notion, whoever tries, for example, to place philosophy 
‘on a strictly scientific basis,’ first needs to stand not only philosophy but truth itself on its head – 
the grossest violation of decency possible in relation to two such venerable ladies” (GM III:24, p. 
152). Nietzsche will continue with this theme of turning truth upside-down as a demonstration of 
bad taste in his later works.  
 
Prefaces to Daybreak and Gay Science and Book V of Gay Science (D P, GS P, and GS 
V) 
 
 The prefaces to Daybreak and Gay Science each contain a few remarks on women in 
sections 3 and 4 in both works, though the bulk of this subsection will be devoted to the fifth 
book of Gay Science. In the preface to Daybreak, Nietzsche first identifies morality as “the 
greatest of all mistress of seduction – and, so far as we philosophers are concerned, the actual 
Circe of the philosophers” (D P §3, p. 2). Recall that Circe transformed Odysseus’s men into 
pigs; we might therefore conclude that the enchantress, morality, turns philosophers into 
metaphorical pigs as well, perhaps in the sense that they build nothing that can make the 
foundations of our philosophy more firm or less treacherous (D P §3, p. 3). Thus the moralist and 
especially the moral idealist works not only in bad taste but is actually counterproductive to her 
own goals; this same judgment applies to feminists who are moral idealists. By Nietzsche’s light, 
most feminists are idealists who are antithetical to good taste more generally and to art more 
specifically; Nietzsche includes himself with the artists who are “hostile, in short, to the whole of 
European feminism (or idealism, if you prefer that word), which is [sic] for ever ‘drawing us 
upward’ and precisely thereby for ever ‘bringing us down’” (D P §4, p. 4-5). It strikes me that 
this remark intentionally recalls BGE §236 and the notion that the eternal feminine draws nobler 
men ‘higher’ just as the eternal masculine does for nobler women. Given this recollection, I 
suspect that Nietzsche here could intend the implication that feminist idealism falls short of the 
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eternal feminine, but I feel a more accurate interpretation based on his criticism of the concept of 
the eternal feminine would rather state that the reason feminist idealism fails is precisely because 
it utilizes the concept of the eternal feminine in just the way Nietzsche criticizes: as an essentialist 
framework for womanhood. Thus nineteenth century feminism brings us down because it 
uncritically accepts essentialism about femininity.  
 The preface to Gay Science revives the parallel between mothers and creators, including 
not only artists but also philosophers: “We are not thinking frogs, nor objectifying and registering 
mechanisms with their innards removed: constantly, we have to give birth to our thoughts out of 
our pain and, like mothers, endow them with all we have of blood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion, 
agony, conscience, fate, and catastrophe” (GS P §3, p. 35-6). Nietzsche continues with the theme 
of pain throughout this section, concluding that it does not necessarily make us “gloomy” for 
“Even love of life is still possible, only one loves differently. It is the love for a woman that 
causes doubts in us” (GS P §3, p. 37); the ‘woman’ in question here must be Life herself because 
of this close juxtaposition. Though life wounds us, this causes us not to love her less but to love 
her differently and more profoundly by Nietzsche’s estimation.  
 Because of this profundity, Nietzsche is no longer convinced that “truth remains truth 
when the veils are withdrawn” and indeed that withdrawing all veils is a sign of bad taste and 
indecency; Nietzsche conveys this attitude through a perhaps fictional anecdote accompanied by a 
reference to Demeter’s search for her daughter: 
“Is it true that God is present everywhere?” a little girl asked her mother; “I think that’s 
indecent” – a hint for philosophers! One should have more respect for the bashfulness 
with which nature has hidden behind riddles and iridescent uncertainties. Perhaps truth is 
a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons? Perhaps her name is – to 
speak Greek – Baubo? 
GS P §4, p. 38 
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The initial anecdote wherein the mother calls God’s omnipresence indecent implies to me that an 
omnipredicate God is not only present in public and everywhere generally but also in private 
places, which makes God out to be a kind of peeping Tom. The hint for philosophers then is that 
snooping for the sake of snooping is not doing philosophy in good taste. Baubo, however, 
presents a more difficult interpretive task: according to Kaufmann, she is a “primitive and 
obscene female demon” who was “originally a personification of the female genitals” (GS P §4, 
fn. 8, p. 38). Perhaps more accurately, we can say Baubo is a minor goddess associated with the 
vulva and reproduction. In the mythos surrounding the Eleusinian mysteries, Demeter seeks her 
daughter Persephone, whom Hades has raped and kidnapped; Demeter neither bathes, nor eats, 
nor drinks in her grief-stricken search for her daughter. However, by lifting her own skirts and 
inappropriately revealing her genitals (or perhaps a drawn figure on her belly), Baubo is able to 
shock Demeter into laughing. Thus Truth, who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons, 
conceals and reveals herself not only to enlighten us, but also to shock and even sometimes 
amuse us.  
 Book V of Gay Science adds another ten aphorisms which refer to women, and the 
afterword includes four poems which refer to women as well. Nietzsche opens the fifth book with 
an aphorism explaining the death of God, followed by a description of how free spirits and 
philosophers of Nietzsche’s stripe are still ‘pious,’ and then turns to a treatment of morality as a 
‘problem,’ wherein the first reference to women appears. Nietzsche makes the claim that “All 
great problems demand great love,” explaining that those who approach great problems with 
disinterested and weak personalities will find it impossible to properly grasp such problems 
because great problems anthropomorphically find it distasteful to be held by “frogs and 
weaklings,” to which Nietzsche adds “a taste, incidentally, that they share with all redoubtable 
women” (GS §345, p. 283), thus including Great Problems in his pantheon of goddesses. These 
redoubtable or formidable women contrast with the women at the end of this section: Nietzsche 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
248 
 
comments that medicine works for a person regardless “of whether he thinks about medicine 
scientifically or the way old women do” (GS §345, p. 285). Though we might initially think that 
‘the way old women’ think about medicine, when opposed to thinking ‘scientifically’ about 
medicine, sets ‘bad’ thought in opposition to ‘good’ thought, but given Nietzsche’s harsh critique 
of science and his repeated rejection of dualisms I do not think this is his intention. Rather, these 
two types of thought appear as an abbreviated but not mutually exclusive listing of ways people 
can think; the superstitions of scientists do not necessarily exclude the superstitions of old 
women, nor are they necessarily any better. Nietzsche’s point is that the value of medicine to the 
sick does not depend on our belief system, and more broadly that the value of moral commands is 
similarly independent of our ability to understand or critique the grounds of those commands. 
 After a long gap, Nietzsche returns to women in a passage discussing the problem of 
what it is to be German and whether philosophers from Germany can be described properly as 
‘German.’ Nietzsche argues in particular that Schopenhauer need not be German in order to pose 
the problem of the value of existence independently of God’s existence, because “the decline of 
the faith in the Christian god, the triumph of scientific atheism, is a generally European event in 
which all races had their share and for which all deserve credit and honor” (GS §357, p. 306), and 
because atheism is the natural outgrowth of a religion which worshiped truth and ultimately had 
to forbid itself “the lie in faith in God” (GS §357, p. 307). It is this self-undermining morality that 
Nietzsche claims Europeans now feel is “mendaciousness, feminism, weakness, and cowardice,” 
and he takes the shift in public opinion on religious faith as a mark of a ‘good European’s’ 
severity and inheritance in “Europe’s longest and most courageous self-overcoming” (GS §357, 
p. 307). Nietzsche implies that associating Christian morality with ‘feminism’ and ‘weakness’ is 
not necessarily an accurate description but merely the general attitude of his contemporaries; the 
fact that he separates himself from this claim in this way allows him to use the derogatory 
language of his peers without necessarily accepting their beliefs. So also, when he refers to 
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“dilettantes and old spinsters [such] as that mawkish apostle of virginity, Mainländer” (GS §357, 
p. 309), he might appear to be using femininity as an insult. However, it occurs to me that the 
appearance of insult may be a result of internalized misogyny; the problem for Nietzsche is not 
that his target is a spinster but rather that he is ‘mawkish’ or feebly sentimental.  
 The next passage discusses the “peasant rebellion of the spirit” (GS §358, p. 310) 
primarily in terms of Luther’s revolt against the aristocratic Church of his time:  
He gave back to the priest sexual intercourse with woman; but three quarters of the 
reverence of which the common people, especially the women among the common 
people, are capable, rests on the faith that a person who is an exception at this point will 
be an exception in other respects as well; it is here that the popular faith in something 
superhuman in man, in the miracle, in the redeeming god in man, finds its subtlest and 
most insidious advocate. Luther, having given the priest woman, had to take away from 
him auricular confession; that was right psychologically. 
GS §358, p. 311-2 
We might ask why Nietzsche remarks that it is “especially the women among the common 
people” whose faith rests on a priest’s ability to abstain from sex with women, more so than for 
the men among the common people; given Nietzsche’s earlier remarks about how women are 
trained to abhor sex with men (see, for example, GS §71), I believe the best explanation for why 
common women more than common men base their faith largely on priestly chastity is precisely 
because so many women know men to be brutes in sexual conquest, especially in the lower 
classes as contrasted with an aristocratic woman’s learned ignorance concerning sex. Given also 
that the lower classes frequently tend to emulate the upper classes, we might also suspect that 
common women learn the same kind of pretend ignorance as well. 
 Nietzsche appears to be highly aware of the ways in which society teaches women to put 
on pretenses. In his section on “the problem of the actor” (GS §361, p. 316), Nietzsche concludes 
by noting that if one were to consider “the whole history of women” one must ask “do they not 
have to be first of all and above all else actresses?” a question answerable at least in part by 
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listening to the “physicians who have hypnotized women” (GS §361, p. 317). Thus, when 
Nietzsche concludes with the pun that women “‘put on something’ even when they take off 
everything,” we need not read this as mere low-brow humor as Kaufmann indicates (GS §361, p. 
317, see also fn. 93), but rather a somewhat sophisticated understanding of how society forces 
women to perform their gender artificially. Hence, Nietzsche’s conclusion that “Woman is so 
artistic” (GS §361, p. 317) is not a statement about the inherent essence of femininity but rather a 
statement about the social construction of femininity in the modern world.  
 Nietzsche also addresses the free spirits’ “faith that Europe will become more virile” in 
the sense of Napoleon’s dream: “one unified Europe, as is known – as mistress of the earth,” and 
even now Nietzsche credits Napoleon “for the fact that in Europe the man has again become 
master over the businessman and the philistine – and perhaps even over ‘woman’ who has been 
pampered by Christianity and the enthusiastic spirit of the eighteenth century, and even more by 
‘modern ideas’” (GS §362, p. 318). It would be all too easy to read this passage as the valuation 
of the masculine over the feminine and the glorification of ‘virility,’ Vermännlichung, the 
masculinization of Europe. It is not only the ease of this interpretation but also the games 
Nietzsche is playing with words and language here that indicates to me that the interpretation of 
this passage cannot be so straightforward. For one thing, despite the emphasis on virility, mastery, 
and ‘man,’ Nietzsche still genders Europe as a female entity as is often the convention with 
continents and countries; it strikes me here that Nietzsche does not describe Europe as a potential 
mistress of the world without doing so as an intentional contrast with the masculine themes 
above. For another, Nietzsche does not say that men will be master over women, but rather that 
‘the man’ will be master over ‘woman’ in scare-quotes; thus we may read Nietzsche as saying 
that the free spirit has faith that a certain kind of masculinity, as defined by past social 
conventions, is now on the rise over a certain kind of femininity, also as defined by past social 
conventions and which had itself been preceded by the dominance of another kind of masculinity 
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once again. This is less an advocation of masculine superiority and more an observation about a 
shift in European mores from the Napoleonic and warlike masculinity to the Renaissance and its 
artistic femininity, and then further to another warlike era afterwards. In this prediction, that 
Europe would be entering another masculine era of war, Nietzsche demonstrates chilling 
prescience.  
 Thus Nietzsche shows a reactionary seesaw between more masculine and more feminine 
eras of Europe; Nietzsche next demonstrates how this tug-of-war between gendered sensibilities 
also plays out in love and romantic relationships, especially in monogamous marriage. 
Specifically, Nietzsche speaks about how the genders each have different prejudices about love, 
and early states “I will never admit the claim that man and woman have equal [gleichen] rights in 
love; these do not exist. For man and woman have different conceptions of love” (GS §363, p. 
318-9). While I could spend some time explaining the difference between equity and equality 
here, I think it will suffice for now to state that Nietzsche here is pointing out an important though 
perhaps apparently tautological fact about the nature of mutual endeavors, romantic or otherwise: 
that when two people have different concepts of any mutual goal, activity, or relationship, they 
will not discuss or think about the same concept and so will not have the same expectations or 
desires for that end, most especially not the same expectations of rights and responsibilities with 
regards to that end.  
 Nietzsche again repeatedly uses the more abstract singular of ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ thus 
signaling that he is again referring to the constructions of each gender rather than specific men 
and women or actual men and women more generally; thus claims like “Woman gives herself 
away, man acquires more” for the duration of this passage (GS §363, p. 319) are explications of 
our social training more than they are pronouncements on biological predispositions. Nietzsche 
also again makes use of the parallels that nineteenth century feminists were drawing between 
slavery and marriage: “A man who loves like a woman becomes a slave; while a woman who 
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loves like a woman becomes a more perfect woman” (GS §363, p. 319). In the end, I think 
Nietzsche offers a concise explanation of how and why romantic love often evanesces: men are 
taught to take and women are taught to give, when mutual beneficence requires both that 
everyone be taking and that everyone be giving. 
 Following two brief speeches by the ‘hermit’ and a distinction regarding art, Nietzsche 
lets the ‘cynic’ within himself speak, and the cynic objects strenuously to Wagner, and most 
especially to the way Wagner’s art fails to speak to higher types and instead to the “common 
people, audience, herd, woman, pharisee [sic], voting cattle, democrat, neighbor, fellow human” 
and the leveling of good taste (GS §368, p. 326). That Weib is singled out and singular again 
indicates Nietzsche’s reference to common conceptual femininity. We can have a fruitful 
discussion about whether elitism of pursuit of basic commonalities is more feminist, but I think 
that such a discussion should be careful to avoid the no true Scotsman fallacy. Both individuation 
and community have important roles for contemporary feminists, but I do not think it is troubling 
to assert that common femininity belongs with other common aspects of humanity. 
 Following a long gap, Nietzsche again discusses his artistic “motherly human type” (GS 
§376, p. 337); and then offers a passage wherein he describes himself as one of many ‘homeless’ 
Europeans whom “the hysterical little males and females” would like to convert to a “religion of 
pity” (GS §377, p. 338-9). Indeed, Nietzsche rejects humanity as an animal: “Has there ever been 
a more hideous old woman among all old women – (unless it were ‘truth’: a question for 
philosophers)?” (GS §377, p. 339). Thus for all his veneration of the feminine 
anthropomorphizations in his pantheon, Nietzsche does not necessarily view these goddesses as 
beautiful young creatures, at least not in all their aspects; furthermore, while “Humanity” may be 
another such idol, she does not belong in Nietzsche’s Olympus. Nietzsche goes on to explain his 
lack of love for humanity as a whole in a passage that could give hope for interpreting his various 
racialized comments: 
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No, we do not love humanity; but on the other hand we are not nearly “German” enough, 
in the sense in which the word “German” is constantly being used nowadays, to advocate 
nationalism and race hatred and to be able to take pleasure in the national scabies of the 
heart and blood poisoning that now leads the nations of Europe to delimit and barricade 
themselves against each other as if it were a matter of quarantine. 
GS §377, p. 339 
Nietzsche’s rejection of common humanity is thus tied to his rejection of the commonness and 
pettiness of German volkish attitudes, and though not stated explicitly here a rejection of the 
rising anti-Semitism that ultimately lead to World War II. Nietzsche has no love for the “asses 
and old maids of both sexes” who have nothing to individuate them and who wallow in 
sentimentality (GS §381, p. 345) and it is clear to him that this type makes up the majority of 
humanity. 
 The remaining four passages referring to women all occur in his Appendix, “Songs of 
Prince Vogelfrei.” The first again describes Truth as less than beautiful: “I loved a creepy ancient 
belle: The name of this old hag was Truth” (GS A §3, p. 357).The second reference apparently 
presented Kaufmann with a translation challenge, resulting in him rhyming “God loves a lassy”/ 
“Gott liebt die Weibchen” at the beginning of “Pious Beppa” with “When I am old and gassy”/ 
“Als altes Wackelweibchen” at the end (GS A §4, p. 357 and 359). This poem describes God 
loving “pretty maids,” a direct contrast with the “old hag” Truth; so also Nietzsche’s description 
in “Rimus remedium” of the “speichelflüssige Hexe Zeit,” the witch Time as a “drooling ghoul” 
(GS A §10, p. 365) and a disdainful “whore”/ “Dirn’” (GS A §10, p. 367) again present a less 
than flattering description of the goddesses by whom Nietzsche feels alternately blessed, 
controlled, or damned. However, even great suffering does not deter Nietzsche from worship, and 
he sings “Let us dance like troubadours, between holy men and whores [Huren], between god and 
world beneath!” (GS A §14, p. 375).  
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The Case of Wagner (CW) 
 
 Despite the brevity of this piece, Nietzsche manages to work in multiple references to 
women; the primary source of these references includes the cast of women and heroines from 
Wagner’s operas, as well as cast members from other operas, such as Carmen. These named 
women include the titular Carmen, as well as Senta, Kundry, Isolde, Brunhilde, the Valkyries, 
Madame Bovary, Circe, the Queen of Sheba, and the goddesses Erda and Venus, though 
Nietzsche remarks largely concern the natures of the author-composers rather than the women 
about whom they write and compose. This is to be expected, given that this essay in particular 
concerns Nietzsche’s ‘recovery’ from Wagner and his criticism of the self-same composer.  
 Nietzsche explicitly rejects the sentimentality of “a ‘higher virgin’” found in Wagner’s 
pieces (CW §2, p. 614) in favor of Bizet’s representation of love as war and hatred between the 
sexes as a more rarified and philosophical conception of love (CW §2, p. 615). He lists at length 
Wagner’s attempts to use marriage and love to “redeem” his characters: whether innocence 
redeeming “interesting sinners,” marriage redeeming the mythical Wandering Jew, “corrupted 
females” redeemed by “chaste youths,” beautiful maidens or married women redeemed by 
Wagnerian knights, or even “the old God” redeemed by “a free spirit and immoralist” (CW §3, p. 
616). Nietzsche challenges not only the truth but also the desirability of Wagner’s preached 
doctrines, in particular the kernel of the doctrine of the Eternal Feminine: “that woman makes 
even the most restless man stable” (CW §3, p. 617). If it were true, it would entail that a 
romantically entangled culture hero like the Wandering Jew no longer fulfills his mytho-poetic 
role when he is adored and made ‘stable’ by a woman: “He merely ceases to be eternal; he gets 
married, he is of no further concern to us” (CW §3, p. 617). Thus if Wagner were correct about 
women, then “adoring women” would confront artists and geniuses with the danger of 
“corruption,” specifically that “soon they condescend to the level of the women,” and furthermore 
– if Wagner were correct about his doctrine on the Eternal Feminine – then it would have to be 
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the case that “Man is a coward, confronted with the Eternal-Feminine – and the women know it” 
as demonstrated by famous representations of feminine love as “merely a more refined form of 
parasitism” (CW §3, p. 617). Thus Nietzsche subtly criticizes the notion of the Eternal Feminine 
while painting its worst representations as Wagner’s idealized understanding of femininity and 
feminine love.  
 Nietzsche offers a brief history of Goethe “in moraline-sour, old maidish Germany” in 
contrast to Wagner’s current fate; Goethe so offended German tastes and made “higher virgins” 
indignant with the Venetian Epigrams that “he had honest admirers only among Jewesses” (CW 
§3, p. 617-8). Nietzsche’s tone fills with disgust as he describes how Wagner “redeems” Goethe 
by luring him to perfection with a “higher virgin” (CW §3, p. 618), and he concludes this section 
with a philosophical epilogue by noting how holiness is “perhaps the last thing the people and 
women still get to see of the higher values, the horizon of the ideal for all who are by nature 
myopic” (CW §3, p. 618-9). Though Nietzsche’s language is generalized here, I believe that 
given his previous works we can specify that it is common people, including common women, 
who are by nature of their positions and roles in society “myopic” and unlikely to see higher 
values beyond holiness.   
 Nietzsche then goes on to recount Wagner’s Ring Cycle, wherein he characterizes 
Wagner’s “main enterprise” as the aim “to emancipate woman – ‘to redeem Brunhilde’” through 
Siegfried and “the sacrament of free love,” but in the end “everything goes wrong, everything 
perishes, the new world is as bad as the old: the nothing, the Indian Circe beckons” (CW §4, p. 
619-20). Nietzsche explains that Wagner’s course changed from the twilight of the gods towards 
a land of lotus-eaters when his ship struck the reef of Schopenhauer’s philosophy; thus 
Brunhilde’s intended end changes as well: “She has to study Schopenhauer first; she has to 
transpose the fourth book of The World as Will and Representation into verse. Wagner was 
redeemed” (CW §4, p. 620). Thus Wagner’s success “with nerves and consequently women” is a 
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symptom of both his own and Schopenhauer’s decadence (CW §5, p. 622), it being understood 
once again that the association between women and ‘nerves’  is a matter of the construction of 
femininity based on the concept of the Eternal Feminine. Nietzsche’s derision of the harmful 
concept of the Eternal Feminine appears again when he lists those who buy into the concept along 
with others he has no taste for: “the culture crétins, the petty snobs, the eternally feminine, those 
with a happy digestion, in sum the people” (CW §6, p. 623). 
 Nietzsche also recounts how far Wagner’s attempts to ‘emancipate’ woman extend, so far 
that “He emancipates the oldest woman of the world, Erda: ‘Come up, old grandmother! You 
have to sing’” (CW §9, p. 631). Once Wagner’s purposes are fulfilled, he immediately “abolishes 
the old lady again,” and returns to one of his other heroines (CW §9, p. 631). Thus it appears that 
the reason Nietzsche continues to mock Wagner’s ‘emancipation’ of women is that like so many 
false emancipators, Wagner only frees his female characters for the purpose of using them for his 
own benefit, towards his own ends and regardless of theirs. Nietzsche objects to Wagner’s use of 
“Music as Circe,” a sedative he describes as Wagner’s mastery of “all the feminisms from the 
idioticon of happiness” brought to the people in the shape of “Magic maidens” (CW PS1, p. 639-
40). In other words, Wagner uses the most restrictive notions of womanhood from an 
oversimplified idiom to seduce his audience into hating knowledge. 
 Nietzsche lambastes Wagner’s effect, saying he “is bad for youths; he is calamitous for 
women” in such a way that “a doctor can’t confront young women too seriously with this” 
Wagnerian false redemption; ultimately “Woman impoverishes herself for the benefit of the 
master” at the same time that Wagner “robs our women and drags them into his den” (CW PS1, p. 
641). Nietzsche bemoans the loss of “the most beautiful maidens and youths” every year in trains 
to the old “Minotaur” in Bayreuth (CW PS1, p. 641), and notes how Wagner takes advantage of 
“a certain type of dissatisfied woman” (CW PS2, p. 643). Only two remarks on women remain in 
this piece: Nietzsche’s decision to ignore “the clever apes of Wagner” including the author of 
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Queen of Sheba (CW PS2, p. 644), and lastly the claim that in his old age, Wagner had definitely 
become a kind of “feminini generis” or feminine type, especially a Christian feminine type (CW 
E, p. 647). I emphasize the last remark as a further indication that Nietzsche rejects biological 
essentialism and sees the potentiality for masculinity and femininity, whether good or bad types 
of each, in humans of all sexes and genders. 
 
Twilight of the Idols (TI) 
 
 The last three texts to be published during Nietzsche’s lifetime were published after his 
descent into madness though along with the posthumously published Ecce Homo, they were all 
written before January 1889. Nietzsche’s commentators frequently cite especially Twilight, 
Antichrist, and Ecce Homo as containing his most vicious barbs against women. Twilight of the 
Idols contains the most remarks about women out of all four of Nietzsche’s final four published 
works, each of which returns to various themes we have already explored, including the Eternal 
Feminine, artistry, truth, profundity versus superficiality, the witch hysteria, revenge, sensuality, 
morals, commonality, and sentimentality. Nietzsche includes six “Maxims and Arrows” which 
reference women; the first of these states that “Man has created woman – out of what? Out of a 
rib of his god – of his ‘ideal’” (TI I:13, p. 468), thus establishing consistency with his previous 
works. In particular, the notion expressed herein that society, and men in particular, have created 
the concept of femininity and especially the Eternal Feminine maintains Nietzsche’s previous 
rejection of gender essentialism in favor of a socially constructed concept of gender.  
 Nietzsche’s next maxim or arrow is “Among women: ‘Truth? Oh, you don’t know truth! 
Is it not an attempt to assassinate all our pudeurs?’” (TI I:16, p. 468), and refers back to the theme 
that truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons, that an objective God is 
in a sense indecent for seeing everything everywhere at every time. Following this we have a 
depiction of a ‘perfect’ woman who “perpetrates literature” as a sin, “as an experiment, in 
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passing, looking around to see if anybody notices it – and to make sure that somebody does” (TI 
I:20, p. 469), and given the early signal that man has created the ideal of womanhood I believe 
Nietzsche uses ‘perfect’ here to again refer to the construction of the Eternal Feminine.  
This further seems to be the case in the remaining three arrows or maxims: first, one 
stating that contentment protects against colds with the questionably witty question and 
assumption, “Has a woman who knew herself to be well dressed ever caught cold? I am assuming 
that she was barely dressed” (TI I:25, p. 470). Second, one stating that “one considers woman 
profound” with the question and answer “Why? Because one never fathoms her depths. Woman 
is not even shallow” (TI I:27, p. 470).193 Third, one stating that “If a woman has manly virtues, 
one feels like running away; and if she has no manly virtues, she herself runs away” (TI I:28, p. 
470). Each of these responses is a comment on how men and women respond to internalizing the 
concept of the Eternal Feminine: women learn to objectify themselves; men and women both 
believe in the incommunicability and mysteriousness of femininity and the feminine experience; 
and men are repulsed by the presence of masculine qualities in women just as women learn to 
think of femininity as flightiness. Note also how Nietzsche interjects a genderless aphorism 
between the first and second of these: “I mistrust all systemizers and I avoid them. The will to a 
system is a lack of integrity” (TI I:26, p. 470). Given how Nietzsche lobs this remark betwixt 
projectiles concerning gender, I believe it must be intended to reject both the misogynists of his 
day and the Wilhelmine feminists because both parties were indebted to certain systemic beliefs 
about women. In particular, I suggest these systemic beliefs were essentialist doctrines and false 
dualities between men and women.  
Nietzsche does not comment on women again until he begins discussing “Reason” in 
philosophy, a concept he anthropomorphizes as another woman in his pantheon: “‘Reason’ in 
language – oh, what an old deceptive woman she is! I am afraid we are not rid of God because we 
                                                          
193 I have retranslated this to reflect Nietzsche’s use of the singular das Weib instead of the plural die 
Weiber.  
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still have faith in grammar” (TI III:5, p. 483). Nietzsche is no misologist, but he also sees that 
reason, logic, syntax and grammar all have limited use, but especially as philosophers we tend to 
overemphasize their prominence. Nietzsche also returns to the theme of the problematically 
‘mysterious’ femininity when he recounts the “History of an Error”: “2. The true world- 
unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man (‘for the sinner who 
repents’). (Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible – it becomes 
woman, it becomes Christian)” (TI IV, p. 485). Nietzsche appears to intend to indicate that in a 
world which has constructed women as prizes to be won, we at one point characterized truth as 
something mysterious and out of reach unless one underwent trials and tribulations, much the 
way many men still characterize their interactions with women as conquests for ‘prizes’ they 
receive by achieving masculine ideality.  
In “The Four Great Errors,” Nietzsche discusses how we tend psychologically to prefer 
any explanation as better than no explanation, and furthermore how depending on our type we 
tend to incline to one explanation over others, “as simply precluding other causes and 
explanations. The banker immediately thinks of ‘business,’ the Christian of ‘sin,’ and the girl of 
her love” (TI VI:5, p. 497-8). However, most frequently these causes have very little to do with 
the effects in question; unfortunately, we have a tendency to assign these imaginary causes with 
malice and fear: “They are produced by beings that are hostile to us (evil spirits: the most famous 
case – the misunderstanding of the hysterical as witches)” (TI VI:6, p. 498). Though Nietzsche’s 
description of women who are mentally ill or dissatisfied with society as ‘hysterical’ is now 
outdated, I believe the term was psychologically accurate at the time;194 either way, Nietzsche is 
certainly right to point out that even women falsely accused of evil or witchcraft may still buy 
into that accusation through internalized misogyny or the madness of crowds.  
                                                          
194 See Tasca, Cecilia, Mariangela Rapetti, Mauro Giovanni Carta, and Bianca Fadda. “Women and 
Hysteria in the History of Mental Health.” Clinical Practice & Epidemiology in Mental Health. 2012, v. 8: 
p. 110-119. Diagnosticians did not cease using ‘hysterical neurosis’ as a diagnosis until the publication of 
the 1980 DSM-III. 
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Nietzsche also rejects many of the “improvers” of humanity and their false or bad 
moralities. Nietzsche discusses in particular the case of “so-called morality, the case of breeding a 
particular race and kind” as “furnished by Indian morality, sanctioned as religion in the form of 
‘the law of Manu’” (TI VII:3, p. 503). Unlike Christians who struggle with the difference 
between humanity and animality, the laws of Manu indicate a struggle with the difference 
between the civilized human and “their counter-concept, the unbred human, the mish-mash 
human, the chandala” and their effort to weaken and sicken such people (TI VII:3, p. 503). In 
particular, Nietzsche recounts the prohibition against Sudra women assisting chandala women in 
childbirth and the further prohibition against chandala women assisting each other (TI VII:3, p. 
504). As a consequence of the policing of racial sanitation, Nietzsche asserts the following evils 
arose: “murderous epidemics, ghastly venereal diseases,” and “the law of the knife” or 
circumcision of male and female children, as well as “adultery, incest, and crime” (TI VII:3, p. 
504). Nietzsche’s statement that “we learn that the concept of ‘pure blood’ is the opposite of a 
harmless concept” (TI VII:4, p. 504) is unequivocal.  
The remaining thirteen aphorisms on women in Twilight all populate “Skirmishes of an 
Untimely Man.” Nietzsche includes among his “impossible ones” the composer Franz Liszt “or 
the school of smoothness – with women” and the authoress “George Sand: Or lactea ubertas – in 
translation, the milk cow with ‘a beautiful style” (TI IX:1, p. 513). Each of these creators 
represents some struggle or skirmish for Nietzsche, whether of taste or some other issue. 
Nietzsche describes Sainte Beauve as “a woman at bottom, with a woman’s lust for revenge and a 
woman’s sensuality,” related to Rousseau’s ressentiment, “Poet and half-woman enough to sense 
the great as a power; always writhing like the famous worm because he always feels stepped on” 
(TI IX:3, p. 514). Nietzsche finds the pretense inherent in the Eternal Feminine objectionable, 
whether emulated by man or woman; thus Nietzsche also rejects De imitatione Christi because “it 
exudes a perfume of the Eternal-Feminine” as much as Sainte Beuve and other “little moralisitic 
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females á la Eliot” (TI IX:4-5, p. 515). Similarly, Nietzsche rejects the pretension inherent in “the 
female’s coquetry with male attributes” in Sand’s work (TI IX:6, p. 516). 
Nietzsche characterizes Plato as a “Another queer saint!” (TI IX:23, p. 528)195 because of 
his intense sensuality and appreciation for the beautiful young men of Athens; to modern eyes 
who associate sensuality with femininity, however, reading Plato allows one to look everywhere 
“for the amatory, the senses, the sexual contest, ‘the woman’ – one will never look in vain” (TI 
IX:23, p. 529). Nietzsche returns to the notion that the ancient world considered beauty the 
province of young men rather than young women later when he states that Cicero “expresses his 
surprise about this” that “the men and youths were far superior in beauty to the women” (TI 
IX:47, p. 552). Nietzsche again recalls the contemporary construction of femininity as a contrast 
with historical constructions of femininity with a picture of the ‘literary woman’ who is “vain 
enough and goose enough to speak secretly with herself in French” even when she is “educated 
enough to understand the voice of nature even when it speaks Latin” (TI IX:27, p. 531), and again 
when he describes contemporary virtue as “‘cowardice’ perhaps, ‘wretchedness,’ ‘old ladies’ 
morality’” (TI IX:37, p. 539). 
Nietzsche strongly rejects the motley crowd filled indiscriminately with the desire for the 
“contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, 
Englishmen, and other democrats” (TI IX:38, p. 542), and just as strongly rejects the notion that 
institutional marriage can be founded on love; instead, he states that institutional marriage “can 
be founded on the sex drive, on the property drive (wife and child as property), on the drive to 
dominate” etc. (TI IX:39, p. 544). This is not to say that married persons cannot be in love, but 
rather that institutional marriage as we know it has very little if anything to do with love, and has 
historically at least in part required treating women and children as property. In such a context, it 
makes sense to say that “A woman who loves, sacrifices her honor; a knower who ‘loves’ may 
                                                          
195 The adjective is wunderlicher, which I do not believe has the same connotations ‘queer’ does to LGBTQ 
people today.  
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
262 
 
perhaps sacrifice his humanity; a God who loved because a Jew” (TI IX:46, p. 551) because in 
each case the individual in question must sacrifice themselves or that part of them which makes 
them who they are. Women lose their identity as persons and become property; knowers lose their 
identity as perspectival beings and become objective; and God loses his identity as omnipredicate 
to become a limited human being. Lastly, Nietzsche again associates ‘feminism’ with 
‘hypersentimentality’ on the basis of the social construction (TI IX:50, p. 555).  
 
The Antichrist(ian) (A) 
 
 The Antichrist, a title which might be better translated as The Antichristian, contains only 
nine aphorisms which refer to women out of the total of sixty-two. Again Nietzsche refers to the 
sentimentality of “little women” found in “great enthusiasts and prodigies” (A §12, p. 578). 
However, the majority of the references to women contained herein explore the ways religion 
controls men and women on the basis of gender constructions and restrictions. Nietzsche also 
notes how religion uses sexuality to arouse spiritual excitement: “To excite the ardor of the 
women, a beautiful saint must be placed in the foreground, and to excite that of the men, a Mary” 
(A §23, p. 591). Nietzsche briefly discusses religious restrictions to not divorce one’s wife “under 
any circumstances, not even if [one’s] wife has been proved unfaithful” (A §33, p. 607). 
 Then Nietzsche turns to the Christian conception of the feminine and Eve’s role in 
creation: “God’s first mistake: man did not find the animals entertaining; he ruled over them, he 
did not even want to be animal” and therefore “God created woman. And indeed, that was the end 
of boredom – but of other things too! Woman was God’s second mistake” (A §48, p. 628). Just as 
Christianity conceptualizes humanity as separate from and better than animality, which is the part 
of creation which causes us humans to err, so does Christianity conceptualize masculinity as 
separate from and better than femininity, which is the part of creation which causes men to err. 
Thus every priest knows that “Woman is by nature a snake” and that “from woman comes all 
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calamity in the world” as well as knowledge and consequently science because it was “only from 
woman did man learn to taste of the tree of knowledge” (A §48, p. 628-9). In turn for this sin, the 
priestly type “invents distress, death, the mortal danger of pregnancy, every kind of misery, old 
age, trouble, and, above all, sickness – all means in the fight against science” (A §48, p. 629).  
 This lying priestly type thus teaches falsehood as virtue and impresses most strongly 
these virtues upon the most vulnerable in our society: “one should observe hysterical women and 
children with a tendency to rickets to see how regularly instinctive falseness, the inclination to lie 
in order to lie, and the incapacity for straight glances and steps are the expression of decadence” 
because by definition “‘Faith’ means not wanting to know what is true” (A §52, p. 635). 
Christianity teaches “all idiots, woman and the people included, that there must be something to a 
cause for which someone goes to his death” and has been so successful in this doctrine that “Even 
today woman lies on her knees before an error because she has been told that somebody dies on 
the cross for it” (A §53, p. 637). Thus women are taught to be sick and weak in every respect. 
 Nietzsche describes those trained to such weakness of will as eventually finding it 
necessary to find “something regulatory, which will bind them from without and tie them down; 
how compulsion, slavery in a higher sense, is the sole and ultimate condition under which the 
more weak-willed human being, woman in particular, can prosper,” and states that understanding 
this necessity allows one to better understand faith (A §54, p. 639): in other words, faith teaches 
us to be weak, and then we discover that because of this weakness of will we must now enslave 
ourselves to the binds of faith afterwards. Nietzsche objects repeatedly to the way Christianity has 
vented “its unfathomable meanness” on so many things, including “procreation, for example, 
woman, marriage” in contrast with the Law of Manu (A §56, p. 542). Nietzsche lambasts St. 
Paul’s “vile dictum” that “to avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every 
woman have her own husband” and the fact that people take the book containing such malice and 
dirtying of human origins and place it “in the hands of children and women” (A §56, p. 542). 
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On the other hand, Nietzsche describes the Law of Manu as having much more “tender 
and gracious things” to say about women in a courteous way, namely on the purity of “The mouth 
of a woman” as well as “the bosom of a girl,” and her breath, and her whole body (A §56, p. 643). 
Nietzsche describes Christian femininity in contrast as “cowardly” and “saccharine,” in such a 
way as to imply that it falls far short of ancient “subterranean cults of all kinds,” including those 
who worshiped “the Great Mother” (A §58, p. 649). Though we might object to the valorization 
of womanhood when it is ‘pure’  as equally problematic as the devaluation of womanhood when 
it is ‘sinful,’ Nietzsche’s inclination to find religious doctrines which call women inherently good 
more palatable than religious doctrines which call women inherently evil does suit my own tastes 
better than it would reversed, as does his preference for a more robust femininity found in ancient 
goddess worship over the saccharine femininity of Christian Mary-worship.  
 
“Nietzsche contra Wagner” (NCW) 
 
 This brief essay only contains seven references to women; as each of these is simply a 
revision of earlier published passages, I will skip reviewing them again.  
 
Ecce Homo (EH) 
 
 Nietzsche’s final book largely comments on his body of work and his own understanding 
of himself, and contains thirteen more passages which remark on women, including the many 
women who affected him throughout his life. Nietzsche opens the first chapter, “Why I Am So 
Wise,” with the riddle that he is “already dead as my father, while as my mother I am still living 
and becoming old,” or in other words he is both decadent from the highest rung “on the ladder of 
life” and beginning to climb up from the lowest rung simultaneously (EH I:1, p. 678). This is 
perhaps the kindest thing he has to say about his mother in all of Ecce Homo. Nietzsche 
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additionally says that his mother “is at any rate something very German; ditto, my grandmother 
on my Father’s side” who spent her youth in Weimar and was connected to Goethe’s circle by 
way of her mother, Nietzsche’s great-grandmother, who “is mentioned in the diary of the young 
Goethe” (EH I:3, p. 681-2). Thus Nietzsche connects himself to one of his greatest influences. 
 In the alternate version of this section, Nietzsche grows more vicious concerning his 
mother and especially his sister, saying that when he looks for “the most profoundly opposite 
type, an incalculable vulgarity of the instincts” in contrast with the Polish aristocratic type, he 
always finds his mother and sister, the relationship to whom he counts as “a blasphemy against 
my divinity” (Kaufmann, p. 456). He further describes the way they treat him as filling him with 
“inexpressible horror” and “disharmonia praestabilita,” and says that the existence of his mother 
and sister is “the most profound objection to the ‘eternal recurrence,’ my truly abysmal thought” 
(Kaufmann, p. 456-7). By contrast, “Frau Cosima Wagner is by far the noblest type” of person; 
indeed, Nietzsche finds it wholly objectionable to say we are most related to our families: “One is 
related least of all to one’s parents; it would be the most extreme sign of vulgarity to be related to 
one’s parents” (Kaufmann, p. 457, emphasis Nietzsche’s). Nietzsche later reiterates his praise of 
Cosima Wagner, saying that she is “by far the first voice in matters of taste that I have ever 
heard” (EH II:3, p. 699) in contrast to the German tastes he finds so despicable. It seems that in 
addition to Nietzsche’s outrage over his mother and sister’s behavior, he is disgusted by their very 
German-ness. Though Nietzsche elsewhere continues his objections against Germans and 
German tastes, he has nothing more to say explicitly about his mother and sister for the rest of 
this text. 
 Nietzsche’s remaining remarks about women continue previous themes. First, Nietzsche 
again associates “woman” and the Eternal Feminine with vengeance: “the aggressive pathos 
belongs just as necessarily to strength as vengefulness and rancor belong to weakness. Woman, 
for example, is vengeful: that is due to her weakness, as much as is her susceptibility to the 
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distress of others” (EH I:7, p. 688). Thus Nietzsche explains the false dualism of masculine 
strength and feminine weakness; active, aggressive fight-seeking is a pathos and pathology as 
much as reactive, passive vengefulness and pity. Nietzsche’s description of himself as ‘warlike’ 
and thus constantly seeking the enemy is tied to his notion of a worthy opponent: in particular he 
seeks “equality before the enemy” so that he can engage in an “honest duel. Where one feels 
contempt, one cannot wage war; where one commands, where one sees something beneath 
oneself, one has no business waging war” (EH I:7, p. 688). Hence we may read the subtext that 
anyone against whom Nietzsche wages war must be in some way an equal to Nietzsche, a worthy 
opponent. Thus I feel it necessary to note that, among many other people, Nietzsche must 
consider women and especially feminists in some significant way to be deserving enemies; 
otherwise Nietzsche would not have written about women, femininity, or feminism in every 
single published text. Rather, because Nietzsche claims that “An artist chooses his subjects: that 
is his way of praising” (GS §245, p. 215), I get the impression that had feminism not been a 
worthy opponent, Nietzsche would have completely ignored the subject. 
 Nietzsche finds much to praise in his equals and opponents as well as their qualities, for 
indeed they would not be worthy opponents if he could find nothing in them to praise; femininity 
is something he values strongly in art especially, and this is exhibited in the next remark about 
women and what he really wants from music: “That it be cheerful and profound like an afternoon 
in October. That it be individual, frolicsome, tender, a sweet small woman full of beastliness and 
charm” (EH II:7, p. 707). To me and I believe also for Nietzsche this passage is meant to evoke 
“Miss Lou von Salomé” whom Nietzsche poignantly describes as the “young Russian woman 
who was my friend at that time,” of the creation of his orchestral composition, the Hymn to Life, 
and the inspiration for the text thereto (EH III TSZ:1, p. 752). Thus even this late in life, when he 
is supposed to be at his most virulently misogynistic period, and yet even on the brink of incipient 
madness, Nietzsche still finds value in kinds of femininity and kinds of women; though this is no 
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evidence that he is not a misogynist, for even the worst misogynist may love or try to love at least 
one woman, it does counter or at least mitigate the claim of rabid virulence.  
 Nietzsche also takes pride in the fact that he was never a womanizer or a seeker of wealth 
or glory, unlike so many of the men of his day: “A man over forty-four who can say that he never 
strove for honors, for women, for money!” (EH II:9, p. 711). Behaviorally, there are many 
indicators of misogyny; in particular, one indicator does tend to be the indiscriminate pursuit of 
sex with women, often painted falsely as the ‘love’ of women; that Nietzsche does not engage in 
such pursuit again is not conclusive evidence against the claim of misogyny, but certainly I 
believe a mitigating factor once more. Further, this passage also recalls ideas from the third essay 
of the Genealogy, wherein Nietzsche discusses asceticism and the abstention from “fame, princes, 
women” (GM III:8, p. 110), as well as the fifth book of Gay Science, wherein Nietzsche discusses 
the awe certain women have in the face of priestly chastity (GS §358, p. 311-2). 
 Thus it may come as no surprise that despite Nietzsche’s warnings to some women not to 
read him (e.g. Resa von Schirnhofer, see Gilman, p. 151), he still claims that his very small ears, 
being the opposite of a donkey’s large ears, are the better for hearing women: “I dare assert that I 
have the smallest ears. This is of no small interest to women – it seems to me that they may feel I 
understand them better. – I am the anti-ass par excellence and thus a world-historical monster – I 
am, in Greek, and not only in Greek, the Antichrist” (EH III:2, p. 719). With all of Nietzsche’s 
remarks about his own feminine qualities, such as calling himself a “female elephant” (EH III 
TSZ:1, p. 751), and his praise of kinds of women and kinds of femininity, it might them seem 
contradictory for Nietzsche to say things like “All ‘feminism,’ too – also in men – closes the 
door: it will never permit entrance into this labyrinth of audacious insights” (EH III:3, p. 720). 
However, I believe Nietzsche contrasts ‘feminism’ in this sense with various lived expressions of 
femininity and the women who he thinks believe that he hears them better with his tiny ears; this 
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‘feminism’ is what he associates with the Eternal Feminine and the false dualism of masculinity 
and femininity.  
 Nietzsche refers to happiness as the “Circe of humanity” in a passage where he criticizes 
the notion of unegoistic love, saying that it is self-contradictory and “Ultimately women know 
that only too well: they don’t give a damn about selfless, merely objective men” (EH III:5, p. 
722). He claims that as part of his “Dionysian dowry” he can “venture the surmise” that he knows 
women, and that perhaps he is “the first psychologist of the eternally feminine” (EH III:5, p. 722). 
He goes on to say that all of the eternally feminine love him, which we may presume includes not 
only those women who emulate the Eternal Feminine but also those men who buy into the Eternal 
Feminine, excepting only “abortive women, the ‘emancipated’ who lack the stuff for children” 
(EH III:5, p. 722).  
I believe Nietzsche here means to specify a subset of women who emulate the Eternal 
Feminine, because he goes one to say “the perfect woman tears to pieces when she loves. – I 
know these charming maenads. – Ah, what a dangerous, creeping, subterranean little beast of 
prey she is! And yet so agreeable! – A little woman who pursues her revenge would run over fate 
itself” (EH III:5, p. 722). Nietzsche continues, mixing admiration and censure, saying that 
“Woman is indescribably more evil than man; also cleverer: good nature is in a woman a form of 
degeneration” (EH III:5, p. 722). As if to contrast himself with the “typical old virgin” Henrik 
Ibsen, who “aims to poison the good conscience, what is natural in sexual love,” Nietzsche fills 
this section with several paragraphs about the nature of the Eternal Feminine and those small 
persons who perform it: 
In all so-called “beautiful souls” something is physiologically askew at bottom; I do not 
say everything, else I should become medi-cynical. The fight for equal rights is actually a 
symptom of a disease: every physician knows that. – Woman, the more she is a woman, 
resists rights in general hand and foot: after all, the state of nature, the eternal war 
between the sexes, gives her by far first rank. 
EH III:5, p. 723 
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Here Nietzsche indicates that his objection against so-called ‘equal rights’ is that they do not 
appropriately prescribe what is necessary for the benefit of various types; furthermore, he claims 
that the ‘natural’ ranking of the sexes gives women the first rank by far. Though placing ‘woman’ 
on a pedestal is problematic, this is assuredly a counter to any claim that Nietzsche ranks men 
above women in his system of value. 
Has my definition of love been heard? It is the only one worthy of a philosopher. Love – 
in its means, war; at bottom, the deadly hatred of the sexes. 
Has my answer been heard to the question how one cures a woman – “redeems” her? One 
gives her a child. Woman needs children, a man is for her always only a means thus 
spoke Zarathustra.  
EH III:5, p. 723 
Nietzsche describes love as war and deadly hatred, a sentiment which echoes with the cynicism 
and bitterness of those whose love was not reciprocated; however, this also describes the social 
construction of how the genders do and should interact in their pursuit of love. Men are trained to 
see love as a predatory act, wherein they hunt for a wife while also bagging affairs and one-night 
stands, while women’s trained predation is a pursuit of children rather than mere sex; however 
both of these two genders are taught to see love as a hunt for a trophy of a kind, rather than as 
some mutually beneficial endeavor which elevates both parties rather than elevating one party at 
the expense of the devaluation of the other party.  
Given such an environment, the notion of equal rights, equal prescriptions of behavior, 
etc. makes little if any sense. A woman seeking a child requires very different modes of behavior 
than a man seeking a sexual liaison. Those women who either fail to see this distinction or who 
are incapable of having children, have a similar reaction to the social construction of the Eternal 
Feminine which often express as the pursuit of equal rights, either because of the instinct that the 
Eternal Feminine comes first in order of rank or because of the thwarted instinct to enact the 
Eternal Feminine by giving birth: 
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“Emancipation of woman” – that is the instinctive hatred of the abortive woman, who is 
incapable of giving birth, against the woman who is turned out well – the fight against the 
‘man’ is always a mere means, pretext, tactic. By raising themselves higher, as ‘woman 
in herself,’ as the ‘higher woman,’ as a female ‘idealist,’ they want to lower the level of 
the general rank of woman; and there is no surer means for that than higher education, 
slacks, and political voting-cattle rights. At bottom, the emancipated are anarchists in the 
world of the “eternally feminine,” the underprivileged whose most fundamental instinct is 
revenge. 
EH III:5, p. 723 
If women are to be first rank, then it makes little sense to lower them from their rightful role as 
queens to common voting democrats; if women are to be first rank, then it also makes little sense 
for them to make themselves common by ascribing to a social norm like the Eternal Feminine. 
The ‘emancipation of woman’ proposed by Wilhelmine feminists makes little sense in a world 
still in thrall to such a universalizing and devaluing concept as the Eternal Feminine. 
 Two more remarks have to do with his books Human, All-Too-Human and The Case of 
Wagner; the first of these describes Human as Nietzsche’s “sudden end” to his “infections with 
‘higher swindle,’ ‘idealism,’ ‘beautiful feelings,’ and other effeminacies,” (EH III HATH:5, p. 
744), and the second of these repeats the theme that ‘woman’ is a surface, a mask: “It is with 
Germans almost as it is with women: one never fathoms their depths; they don’t have any, that is 
all. They aren’t even shallow” (EH III CW:3, p. 778). For the first I note that Nietzsche rejects 
certain ‘effeminacies’ just as he affirms other femininities, and for the second I ever recall 
Nietzsche’s small poem “For Dancers”: “Smooth ice / is paradise / for those who dance with 
expertise” (GS §13, p. 47). Nietzsche has great love for surfaces and superficialities, so I do not 
take the remark that women ‘aren’t even shallow’ as an insult but rather as a compliment.  
 The final passage in all of Nietzsche’s published works which remarks on women again 
uses the label of the “Circe of humanity,” this time to refer to Christian morality specifically. 
Nietzsche thus asserts that so many things basically deserve each other: “The millennia, the 
nations, the first and the last, the philosophers and old women – excepting five, six moments in 
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history, and me as the seventh – at this point all of them are worthy of each other” (EH IV:7, p. 
788). Nietzsche thus concludes his publications with the idea that all of humanity is equal to 
itself, excepting himself and perhaps six others; thus he rejects the traditional systems which rank 
philosophers and old women differently, as well as the notion of the progress of humanity in the 
whiggish sense. Humanity – and human femininity – exist and perpetuate themselves until, as 
Nietzsche hopes, they begin to self-overcome. Humanity must overcome the all-too-human, just 
as femininity must overcome the Eternal Feminine, both of which hold us back from creating 




 In conclusion to this very detailed chapter, I will attempt to offer first a depiction of the 
accusations Nietzsche’s commentators have made regarding his purported misogyny, his ‘rap 
sheet’ if you will. Next, I will provide a brief recounting of several of the passages in Nietzsche’s 
published works which give counterevidence to the charges against Nietzsche. Lastly I will 
explore other issues which offer further lines of research and exploration of the problems 
explored in this chapter. To begin, let us remember the charges against Nietzsche: Nietzsche’s 
‘rap sheet’ includes the following claims: first, that he is a biological essentialist who defines 
femininity on the basis of the reproductive urge to get pregnant and have babies and who treats 
sex as indistinct from reproduction; second, that he accepts conventional sexism that venerates 
mothers and housewives; third, that he prefers male dominance and female subservience in his 
order of rank; fourth that he is a dualist regarding gender and sexuality; fifth that he is wholly 
anti-feminist; sixth that he is a biological determinist; and seventh that he is a hypocrite in that he 
advocates moral systems which distinguish between the good and the bad but when it comes to 
feminism he abandons this principle and instead distinguishes between the good and the evil.  
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I believe that much of the evidence I provided in this chapter showed how each of these 
claims is false or at the very least only superficially true; for my conclusion here I will offer seven 
quotes as more specific counter evidence, one each to combat each claim. I assert with more 
conviction now the claim that Nietzsche may not be a “true” feminist, whatever that may entail, 
but I do believe that he intends to comport himself as an anti-misogynist. For brevity I will not 
reiterate my commentary or re-quote the cited passages here. First, the claim that he is an 
essentialist regarding femininity: given the wide variety of women to whom he refers, including 
not only mothers and wives but also sisters and daughters, witches, nuns, nurses, common 
women, noble women, maidens, old maids, virgins, the Holy Virgin, all sorts of historically 
worshipped goddesses, his own pantheon of Truth, Life, Philosophy, etc., authors, artists, 
performers, and so forth, (e.g. HATH §342, 356, 635, 636 for just a few; see the Appendix: Index 
II for a more complete listing), we cannot say that Nietzsche singles out only motherhood and 
marriage as the appropriate roles for women in society. This variety and praise for various types 
also serves as counterevidence to the claim that Nietzsche is conventionally sexist in the form of 
desiring women to remain in such essentialist roles.  
 Thirdly, Nietzsche rejects the idea that men are inherently higher than women or that 
women should serve in a subservient role (see UM II §5 as well as HATH §377 and 440). 
Fourthly, Nietzsche rejects dualism not only generally but also with regards to sex and gender 
(see BT §16, 21, and 23, as well as D §248, and GS §24, 72, and 75). Fifthly, Nietzsche portrays 
himself as anti-misogynistic and offers several feminist insights (see WS §17, 20, D §192, 201, 
227, 346, 369, GS §68, 71, and TSZ I:14). Sixthly, Nietzsche appears to reject biological 
determinism with regards to the relationship between sex and gender (see GS §68, 71, 144, etc.). 
Lastly, Nietzsche’s so-called hypocrisy in calling women ‘evil’ on the basis of deception reads 
rather as a statement about what society does to women (HATH §36, etc.), or even a kind of 
praise (TSZ II:10, BGE §188, and EH III:5). Further, Nietzsche repeatedly identifies himself with 
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the feminine or identifies the feminine as explicitly good (see BT §16, 21, 23, among others). I 
am disinclined to accept the claim that Nietzsche turns especially viciously misogynist in his later 
works, as evidenced by the inclusion of several such late works in the above citations. 
 Given that I wish to avoid committing the No True Scotsman fallacy here, I do not offer 
these last considerations as proof that Nietzsche cannot conclusively be a true feminist. Rather, I 
note that these remaining issues outside of the immediate purview of this dissertation complicate 
Nietzsche’s relationship with feminism. In particular, two matters of intersection with gender, 
sex, and sexuality remain: for one, Nietzsche appears to value the elite over the average, 
preferring noblemen and geniuses to commoners. While he does not value wealth per se, 
Nietzsche’s pursuit of something higher than mere humanity smacks distinctly of an elitism 
which could be highly problematic for many feminisms. For the other, Nietzsche has several 
racist tendencies, in particular with regards to the Occidental/Oriental dualism generally and anti-
Asian racism more specifically. Given Kaufmann’s endeavors to show Nietzsche to be the anti-
anti-Semite and the anti-nationalist he is, however, and given my own endeavors to reveal 
Nietzsche as an anti-misogynist, I hope that a more detailed exploration of Nietzsche’s discussion 
of race and ethnicity would prove that he might aim for anti-racism as well, however short he in 
fact falls.  
My work concerning the role of solely and generally women in Nietzsche’s works, 
however, is incomplete. I have yet to properly explore Nietzsche’s depiction of truth and 
perspectivism; this is necessary because of Nietzsche’s repeated use of the metaphor of truth as a 
woman, and sometimes falsehood also. While I again do not have the space here to explore 
Nietzsche’s entire pantheon of goddesses and how they relate to the discussion of women and 
truth, I feel it is necessary to explore the relationship of women to Truth specifically because the 
notion that truth specifically is a woman is a consistent theme and exists from Nietzsche’s first 
publication (BT §8 and 10) to one of the last (A §48) and virtually all in between. Nietzsche’s 
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characterization of truth may reveal further aspects of his commentary on women, just as his 
commentary on women may reveal further aspects of his commentary on truth.  
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Chapter 4: An Account of Nietzsche’s Remarks Regarding Perspective, 
Truth, and Falsity 
   
  §1 Introduction 
§2  Perspective and Perspectivism: 40 Aphorisms 
§3  Defining Perspectivism and Defending Against Relativism 
  §4 The Problem of Optics and Other Metaphors  
  §5 Truth as a Woman and the Veiled Figure at Saïs  
  §6  Standing Truth on Her Head: Reversing Perspectives 





 I intend this chapter to provide an account of Nietzsche’s axiological theory of 
perspectivism; in particular, I wish to focus on how Nietzsche characterizes truth and value as 
perspectival, or in other words Nietzsche’s claim that truth specifically and value broadly are by 
definition matters of perspective. It is not my goal in this dissertation to prove either that 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism is an accurate axiology or value theory or that Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is an accurate alethiology or theory regarding the nature of truth; rather, here my 
goal is to establish what claims Nietzsche makes regarding specifically the relationship of truth, 
value, and perspective, and then to show how this connects to Nietzsche’s remarks about women 
and the broad optical metaphor. My contribution to Nietzsche scholarship in particular here is to 
provide a new reading of both truth and women as they appear in his published works; my 
contribution to philosophy more generally here is to facilitate the integration of feminism as more 
central both to epistemology, value theory, and to the history of philosophy, and to facilitate the 
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integration of Nietzsche studies and especially perspectivism as more central to at least some 




§2  Perspective and Perspectivism: 40 Aphorisms 
 
 In order of publication, Nietzsche refers to perspective, the perspectival, or perspectivism 
explicitly:196 twice in Untimely Meditations II, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life; once in the first edition of Human, All-Too-Human; twice in Wanderer and His Shadow; 
twice in Daybreak; seven times in the early edition of  The Gay Science; ten times in Beyond 
Good and Evil; once in the 1886 preface to Birth of Tragedy; once more in the 1886 prefaces to 
Human, All-Too-Human and Assorted Opinions and Maxims; six times in Genealogy of Morals; 
four more times in Gay Science Book V; and then once each in Twilight of the Idols, Antichrist, 
and Ecce Homo. All told, in his published works Nietzsche only refers to perspective forty times 
total, and only once uses the word ‘perspectivism’ (GS §354, p. 299). However, there are 
hundreds of references to eyes and seeing, to ‘standpoints’ and ‘points of view,’ to spectacles and 
to blindness. Just as with women, Nietzsche has a lot to say about eyesight both literally and 
metaphorically. Interestingly, Nietzsche leaves out any explicit reference to perspective in his two 
pieces on Wagner, which may be a sign of how limited Wagner’s vision was, perhaps only 
metaphorically speaking. However, Nietzsche also decides not to refer to perspective explicitly 
throughout Zarathustra, though he talks extensively of eyes, sight, and images therein. Even the 
                                                          
196 I used the prefix “persp” in my search through digital versions of the publicly available German-
language texts. In this way, I was able to capture all of Nietzsche’s uses of the terms ‘perspective’ and 
‘perspectivism’ and the related term ‘perspectival’ without accidentally including any of the translators’ 
uses of ‘perspective’ when Nietzsche writes Standpunkt or another word unrelated etymologically to 
‘perspektive,’ as Kaufmann is wont to do. I was also able to capture Nietzsche’s uses of ‘perspektive’ 
where translators had eliminated or replaced it, as with Hollingdale. 
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early edition of Birth of Tragedy discusses the valence between objectivity and subjectivity and 
has numerous references as well to the optical metaphor, as does “On Truth and Lie,” though 
neither refer explicitly to perspective. In this section I will focus exclusively on Nietzsche’s use 
of ‘perspective’ and directly related words like ‘perspectival’ and ‘perspectivism.’  
 Nietzsche’s first explicit use of ‘perspective’ appears in the second of the Untimely 
Meditations, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life; here Nietzsche discusses how 
treating history as a science homogenizes perspectives: “All perspectives have been shifted back 
to the beginning of all becoming, back into infinity” (UM II:4, p. 77). Later, he expresses his 
mockery of “the senseless displacement of all perspectives” coming at the expense of life (UM 
II:9, p. 112) and argues that excessive history deprives humanity of its greatest ideas “by 
continually shifting horizon-perspectives and removing a protective atmosphere and thus 
preventing humans from feeling and acting unhistorically” (UM II:9, p. 115).197 These first three 
mentions of perspective offer three concepts basic to perspectivism: first, that perspectives are not 
and should not be homogenous; second, that displacing perspectives should not be done 
senselessly, which thus requires the meaningful displacement of perspective; and third that the 
shifting of perspectives allows humans to feel and act outside of their historical position, which 
Nietzsche appears to value highly given his own estimation of himself as being ‘untimely’ and 
thus existing outside of his own historical place in time. That Nietzsche sees a distinction between 
“senseless” and more sensible displacement of perspectives makes clear very early that 
perspectivism is not intended to be just another form of relativism. He offers two specific criteria 
here to avoid relativism: first, heterogeneity of perspective is a desirable property, at least for 
some purposes; and second, being able to act unhistorically is a desirable property, at least for 
some purposes. Thus Nietzsche provides two criteria for ranking perspectives, which is precisely 
what relativism fails to provide. Following this summary of Nietzsche’s remarks about 
                                                          
197 Hollingdale simply leaves out the word ‘perspectives’ here and in the subsequent aphorism from 
Human. 
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perspective, I will explain in more detail how these criteria allow us to rank and thus avoid 
relativism.  
 Nietzsche’s next reference connects perspective explicitly to his optical metaphor and 
shows how perspective allows us to act, in this case in a preventative capacity: “Precisely because 
we are able to seize this perspective with our eye, we are perhaps in a position to prevent this 
prospect from occurring” (HATH §247, p. 117). Nietzsche also acknowledges the existence of 
“false perspectives” at least with regards to the kinds of perspectives one might use in a painting, 
or in transcribing a conversation into legible text (WS P, p. 302). Nietzsche provides an example 
of how sometimes only one perspective is available while in other cases multiple perspectives 
may coexist, and though contextually the ‘here’ of this passage is unclear he could have in mind 
matters of style or education therein:  
Bird’s perspective. – Here torrential streams plunge from many directions into a gorge: 
their motion is so violent, and draws the eyes so vigorously after it, that the bare and 
wooded cliffs all around seem, not to sink, but to flee down. The prospect arouses in us 
an anxious fear, as though something inimical lay behind it all from which everything 
had to take flight and against which the abyss would lend us protection. This region 
cannot in any way be painted unless one is hovering above it in the air like a bird. Here 
the so-called bird’s perspective is for once not an artistic caprice but the sole possibility. 
WS §138, p. 343198 
Thus, when trying to account for how to ‘paint’ – whether metaphorically or literally – certain 
scenes, one does not always make decisions about perspective capriciously but rather out of 
physical, stylistic, or other necessity. Hence we must conclude that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is 
not capricious; I offer this as new evidence towards my claim that perspectivism is not 
axiological relativism: axiological relativism as I understand it would be the claim that value is 
determined relative to the individual or the individual’s culture, and hence can be capricious and 
lacking necessity. Nietzsche here shows that perspective is sometimes if not often a matter of 
necessity, and thus cannot be relative in the form of being capricious.  
                                                          
198 Hollingdale chooses to not translate ‘perspective’ directly but rather as ‘bird’s-eye view’ in this case. 
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 In the next book, Nietzsche describes the ‘different perspectives of feeling’ which 
predicated ancient Greek appreciation of female beauty on the appreciation of male beauty: 
because “their perspective on female beauty was quite different from ours” Nietzsche claims the 
ancient Greeks “reverenced differently” and “despised differently” than his contemporary 
Europeans (D §170, p.104). Thus note how Nietzsche explicitly ties perspective to the various 
modes of valuation our culture engages in with regards to gender. Nietzsche also explains that 
there is a relationship between his propensity for solitude and his frequent reliance on ‘distant 
perspectives’: “when I am alone I seem to see my friends in a clearer and fairer light than when I 
am with them; and when I loved and appreciated music the most, I lived far from it. It seems I 
need a distant perspective if I am to think well of things” (D §485, p. 199-200). Perspectives of 
close proximity are useful things for certain purposes, for certain individuals, surely, but 
Nietzsche as psychologist recognizes that close proximity is not always the best way to appreciate 
things, especially for one like himself. This passage also reflects Nietzsche’s several remarks 
about how too-close proximity to one’s beloved reveals those biological aspects, at least, that one 
might prefer to ignore in order to better appreciate one’s beloved (e.g. GS §60). 
 The Gay Science provides a flurry of perspectives; in the first of these, Nietzsche notes 
almost in passing how different perspectives can generate different feelings when he remarks on 
how members of the ‘knightly’ caste can be “spurred by the good feeling of this perspective” of 
obliging and honoring one’s peers (GS §13, p. 87). Later Nietzsche describes how “eternal 
perspectives” have affected humanity and concedes “a singular merit” to Christianity for teaching 
us to see every individual’s sin “through a magnifying glass, turning the sinner into a great, 
immortal criminal” by way of such eternality: “By surrounding it with eternal perspectives, it 
taught humanity to see itself from a distance and as something past and whole” – in other words, I 
suggest, as something to be overcome (GS §78, p. 133). However, Nietzsche later states explicitly 
that humanity is incapable of such eternal perspectives: “hence man alone among all the animals 
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has no eternal horizons and perspectives” (GS §143, p. 192), despite the pretenses of religions 
and belief systems like Christianity. I suggest that the reason Christianity thus has merit for 
Nietzsche is that it creates an appreciation for a distant perspective on humanity, but one of the 
reasons Nietzsche sees Christianity as flawed at the outset is that it treats distance as eternality 
and objectivity rather than simply as distance. 
 Nietzsche offers an example of a different belief system with a different employment of 
perspective: “Egoism is the law of perspective applied to feelings: what is closest appears large 
and weighty, and as one moves farther away size and weight decreases” (GS §162, p. 199). Yet 
another example provides us with the “most dangerous” perspective: “What I do or do not do now 
is as important for everything that is yet to come as is the greatest event of the past: in this 
tremendous perspective of effectiveness all actions appear equally great and small” (GS §233, p. 
212-3).  Regardless, Nietzsche advocates the learning of new perspectives; in particular he praises 
artists for granting us even the merest “glimpses of architectural perspectives” (GS §299, p. 239). 
Indeed, this ability to not only see things from new perspectives but to actually generate new 
perspectives seems to be a quality of creator- and creative-types, a part of the “fancy of the 
contemplatives” who “think and feel at the same time” and “who really continually fashion 
something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, 
colors, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations” (GS §301, p. 241-2).  
 Though Nietzsche does not write about perspective explicitly in Zarathustra, the seven 
discussions of perspectives from the Gay Science are quickly followed by another ten discussions 
of perspectives in Beyond Good and Evil. The first of these comes in the preface, in connection to 
the notion that truth is a woman. Specifically, Nietzsche connects problems with perspective to 
the “dogmatist’s error,” which he also describes as “Plato’s invention of the pure spirit and the 
good as such,” and ties it to Christianity as “Platonism for ‘the people’” (BGE P, p. 193). 
Nietzsche explicitly states that the dogmatist’s error reverses the truth: “To be sure, it meant 
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standing truth on her head and denying perspective, the basic condition of all life, when one 
spoke of spirit and the good as Plato did” (BGE P, p. 193). Thus perspectivism is not a denial of 
the existence of truth, but rather a redefinition of what truth entails in contrast with the erroneous 
Platonic and Christian versions of the truth. Later, Nietzsche will also explicitly include Kantian 
philosophy as one of the doctrines that reverses the truth in a similar way.  
 Nietzsche also offers a kind of perspective to contrast with the bird’s perspective from 
earlier, namely a perspective from below for which he criticizes metaphysicians; Nietzsche asks 
whether the “faith in opposite values” and the opposite values themselves “are not perhaps merely 
foreground estimates, only provisional perspectives, perhaps even from some nook, perhaps from 
below, frog perspectives, as it were, to borrow an expression painters use” (BGE §2, p. 200). 
Nietzsche goes on to suppose that life might in some cases benefit from or even require deception 
and falsehood, and thus the ranking of truth over falsehood for the value of life in particular 
would be incorrect (BGE §2, p. 200). Nietzsche describes the behavior of the anti-real 
metaphysicians as a form of nihilism and weariness of the soul, and contrasts them with the anti-
appearance metaphysicians who are “stronger and livelier thinkers who are still eager for life,” 
who “side against appearance, and speak of ‘perspective,’ with a new arrogance,” and who “rank 
the credibility of their own bodies about as low as the credibility of the visual evidence that ‘the 
earth stands still,’” in an attempt to regain “something of the ancient domain of the faith of former 
times” (BGE §10, p. 206-7). Though Nietzsche seems to reject both the metaphysicians who are 
anti-reality and those who are anti-appearance, his sympathies do seem to lie with the latter group 
at least in their mistrust of modernity and the desire to rise up and get away from this embodied 
life.  
 Nietzsche then criticizes Kant for operating from perspectives which do not facilitate life, 
giving us another criterion for perspective which allows us to dispute the claim that perspectivism 
is relativism. In particular, he says that we should not ask the Kantian question of how synthetic a 
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priori judgments are possible, but rather “Why is belief in such judgments necessary?” a question 
he answers by saying that “such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the 
preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they might, of course, be false judgments for all 
that!” (BGE §11, p. 209). Thus life might not only require deception, but even self-deception. 
Nietzsche continues by asserting that these synthetic judgments “should not ‘be possible’ at all; 
we have no right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments. Only, of course, 
the belief in their truth is necessary, as a foreground belief and visual evidence belonging to the 
perspective optics of life” (BGE §11, p. 209). In saying this, Nietzsche makes several claims 
relevant to perspectivism: that humans have no right to assert the possibility of synthetic 
judgments by virtue of our humanity; that regardless of our lack of right to such assertions, we 
nonetheless must believe in their possibility; and that this is necessary because it provides the 
foregrounding required to make life itself possible for creatures like ourselves.  
 Reversals of perspectives can occur in many different ways, and are thus not merely 
limited to the dogmatist’s error from the preface. Nietzsche in particular notes how we tend to 
take the cause for the effect and vice versa; this can include how we judge the morality of an 
action, such as in Kantian practical philosophy where the results are less important than one’s 
intentions: “Instead of the consequences, the origin: indeed a reversal of perspective!” (BGE §32, 
p. 234). Though Nietzsche describes this reversal as hard-won, he also finds it to be “calamitous” 
and to necessitate another “reversal and fundamental shift in values” in the present day (BGE 
§32, p. 234). Indeed, because of the basic error at the foundation of his contemporaries’ 
philosophies, Nietzsche claims that “Whatever philosophical standpoint one may adopt today, 
from every point of view the erroneousness of the world in which we think we live is the surest 
and firmest fact that we can lay eyes on” (BGE §34, p. 235).  
Nietzsche himself has learned to value truth and deception differently, and to understand 
the difference between a philosopher’s ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’ differently, and so challenges: 
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It is no more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than mere appearance; it is 
even the worst proved assumption there is in the world. Let at least this much be 
admitted: there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and 
appearances; and if, with the virtuous enthusiasm and clumsiness of some philosophers, 
one wanted to abolish the “apparent world” altogether – well, supposing you could do 
that, at least nothing would be left of your “truth,” either. Indeed, what forces us at all to 
suppose that there is an essential opposition of “true” and “false”? Is it not sufficient to 
assume degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of 
appearance – different “values,” to use the language of painters? Why couldn’t the world 
that concerns us – be a fiction? And if somebody asked, “but to a fiction there surely 
belongs an author?” – couldn’t one answer simply: why? Doesn’t this “belongs” perhaps 
belong to the fiction, too? Is it not permitted to be a bit ironical about the subject no less 
than the predicate and object? Shouldn’t philosophers be permitted to rise above faith in 
grammar? All due respect for governesses – but hasn’t the time come for philosophy to 
renounce the faith of governesses?” 
BGE §34, p. 237 
  
Though Nietzsche’s language only clumsily manages to convey this here, I believe he intends to 
reject the falseness of the philosopher’s ‘reality,’ but without necessarily affirming the truth of 
their concept of ‘appearance’ because the two are based on a false dichotomy between what is 
real and what is apparent. The notion of ‘appearance’ is the closest thing contemporary 
philosophers offer him in terms of a label for the idea he wants to convey or re-write herein: a 
thing in a sense manufactured by the conjunction of observer and perspective, but 
unmanufactured in the sense that there is no one ‘creating’ that conjunction, not even God. 
Nietzsche rejects the childish assumption that just because grammar indicates the necessity of a 
subject for every verb, there must be a creator for every fiction or ‘created’ concept. So also 
Nietzsche supplants his contemporaries’ usage of ‘value’ for a more artistic understanding; colors 
come in lighter and darker ‘values,’ tints and shades, pastels and hues in a painter’s world, and a 
painter can use each of these to different purposes. Thus the ‘value’ of an ‘appearance’ which is 
less-true or more-true is not a value of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in some nebulous and falsely ‘objective’ 
sense, but a darkness or lightness useful for different purposes.  
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 Nietzsche cannot resist reminding us that his treatment of truth and perspective is 
connected to his treatment of women in this text as well; one of his epigrams reminds us that 
“The enormous expectation in sexual love and the sense of shame in this expectation spoils all 
perspective for women from the start” (BGE §114, p. 275), a problem for which society is 
primarily to blame. Thus, as well as being useful the way ‘values’ were to the painter, a 
perspective can be harmful to the beholder. Further, perspectives come in different kinds, 
narrower or wider: “The devil has the broadest perspectives for God; therefore he keeps so far 
away from God – the devil being the most ancient friend of wisdom” (BGE §129, p. 277). I take 
this interlude between several epigrams about gender and sex to say several things: first, that 
because the devil views God from these broadest perspectives, he must maintain great distance; 
second, a great distance from God is wise at least for some; third, these two claims together seem 
to imply that broader perspectives – whatever those entail – are wiser than narrower perspectives. 
Based on my knowledge of Nietzsche’s upcoming remarks in the Genealogy (see especially 
Essay III §12), I believe the idea of ‘broadness’ of perspective here has something to do with the 
ability to attain or use multiple perspectives when ‘viewing’ or considering a concept. This would 
imply in connection with his surrounding epigrams on women that perhaps the reason 
Wilhelmine feminists failed to persuade Nietzsche to accept their definition of womanhood has to 
do with the fact that they were still too close to the concept, viewing it from entirely too narrow a 
perspective.  
 Nietzsche later describes “teaching the narrowing of our perspective” as teaching “thus in 
a certain sense stupidity” (BGE §188, p. 292), one of the things any system of morality 
whatsoever “as opposed to laisser aller”199 does to human perspective (BGE §188, p. 290). That 
this narrowing is “a bit of tyranny against ‘nature’; also against ‘reason’” is not an objection for 
Nietzsche “as long as we do not have some other morality which permits us to decree that every 
                                                          
199 Letting go. 
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kind of tyranny and unreason is impermissible” (BGE §188, p. 290). In fact, it is this long-
standing compulsion that Nietzsche describes as “what is essential and inestimable in every 
morality” (BGE §188, p. 290). I suppose here that Nietzsche finds this essential and inestimable 
in the value system with which he experiments in his work, namely perspectivism.  
 Thus Nietzsche connects his notion of perspective not only to epistemological rankings of 
values, but also to moral systems; hence I argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not exist 
exclusively in either narrower sense of value, but in the broader and overarching sense of 
axiology. Nietzsche again refers to moral perspective before the close of this text: he analyzes the 
Christian concept of neighbor-love as based on the fear of the neighbor, and states “After the 
structure of society is fixed on the whole and seems secure against external dangers,” and there is 
no longer much need to fear the outsider, one begins to fear that those who protected the 
community against outsiders will now turn their strength against the community, and that “it is 
this fear of the neighbor that again creates new perspectives of moral valuation” (BGE §201, p. 
303). Instead of valuing violent tendencies, the community of people now draws up new tables of 
values: “How much or how little is dangerous to the community, dangerous to equality, in an 
opinion, in a state or affect, in a will, in a talent – that now constitutes the moral perspective: 
here, too, fear is again the mother of morals” (BGE §201, p. 303). Thus perspective may be 
affected significantly by human emotions and needs.  
 Following this second book of his late or mature period, Nietzsche includes a smattering 
of references to perspective in the 1886 prefaces he added to Birth of Tragedy, Human, All-Too-
Human, and the sequel Assorted Opinions and Maxims. First, in his “Attempt at a Self-
Criticism,” Nietzsche describes a problematic feature inherent in the beliefs of Wagner, 
Schopenhauer, and their attendant Christianity that he deems as the “will to decline,” and which 
we may also think as a will to decadence, a denial of perspective in favor of the aforementioned 
dogmatist’s error that implies only truth can be necessary or even useful for life:  
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Behind this mode of thought and valuation, which must be hostile to art if it is at all 
genuine, I never failed to sense a hostility to life – a furious, vengeful antipathy to life 
itself: for all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the 
necessity of perspectives and error, Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and 
fundamentally, life’s nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, 
dressed up as, faith in ‘another’ or ‘better’ life.” 
BT P:5, p.23 
Nietzsche elsewhere calls “afterworldly” (see TSZ I:3, for one example) this proposition that a 
‘better’ life will come along after this one and links this body-hatred to the Platonic ‘afterworld’ 
of the Forms and the Kantian noumenal realm, as well as the Christian Heaven and other religious 
afterlives.  Therefore, we can see that Nietzsche finds a basic connection between afterworldly 
attitudes and anti-perspectival axiologies. As if to reinforce this, Nietzsche then praises the free 
spirit who gets “control over your For and Against” and learns “to grasp the necessary injustice in 
every For and Against, injustice as inseparable from life, life itself as conditioned by the sense of 
perspective and its injustice,” and becomes able to see with one’s “own eyes the problem of order 
of rank, and how power and right and spaciousness of perspective grow into the heights together” 
(HATH P §6, p. 9). By this Nietzsche makes clear that if perspective is necessary for life, then 
this entails that each perspective comes at the expense of others; ranking things one way means 
that something ‘unjustly’ comes at the bottom of the order, and ranking things by a different 
perspective means that something else ‘unjustly’ comes at the bottom instead. True equalization 
would reject this order of rank. This may explain Nietzsche’s distaste for democracy and its 
attempts at false equalities; even in democracies some are ranked less than others for the purposes 
of the democratic perspective, and this entails once again that someone comes at the bottom of 
the order. Perhaps also this offers a useful distinction for the difference between striving for 
equality and striving for equity: equity offers more to those who have greater need, while equality 
just gives everyone the same thing regardless of their need. 
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 Nietzsche’s last prefatory remark about perspective comes in a different tone, and 
discusses the “pessimism of the renunciators” like Schopenhauer and Wagner in terms of a 
formula: “there is a will to the tragic and to pessimism that is as much a sign of severity and of 
strength of intellect,” a claim he perhaps self-indulgently believes is solely his own new and 
unique belief, as it “has been my pessimistic perspective from the beginning – a novel 
perspective, is it not? A perspective that even today is still novel and strange?” (AOM P §7, p. 
213). Thus, just as the severe and strongly intelligent ancient Greek type tended towards 
cheerfulness (not to be confused with happiness), the severe and strongly intelligent modern 
European type tends towards a more pessimistic perspective of asceticism and renunciation. The 
parallel I want to draw out here is that the same effect may have different causes and that the 
same cause can have multiple effects. Severity can lead to cheerfulness or pessimism, self-
indulgence and self-restraint; but different times and types can all generate a similar severity at 
the same time. Just so, we may train multiple perspectives on one object and get similar results or 
concepts; likewise, a singular perspective can sometimes produce a multitude of concepts about 
that self-same single object. That there is no one-to-one relationship between cause and effect or 
perspective and concept is not evidence of its illogic, but rather of its consistency with both 
human experience and the human condition.  
 Ultimately, however, Nietzsche seems to value most highly the diversity of perspective 
rather than the pre-eminence of any non-self-defeating perspective over others. In other words, 
Nietzsche privileges diversity over ‘objectivity’ and undermines the notion of objectivity that is 
so problematic for epistemologists and feminists alike. Nietzsche’s problem with objectivity is 
largely based on the fact that it denies the presence of interest in even the broadest perspectives; 
in other words, the philosopher who pretends to objectivity is pretending he has no interest or 
investment in the outcome of his intellectual pursuits. This is the case whether in valuing a claim 
as true or false or valuing an action or law as good or bad: “The question: what is the value of this 
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or that table of values and ‘morals’? should be viewed from the most divers perspectives; for the 
problem ‘value for what?’ cannot be examined too subtly” (GM I:17 Nietzsche’s note, p. 55). 
When questioning value, Nietzsche appears to reject the idea of intrinsic value; all value is 
extrinsic, it is value for someone or some purpose, some perspective. The idea of intrinsic value 
rests on the perspective of a non-person with non-interests, and therefore must have a non-
existence.  
 As if to bolster this claim, Nietzsche offers a plausible but probably fictive just-so story 
about the origins of the concepts of legal rights and justice from the perspective that everything 
can be “objectively” measured, priced, and sold, saying that “it was rather out of the most 
rudimentary form of personal legal rights that the budding sense of exchange, contract, guilt, 
right, obligation, settlement, first transferred itself to the coarsest and most elementary social 
complexes” as well as the comparison of power between people; once it became the case that 
one’s “eye was now focused on this perspective,” it was inevitable that people would ultimately 
arrive at the belief that “everything has its price; all things can be paid for” and that they could 
thus arrive at justice (GM II:8, p. 70). The notion of objectivity built in to this initial valuation of 
all things claimed that the evaluator was disinterested, whether by one’s own nature or by the 
nature of knowledge.  
 Nietzsche finds particularly absurd the claim that “there is a realm of truth and being, but 
reason is excluded from it!” and dismisses this “incarnate will to contradiction and 
antinaturalness” as part and parcel of the dogmatist’s error and the flipping of truth onto her head 
(GM III:12, p. 118). Here Nietzsche explicitly includes Kant and Vedanta ascetics with other 
wrongly oriented philosophers; these philosophers, like Platonists and Christians, have all 
determined that reality and value and truth all exist but are by definition out of the grasp of 
humanity. Thus Kant can discuss an “intelligible character” which signifies that “things are so 
constituted that the intellect comprehends just enough of them to know that for the intellect they 
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are – utterly incomprehensible” (GM III:12, p. 119). Nietzsche seems to find these “resolute 
reversals of accustomed perspectives and valuations” more mischievous and futile than 
maliciously and negatively affecting humanity, and indeed even having some useful qualities for 
the flourishing of something new in humanity:  
…to see differently in this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline 
and preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity” – the latter understood not as 
“contemplation without interest” (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to 
control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a 
variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. 
 
Thus the value of the false objectivity is that it has trained philosophers to try to discipline 
themselves to see the world differently, a useful skill when employed properly; properly in this 
case necessitates learning how to use one’s “Pro and Con,” rather than being solely controlled by 
them. Nietzsche goes on to offer an emphatic warning against this dogmatist’s erroneous 
asceticism of knowledge and absurd concepts of impossible and false objectivity especially, and 
to instead advocate the plurality of many interested perspectives over the Platonic, Christian, and 
Kantian ideals of a singular uninterested perspective. I quote at length: 
Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old 
conceptual fiction that posited a “pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject”; let 
us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as “pure reason,” “absolute 
spirituality,” “knowledge in itself”: these always demand that we should think of an eye 
that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the 
active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are 
supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. 
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and the more affects we 
allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe on 
thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity,” be. But to 
eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were 
capable of this – what would that mean but to castrate the intellect? –  
GM III:12, p. 119 
Rather than completely throwing out the concept of objectivity, Nietzsche seeks to redefine it: 
Nietzschean objectivity, or the objectivity which belongs properly to this doctrine of 
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perspectivism, is the accumulation of perspectives rather than the absence of perspectives. Thus 
objectivity becomes multi-perspectival instead of aperspectival or non-perspectival. In this new 
definition, objectivity is not the opposite of subjectivity but a palimpsest of subjectivities. I argue 
that this notion of objectivity is far more consistent with feminist epistemologies than the 
historical modern philosopher’s notion of objectivity.  
 Nietzsche also believes that a perspective which used to hold sway can fall out of favor 
and efficacy as time marches on; he states that the “religio-moral perspective” in particular “is no 
longer binding on us” the way it was binding on peoples of the past (GM III:16, p. 129). 
Nonetheless, he has high regard as a sufferer for the genius possible from this perspective that the 
alleviation of suffering matters most: “if one adopts the only perspective known to the priest, it is 
not easy to set bounds to one’s admiration of how much he has seen, sought, and found under this 
perspective” (GM III:17, p. 130). However, Nietzsche still is able to find fault with this 
perspective even as a party interested in the alleviation of his own pain, precisely because it is 
antithetical to life and its conditions: “This interpretation – there is no doubt of it – brought fresh 
suffering with it, deeper, more inward, more poisonous, more life-destructive, suffering: it placed 
all suffering under the perspective of guilt” (GM III:28, p. 162). Thus, much as Kant destroyed 
reason in order to make a place for faith, Nietzsche sees asceticism as destroying life in order to 
make a place for the will. 
 Only seven passages with comments on perspective remain: four from Book V of Gay 
Science, and one each from Twilight, Antichrist, and Ecce Homo. In a section exploring the nature 
of consciousness, communication, and ‘the genius of the species,’ Nietzsche remarks that our 
consciousness by its nature translates even our most individual thoughts “back into the 
perspective of the herd,” and then offers an explicit pairing of perspectivism with 
phenomenalism, which I again quote at length:  
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This is the essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand them: Owing to 
the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can become conscious is only 
a surface- and sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever becomes 
conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd 
signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, 
reduction to superficialities, and generalization. Ultimately, the growth of consciousness 
becomes a danger; and anyone who lives among the most conscious Europeans even 
knows that it is a disease. 
 You will guess that it is not the opposition of the subject and object that concerns 
me here: This distinction I leave to the epistemologists who have become entangled in the 
snares of grammar (the metaphysics of the people). It is even less the opposition of 
‘thing-in-itself’ and appearance: for we do not “know” nearly enough to be entitled to any 
such distinction. We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for “truth”: we “know” (or 
believe or imagine) just as much as may be useful in the interests of the human herd, the 
species; and even what is here called “utility” is ultimately also a mere belief, something 
imaginary, and perhaps precisely that most calamitous stupidity of which we shall perish 
some day. 
GS §354, p. 299-300 
I take Nietzsche here to be playing out the consequences of the dogmatist’s error: if we define 
truth as this false Kantian or Platonic or otherwise dogmatic “objectivity,” then by definition we 
prevent humanity by virtue of our animal nature from ever achieving or ascertaining truth in our 
beliefs. Perspectivism is then connected to phenomenalism by their shared essential claim that 
animal perception and awareness are in an important sense superficial. This becomes a problem 
in phenomenalism, such as some describe Kantian epistemology among that of other modern 
philosophers, because phenomenalism also includes the claim that truth is not superficial. 
Because perspectivism allows for superficial, shifting, temporary ‘truths,’ it does not necessarily 
require that humanity exist forever without access to ‘objective’ truth. Remembering Nietzsche’s 
new definition of objectivity for perspectivism, all the perspectivist has to do to become more 
objective is to learn to see from new and more perspectives; the phenomenalist by contrast has no 
such escape clause because he has defined himself as incapable in principle of achieving 
whatever his ‘objectivity’ entails, and is forever trapped in a vale of shadows, the merely apparent 
world. Perspectivism does not treat the apparent as ‘mere’ in any sense; there is (or at least so far 
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has been) nothing more than surfaces, and therefore the superficial is richly and importantly 
valuable.  
 Nietzsche’s next remark about perspective notes how certain beliefs may be required for 
certain perspectives: Schopenhauer’s answer to the question of the meaning of existence 
remained “stuck – in precisely those Christian-ascetic moral perspectives in which one had 
renounced faith along with the faith in God” (GS §357, p. 308). Thus Nietzsche offers further 
evidence of the way the dogmatist’s error engages in self-undoing by defining value, truth, and 
existence as outside of human grasp. However, this is not the only kind of perspective Nietzsche 
finds objectionable. Nietzsche later goes on to reject perspectives originating from the notorious 
social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer: “a human race that adopted such Spencerian perspectives as its 
ultimate perspectives would seem to us worthy of contempt, of annihilation!” (GS §373, p. 334). 
Thus we may have some inkling that though Nietzsche may uncritically accept racial stereotypes, 
he was not uncritical of the kinds of beliefs which later became atrociously exemplified by the 
Nazi regime. 
 The last passage remarking on perspective in Book V of The Gay Science again offers 
Nietzsche’s redefinition of ‘objectivity’ and the infinite, and what a new objectivity or new 
‘infinite’ must be for new philosophers. He cautions us against worshiping this new definition as 
the past erroneous dogmatists worshiped their own conception of truth starting with Plato, 
running through Christianity, and thenceforth through the history of Western philosophy. It is 
important to note that he does permit with a shudder the possibility of an infinite number of 
different perspectives and interpretations, particularly because he thinks we limit ourselves too 
much if we reserve perspective only for human or even animal existence. In this way, this passage 
makes Nietzsche’s perspectivism into a cousin of Leibniz’s monadology, which not only permits 
but outright requires a kind of perspective or viewpoint possible from every point in the universe.  
I will again quote this at length to offer the fullest picture of Nietzsche’s perspectivism:  
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How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence has 
any other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without “sense,” 
does not become “nonsense”; whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially 
actively engaged in interpretation – that cannot be decided even by the most industrious 
and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in 
the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own 
perspectives, and only in these. We cannot look around our own corner: it is a hopeless 
curiosity that wants to know what other kinds of intellects and perspectives there might 
be; for example, whether some beings might be able to experience time backward, or 
alternately forward and backward (which would involve another direction of life and 
another concept of cause and effect). But I should think that today we are at least far from 
the ridiculous immodesty that would be involved in decreeing from our corner that 
perspectives are permitted only from this corner. Rather has the world become “infinite” 
for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibility that it may include 
infinite interpretations. Once more we are seized by a great shudder; but who would feel 
inclined immediately to deify again after the old manner this monster of an unknown 
world? And to worship the unknown henceforth as “the Unknown One”? Alas, too many 
ungodly possibilities of interpretation are included in the unknown, too much devilry, 
stupidity, and foolishness of interpretation – even in our own human, all too human folly, 
which we know. 
GS §374, p. 336-7 
I leave this text with a question: is Nietzsche’s shudder here the shake of a fearful man, the palsy 
of a man growing old too quickly, a wave of proto-existentialist nausea, or even a frisson of 
excitement? I suspect that Nietzsche is in a sense nauseated because of the thought that humanity 
would foolishly deify the unknown. This final passage on perspective in the last book of The Gay 
Science offers several other claims about perspective: those perspectives which we never 
experience in any way are inaccessible to us by definition; the number of possible perspectives 
may extend to infinity; and it is at least partly a matter of axiological taste and epistemic modesty 
that Nietzsche in his perspectivism rejects objectivity as defined by the dogmatist’s error.  
 In the one reference to perspective in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche states that “one 
misunderstands great human beings if one views them from the miserable perspective of some 
public use” (TI IX:50, p. 555), thus giving us the claim that not all perspectives provide the same 
understanding of the same concept, with the implied corollary that certain perspectives are better 
than others for understanding certain concepts. Given Nietzsche’s repeated prioritizing of values 
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congruent with life and the overcoming of humanity, I assert here that Nietzsche’s order of rank 
with regards to perspective must also be congruent with these standards if he is to be minimally 
coherent. I do not think that Nietzsche would find outright contradictions to be objectionable, 
given his claims about the sometimes necessity of contradiction and falsehood for life, but 
coherence is an epistemic quality which does seem necessary for life, particularly human life. 
Incoherence renders communication and thus social interaction unfeasible; social interaction is 
necessary for human life at a variety of levels including the most basic of acquiring food and 
shelter in the contemporary, modern, and even the classical societies; therefore, coherence is 
necessary for life as a Nietzschean standard of value, and thus also for a perspectivist axiology.  
 The one reference to perspective in Antichrist appears in a long passage concerning the 
Christian Gospels. Nietzsche discusses how as a matter not only of tradition but of heritage, the 
Christian has not merely learned to reject other perspectives but has been in a sense “determined, 
as a matter of principle, to apply only concepts, symbols, attitudes which have been proved by the 
practice of the priest; instinctively to reject every other practice, every other perspective of value 
and usefulness” in favor of those approved by their religious leaders (A §44, p. 620-1). By this 
almost off-hand use of “perspective of value and usefulness,” Nietzsche demonstrates clearly how 
broad his conception of perspectivism truly is: perspective does not pertain solely to truth, 
knowledge, and epistemic concerns, nor only to reality, ontology, and metaphysical concerns, but 
rather appears to encompass the very broad categories of value and use in addition to those 
connected to belief and existence. Thus I argue that properly speaking perspectivism is a doctrine 
concerning axiology narrowly and value theory broadly. Perspectivism therefore pertains to 
multiple branches of philosophical study and their connected spectra of value: epistemology and 
its attendant alethiology given the various ‘values’ assigned such as true/false, known/unknown, 
etc.; metaphysics and especially ontology given the ‘values’ assigned such as real/illusory, 
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extant/not existing, etc.; ethics and morality given the traditional ‘values’ assigned such as 
good/bad/evil, right/wrong, etc.  
I have already included these three branches in my discussion of perspectivism 
elsewhere; here I add the remaining three major branches based on the evidence above: social and 
political philosophies given the ‘values’ assigned such as just/unjust, reward/punishment, etc.; 
aesthetics and its assigned ‘values’ such as art/non-art, beautiful/sublime/ugly, etc.; and finally 
also logic itself with its assigned ‘values’ such as valid/invalid, strong/weak, etc. I also wish to 
point out that given Nietzsche’s moral value scheme which includes the good, the bad, and the 
evil, and particularly given his explicit resistance to simple and simply false dualities, even the 
dichotomies I included here are not necessarily limited to a simplistic black-and-white two-value 
structure. As an additional example of how value need not be dualistic, I included the trio of 
values beautiful/sublime/ugly. Further, I suggest that even these sets of three values are not 
necessarily limited to triplets. Part of the benefit of perspectivism is that we can multiply value 
schemes theoretically infinitely, depending on our purposes and needs, and provided that those 
purposes do not conflict with the flourishing and overcoming of humanity.  
Nietzsche’s final published remark on perspective closes the first section of “Why I am 
So Wise,” the first chapter in Ecce Homo. It is easy to read this text as the grandstanding of a 
megalomaniac madman, but I think we can charitably temper that reading in some small way if 
we see it instead as a sort of how-to manual for the philosophers of the future who Nietzsche 
anticipates: how to create a person who is wise and clever or how to make oneself become as 
wise and clever, as good a writer of books, and even as much a destiny as Nietzsche believes he 
can prove to be. Nietzsche’s keen insight into decadence in particular is a matter of experience 
and experimentation with perspective, so we might be able to replicate some of his results and 
gain his insight by experiencing similar observations and experimenting with the ideas with 
which Nietzsche has experimented throughout his almost two decades of published work. 
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Nietzsche describes his mastery over decadence as history of actions wherein he has intentionally 
and unintentionally experimented with the reversals of perspectives and changes between kinds of 
perspectives, and he offers this behavior as a kind of psychological prescription:  
Looking from the perspective of the sick toward healthier concepts and values and, 
conversely, looking again from the fullness and self-assurance of a rich life down into the 
secret work of the instinct of decadence – in this I have had the longest training, my truest 
experience; if in anything, I became master in this. Now I know how, have the know-
how, to reverse perspectives: the first reason why a “revaluation of values” is perhaps 
possible for me alone. 
EH I:1, p. 679 
Hence, for the philosophers of the future, the progenitors of Übermenschen, and other 
Nietzschean types, Nietzsche prescribes looking back and forth from one kind of perspective to 
another, changing perspectives, and learning how to reverse perspective at will as the necessary 
means for the revaluation of all value. Though Nietzsche here only depicts sick and healthy, 
abundant and decadent as his interchanging perspectives, I will argue later that we can connect 
this to a variety of concern, including those concerns motivating standpoint theory and feminist 
epistemologies based on the Hegelian notion of the slave’s superior understanding of the master.  
 
§3 Defining Perspectivism and Defending Against Relativism  
 
 I will now attempt to summarize the preceding as well as to synthesize Nietzsche’s poetic 
aphorisms into something more akin to contemporary philosophical claims. Some of the phrasing 
may be slightly redundant, but I do this to maintain contiguity with the above interpretations. 
Now that we have the chronological layout, I offer a more thematic approach wherein I divide 
Nietzsche’s forty aphorisms into four connected categories of claims: truth and objectivity, the 
dogmatist’s error and other objectionable perspectives, the various types of perspective including 
broad and narrow, and some remaining instructive remarks. To begin, one of the central issues is 
truth, falsity, and the definition of objectivity: The falseness of perspective depends on the 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
297 
 
purpose for which it is employed (WS P, p. 302). Sometimes the choice of perspective is 
necessarily the only choice available (WS §138, p. 343). Value is always value for some purpose 
and should be explored from as many perspectives as possible (GM I:17, Nietzsche's fn, p. 55). 
Given certain perspectives, certain beliefs are inevitable; objectivity leads to disinterested value 
(GM II:8, p. 70). There is only perspective knowing, seeing, conceiving, willing, etc. (GM III:12, 
p. 118). The most dangerous perspective is the belief that one's actions weigh equally on the 
future as all past (GS §233, p. 212-3). Rather, we should learn multiple new perspectives (GS 
§299, p. 239), and know how to do so because creative types tend to do this and also to create 
new perspectives (GS §301, p. 241-2), and because new emotions and needs lead to new 
perspectives (BGE §201, p. 303). 
Second, the dogmatist's error is the denial of perspective in favor of objectivity, 'standing 
truth on her head' (BGE P, p. 193). The consequences of the dogmatist's error in perspective are 
dire, but redefining objectivity as a plurality of perspectives allows human flourishing and 
potential access to the only kind of objectivity worth having as humans (GS §354, p. 299-300). 
The wrong perspective leads to errors like false dichotomies as throughout metaphysics (BGE §2, 
p. 200). These false dichotomies in metaphysics lead to reject lived bodily life for imaginary 
other worlds (BGE §10, p. 206-7). Lived bodily life often requires superficial belief for survival 
and flourishing (BGE §11, p. 209). Reversals of perspective, like taking cause for effect, can be 
harmful; they can also help (revaluation) (BGE §32, p. 234). Perspective and appearance are 
necessary for life far more than a metaphysician's 'real' world (BGE §34, p. 247). And yet, the 
wrong perspectives are antithetical to life: the perspectives we teach women do them great harm 
(BGE §114, p. 275). Christianity proves its antipathy to life by its antipathy to perspective (BT 
P:5, p. 23). Because perspective is necessary for life, it is good to learn to control perspectives 
(HATH P:6, p. 9). Another objectionable perspectives is Social Darwinism a la Herbert Spencer 
(GS §373, p. 334). 
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Third, different perspectives lead to differing understandings and valuations (the 
epistemic-axiological connection) (D (§170, p. 104). For example, distance allows one to 
appreciate friends better (D §485, p. 199-200). And just as a perspective may permit certain 
beliefs, certain beliefs may permit certain perspectives (GS §357, p. 308). Not all perspectives 
provide the same understanding, and some are better than others for certain purposes (TI IX:50, p. 
555). Additionally, not all perspectives work the same way on all types of people (GS §13, p. 87). 
Eternal perspectives from Christianity gave us a distant perspective on humanity (GS §78, p. 
133). However, these eternal perspectives are strictly speaking impossible for human creatures 
(GS §143, p. 192). When we apply the way distance works on perspective to feelings, we get 
egoism (GS §162, p. 199). Broadness of perspective and distance are wiser and further removed 
from false objectivity (BGE §129, p. 277). Compulsions to narrow perspective are in a sense 
stupid but also necessary to all moral systems (BGE §188, p. 290-2). Adopting the perspectives of 
a type allows one to admire that type better (GM III:17, p. 130). Nonetheless, that adoption does 
not preclude our ability to criticize that type (GM III:28, p. 162). 
 Fourth and last, some remaining instructive remarks: perspectives are not homogenous 
and should not be homogenized (UM II:4, p. 77). The senseless displacement by homogenization 
of perspective damages human life and growth (UM II:9, p. 112), but intentional shifting 
perspective is useful unless it prevents us from acting unhistorically (UM II:9, p. 115). 
Perspectives can be and frequently tend to be optical (HATH §247, p. 117). At the same time, 
however, perspective is a very broad category including eyesight, truth, knowledge, belief, 
reality, existence, value, etc. (A §44, p. 620-1). Nietzsche’s pessimistic perspectives are still 
novel and strange, which may show the strength of one’s intellect (AOM P:7, p. 213). As self-
aware students of perspective, the old perspectives no longer bind us (GM III:16, p. 129). 
Reversing perspectives allows for the revaluation of values (EH I:1, p. 679), but the possibility of 
infinite perspectives does not necessitate deifying the unknown (GS §374, p. 336-7). 
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 From this synthesis I distill four essential claims which make up a kind of perspectival 
doctrine for value theory broadly construed: one, objectivity must be redefined as the plurality of 
perspectives; two, the previous definition of objectivity was antithetical to life and rather we must 
preserve and facilitate life, particularly the flourishing and overcoming of humanity; three, the 
value of different perspectives depends on purpose; four, the value of perspectives depends on 
their experimental viability. Thus I see these claims as four binding values which must be shown 
to be internally coherent for perspectivism to hold: redefinition of objectivity, promotion of life, 
purposive plurality, experimental viability. Finally, these values offer the fullest evidence against 
the claim that perspectivism is relativism: Nietzsche’s requirements for perspective do dictate an 
order of rank and a new determination of what ‘objective values’ can mean in the mouths of 
humans.  
 Given this new understanding of ‘truth,’ we can correlatively redefine ‘falsity’ as 
follows: claims are false which fail to meet the four values of intersubjective agreement,200 
permitting life to flourish, depending on purpose, and playful but careful experimentation. A false 
claim would thus be one which has little or no intersubjective agreement, which hinders or 
damages life, which is purposeless, and which is experimentally unviable. Claims are more false 
the more criteria they fail to fulfill, or the worse they fail a given criteria; thus a claim can be 
false which has intersubjective agreement but is totally inimical to life, or a claim may fail on 
multiple accounts, etc. Thus I believe Nietzsche can coherently use the word ‘false’ to describe 
objectionable claims from within perspectivism.  
 Given this account of perspectivism, it is difficult for me to believe that this axiology 
could fall prey to relativism. I will borrow my definition of relativism from the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Relativism, roughly put, is the view that truth and falsity, right and 
                                                          
200 This is my term for how I understand we can express Nietzsche’s new idea of a more human 
‘objectivity’ as the accumulation of a plurality of perspectives, and not a reference to Habermas or other 
notions of intersubjectivity. 
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wrong, standards of reasoning, and procedures of justification are products of differing 
conventions and frameworks of assessment and that their authority is confined to the context 
giving rise to them,” or: 
More precisely, “relativism” covers views which maintain that—at a high level of 
abstraction—at least some class of things have the properties they have (e.g., beautiful, 
morally good, epistemically justified) not simpliciter, but only relative to a given 
framework of assessment (e.g., local cultural norms, individual standards), and 
correspondingly, that the truth of claims attributing these properties holds only once the 
relevant framework of assessment is specified or supplied. Relativists characteristically 
insist, furthermore, that if something is only relatively so, then there can be no framework-
independent vantage point from which the matter of whether the thing in question is so can 
be established.201 
 
Thus I take the criteria of broadly axiological relativism to be that 1) values are products of 
different frameworks of assessment and 2) the authority of these values is confined to their 
context. These values may include truth, beauty, reality, rightness, etc. Thus the objects of which 
these values are properties only have these values relative to their given framework of 
assessment, and there is no framework-independent means of establishing those values. This 
definition of relativism thus does imply the claim that values are real, extant things, but limits 
their existence to specific contexts. To put it another way: value is real and value is context-
dependent. Relativism can be construed as a denial of absolutism, objectivism, monism, and/or 
realism; that is to say, the context-dependence of value may be set up in opposition to the 
universality and ahistoricity of value, or to the mental independence of value, or to the reduction 
of correctness of evaluation to a single option, or to the existence of value where existence 
requires objectivity or monism.  
 I have already argued that Nietzsche does not intend perspectivism to be relative, but 
intentions often pave the way to deleterious effects. It is quite possible that the criteria I have 
                                                          
201 Baghramian, Maria and Carter, Adam, "Relativism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2015), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/relativism/>. 
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recovered (redefinition of objectivity as intersubjective, promotion of life, purposive plurality, 
experimental viability) might fail to save perspectivism from relativism despite my arguments to 
the contrary. However, the fact that from within perspectivism Nietzsche attempts to make some 
substantive normative epistemic claims, especially regarding the value of deceptions and the 
creation of new values, I am more confident that perspectivism cannot or at least should not be 
relativist. 
 By contrast, Danto and other of Nietzsche’s commentators who describe perspectivism as 
relativism often conflate nihilism with relativism, that is, they conflate the claim that there is no 
value with the claim that value (exists and) is relative. Given the fourth opposition to relativism – 
realism – it is perhaps understandable that some philosophers confuse relativism and nihilism. 
Further, given Nietzsche’s infamous statement in the Nachlass that “there are no facts, only 
interpretations,” elsewhere published as “there are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral 
interpretation of phenomena” (BGE §108, p. 275), it is also perhaps understandable that some 
commentators take Nietzsche to be nihilistic about the truth. However, the denial of reality is not 
the same as saying what is real is not objective or monistic, and a deflationary metaphysical claim 
is not the same thing as a substantive dismissal of an idea. Further, the denial of facts, especially 
so-called objective facts about evaluative phenomena, is not the denial of all kinds of truth.202 
Thus, Danto and others who define perspectivism as hybridized relativism-nihilism are not only 
wrong about their definition of perspectivism, but they are wrong about how they understand 
relativism in the first place. Philosophical rigor requires that we make clear distinctions between 
our definitions, and in this respect many of Nietzsche’s commentators have failed to be rigorous. 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism cannot be axiological relativism if we define it on the basis of nihilist 
denials of the existence of truth.  
                                                          
202 I was inspired to this difference by a pronouncement from the poet Robert Graves: “Fact is not truth, but 
a poet who willfully defies fact cannot achieve truth.” See p. 224 of The White Goddess (Noonday Press: 
1948). Additionally, I found this inspiration reinforced by a science fiction character written by Anne 
McCaffrey: “Fact is not the only truth.” See p. 159 of All the Weyrs of Pern (Del Rey: 1997). 
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If perspective does depend on the individual in any way, it is because knowledge in some 
way does seem to be connected to perception. Because perception is relative to the individual and 
the way the individual conceptualizes within the social constructions of their society, it is 
important that we do not merely define perspectivism as “the truth depends on perceptions” 
alone. Further, and more importantly, I believe my definition of Nietzsche’s perspectivism avoids 
relativism without falling into nihilism either. The last two criteria may not be much use in this 
regard. First, purposiveness of perspective might not avoid relativism, though it does avoid 
nihilism. When value is dependent in anyway on the purpose of an individual or group, this still 
presumes the existence of that value. Second, experimental viability does not seem to avoid either 
relativism or nihilism in all cases; conditions can vary such that what works in one experiment 
may fail in another experiment and hence viability may be strictly relative to specific conditions. 
Likewise, depending on the kind of experiment, in particular if one is performing a thought 
experiment, one may be experimenting with objects which do not physically exist, such as 
unicorns or empty sets and hence viability may not be a preventative against nihilism or the lack 
of existence. 
 However, I find that intersubjective agreement and promotion of life both help 
perspectivism avoid lapsing into either relativism or nihilism. Intersubjective agreement in its 
pluralist redefinition of objectivity is a fail-safe which acts as a preventative: against nihilism, 
perspectivism does assert the reality of value, provided that the value has intersubjective 
agreement; against relativism, perspectivism asserts the independence of context through the 
agreement of increasingly more subjectivities. If a value is dependent on intersubjective 
agreement, then it cannot be merely context-dependent (though it may be contextually generated), 
for the more subjectivities in agreement on the value, the truer the value can be. A value is 
maximally true when all subjectivities are in agreement, and though this maximal truth may in 
practice be unattainable at the moment, theoretically it is not necessarily impossible. As for the 
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promotion of life, such a criteria has as its objects what fills most of our existence: living beings, 
especially humans. Thus the promotion of life is a criteria which also prevents nihilism. By the 
same token, I argue that promoting life is a criteria which prevents relativism because while the 
particulars of what allows an individual to survive and flourish might be context-dependent, the 
promotion of life itself is not and cannot be context-dependent. It is not and cannot be context-
dependent because life and the promotion thereof are prerequisite for value: without living beings 
there can be no value at all.  
 The core motivation for perspectivism as I see it is the rejection of the sensibility and 
desirability of the modern understanding of epistemic objectivity in any kind of evaluation. Other 
philosophers have addressed this as a problem concerning the relationship between our epistemic 
judgments and our beliefs concerning metaphysics. As Gideon Rosen points out, “however 
interesting the contrast between the causally or explanatorily potent features of the world and the 
rest may be for epistemology, it seems to have no intrinsic connection between the metaphysical 
contrast between that which exists independently of us and that which does not” (Rosen, 313). 
Thus, whether an evaluation is true is a question wholly independent of whether or not the 
evaluation depends on an individual. In other words, it is meaningless to consider objectivity as a 
matter of independence from humans, cultures, or individuals. Such an objectivity would have no 
use for us in the sense that it could not possibly contribute to human flourishing. This is not 
relativism, however, for precisely the reason that we are motivated by what can promote life and 
human flourishing from a plurality of perspectives which intersubjectively agree, are purposive, 
and are experimentally viable. 
 The arguments against relativism typically include: the claim that relativism entails that 
the majority in any given context is infallible; the claim that relativism precludes the possibilities 
of inter-societal comparisons, social development or progression, and the resolution of inter-
societal disagreements; and the claim that relativism can lead to undesirable consequences. Each 
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consequence is of especial importance for feminism, which seeks to avoid ethnocentrism but 
cannot risk relativism either. First, feminism needs a means to argue against majority rule, for 
often times the political majority has oppressed women throughout history and round the globe. 
Second, feminism needs a means of comparing different societies, arguing for concrete social 
development, and resolving inter-societal disagreements, for without a means for comparison and 
judgment, feminists have no recourse to argue against social practices like excision or to claim 
that a world where women have the same rights as men is better than a world without. Third, 
feminism seeks to avoid the undesirable consequences relativism permits, such as slavery and 
patriarchal hegemony, for a relativist simply has to accept that slavery and patriarchal hegemony 
are ‘right’ in other cultures than our own while a feminist wants to be able to say that slavery and 
patriarchal hegemony are always wrong. 
 However, perspectivism is not susceptible to these arguments against relativism and 
provides the axiological means feminism requires. First, with regards to majority rule, 
perspectivism reveals that the ‘political’ majority is not the perspectival majority, and shows that 
even if most or all people believe something to be true or just, it can still be false or unjust if it is 
inimical to life, lacking in purpose, or experimentally unviable. Excision may be purposive and 
accepted by the majority in a limited group, but more perspectives reveal the harm of excision 
and other cultures prove excision to be experimentally unviable. In this way, perspectivism unites 
the valuable insights from relativism, naturalism, and pragmatism while using each as a fail-safe 
against the flaws of the others. Second, with regards to inter-societal comparisons, social 
development, and inter-societal disagreement, perspectivism reveals multiple means for giving 
ground to these kinds of arguments beyond what is simply accepted by the cultures and societies 
themselves. In this way, feminists can claim that patriarchal hegemony is unjust and regressive 
through the comparison of multiple perspectives. Third, with regards to undesirable 
consequences, perspectivism allows us to increasingly correct our understanding of the world as 
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we multiply perspectives, and hence we can through the accumulation of perspectives determine 
reasons why for example slavery is wrong in every circumstance, even if it does allow a given 
society to flourish for a time. Thus Nietzsche can make claims that great civilizations have always 
predicated their greatness on slavery, and it can also be true that regardless of this fact, slavery 
was wrong in each case despite its ostensible purposiveness because adding the perspectives of 
the slaves reveals the harms of slavery and its lack of intersubjective agreement; additionally, 
slavery is shown historically to be experimentally unviable: every civilization dependent on 
slavery either has collapsed or has had to abolish slavery to continue to survive. Maximally true 
claims fulfill all the criteria of perspectivism, not just one or two, and the lack of fulfillment of 
any given criteria requires a re-evaluation of the truth of a claim. Thus we have recourse to argue 
against the relativist and the nihilist both, and can provide a much stronger defense of 
perspectivism. 
 
§4 The Problem of Optics and Other Metaphors 
 
Zarathustra remarks in “On Redemption” how he has seen many who have lost body 
parts like an eye, ear, or leg, but that he has also seen what is worse: “human beings who are 
nothing but a big eye or a big mouth or a big belly…Inverse cripples I call them,” or creatures 
“who had too little of everything and too much of one thing” (TSZ II:20, p. 137-8). Zarathustra 
describes an encounter with a genius who happened to be “An ear as big as a man!” with a “little 
bloated soul…dangling from the stalk” that held up the ear (TSZ II:20, p. 138). I suspect this 
giant ear with a little bloated soul might well be Wagner; regardless, we have one of Nietzsche’s 
tools of criticism within perspectivism: overspecialization, or narrowness of perspective. A 
problem for perspectivism from within thus might be the narrowness of perspective with which 
Nietzsche or his commentators focus on the optical metaphor or, to put it figuratively, 
perspectivism runs the risk of being a doctrine which is little more than a giant eye walking 
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around with only the tiniest bloated soul dangling from its stalk. Though Nietzsche himself 
explicitly states the broadness of his category of perspective as including eyesight, truth, 
knowledge, belief, reality, existence, value, etc. (e.g., A §44, p. 620-1), his commentators cannot 
resist the allure of the metaphor, and Nietzsche himself makes use of it extensively. Thus, we 
must address the problems with optics as a metaphor. I will focus in this section on the problems 
with the optical metaphor, and use the next section to focus on the problems with the feminine 
metaphor. 
One of the problems with metaphors generally is that they can be both too broad and too 
narrow to capture the intended meaning. In this way, the problem with the optical metaphor is 
that it requires an analogy between knowing and sight, which artificially limits knowledge to 
seeing and imagery while artificially expanding the limits of knowledge to include all things seen 
or otherwise perceived. However, Nietzsche is a poetical author; metaphor is his preferred 
method of argumentative analogy. We must then ask whether perception a better analogy for 
knowing than other processes or faculties. If a better analogy exists, perspectivism might benefit 
from a change in perspective. We might also find the metaphor to be inappropriate to the context 
of human knowledge: after all, blind and visually impaired humans are still capable of 
knowledge. Given this I expand the metaphor to perception: with apologies to Bishop Berkeley, 
esse may not be percipi aut percipere, but scire may well be. To translate: while ‘being’ or 
existence may not mean ‘perceiving or being perceived,’ it is possible that ‘knowing’ means 
‘perceiving or being perceived.’  
 Another problem with the metaphor is that it perhaps falls into Nietzsche’s identified 
error of having ‘faith in grammar’: we must ask why does knowledge requires a knower. In other 
words, ‘knowing’ might be the kind of event that occurs in living beings, an event without a 
subject as we have previously understood. For example, an event with no subject might be a 
thunderstorm: the weather ‘storms’ without there being a subjective entity doing the storming. 
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Likewise, despite our experience as subjective beings experiencing learning, believing, and 
knowing, we might be operating under some sort of illusion based on linguistic structures like 
grammar. It could be the case that like the thunderstorm, we are knowing without being the kinds 
of subjective entities we think we are doing the knowing. The fact that this metaphor is difficult 
to comprehend as an apparently subjective entity is not necessarily an argument against it, but I 
confess I have no solution at this time. 
 Additionally, we might question the fact that it is a metaphor in the first place as being 
too figurative, obscure, vague, or ambiguous to provide a coherent argument against or in favor of 
anything at all. However, I think this last concern is the least of our concerns; in one sense, this 
problem applies to any argument in natural language, and is not therefore a problem with 
perspectivism which puts it at a disadvantage to any other axiological doctrine. If language is 
metaphor, this is not a problem with perspectivism or with Nietzsche’s philosophy generally, or 
with the metaphors of optics and women.  
  Remaining questions include whether there is a difference between sensory perspectives 
and ‘cognitive’ or ‘intellectual’ perspectives, and whether or not cognition and perception are 
sufficiently analogous for perspectivism to hold. Optics is too narrow a category to encompass all 
perception, but the broadness and multiplicity of sensory perception overall might be sufficient to 
do the work that we want. To go yet further: if someone were completely deprived of all 
perception from conception or birth or whenever perception would usually begin, if such a 
‘person’ were even conceivable, we must ask whether and how such a person could know 
anything. In a way this is a question of developmental psychology: How can there be a self 
without the other? An existentialist, or a proto-existentialist like Nietzsche, might answer that 
without perception there can be no ‘other’ and hence can be no ‘self,’ and hence there can be no 
knower and no knowing. 
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 R. Lanier Anderson raises several problems for the optical metaphor. First, there are no 
laws of cognitive optics the way there are laws of physical optics, so cognitive perspectives are 
not compatible with each other in the way visual perspectives are (Anderson, p. 4).  Second, 
Anderson finds the optical analogy too narrow, and argues that it is better to reframe perspective 
as a matter of interpretation involving both an object and an interpreter. Other commentators 
agree that interpretation is tied to perspective in a meaningful way; Christoph Cox defines 
“perspective” as an evaluation made possible and caused by the operation of a particular affective 
interpretation (Cox, p. 112).203   
 In response to Anderson’s first criticism, I argue instead that just because we lack a set of 
laws for cognitive optics does not mean that such laws do not exist. Though psychology is a 
discipline only a few hundred years old, we have already determined some principles which 
appear to drive human behavior in law-like ways. also he presupposes that all visual perspectives 
are compatible which they need not be In response to Anderson’s second criticism, I argue that 
Anderson’s metaphor requires a Kantian thing-in-itself type of cognitive ‘object’ metaphorical to 
the visual object, and a grammatically assumed ‘subject’ doing the interpretation, both of which 
Nietzsche would find objectionable. Further, I agree with Cox who says that sensory perception 
and interpretation are “inseparable activities” (Cox, p. 98); thus Anderson’s reframing of optics as 
interpretation does not get us out of the difficulty we encounter with the limitations on 
Nietzsche’s metaphor..  
 As for the issue of relativism, I believe my most convincing argument is as follows: 
Nietzsche builds in a self-correcting control against relativism in the form of intersubjectivity and 
the multiperspectival redefinition of objectivity. As human beings and ‘knowing’ entities, we are 
creatures of perception (or interpretation, or whatever metaphor works best), and perception is 
relative to our idiosyncratic bodies and to our cultural umbrellas of cognitive structures. 
                                                          
203 I decline to use Cox’s discussion of Heidegger’s horizons, as Heidegger is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
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However, we correct for this relativity by checking our perceptions with each other, and 
employing intersubjectivity or the plurality of perspectives to determine how ‘objective’ our 
perceptions are. The more perspectives we employ, the closer we can get to a more perfect 
‘objectivity’ in our self-correction. Hence we can account for individual hallucinations, 
groupthink, and other internally coherent but intersubjectively/objectively false beliefs as existing 
in a bubble with an insufficient number of perspectives or insufficient number of kinds of 
perspectives for self-correction.  
 These are not the only problems with optics as a metaphor for perspectivism and 
perspectival truth, but they do seem to be the predominant issues in the literature. However, I do 
not believe these problems are so troubling. Ultimately many of these objections against “optics 
as metaphor” are merely objections against metaphors in philosophical argument: metaphors are 
too imprecise and lacking in rigor to do the work many philosophers need or prefer to do. 
However, this is not the kind of philosophy Nietzsche needs or prefers to do, and so I do not feel 
these objections hold much force. Metaphor is an important tool for Nietzsche precisely because 
of its imprecision and lack of rigor; after all, he would levy these objections against most of if not 
all of human language. The point is to try and forge new metaphors and to use old metaphors in 
new and interesting ways, to experiment and see what generates the best conditions for human 
flourishing in changing times and conditions.  
  
§5 Truth as a Woman, the Sexual Metaphor, and the Veiled Figure at Saïs 
 
 We must also address Nietzsche’s feminine metaphor for truth as a woman because 
women and optics serve as dual metaphors connected to truth, objectivity, and perspective 
throughout the corpus of Nietzsche’s published work. I argued in the last section that metaphors 
are too broad and too narrow to capture the intended meaning with regards to perspectivism and 
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optics. Likewise, a problem with the feminine or sexual metaphor is that it requires an analogy 
between truth and woman, which is also both too broad and too narrow a metaphor in that it 
artificially limits truth to definitions of femininity and artificially expands truth to include all 
definitions and experiences of femininity.  
 I initially raise the problem of using women and things associated with women, like 
pregnancy, as metaphor in Chapter Three, in relation to Birth of Tragedy §8. What I now want to 
explore is whether it is always sexist to use or appropriate women as a metaphor for anything. If 
is sometimes acceptable in the sense of not being misogynistic, then it could be the case that, for 
example, Nietzsche’s remarks about Truth’s veiled pudenda are not inherently vulgar statements 
about biological sexuality. I would be more inclined to suspect that Nietzsche falls into the trap of 
complementary sexism by elevating women metaphorically as goddesses like Truth, Life, 
Wisdom, etc., but on the contrary I also feel that goddess-worship is consistent with his 
appreciation for the ancient peoples and their pluralistic pantheons.  
 Another problem is how we are supposed to be able to tell when Nietzsche is referring to 
women as metaphors and when as people. Sometimes he is happily explicit for us: using 
metaphors like Wisdom or Life as goddesses versus discussing the effects a human woman like 
Georges Sand has had on the literary world. However, there are times when he seems to shift 
from speaking in a metaphorical mode to speaking in a more literal mode or vice versa, and these 
occasions in particular seem to present problems for exegesis. If Nietzsche blurs the boundaries 
between metaphorical and literal women, then he makes difficult determining whether he directs 
his apparent insult at a real woman or whether he directs his apparent insult at the metaphor. Not 
all insults against a woman are necessarily misogynistic just for the sake of being insults against a 
person who happens to be a woman, and by the same token insults against a metaphorical woman 
rather than an actual woman would not by any means be automatically non-misogynistic just for 
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the sake of being insults against metaphorical women or womanhood rather than against a human 
woman.  
 However, we cannot simply dismiss these concerns out of hand. Metaphors are 
significant not only for Nietzsche but for human communication in general. They can serve as 
frames of reference, models for behavior or understanding, speculations, constraints and 
prescriptions, as well as explanations (Haste, p. 43-47):  
Metaphors are not just peripheral linguistic frills. They provide analogies, models for 
explanation, and therefore facilitate innovative thought…Metaphor is a rhetorical 
process, and an important insight from rhetoric is that in every communication there are 
things that are taken for granted and things that are problematic. If something is taken for 
granted, it lends itself to shorthand expression and needs neither elaboration nor 
advocacy. What is problematic, however, must be explained and justified. Changing 
social values or deep-seated beliefs requires challenging what is taken for granted to 
make it problematic in new ways. 
 Haste, p. x (“Preface”) 
If Nietzsche’s use of the sexual metaphor is conventional shorthand for the stereotypes and biases 
of his contemporaries, then it is uninteresting standard-grade misogyny. However, I believe I 
have demonstrated in my third chapter that Nietzsche’s use of these feminine and sexual 
metaphors is anything but conventional derogation of women. Thus I claim that Nietzsche instead 
is doing what Helen Haste argued feminism did in the twentieth century, that Nietzsche 
challenges and is concerned with making problematic what his contemporaries took for granted 
about gender.  
 In particular I wish to address Kelly Oliver’s argument that Nietzsche’s use of woman as 
a trope demonstrates a reappropriation of the feminine for and by masculine and masculinist 
philosophers while at the same time rejecting any objective femininity or objective truth, and 
most importantly her identification of feminism as congruent with the kind of truth Nietzsche 
rejects. Given that Nietzsche identifies ‘feminism’ as he explicitly refers to it as ‘idealism’ and 
hence as a kind of dogmatism, I do not think he is engaging in the kind of malicious appropriation 
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Oliver claims. Further, because Nietzsche redefines rather than rejects objectivity, I do not think 
Oliver is right to say that Nietzsche rejects ‘truth’ or ‘femininity.’ Rather, Nietzsche offers a 
redefinition of truth and hence also femininity, which permits and even requires the diverse 
plurality of views so valuable to feminism. Finally, Nietzsche repeatedly describes himself as 
having feminine instincts, qualities, abilities, etc., so we must acknowledge the way he aligns 
himself with femininity under a different aegis.  
 Further, Nietzsche’s sustained resistance to dualism plays out in the multitudinous roles 
he assigns women in his pantheon, and the ways in which they break out of sexual dualism in 
particular. To list around a dozen he names explicitly would include Wisdom, Life, Number, 
Truth, Zarathustra’s Stillest Hour, Happiness, Eternity, Philosophy, various Great Problems, 
Reason, Victory, Poetry, and Charm. Compare these with the primary metaphors of sexual 
dualism, otherness, hierarchy, and polarity: light-dark, public-private, rational-intuitive, order-
chaos, active-passive, thinking-feeling, higher-lower (see Haste, p. 3). Given that sexual dualism 
had come into vogue and displaced sexual monism (where ‘male’ was the only sex) during 
Nietzsche’s time, and given Nietzsche’s various disruptions of this and other dualisms, we must 
read Nietzsche as engaged with challenging the taken-for-granted assumptions built into sexual 
dualism which was championed by the Wilhelmine feminists and misogynists alike.  
 Further evidence comes with Nietzsche’s equation of Truth, Wisdom, and Reason with 
feminine entities; by making this equation, Nietzsche upsets the traditional treatment of 
rationality as essentially masculine. Some feminists (including Haste, p. 33) see the critique of 
reason as solely masculine in nature as central to the feminist enterprise. In this regard, by calling 
Reason a woman, Nietzsche again proves himself to at least be trying to disrupt sexual dualism. 
Another concern is Nietzsche’s reliance on the relationship between women and nature as part of 
his metaphorical environment. However, the woman-nature relation only becomes problematic 
when it is used to oppress women, typically by enforcing the status quo as ‘natural’ (Haste, p. 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
313 
 
61). On the contrary, Nietzsche makes arguments that the status quo is unacceptable, with regards 
to men, men’s education about women, and women as well. Nietzsche finds especially deplorable 
the state of women’s education concerning sex, as we saw in The Gay Science, and appears to 
reject enforced chastity for healthy sexual fulfillment. Even Carol Diethe, Nietzsche’s strongest 
detractor, recognizes this, as I pointed out in Chapter 1. Note also that Nietzsche does not appear 
to be under the false impression that woman’s sexual power leads to political power the way 
misogynists from antiquity into the modern day like to insinuate (see Haste, p. 171), for as we 
have seen he points out multiple ways in which women are oppressed politically; this is true 
despite the fact that he is against women’s suffrage, but then he was generally against voting 
anyway. Nietzsche was anti-democratic, which I think is sufficient reason for him to be against 
anyone’s suffrage without necessarily lapsing into being regressive, reactive, defensive, or 
otherwise repressive. Democracy is imperfect: it does fail in that it opens government power to 
those who proselytize lifestyles founded on bigotry, willful ignorance, intolerance, and otherwise 





§6 Standing Truth on Her Head: Reversing Perspectives 
 
 Nietzsche often claims that the correct perspective is a reversal of whatever perspective 
seems common in each given context. Thus Nietzsche reverses cause and effect frequently, 
showing that what we purport to be the cause is actually the effect and vice versa. Given my 
initial defense of perspectivism above, we can see how Nietzsche’s perspectival definition of 
truth allows him to engage in these reversals. I wish to demonstrate now how such reversals are 
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of inestimable value to contemporary feminism, particularly standpoint theory and other feminist 
epistemologies, as well as other feminist axiologies more generally. 
 In particular I believe perspectivism, and especially the claim that we must learn to 
control perspectives and learn to become more ‘objective’ by experimenting with perspective, 
contributes to feminism in the following ways: first, reversals of perspective provide a tool for 
feminists to question and challenge the privileged perspectives of entrenched white masculine 
discourses; second, reversals of perspective provide a tool for feminists to introduce new modes 
of valuation which are not merely reactionary but considered analytical responses to existing 
value schemes; third, reversals of perspective provide a tool for feminists to act intentionally and 
hence to avoid slave morality and its unintentionally reactionary reversal which merely posits the 
opposite of the master morality, as Conway argues occurs in Harding’s standpoint epistemology 
(Conway, p. 274). 
 First, I see perspectivism as a tool for questioning and challenging privilege. Nietzsche 
frequently uses ‘noble’ in a positive sense, and comes off as extraordinarily elitist. Though elitism 
may be endemic to philosophy, this does not excuse Nietzsche from the idiosyncrasy at best and 
intellectual violence at worst. However, it is his ability to reverse perspective which allows him to 
challenge the established tables of values and modes of valuation in his own time; without 
perspectivism, Nietzsche could not be so scathingly critical of Christianity, Kantianism, or 
Platonism, all established dogmas which privileged white men of property. We also see that he 
uses these reversals to challenge misogyny and the mistreatment of women in multiple places. 
 Next, I see perspectivism as a tool for creating new tables of values and modes of 
valuation. First, perspectivism is a value creator’s tool because perspectivism permits reversals 
and other changes in perspective. These reversals and other changes like tinting, shading, etc. 
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Second, perspectivism is a tool for value-creation because perspectivism requires a plurality of 
experiences and points of view with regards to any given concept. The more ways we learn to 
understand a concept, the more ways we can see how value can apply to that concept and related 
concepts. Third, perspectivism is a value-creation tool because perspectivism requires us to avoid 
caprice. Capriciousness theoretically could create new value, but only accidentally; non-
accidental creation requires perspective knowing, not mere relative belief.  
 Last, I see perspectivism as a tool for avoiding slave valuation and mere reaction in favor 
of intentional action. That we can reverse perspective does not always dictate that we should 
reverse perspectives, whether on gender or other concepts. Perspectivism requires that our 
reverses be purposeful and consciously chosen where possible, and that we should gather as many 
perspectives as possible in our continuous process of re-valuation. Slave axiology is defined by 
its knee-jerk reactionary response, and makes the dogmatic error of belief in an eternal afterworld 
of ‘being’ which is superior to the changing world of ‘becoming.’ I believe Nietzsche would 
agree that we have never ‘arrived’ at any final conclusion because humans exist as creatures of 




One of the questions which plagues philosophers concerned with perspectivism is 
whether and how Nietzsche can claim that his doctrine of perspectivism is a true doctrine. Now 
that I have provided all forty of Nietzsche’s remarks on perspectivism and what claims this 
doctrine appears to entail, I will in a future work seek to show that perspectivism is ‘true’ in the 
perspectival sense of ‘truth’ and thus internally coherent. Other concerns for the viability of 
perspectivism include: Nietzsche’s criteria of the promotion of life, which he does not appear to 
clearly define; a coherent and contextual definition of nature and the natural, also not provided 
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explicitly by Nietzsche but perhaps in large part based on the literary culture of the nineteenth 
century; and, given that so much of what Nietzsche writes is polemical rhetoric rather than 
argumentative, the rational reconstruction of the mutual relationships between the plurality of 
perspectives Nietzsche employs which ought to reveal what a priori moral assumptions Nietzsche 
makes in his table of values.  
To conclude this chapter on perspectivism, and how it relates to Nietzsche’s remarks 
about women, I offer one final set of considerations: Truth is an ideal. ‘Woman’ is also an ideal. 
Ideals are valuations. Perspectivism dictates the necessity of a plurality of valuations. Therefore 
perspectivism implies that we should pluralize our ideals/valuations of women (and truth) to be 
more inclusive of more perspectives, different perspectives, more eyes, different eyes. This 
strikes me as eminently feminist in a contemporary sense. However, this kind of perspectivist 
argument in favor of pluralism is directly counter to Wilhelmine feminism and similar feminisms 
which tend to objectivism, dualism, and essentialism. Thus Nietzsche would not respond to all 
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Chapter 5: Not Forgetting the Whip: What Perspectivism Entails for 
Feminist Theory 
   
  §1 Introduction 
§2  Distinguishing Perspectivism from Pragmatism and Standpoint Theory 
  §3 Distinguishing Misogyny from Anti-Wilhelmine Feminism 
  §4 What Perspectivism and Contemporary Feminism Offer Each Other 




 I will take this concluding chapter to tie up some loose ends remaining from the extensive 
discussion in the preceding chapters. First, it remains to be seen how perspectivism as I define it 
differs from other leading value theories in philosophy broadly and feminism more specifically; 
in particular, I must distinguish perspectivism from pragmatism and standpoint theory. 
Pragmatism and standpoint theory both differ in that they offer different means for ranking values 
than perspectivism offers. Further, I wish to offer some final considerations to the argument that 
Nietzsche’s rejection of Wilhelmine feminism is distinct from misogynist arguments against 
feminism and consistent with what I believe is his attempt to represent himself as an anti-
misogynist to the best of his ability. I believe Nietzsche would have found contemporary 
feminism far more palatable than the feminism of his own time. 
I would additionally like to explicitly address what perspectivism and feminism provide 
for each other working together rather than considered wholly unrelated. This is partially in 
response to those who suggest it is sufficient to consider each alone, or that feminism is a tertiary 
concern to perspectivism, and partially in response to those who argue that Nietzsche has no place 
in feminist theory. Lastly, I will offer some suggestions for future avenues of research which I 
feel are necessary supplements to the work I have done in this dissertation. I do this because 
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contemporary feminism requires intersectional study of gender and the social problems connected 
to it. Hence a twenty-first century feminist study of any subject is not fully engaged until we 
considered the intersections of race, class, ability, sexuality, and all of the other socially 
constructed categories affecting the lived human condition.  
 
§2  Distinguishing Perspectivism from Pragmatism and Standpoint Theory 
 
In this section I seek to distinguish perspectivism from other axiological and 
epistemological theories, particularly pragmatism and standpoint theory. We must look at 
pragmatism because several times over the course of researching for and writing this dissertation 
my initial (and more glib) definitions of perspectivism led people to ask about the difference 
between it and pragmatic theories of truth. I have already established the many reasons 
perspectivism is not nihilism, primarily because perspectivism does not wholly deny meaning or 
truth, and the many reasons perspectivism is not relativism, primarily because perspectivism does 
not leave all truths as equal to each other in value.  
Pragmatism is different from both nihilism and relativism in a superficially similar way 
to perspectivism: it neither denies the existence of value nor the possibility (even necessity) of 
ranking values. Likewise, we must look at standpoint theory because it has a similar set of 
superficial similarities to perspectivism, neither denying value or the possible rank thereof, and 
some commentators have tried to tie perspectivism to standpoint theory explicitly. However, 
neither pragmatism nor standpoint theory fully parallel the specific requirements perspectivism 
posits for defining truth and value as the new multiperspectival ‘objectivity’ and as such must be 
distinguished from perspectivism proper, though they may prove to be useful instruments in the 
perspectivist’s toolbox. 
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Pragmatists tend to define knowledge, truth, value, etc. on the basis of what can make 
differences in lived experience. For my general definition of a pragmatic concept of truth, I refer 
to the lecture William James gave on the Schiller-Dewey view, “Pragmatism’s Conception of 
Truth.” James poses several questions which reveal the tendency of pragmatists to rely on what 
makes differences in lived experience, saying that pragmatism: 
…asks its usual question. “Grant an idea or belief to be true,’ it says, “what concrete 
difference will its being true make in any one’s actual life? How will the truth be 
realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief 
were false? What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?” 
James, p. 88 
These questions lead James to define truth pragmatically as follows: “True ideas are those that 
we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we can not. That 
is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, 
for it is all that truth is known-as” (James, p. 88-9). Thus the pragmatic view of truth is that truth 
depends wholly on what can be experienced, and what can cause one experience to be different 
from another experience. James offers one essential criteria for truth, which he interchangeably 
discusses as usefulness or verifiability.  
 Given my four criteria for perspectival truth and other values, namely the redefinition of 
objectivity, promotion of life, purposive plurality, and experimental viability, I see that there is 
some overlap between pragmatic truths and perspectival truths. Useful and verifiable truths will 
tend to promote life in at least some cases, though Nietzsche is very clear that sometimes the 
contradictory – and hence perhaps what is not useful or verifiable – is what promotes life in many 
cases. Further, useful and verifiable truths are going to tend to have experimental viability, but I 
suggest on the basis of Nietzsche’s taste for contradictions that some contradictory perspectival 
‘truths’ are going to be experimentally viable as well. Thus perspectivism may include 
pragmatism both with and without any contradictions, but is not limited to pragmatism alone. 
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As an example of a contradictory perspectival truth which is nonetheless experimentally 
viable, I would suggest considering religious experiences derived from entheogens. Many 
cultures and religions have employed the use of dangerous natural poisons to induce experiences 
of the divine. The contradiction lies in the idea that one can approach something pure and holy by 
introducing deadly toxins into the body; and yet, so many religions are in part connected to or 
based on this contradiction. Zoroaster had his bath in haoma water, Indra and Agni consume 
soma, alcohol and especially wine figures prominently in ancient Dionysian, Osirian, Jewish, and 
Christian religions; examples from the ancient and the contemporary world abound, whether in 
revivals of old religions, continuations of indigenous traditions, or syncretic ‘new age’ religious 
invention. For further examples of contradictions which are nonetheless perspectival truths, note 
the few “Nothlügen” or “necessary lies” Nietzsche explicitly references in UM II:10 and HATH 
40 and 104, and consider also his many discussions of opposites (see ‘gegensatz’ in the index).  
Standpoint theory derives from the ideas in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic and Marxist 
accounts of social relations (Conway, p. 260 fn. 11, citing multiple sources from Harding 1986, 
Ch. 7). In particular, Harding’s account of feminist standpoint theory perpetuates a slave revolt in 
epistemology, because it treats the ‘slave’ perspectives epistemically privileged and more 
‘objective’ than ‘master’ perspectives, as Conway has already demonstrated at length (see p. 266-
277). Standpoint theory values a reactionary rather than creative-experimental value system, 
which is counter to the fourth criteria of experimental viability and the second criteria of 
purposive plurality. Crucially, because Hegel’s master-slave dialectic is a false dichotomy with 
regard to perspective, standpoint theory carries over the same fallacious dualism. 
Consider: the slave has no more a complete panoptic view of the world than the master; 
he has merely learned to see the world in two ways, which is only one additional way to the way 
the master can see the world. This is dualism, not pluralism. For Nietzsche’s perspectivism to be 
consistent with standpoint theory, the slave would have to learn to control his perspectives and 
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multiply them further, not merely or solely invert the value scheme provided by the singular 
perspective of the master. Inversion is a necessary first step, but it cannot be the end game. Going 
beyond the revolt to build a new table of values is ultimately what Nietzsche is arguing must be 
necessary for the health of those who survive the revolution in value, in order to continue thriving 
in a new world.  
 
 
§3 Distinguishing Misogyny from Anti-Wilhelmine Feminism 
 
The criticism of feminism is not equivalent to the hatred of women. Indeed, many 
feminists themselves engage in critiques of their own feminisms and the feminisms of others. An 
intersectionally-oriented contemporary feminist will have at minimum one doctrine in common 
with Nietzsche: the rejection of gender essentialism and dualism as seen in Wilhelmine feminism 
and other essentialist/dualist feminisms. Critiquing essentialism and dualism are at the heart of 
many contemporary feminist critiques of past feminists. However, this is a minimum 
requirement, and we must establish a more robust connection here; not all misogynists need be 
dualists or essentialists. It is at least theoretically possible for a misogynist to recognize the 
plurality of gender and to understand the nature of the social construction of gender and to still 
maintain conventional sexism such as veneration of apparently chaste or religious women at the 
expense of less ‘pure’ women, or the preference for the dominance of men in society on non-
biological grounds, just as a few examples.  
In particular, I argue that Nietzsche’s philosophy is connected to the kind of feminism 
which rejects gender essentialism and dualism as well as the politics of Wilhelmine feminists, 
misogynists, and those like them throughout history who sought primarily to improve women’s 
qualities and conditions as wives and mothers rather than as persons or humans with particular 
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wants and needs, and thus both to generalize women categorically as wives and mothers and to 
keep women submissive to male dominance. I do not argue here that it is misogynist or otherwise 
harmful to improve the conditions of married women or women who have children, for that 
seems patently false prima facie; I do however claim that focusing on the state of women in these 
positions to the exclusion of all other women is misogynist and harmful precisely because it 
reduces female human beings to a mere fraction of their personhood and potential lived 
experience.  
It is possible to value human reproduction, socialization, romantic and sexual coupling, 
etc., without making these the exclusive or primary domain of women as has been the historical 
trend in Western society. That Nietzsche grants women their sexuality rather than denying it like 
his Victorian peers, that he even discusses women in other roles beyond marriage and 
motherhood, such as scholars and artists, and that he sympathizes with the plight of their bad 
sexual education I take to be counter-evidence to the claims that Nietzsche prefers to keep women 
subservient and locked into their traditional roles. Rather, Nietzsche’s use of metaphor and 
multiplicity in his expressions about women and femininity allow him to break the traditional 
labels, roles, and criticisms his contemporaries employed to keep women with children, in the 
kitchen, or in the church.  
That Nietzsche sometimes discusses women in these relationships is no doubt a result of 
the fact that “gendered metaphors of women in power cannot avoid perpetuating gender-sexual 
systems that privilege masculinity” (Lim, p. 266, citing Haste). However, we can also see 
Nietzsche’s attempt to create new metaphors or recreate old ones when he revives old goddesses 
like Athena and old feminine gods like Dionysus, as well as when he breathes life into his own 
pantheon of goddesses such as Truth, Wisdom, Philosophy, etc. By including discussions of 
women from all walks of life, not only mothers and wives but also nuns and prostitutes, ladies of 
quality and common women, scholars and artists, young maidens and little old women, Nietzsche 
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shows a kind of embracing of the plurality of kinds of women that we do not see in other 
canonical western philosophers who more accurately fit the category of misogynist, like 
Schopenhauer, Kant, and Aristotle, all of whom come under Nietzsche’s scrutiny explicitly and 
repeatedly. 
 
§4 What Perspectivism and Contemporary Feminism Offer Each Other 
 
 Another challenge I encounter concerning my work on this dissertation is the thought that 
there is nothing fruitful to be gained from tying perspectivism to feminism. Some have argued 
that it would be sufficient to write about perspectivism alone, as it is a rich and underexplored 
field of study in itself. The majority of commentators have restricted themselves to either 
epistemological, alethiological, or ethical understandings of perspectivism, and have failed to 
explore the aesthetic, logical, metaphysical, and socio-political perspectivisms specifically as well 
as axiological perspectivism broadly. As such, there is much work which remains with regard to 
perspectivism as a philosophical theory or doctrine. Similarly, feminism, women’s studies, and 
gender studies are all rich and underexplored fields of study in themselves without digging up 
theories from yet another dead white European man; any number of dissertations could be written 
about the intersection of philosophy with these fields of study, particularly focusing on the many 
women of color who are writing today or in the recent past.204  
 It probably would have been in some respects easier to write a shorter dissertation on one 
of these narrower topics. However, a work like I wanted to read had not yet been written: no one 
had gone through Nietzsche’s publications chronologically to explore everything he wrote about 
women, and no one had done so with an eye to his significant claim that truth is a woman. The 
claim that truth is a woman is significant because it makes explicit something philosophers have 
                                                          
204 I have in mind much work which could be done exploring Octavia Butler’s science fiction and how she 
plays with our notions of humanity, gender, society, etc. in works like her trilogy Lilith’s Brood, as just one 
of several possible examples.  
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historically assumed implicitly, namely a parallel between the unknowable mysteries of pure 
objectivity – in other words, the common understand of what “Truth” entails – and the 
unknowable mysteries of the gender they basically invented to assuage their fragile masculine 
egos.  
“Truth is a woman” is a psychological evaluation of canonical Western philosophy as a 
whole. These philosophers were unhappy with their limited perspectives, their physical 
limitations, their lack of socio-economic power over their fellow men, their lack of ability to 
enforce their will over the world, their lack of ability to know all with absolute accuracy, and 
their inability to produce inviolable proofs of their claims to this absolute knowledge. As a result, 
or perhaps correlatively, they turned their self-hatred on others and declared ‘Truth’ itself to be 
unattainable, at least without extensive study, thus placing the truth on a pedestal out of reach of 
all common men, all non-philosophers. Like many psychologically suffering men, they also 
lashed out at women and invented ‘Woman,’ also known as the Eternal Feminine. She became as 
unreachable as Truth, and placed on the same pedestal, out of reach not only of all men but also 
of all living, human women. No man could gain a ‘real woman’ as his prize any more than he 
could gain the ‘real truth,’ and no woman could ever hope to do anything more than perform and 
attempt to emulate this impossible ideal. Because women thus were tricked into becoming 
performers, it then became easy (and cheap) to attack them for the quality of their performance or 
the fact that they were performing at all. When ‘real’ women – and ‘real’ truth – become ideals 
like this, everyday women and truth become false by definition. Nietzsche’s redefinition of truth 
allows for everyday women and truths to enter the category of real once again.  
Further, he reveals how all gender is performance, since masculinity in this system is 
defined by its striving for the capture of the eternally feminine woman. This entails that 
masculinity is a performance as well because men are complicit in the definition of the eternal 
feminine, and thus can only perform a chase of this ideal, knowing it is by definition out of reach. 
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In parallel, when truth is defined as out of reach, and the philosopher is complicit in that 
definition, philosophy as well becomes a performance. However, Nietzsche does not devalue 
performance and superficiality, as these make up the majority of our lives and he chooses to value 
life most highly. It does, on the other hand, become hypocritical of philosophers to accuse 
feminists of being dilettantes or falseness without recognizing themselves as performers in the 
same light, as Nietzsche points out at the end of the too often abbreviated “When a woman has 
scholarly inclinations there is usually something wrong with her sexually” quote from Beyond 
Good and Evil, which concludes: “Sterility itself disposes one toward a certain masculinity of 
taste; for man is, if I may say so, ‘the sterile animal’” (BGE §144, p. 279).  
Thus what perspectivism offers feminism is a doctrine and set of values which allows for 
self-critique without self-undoing, or to say it more metaphorically, an ability to stare into the 
abyss and to allow the abyss to stare back into oneself without losing one’s sanity or identity, or 
the ability to fight monsters without oneself becoming a monster. If we have the ability to change 
perspectives and control our ‘pro and con,’ then we can perhaps use the master’s tools to destroy 
the master’s house. Perspectivism allows all this because it advocates pluralism with coherent 
style that avoids empty-headed relativism because it also has a means to rank values without 
becoming falsely objectivist.  
Feminism has introduced the language Nietzsche lacked, and which clarifies what he 
tended to express poetically: terminology like essentialism, gender, social construction. Feminism 
has also made our social environment more receptive to his concept of revaluating all values and 
the pluralist value of his perspectivism. Further, contemporary feminism has made the academic 
landscape more receptive to some of Nietzsche’s criticisms of gender norms and criticisms of 
essentialist Wilhelmine-like feminisms in particular, though not necessarily when those criticisms 
come from Nietzsche’s texts specifically. Contemporary feminism if anything is aimed at self-
criticism and self-improvement within the field of academic study and social activism.  




§5  Conclusion 
 
 All projects are of necessity incomplete in some way. Even a dissertation of this size 
could not encompass all of the possible concerns tied to perspectivism or feminism. I have 
already mentioned a few of these throughout, but I would like to include an explicit list of these 
future avenues of research that would significantly supplement the work I have completed here. 
First and more important, a more thorough-going exploration of Nietzsche’s attitudes towards 
racial difference is necessary; one insight which emerged in chapter three is that any 
intersectional feminist study of Nietzsche’s attitudes towards gender must attend to how 
Nietzsche regards Chinese women, for example. Though I am somewhat satisfied by Kaufmann’s 
explanation of Nietzsche’s anti-anti-Semitism, I do not believe this is the entire story with regards 
to Nietzsche and race. Close readers will note Nietzsche’s discussion not only of the ‘blond beast’ 
as pertaining to multiple nationalities and ethnicities but also of the fact that Nietzsche seems to 
dislike the Orientalism of his peers regardless of whether Orientalism was even remotely related 
to Chinese, Japanese, or other Asian philosophies and lived conditions. Given Nietzsche’s 
apparent reject of essentialism, especially gender essentialism, we must question any apparent 
racial essentialism or dualistic racist value schemes.  
 Socio-economic class intersects with gender and race as well. Nietzsche seems to express 
a preference for aristocrats over common folk, at least on a superficial reading. That there are 
valid criticisms of democracy is no reason to prefer aristocracy to democracy per se if only 
because aristocracy also has its flaws, but a more thorough-going analysis of Nietzsche’s 
discussion of social and economic classes is necessary to determine his attitudes with regards to 
classism as an intersecting form of bias. Some might argue that Nietzsche prefers exceptional 
people, geniuses, and heroes to peasants, commoners, and the voting masses because of their 
capacity to point us to Nietzsche’s aspirational doctrine of the Übermensch. I suspect that 
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Nietzsche’s criticisms of democracy and commoners are not based on the belief that most 
aristocrats are essentially better people; again, I think Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism is an 
important guide, but that more focused study on class is necessary to explore this problem. 
 Nietzsche also frequently discusses health, illness, disease, and disability. Ableism is a 
social bias now receiving more recognition, as it intersects with race, gender, and class, and 
disproportionately aggravates the injustices of otherwise already oppressed individuals. 
Intersectional feminist readings of Nietzsche thus would benefit from exploring Nietzsche’s 
attitudes here. Nietzsche does not see sickness or disability as an inherently negative thing, and 
even in a way prescribes ill health and other changes of abilities as methods of changing 
perspectives (see Ecce Homo). This is not the kind of inspirational commodification of disability 
seen in feel-good movies and media; rather, this is the recognition of value of traditionally 
disparaged perspectives and the persons who inhabit them. As Nietzsche discusses not only 
physical but also psychological disabilities, additional focused research on ability and health 
would be multiply useful. 
 Sexuality studies also intersect with gender, race, class, and ability, and Nietzsche 
discusses sexuality both explicitly and metaphorically, though usually he does seem to restrain 
himself to traditional heterosexuality, more or less monogamy, etc. However, I note that in the 
Gay Science he names one aphorism “The Third Sex,” which opens a number of doors for 
interpretation. Further, many scholars have suspected or insinuated that Nietzsche was not strictly 
heterosexual, heteroromantic, monogamous, etc. Additionally, his willingness to cohabitate with 
both Lou and Paul implies a more polyamorous sexuality at minimum. We might even see some 
sado-masochistic tendencies in his handing a whip to Lou for the infamous photo, or in the 
infamous whip passage from Zarathustra. All of these facts combine to produce a less than 
traditional picture: Nietzsche appears to be someone who may have strayed from the 
heterosexual, hetero-romantic, monogamous, mono-sexual, ‘vanilla’ standards of his day. 
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Nietzsche’s philosophy in general does seem to be amenable to a ‘create-your-own adventure’ 
sort of sexual value system; at the very least we must consider the fact that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy concerning sexuality is not explicitly and perfectly traditional itself.  
 These are just four additional possible cultural lenses which we can apply to a better 
understanding of Nietzsche’s apparent misogyny. If Nietzsche ultimately fails on these and other 
points, then his anti-misogyny is not congruent with intersectional feminism; this does not mean 
his feminism would be not ‘true’ feminism, but that it would be a lesser feminism in the 
intersectional feminist’s rank of values. However, if he proves to reject essentialism and dualism 
with regards to race, class, ability, and sexuality in addition to gender, then his anti-misogyny 
would be in many significant respects identical to intersectional feminism, and thus his would be 
a higher feminism in the contemporary intersectional feminist philosopher’s ranking of values.  
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Appendix: Indices of Passages Containing Key Terms 
 This appendix contains the results of the research necessary for building the second and 
third chapters. Below you will find several indices of passages in Nietzsche’s works containing 
references to or usages of the key terms for this dissertation. In particular, you will find indices of 
passages using words related to truth, knowledge, and epistemology, as well as indices of 
passages using words related to gender, femininity, women, and the Eternal Feminine. I have 
tried to be as inclusive as possible with my research, such that I not only include references to 
perspective, but also to the perspectival, not only to women but also to womanhood, etc. In this 
appendix I have striven for the most thoroughness of which I am capable. However, I am only 




INDEX I: PERSPECTIVE AND THE OPTICAL METAPHOR 
 
List of passages referencing perspective: (“-Perspe-”) 
1  A  44 
1  AOM  P (7) 
10  BGE  P, 2, 10, 11, 32, 34, 114, 129, 188, 201 
1  BT   P (5) 
0  CW   none 
2  D   170, 485 
1  EH  I:1 
6  GM  I:17fn, II:8, III:12, 16, 17, 28 
11  GS  13, 78, 143, 162, 233, 299, 301, 354, 357, 373, 374 
2  HATH P (6), 247 (not translated in the Hollingdale as ‘perspective’) 
0  NCW  none 
0  OTL  none 
1  TI  IX 50 
0  TSZ none 
2  UM  II:4, 9 
2  WS  P, 138 
Total: 40 





Referencing optics or eyes: (“-Opti-,” “-Auge-,” “-Vision-”) [excluding variations on 
optimismus]  
A  OPTI:   §9, 54   
AUGEN:  P, 8, 17, 44, 45, 46 (Augen-schliessen), 51, 58 (blutaussaugend), 
(Augenblick: 17, 25, 27, 32, 38, 39, 40, 52, 55, 58) 
VISION:  25, 27, 42 
AOM  OPTI:  none 
AUGEN:  P (3, 5, 7), 10, 24, 38, 49, 86, 113, 116, 142, 151, 174, 187, 199, 206, 
212, 213, 222, 224, 243, 261 (Augen der Wahrheit), 286, 309, 320, 344, 
387 (Auges und Standpunktes), 398, 404, 408, (Augenblick: 15, 26, 60, 
70, 89, 95, 101, 169, 203, 222, 223, 226, 287, 299, 380) 
VISION:  180 
BGE   OPTI:   11 
AUGEN:  1, 14, 22, 23, 24, 25 (Augenmerk), 29, 34, 40, 44, 45 (Spürauge), 56, 57, 
62, 73, 190, 192, 203, 206, 209 (Blutaussaugerin), 211, 213, 228, 229, 
230, 244, 247, 256, 262, 263, 269, 278, 284, 288, 293, (Augenschein: 10, 
11, 12, 14, 134, 226, 248, 264), (Augenblick: 16, 22, 48, 188, 193, 199, 
218, 223, 224, 225, 240, 248, 254, 269) 
VISION:  none 
BT  OPTI:  P (2, 4, 5), 9 
AUGEN: P (2), 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25 
(Augenblick: P (5), F (RW), 4, 5, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25) 
VISION:  P (4, 5), 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 19, 24 
CW   OPTI:  7, E 
AUGEN: P, 3, 7, 9 (fn), E, (Augenblick: 7, 8, 9, E) 
VISION:  none 
D   OPTI:  none 
AUGEN: P (1, 5), 6, 8, 22, 30, 33, 45, 60, 77, 78, 106, 107, 109, 113, 114, 117, 
119, 122, 125, 136, 137, 142, 146, 149, 173, 174, 182, 193, 198, 199, 
201, 214, 223, 253, 270, 272, 298, 305, 321, 322, 340, 352, 361, 381, 
414, 426, 427, 433, 456, 468, 483, 497, 499, 501, 506, 509, 532, 533, 
539, 543, 546, 547 (Auge des Philosophen), 548, 553, 561, 565, 
(Augenblick: 9, 27, 30, 50, 52, 56, 68, 114, 119, 120, 125, 129, 134, 159, 
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162, 168, 177, 179, 184, 192, 199, 239, 240, 254, 255, 317, 369, 391, 
423, 524, 531, 534, 538, 543) 
VISION:  66, 68, 550 
EH   OPTI:  I:1, III BT:1, IV:5 
AUGEN: I:1, 8, II:1, 2, 3, 8, 9, III HATH:3, 4, TSZ:7, BGE:2, CW:4, IV:5, 7 
(Augenblick: I:3, II: 5, 6, 9, 10, III:2, BT:4, UM:3, HATH:3, D:1, 2, 
TSZ:4, 6, TI:3, CW:2, 3, 4, IV:7) 
VISION:  II:4, III BT:4, UM:3, HATH:2 
GM   OPTI:  none 
AUGEN: P (7), I:7, 8, 11, 14, 16, II:6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 18, III:6, 8, 10 12, 14, 19, 20, 
26, 26, (Augenblick: I:14, II:2, 3, 23, III:6, 15, 23, 24) 
VISION:  I: 15 
GS   OPTI:  28, 367 
AUGEN: P (2), F (25, 40), 2, 3, 8, 11, 16, 18, 21, 36, 45, 53, 59, 69, 71, 78, 84, 86, 
95, 107, 110, 127, 128, 143, 158, 215, 223, 228, 249, 261, 277, 290, 291, 
301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 319, 329, 337, 338, 340, 342, 343, 357, 363, 
367, 370, 377, 380, A (8, 11, 12, 14), (Augenblick: P (2), 3, 23, 25, 83, 
86, 87, 89, 92, 107, 251, 278, 288, 291, 301, 302, 303, 318, 334, 338, 
339, 340, 341) 
VISION:  79, 370 
HATH  OPTI:  none 
AUGEN: P (1, 5, 7), 3, 13, 18, 22, 33, 47, 49, 50, 65, 95, 108, 116, 122, 124, 141, 
143, 149, 160, 162, 163, 170, 176, 216, 217, 221, 224, 228, 236, 245, 
247, 250, 261, 279, 282, 287, 350, 373, 376, 415, 423, 434, 445, 446, 
455, 572, 599, 600, 607, 621, 636, 638 (Augenblick: P (3, 8), 16, 50, 61, 
94, 106, 108, 109, 114, 138, 147, 148, 153, 196, 218, 242, 345, 347, 354, 
372, 373, 438, 471, 472, 623, 624) 
VISION:  126, 142, 611, 624 
NCW  OPTI:  I 
AUGEN: VII, IX (1), P, (Augenblick: I, V, X (2)) 
VISION:  none 
OTL  OPTI:  none 
AUGEN: 1 (Augenblick: 1, 1 (fn), 2) 
VISION:  none 
TI  OPTI:  III:6, V:5, IX:7, 24 
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AUGEN: II:9, III:5, V:1, 6, VI:7, VIII:6, IX:7, 10, 15, 19, (Augenblick: P, IV, 
VIII:4, 5, IX:22, 39, X:1, 4) 
VISION:  IX:10 
TSZ  OPTI:  none 
AUGEN: P (1, 2, 5, 6, 9), I:2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22 (1, 2, 3), II: 
quote, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, III:1, 4, 5 (2), 
7, 8 (2), 9, 10 (1, 2), 11 (1, 2), 12 (17, 21, 30), 13 (1, 2), 14, 15, (1, 2), 
IV:1, 3 (1), 4, 5 (1, 2), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 (4, 7, 9, 11, 20), 14 (2), 15, 
16 (1), 17 (2), 18 (1), 20, (Augenblick: I:6, 9, II:11, 21, III: 2 (2), 12 (2), 
IV:2, 5 (2), 6, 19 (10)) 
VISION:  none 
UM  OPTI:  I: none, II: none, III: none, IV: none 
AUGEN: I: 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12; II: 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10; III: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9,  
10, 11; IV: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, (Augenblick: I: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, II:1, 3, 5, 
6, 8, III: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10; IV: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) 
VISION:  I: none, II: none, III: none, IV:7 
WS  OPTI:  none 
AUGEN: P, 6, 16, 20, 22, 33, 47, 73 (Männerauge?), 81, 83, 105, 127, 138, 143, 
158, 163, 170, 171, 174, 177, 179, 184, 189, 190, 201, 213, 222, 228, 
233, 236, 241, 248, 268, 280, 268, 287, 294, 297, 308, 313, (Augenblick: 
11, 14, 22, 69, 124, 134, 179, 190, 295, 309, 316) 




Variations on sight: (“-betracht-,” “-Blick-,” “-Meinung-,” “-sah/seh/sicht/sieht-”) 
Note: excluding Gesichtspunkt, included below, and excluding Augenblick 
A   BETRACHT: 54, 55, 59 
 BLICK: 8, 25, 38, 39, 52, 54, 57, 59 
 MEINUNG: none 
 SEHEN: 1, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 20, 23, 26, 27, 31, 32,35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 44, 45, 48, 
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62 
AOM  BETRACHT: P (1, 2), 74, 107, 110, 119, 170, 177, 180, 223, 233, 342, 382, 388,  
  398, 399, 407 
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 BLICK: P (5), 25, 86, 119, 131, 151, 165, 173, 175, 177, 179, 222, 223, 243, 271, 
320, 359, 396 
 MEINUNG: P (2), 58, 60, 176, 226, 325, 338 
 SEHEN: P (3, 6), 1, 3, 4, 11, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 37, 49, 52, 58, 60, 61, 64, 
79, 86, 91, 98, 99, 101, 105, 113, 114, 116, 117, 120, 126, 127, 128, 
134,142, 143, 144, 151, 154, 169, 171, 174, 177, 179, 181, 196, 199, 
200, 203, 207, 209, 211, 215, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 
235, 237, 239, 244, 249, 257, 258, 259, 270, 281, 285, 299, 300, 305, 
306, 310, 320, 323, 324, 332, 333, 334, 336, 346, 359, 364, 379, 381, 
408 
BGE   BETRACHT: 3, 32, 44, 52, 59, 199, 226, 245, 273 
 BLICK: 5, 11, 19, 20, 22, 30, 32, 38, 41, 51, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 71, 146, 201, 203, 
204, 205, 211, 212, 213, 225, 229, 232, 244, 252, 255, 256, 257, 260, 
265, 269, 275, 286, 289, 291, 295, A 
 MEINUNG: 5, 148, 199, 201, 213, 261, 269, 289 
 SEHEN: 2, 6, 9, 13, 14, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 25, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 44, 45, 46, 
47, 48, 51, 52, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 97, 165, 186, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 
196, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 
218, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 240, 241, 244, 246, 251, 
252, 255, 256, 259, 260, 262, 268, 269, 275, 277, 278, 282, 284, 286, 
287, 291, 292, 295, 296, E 
BT  BETRACHT: P (6), F (RW), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24 
 BLICK: P (1, 7), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
22, 23, 24, 25 
 MEINUNG: 14, 19 
 SEHEN: P (1, 2, 4), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22 (Sehkraft), 24, 25 
CW  BETRACHT: 2, 3, 5, PS2, E 
 BLICK: 1, 2, 6, 7 
 MEINUNG: E 
 SEHEN: P, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, PS1, PS2, E 
D  BETRACHT: P (3), 50, 75, 76, 92, 202, 206, 243, 247, 281, 317, 342, 437, 471 
 BLICK: P (3), 8, 14, 18, 26, 30, 56, 68, 71, 89, 107, 112, 113, 114, 133, 138, 142, 
146, 148, 173 ,193, 195, 216, 219, 240, 255, 263, 266, 270, 299, 324, 
329, 352, 426, 427, 441, 450, 465, 471, 476, 497, 502, 515, 521, 523, 
546 
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 MEINUNG: 26, 56, 62, 82, 105, 115, 149, 167, 206, 237, 270, 307, 353, 431, 448, 
449, 506, 507, 562, 563, 573 
 SEHEN: P (1, 3, 5), 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30, 
31, 33, 34, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 50, 51, 56, 60, 62, 66, 68, 71, 72, 77, 78, 
84 (Passahlam?), 87, 91, 96, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 
114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 
139, 142, 143, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152, 157, 161, 163, 167, 168, 169, 
173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 183, 188, 189, 190, 192, 197, 199, 201, 202, 
203, 205, 207, 209, 210, 212, 214, 216, 223, 226, 227, 234, 240, 245, 
248, 253, 255, 270, 271, 272, 273, 275, 278, 289, 298, 303, 309, 314, 
318, 321, 323, 324, 325, 329, 349, 357, 361, 362, 371, 381, 382, 388, 
389, 403, 411., 413, 414, 421, 426, 428, 432, 433, 435, 438, 444, 448, 
453, 456, 464, 465, 468, 470, 480, 481, 483, 484, 485, 488, 495, 497, 
499, 512, 513, 516, 517, 523, 524, 526, 529, 533, 534, 536, 539, 540, 
542, 546, 548, 550, 551, 553, 558, 559, 575 
EH  BETRACHT: I:1, 3, II:9, III:1, 4, 5, UM:3, D:1, CW:4, IV:4 
 BLICK: P (4), II:1, 4, III:2, 6, BT:4, UM:1, 3, HATH:3, 6, TSZ:2, 5, BGE:1, 
TI:3, CW:2, 4, IV:6, 7 
 MEINUNG: III:3, BT:1, UM:1 
 SEHEN: P (1, 4), I:1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, II:2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, III:1, 2, 3, 5, 6, BT:1, 2, 4, 
UM:2, 3, HATH:1, 2, 3, 6, D:1, 2, GS, TSZ:3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, BGE:2, GM, 
TI:2, 3, CW:1, 4, IV:4, 7, 8 
GM  BETRACHT: I: 7, 11, II:3, 7, 11, 24, III:17, 25, 28 
 BLICK: P (5, 7), I:4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, II:2, 6, 7, 11, 14, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
III:5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 20, 23, 26 
 MEINUNG: I: 4, III:18 
 SEHEN: P (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), I:2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, II:3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, III:3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 
12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 
GS   BETRACHT: 7, 99, 112, 224, 301, 333, 356, 357 
 BLICK: F (27, 31, 40), 1, 3, 13, 17, 23, 38, 40, 45, 48, 50, 59, 67, 86, 87, 95, 99, 
105, 109, 118, 122, 125, 128, 136, 139, 141, 150, 198, 241, 277, 284, 
285, 290, 291, 293, 299, 301, 304, 309, 314, 317, 334, 335, 338, 348, 
352, 354, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 373, 380, 381, 382, A (8, 12) 
 MEINUNG: 4, 25, 35, 39, 174, 294, 296, 307, 328, 335, 345, 366 
 SEHEN: P (1), F (6, 25, 28, 37, 39, 40), 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 34, 36, 38, 40, 41, 45, 47, 48, 53, 56, 58, 
59, 60, 68, 70, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 87, 88, 91, 92, 94, 95, 99, 100, 102, 
107, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 127, 134, 
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135, 136, 139, 143, 146, 152, 161, 169, 173, 176, 191, 192, 195, 197, 
222, 228, 229, 238, 249, 261, 276, 278, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 286, 
290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 298, 299, 301, 304, 306, 307, 308, 311, 
316, 319, 320, 321, 322, 326, 329, 333, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 342, 
343, 344, 345, 346, 348, 349, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 
362, 363, 366, 370, 372, 373, 375, 377, 379, 380, 381, A (2, 4, 6, 11, 14) 
HATH BETRACHT: P (1), 6, 16, 18, 23, 26, 27, 28, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 56, 99, 101, 136,  
141, 164, 194, 200, 212, 221, 235, 239, 248, 252, 259, 266, 228, 279, 
282, 364, 373, 472, 591, 612, 616, 632 
 BLICK: P (1, 3, 4, 5), 3, 16, 21, 23, 25, 36, 37, 55, 64, 72, 73, 82, 100, 101, 104, 
106, 107, 112, 131, 132, 134, 141, 143, 148, 149, 151, 160, 162, 164, 
236, 238, 243, 257, 277, 278, 279, 280, 292, 374, 414, Ch. 8 Title, 472, 
480, 587, 591, 599, 606, 616, 626, 634 
 MEINUNG: 30, 39, 73, 81, 89, 94, 110, 120, 137, 141, 169, 170, 212, 227, 261, 269, 
275, 286, 303, 333, 345, 346, 349, 376, 443, 447, 466, 472, 482, 508, 
545, 546, 571, 578, 605, 608, 614, 622, 625, 629, 630, 632, 633, 635, 
637 
 SEHEN: P (1, 2, 5, 7), 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 30, 33, 36, 
37, 38, 39, 45, 49, 51, 52, 53, 55, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 73, 80, 89, 
93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 
114, 122, 124, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 144, 
146, 147, 148, 154, 155, 160, 162, 163, 164, 166, 170, 175, 193, 194, 
196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 203, 207, 209, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 221, 
222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 233, 236, 237, 240, 241, 
242, 245, 246, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 255, 257, 259, 260, 261, 265, 
267, 269, 270, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, , 291, 292, 
314, 318, 320, 322, 323, 331, 336, 340, 345, 349, 365, 367, 372, 374, 
376, 408, 411, 414, 423, 424, 428, 430, 434, 436, 438, 439, 445, 446, 
447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 457, 458, 463, 472, 473, 475, 
476, 477, 489, 491, 511, 514, 517, 540, 542, 543, 544, 572, 576, 577, 
587, 588, 590, 593, 599, 602, 607, 608, 610, 611, 612, 613, 618, 619, 
623, 624, 627, 629, 631, 633, 635, 636, 638, E (1) 
NCW   BETRACHT: none 
 BLICK: I, VI, X (1), E 
 MEINUNG: IV (1), V, VI (1), X (1) 
 SEHEN: F, I, II, III, IV (1), V, VI, VII, X (1, 2), P 
OTL   BETRACHT: 1 
 BLICK: none 
 MEINUNG: none 
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 SEHEN: 1, 2 
TI  BETRACHT: II:2, V:1, VII:3, VIII:2, 4, IX:12, 21 
 BLICK: P, I:20, IX:3, 7, 20, 23, 24, 30, 36, XI 
 MEINUNG: IX:3, 44, 47 
 SEHEN: I:19, 24, 35, 40, II:3, 9, 11, III:5, 6, V:3, 4, VI:1, 6, 7, 8, VII:1, 2, 3, 
VIII:1, 2, 6, IX:5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 20, 22, 24, 28, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 
40, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, X:3, 4 
TSZ  BETRACHT: I:8, IV:6 
 BLICK: P (3, 4, 5, 6, 10), I:3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 22 (1), II:2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10,  
11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, III:1, 2 (1), 5 (1, 2), 6, 7, 10 (2), 12 (29), 
14, 15 (1, 2), 16 (2), IV:2, 3 (2), 5 (1, 2), 6, 7, 8, 11, 13 (16), 14 (3), 15, 
16 (1), 17 (1), 19 (2), 20 
 MEINUNG: I:5, II:4, 7, III:7, 10 (2) 
 SEHEN: P (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10), I:3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 22 (1, 2), II: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, III: quote, 1, 2 (1, 2), 3, 4, 5 (1, 2, 3), 6, 7, 8 (1, 2), 
9, 10 (1, 2), 12 (2, 3, 4, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26), 13 (2), 14, 
15 (1, 2), 16 (7), IV: 1, 2, 3 (1, 2), 4, 5 (1, 2), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 (3, 
4, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17, 20), 14 (1, 2), 15, 16 (1, 2), 17 (2), 19 (1), 20 
UM   BETRACHT: I:q, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9; II:P, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; III: 1q, 1, 2q, 3, 4,  
  6, 7, 8, 9, 10; IV: 1, 2q, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8  
 BLICK: I:1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; II:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10; III: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,  
  7, 8, 9, 10, 11; IV: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8  
 MEINUNG: I:1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12; II:1, 6, 7, 8; III: none; IV: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 
 SEHEN: I:q, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; II:P, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10;  
  III:1, 2q, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; IV: 1, 2, 2q, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
WS   BETRACHT: 3, 22, 56, 69, 73, 152, 211, 215, 271, 285, 312 
 BLICK: 8, 16, 17, 24, 28, 32, 57, 73, 84, 105, 110, 138, 171, 172, 179, 183, 185, 
190, 209, 216, 228, 265, 269, 271, 287, 294, 295, E 
 MEINUNG: 71, 79, 260, 267, 293, 317, 319, 330, 333, 346 
 SEHEN: P, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 17, 22, 23, 25, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 40, 43, 44, 
50, 53, 57, 67, 69, 71, 73, 81, 82, 91, 93, 102, 107, 109, 111,  118, 121, 
123, 125, 126136, 146, 163, 171, 179, 181, 183, 184, 189, 190, 201, 202, 
206, 209, 215, 216, 219, 225, 232, 233, 234, 241, 251, 254, 270, 271, 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
337 
 
272, 275, 282, 285, 286, 287, 294, 295, 296, 297, 304, 307, 308, 309, 




References to illusion and images: (“-illus-,” “-Einbild-,” “-Bild-”)  
Note: excluding references to education “Bildung,” etc., and to illustration 
A   ILLUS: 23, 24 
 EINBILD: 43 
 BILD:   40 
AOM   ILLUS: none 
 EINBILD: 96, 113, 184 
 BILD:   19, 27, 37, 66, 99, 146, 182, 207, 222, 224, 238 
BGE    ILLUS: 39 
 EINBILD: 194 
 BILD:   9, 3, 9, 40, 57, 59, 192, 194, 198, 203, 210, 225, 230 
BT     ILLUS: 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 18, 25 
 EINBILD: 1, 5, 13, 14 
 BILD:   P (4), 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24 
CW     ILLUS: PS2 
 EINBILD: none 
 BILD:   7 
D     ILLUS: 114 
 EINBILD: 195, 303, 423, 550 
 BILD:   28, 53, 60, 77, 119, 121, 129, 147, 148, 191, 199, 207, 216, 240, 543,  
547, 549 
EH     ILLUS: none 
 EINBILD: II:10 
 BILD:   III:1, 3, BT:4, UM:1, 2, TSZ:3, 8 
GM     ILLUS: III:12 
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 EINBILD: II:15, III:25 
 BILD:   I:10, 11, 17fn, II:3, III:6, 11, 9 
GS      ILLUS: 36, 80 
 EINBILD: 86, 251, 345, 354, 359 
 BILD:   F (23, 55), 24, 57 (Bilder von Sais), 68, 76, 80, 112, 114, 215, 252,  
300, 354, 370, A (2) 
HATH  ILLUS: 106, 145, 251 
 EINBILD: 50, 59, 144, 413, 527 
 BILD:   13, 24, 36, 111, 137, 173, 220, 222, 231, 261, 274, 279, 353, 380, 599,  
612 
NCW   ILLUS: none 
 EINBILD: none 
 BILD:   none 
OTL     ILLUS: 1 
 EINBILD: none 
 BILD:   1 
TI     ILLUS: VII:1, IX:47 
 EINBILD: VII:1 
 BILD:   V:76, VI:3, IX:19 
TSZ     ILLUS: none 
 EINBILD: none 
 BILD:   I:6, II:2, 7, 15, 21, III:12 (2), IV:3 (2), 9, 14 (3), 17 (2) 
UM      ILLUS: I: none; II:6, 7, 9; III: none; IV: none 
 EINBILD: I: none; II:5, 6; III: none; IV:6 
 BILD:   I:1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12; II:1, 3, 4, 5, 6; III: 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11; IV: 1, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7 
WS      ILLUS: 12, 44, 312 
 EINBILD: 61 
 BILD:   72, 73, 95, 114, 135, 145, 165, 194, 279 
Total:  





Referencing standpoints or points of view: (“-Punkt-”) 
A STANDPUNKT: none  
GESICHTSPUNKT:  7, 31, 44  
Other PUNKT:  9, 15, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57 
AOM  STANDPUNKT:  387 
 GESICHTSPUNKT:  none 
 Other PUNKT:  119, 125, 284, 287, 323, 349 
BGE   STANDPUNKT: 34 
GESICHTSPUNKT: 261, 291 
Other PUNKT: 8, 201, 209, 223 (c), 259, 262 
BT   STANDPUNKT:  6 
GESICHTSPUNKT:  none 
Other PUNKT:  P(7), F (RW), 4, 5, 7, 8 (der Vision), 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20,  
21 
CW  STANDPUNKT: none 
GESICHTSPUNKT: 5 
Other PUNKT: 4, 6, 9, 11, PS1 (fn), PS2, E 
D  STANDPUNKT: none 
GESICHTSPUNKT: 102, 103, 134, 137, 159, 267, 371 
Other PUNKT: 7, 11, 76, 117, 119, 138, 352, 544 
EH   STANDPUNKT: none 
GESICHTSPUNKT: II:9, III TSZ:8 
Other PUNKT: I:1, 5, III UM:2, D:2, IV:7 
GM   STANDPUNKT: II:11 
GESICHTSPUNKT: I:2, 17fn, II:5, 11, 12, 13, 19, III:8, 9, 14 
Other PUNKT: III:6, 17, 18, 19, 25, 27 
GS   STANDPUNKT: 344; (c) 14, 23 
GESICHTSPUNKT: 347, 356, 359; (c) 7, 21, 80, 233 
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Other PUNKT: 347, 388; (c) 43, 71, 99 ,100, 101, 112, 135, 277 
HATH STANDPUNKT: 147, 511 
GESICHTSPUNKT: 7, 42, 92, 102, 103, 104, 224, 230, 259, 275, 424, 439, 588 
Other PUNKT: 6, 11, 21, 26, 37, 52 68, 108, 110, 175, 221, 229, 242, 254, 261,  
345, 352, 479, 481, 584, 621, 630 
NCW   STANDPUNKT: none 
GESICHTSPUNKT: none 
Other PUNKT: none 
OTL   STANDPUNKT: none 
GESICHTSPUNKT: 1 
Other PUNKT: 1 
TI   STANDPUNKT: none 
GESICHTSPUNKT: VII:4 
Other PUNKT: IV, IX:5, 22 
TSZ   STANDPUNKT: none 
GESICHTSPUNKT: none 
Other PUNKT: none 
UM   STANDPUNKT: I:4, 9; II:1, 9; III: none; IV: none 
GESICHTSPUNKT: I:12; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
Other PUNKT: I:7, 12; II:1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10; III:2q; IV:2, 4, 6, 8; (c) I:4; III:4, 5,  
7, 8, 9, 10 
WS   STANDPUNKT: none 
GESICHTSPUNKT: 22, 33, 286, 292 




Referencing spectacles: (“-schauspiel-”) 
A 6, 24, 39, 44, 61 
AOM   P (3), 24, 98, 113, 134, 166, 304, 310   
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BGE   5, 7, 9, 25, 28, 56, 97, 205, 218, 252, 253, 256 
BT  P (4), 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19 
CW  7, 8, 9, 11, 12, PS1fn, PS2 
D  29, 49, 128, 150, 167, 193, 201, 205, 265, 306, 318, 324, 337, 418, 499, 505, 532,  
533, 538, 548, 558 
EH  III: UM (3) 
GM  I:15, II:7, 16, III:8, 26, 27 
GS   36, 80, 86, 99, 236, 301, 343, 351, 356, 361, 366, 368, 372, 377 
HATH 34, 51, 151, 171, 259, 306, 364, 481, 624 
NCW   II, IV (1), IX (1) 
OTL   2 
TI  I:38, IX:10, 11, 18, 45, 48 
TSZ  I:12, 16, II:21, III:5 (2), IV:5 (2), 11, 13 (8), 18 (1) 
UM   I:1, 7, 10, 12; II:3, 4, 5, 6, 8; III: none; IV:2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 




Referencing blindness: (“-blind-” and “-blend-”) 
A   13, 32, 39, 62 
AOM  7, 28, 148, 186, 197, 228, 300, 321, 331, 336, 390 
BGE   23, 31, 34, 204 
BT  9, 18, 22 
CW  none 
D  38, 58, 89, 109, 119, 140, 143, 167, 190, 191, 199, 227, 241, 271, 277, 301, 321, 352,  
414, 426, 542 
EH  P (3), I:1, III: TSZ (2), IV:7 
GM  I:1, III:24 
GS   F (48), 21, 56, 86, 99, 223, 284, 287, 335, 344, 357, 360, 382 
HATH P (1), 3, 16, 36, 45, 58, 107, 122, 145, 160, 163, 224, 238, 291, 434, 445, 566, 629,  




NCW   none 
OTL   1 
TI  none 
TSZ  I:3, 14, II:6, 8, 11, 20, 21, III:11 (2), 13 (1), IV: 4, 6, 13 (4, 7), 14 (3) 
UM   I:12; II:1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9; III:4, 5, 6, 8; IV:6, 7, 8 





INDEX II: WOMEN, GENDER, AND INTERSECTIONS 
 
List of passages referencing womenw: (“-Weib-”) 
A  12 (die Weiblein), 23, 33, 48, 53 (Weiber und Volk), 54, 56 
AOM  P (3) (verweiblicht, Ewig-Weibliches), 95, 100, 134 (allzuweiblichen), 273 (ein gutes  
 Weib), 274, 278 (weibliche Geschlecht), 287, 290, 291, 292 
BGE   P, 50, 84, 85, 86, 115, 131, 139, 144, 145, 148, 186, 194, 198, 202, 207, 209, 220, 231, 
232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 238, 239, 248, 261, 262, 269, 293 
BT   9, 11, 22 
CW   3 (Ewig-Weibliche, Weiblein), 4, 6 (EW), 9, 10, PS1 
D   3, 25, 42, 75, 119, 142, 149, 150 (Weiblein), 153, 170, 191, 193 (Weiberhasser), 201,  
206, 262, 276, 346, 372 (Weiblein), 503, 511 
EH  I:7, II:7, 9, III:2 (Weiblein), 5 (Weiblein), HATH:5, TSZ:1, CW:3, IV:7 
GM  I:6, II:5, 7, III:q, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17 
GS   P (3, 4), F (19, 22, 50), 3, 24, 43, 59, 63, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 208 (Weiblein), 335,  
339, 345 (Weiblein), 358, 361, 362, 363, 368, 377 (Weiblein), A (3, 4) 
HATH 98 (Weibchen), 113, 257, 374, (Ch. 7: 377, 380, 384, 392, 399, 403, 411, 412, 417,  
419, 421, 424, 425, 436, 437), 479, 629, 636 
NCW   II, III, V, X (2) 
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OTL   1 
TI  I:13, 20, 25, 27, 28, III:5, IV, VII:3, IX:1, 3, 4, 5 (Weiblein), 6, 25, 27, 37, 38, 39, 46 
TSZ  I: 2 (Weiblein), 7, 13, 14, 18 (Weiblein), 20; II: 10, 14, 15, 17, 18; III: 3, 5 (2), 8 (2),  
10 (2), 12 (17, 23, 24), 16 (1-7); IV: 8, 13 (3, 12, 13), 14 (2), 16 (1, 2 [Eheweibchen]), 17 
(1, 2), 18 (1) (Weiblein) 
UM  I:2; II:1, 5 (EW); III: 8; IV: 9, 10 (unglückliches Weib), 11 




List of passages referencing womenf: (“-Frau-”) 
Note that there are no references to misogyny or what is “Frauenfeindlich,” (though Nietzsche 
explicitly uses ‘Weiberfeinde’ as the title of D §346; nor are there any references to women’s 
rights or “Frauenrechten.” Lastly, note that Nietzsche does not make use of the term “neue Frau” 
or “neues Weib” in his published texts. 
A   52 (Frauenzimmer), 56 (Kindern und Frauen) 
AOM   30, 36, 169, 173, 265, 272, 276, 279 (frauenhafte), 282, 284, 286, 304, 324 
BGE   P, 5, 50, 105 (pia fraus/impia fraus), 114, 127, 204, 232, 237, 239, 261 
BT   8, 9 
CW   2, 3, 4, 5, 10, PS1, PS2 
D  30, 75, 191, 192, 193, 196, 201, 255, 282, 285, 294, 321, 369, 379, 403, 532,  
 542, 544 
EH  I:3, II:3, III:5 
GM  III:1, 8, 18, 24, 25 
GS   2, 43, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 70, 71, 74, 75, 104, 119, 227, 293, 312, 325, 329, 361 
HATH 64, 72, 133, 218, 259, 342, 356, 374, (Ch. 7: 383, 388, 390, 391, 394, 398, 399, 401,  
405, 406, 407, 410, 412, 414, 415, 416, 417, 419, 420, 424, 425, 426, 428, 429, 430, 431, 
432, 433, 434, 435, 437), 440, 492, 635 
NCW   none 
OTL   2 
TI  I:16, VII:3, 5 (pia fraus), IX:47 
TSZ  I: 18, 20; II: 10; III: 11 (2); IV: 12 
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UM  I:9; II: none; III: none; IV: 8, 10 




List of passages referencing feminism and femininity: (“-Femin-” and “-fem-”) 
A   58 (femininische) 
AOM  P (3) 
BGE   147, 210 
BT   P (3) 
CW   PS1, E 
D  P (4) 
EH  III:3 
GM  III: 19, 27 
GS   339 (vita femina), 357 
HATH none 
NCW   none 
OTL   none 
TI  IX:50 
TSZ  none 
UM   I: none; II:7; III: none; IV: none 
WS   none 
Total:  14 
 
 
List of passages referring to sex, including the ‘third’ sex: (“-Geschlecht-,” “-dritte-”) 
Note that “Geschlecht” can mean “bad,” “sex,” and “race, family, lineage,” the latter frequently 
translated as “generation”; I will focus here on the sexual meaning and exclude the other two.  
A   52, G 
AOM  95, 113, 273, 278, 291 
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BGE   26, 47, 75, 114, 131, 144, 189, 194, 239, 268 
BT  1, 2, 3, 8 
CW   2 
D  3, 14, 76, 109, 503 
EH  III:5 (Krieg zwischen den Geschlechtern), IV:7 
GM  I:6, III:6, 7, 8 
GS   14, 68, 70, 72, 75 (Das dritte Geschlecht), 358, 363, 381 
HATH 98, 100, 141, 424, 425 
NCW   none 
OTL   1 
TI  V:1, VII:3, IX:8, 22, 23, 39, 47, X:4 
TSZ  none 
UM  I:6; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
WS  197, 274 
Total:  58 
 
 
List of other passages referencing women: (“Mutter-,” “Herrin-,” “Hure-,” “Dame-,” 
“Mädchen-,” “Gattin-,” “Schwester-,” “Tante-,” “Tochter-,” “Nichte-,” “Göttin-,” 
“Gebieterin-,” “Meisterin-,” “Prostitutierin-,” “Dirne-,” “Königin-,” “Dichterin-,” “Hexe-,” 
“Nonne-,” “Jungfern-,”) 
I have chosen not to include a list of the individual women named by Nietzsche throughout his 
works, though I will include a few here for example: Nietzsche does discuss specific goddesses 
like Athena and Artemis, mythical and fictional characters like Isolde and Ophelia, religious 
icons like St. Theresa and Rahula, as well as references to his female family members, friends 
like Lou and Cosima, and women writers like George Sand. See for example GM III:8, BT 7, GM 
III:17, and EH II:3. Also note that there are only two references to the goddess Baubo: GS P (4) 
and NCW E (2).  
Lastly, note that Nietzsche only references Gouvernanten or governesses once, in BGE §34. 
A   MUTTER:  58 (grossen Mutter) 
HERRIN: none 
HURE:  56 (Hurerei?) 
DAME:  none 
MÄDCHEN:  56  
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GATTIN:  none 
SCHWESTER:  none 
TANTE:  none 
TOCHTER:  none 










 JUNGFERN: none 




MÄDCHEN: 169, 170 
GATTIN: 159 
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 JUNGFERN: none 
BGE   MUTTER:  194, 201, 235, 239, 262, 267 
HERRIN: 23 
HURE: none 
DAME: 50, 222, 232, 233, 235 















 JUNGFERN: 206 










GÖTTIN: 10, 15 
GEBIETERIN: none 
MEISTERIN: 11 







HEXE: 2, 9 
NONNE: none 
 JUNGFERN: none 



















 JUNGFERN: 3 
D   MUTTER: 35, 128, 196, 206, 248, 340, 562 
HERRIN: none 
HURE: none 


















NONNE: 30, 440 
 JUNGFERN: none 






















 JUNGFERN: none 

















HEXE: III:16, 21 
NONNE: none 
 JUNGFERN: none 
GS  MUTTER: P (3, 4), 24, 70, 72, 95, 104, 221, 338, 376 
HERRIN: 70, 362 
HURE: A (14)  
DAME: 362 
MÄDCHEN: P (4), 13, 104, A (4) 
GATTIN: none 




GÖTTIN: F (53, Minerva), 84, 92, 107 






DIRN: A (10) 
KÖNIGIN: none 
DICHTERIN: none 
HEXE: 35, 250, 300, A (10) 
NONNE: none 
 JUNGFERN: 357, 381 
HATH MUTTER: 57, 98, 110, 111, 133, 216, 218, 259, 267, 292, 363, 380, 385, 387,  




MÄDCHEN: 57, 257, 404, 407, 409, 421 














 JUNGFERN: none 
NCW  MUTTER: E (2), P 
HERRIN: none 




















 JUNGFERN: none 






















 JUNGFERN: none 
TI  MUTTER: none  


















 JUNGFERN: none 
TSZ  MUTTER: I: 15, II:5, 14 (Mutterländern), 21, III:9, 13 (1), IV:6, 13 (12) 
HERRIN: II:22 
HURE: IV:3 (2), 8 
DAME: none 




TOCHTER: III:7, IV:16 (1, 2) 
NICHTE: none 









DICHTERIN: IV:19 (8) 
HEXE: I:6, 17, III:15 (1), IV:6 
NONNE: none 
 JUNGFERN: none 
UM  MUTTER: I:4; II:2; 7, III:1, 3, 7; IV:10 
HERRIN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
HURE: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
DAME: I:5; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
MÄDCHEN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
GATTIN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
SCHWESTER: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: 2, 5  
TANTE: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
TOCHTER: I: none; II: none; III: 8 (höhere Töchterschulen); IV: none  
NICHTE: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
GÖTTIN: I:10 (Göttin Wahrheit); II:1, 5, III: 8 (Göttin der Wahrheit); IV: none 
GEBIETERIN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
MEISTERIN: I: none; II:2, 10; III: none; IV: none 
PROSTI: I:12; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
DIRN:  I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
KÖNIGIN:  I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
DICHTERIN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
HEXE: I: 7; II: none; III:4; IV: none 
NONNE: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 JUNGFERN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
WS  MUTTER: 30, 73, 132, 158, 294 
HERRIN: none 





MÄDCHEN: 73, 295 
GATTIN: 42, 73 
SCHWESTER: none 
TANTE: none 















References to one’s beloved: (“Geliebte-,”) 
A   none 
AOM  95, 227 
BGE   194 
BT  none 
CW  none 
D  403, 524, 562 
EH  none 
GM  none 
GS   62, 72, 337 
HATH 57, 81, 153, 418 
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NCW   4 
OTL   none 
TI  none 
TSZ  II:3, 11, III:3 
UM   I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: 11 




References to marriage: (“-heirat-,” “-ehe-,”) 
A   HEIRAT: none 
 EHE:  26, 56 
AOM   HEIRAT: none 
 EHE:  26, 169, 273 
BGE    HEIRAT: none 
 EHE:  61, 123, 262 
BT    HEIRAT: 17 
 EHE:  4 
CW    HEIRAT: 3 
 EHE:  3, 4 
D    HEIRAT: 276, 387 
 EHE:  9, 27, 150, 151, 205, 206, 240, 246, 359, 387 
EH    HEIRAT: none 
 EHE:  none 
GM    HEIRAT: III:7 
 EHE:  III:2, 7, 9 
GS     HEIRAT: none 
 EHE:  7, 43, 71, 364 
HATH HEIRAT: 389, 421, 436 
 EHE:  227, 240, 243, 259, 378, 389, 392, 393, 394, 399, 402, 406, 411, 418,  
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421, 424, 426, 427, 434, 598 
NCW   HEIRAT: none 
 EHE:  VIII (2), A 
OTL     HEIRAT: none 
 EHE:  none 
TI    HEIRAT: V:1, IX:3, 9 
 EHE:  VII:3, IX:39 
TSZ    HEIRAT: none 
 EHE:  I:2, 20, III:10 (2), 12 (24, IV:6, 16 (2) 
UM     HEIRAT: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 EHE:  I:8, 9; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
WS     HEIRAT: 58 




References to pregnancy: (“-schwanger-”) 
A   48 
AOM  63, 216, 285 
BGE   248, 292 
BT  none 
CW  none 
D  18, 177, 307, 552 
EH  II:3, III: TSZ (1) 
GM  II:19, III:4, 8, 9 
GS   72, 369, 370 
HATH P (7) 
NCW   none 
OTL   none 
TI  X:4 
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TSZ  I:15, 18, II:15, III:1, 3, 16 (1), IV:13 (11) 
UM   I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 




References to rape, commonly translated as ‘violation’: (“Vergewalt-,” or  
“Nothzucht-”) 
Note that Nietzsche only makes one references to incest or “Blutschande” in his entire published 
corpus, namely in CW 4.  
A   VERGEWALT:  none 
 NOTHZUCHT:  none 
AOM   VERGEWALT: none 
 NOTHZUCHT: none 
BGE    VERGEWALT: 202, 229, 260 
 NOTHZUCHT: 21 
BT    VERGEWALT: none 
 NOTHZUCHT: none 
CW    VERGEWALT: 11 
 NOTHZUCHT: none 
D    VERGEWALT: 369, 432 
 NOTHZUCHT: none 
EH    VERGEWALT: none 
 NOTHZUCHT: II:4 
GM    VERGEWALT: I:13, II:5, 11, 13, 18, III:9, 10, 12, 24 
 NOTHZUCHT: none 
GS     VERGEWALT: 49 
 NOTHZUCHT: none 
HATH  VERGEWALT: 137 
 NOTHZUCHT: none 
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NCW   VERGEWALT: none 
 NOTHZUCHT: none 
OTL     VERGEWALT: none 
 NOTHZUCHT: none 
TI    VERGEWALT: IX:8 
 NOTHZUCHT: IX:36 
TSZ    VERGEWALT: none 
 NOTHZUCHT: none 
UM     VERGEWALT: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 NOTHZUCHT: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
WS     VERGEWALT: none 




List of passages referring to race: (“-Geschlecht-,” “Rasse-,” “Gattung”) 
Note that “Geschlecht” can mean “bad,” “sex,” and “race, family, lineage,” the latter frequently 
translated as “generation,” “tribe,” “clan,” etc.; I will focus here on the racial meaning and 
exclude the other two. Note also that translators, such as Hollingdale, have sometimes inserted 
the term ‘race’ where Nietzsche does not use a German equivalent; for example, see AOM 224 
where Nietzsche refers to “Barbaren” but the translator refers to a “barbarian race.” Likewise, 
note that sometimes when Nietzsche uses “Geschlecht” translators simply translate as “kind” or 
even simply “you” in the plural; see for example UM IV:11 and D 76. 
A   GESCHLECHT: 4 
 RASSE:  19, 22, 44, 51 
 GATTUNG:  6 
AOM  GESCHLECHT: P (2), 189, 224 
 RASSE:  none 
 GATTUNG:  26, 115, 119, 139, 144, 228 
BGE   GESCHLECHT: 14, 55, 58, 189, 199, 208, 213, 219, 242, 254, 262, 285 
 RASSE:  20, 21, 28, 48, 51, 62, 188, 189, 200, 208, 224, 228, 241, 242,  
    244, 248, 251, 252, 256, 257, 262, 264 
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 GATTUNG:  2, 28, 42, 247, 251, 268 
BT  GESCHLECHT: 3, 9 
 RASSE:  none 
 GATTUNG:  2, 7, 11, 14, 19 
CW   GESCHLECHT: PS2 
 RASSE:  1, PS2 
 GATTUNG:  none 
D  GESCHLECHT: 13, 31, 42, 60, 130, 136, 146, 183, 189, 247, 501 
 RASSE:  70, 272 
 GATTUNG:  16, 26, 41, 49, 65, 77, 113, 129, 189, 298, 312, 323, 427, 538, 
546, 551 
EH  GESCHLECHT: II:5, IV:7 
 RASSE:  I:3, 4, 7, III: CW:2, 3, 4 
 GATTUNG:  III:5 
GM  GESCHLECHT: I:5, 9, 11, 16, II:2, 7, 13, 19, 20, 21, III:9, 10 
 RASSE:  I:5, 9, 10, 11, 17fn, II:13, 17, 20, III:11, 14, 17, 21 
 GATTUNG:  none 
GS   GESCHLECHT: 1, 7, 10, 58, 95, 100, 102, 135, 291, 310, 346, 348, 354, 361 
 RASSE:  P (2), 10, 40, 348, 354, 357, 377 
 GATTUNG:  1, 20, 35, 42, 48, 143, 330, 354, 356 
HATH GESCHLECHT: 22, 261, 424, 440, 472, 475 
 RASSE:  45, 224, 475, 479 
 GATTUNG:  33, 37, 97, 98, 107, 111, 132, 141, 144, 157, 194, 210, 220, 229, 
255,  
    274, 283, 367, 372, 462, 618, 636 
NCW   GESCHLECHT: none 
 RASSE:  III 
 GATTUNG:  none 
OTL   GESCHLECHT: 1 
 RASSE:  none 
 GATTUNG:  1 
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TI  GESCHLECHT: IV:2, IX:36, 39, 47 
 RASSE:  VII:3, 4, IX:47, X:3 
 GATTUNG:  III:5 
TSZ  GESCHLECHT: P (5), I:5, III:12 (11, 12) 
 RASSE:  none 
 GATTUNG:  none 
UM  GESCHLECHT: I:7; II:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10; III:1, 2, 4, 8; IV:10, 11 
 RASSE:  I: none; II: none; III:3; IV: none 
 GATTUNG:  I:2, 7, 8, 12 (quoting Strauss); II:6; III: none; IV:9 
WS  GESCHLECHT: 39, 184, 275, 285 
 RASSE:  none 




List of passages referring to specific races, nationalities, religious groups, and ethnicities: 
(“Röm-,” “Schwarz-,” “Afrik-,” “Indi/Inde-,” “Asia/Asie-,” “Chines-,” “Arisch/Arier-,” 
“Arab-,” “Japan-,” “Skandinav-,” “Wiking-,” “Griech-,” “Musel-,” “Perser-,” “Kelt-,” 
“Buddh-,” “Confuc-,” “Amerik-,” “Ägypt-,” “Orient-,”  
“Cambodja-,” “Neger-,” “Phöni-,” “Gäl-,”) 
I have chosen to exclude references to Germans, Europeans, Christians, and Jewish people if only 
because the fact that Nietzsche discusses each is well-known. I include some of the less well-
known groups on which Nietzsche comments, though this list is by no means completely 
exhaustive. I also include the Greeks and Romans to have an idea of the scope of Nietzsche’s 
discussion; because Nietzsche’s treatment of the Greeks and Romans is fairly prominent, their 
inclusion provides a gauge for his interest in other groups. Finally, while he does discuss the 
Aryan race, note that Nietzsche does not use the term “Herrenvolk” or “master race” anywhere in 
his published texts.  
A   RÖM:  46, 58, 59 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: 20, 31, 32 
 ASIA:  none 
 CHINES: 11, 32 
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 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: 60 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: none 
 WIKING: 60 
 GRIECH: 23, 30, 59, 60 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: 20, 21, 22, 23, 31, 42 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: none 
 ÄGYPT: none 
 ORIENT: 23, 60 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
AOM   RÖM:  49, 224 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: none 
 ASIA:  131, 219, 220 
 CHINES: none 
 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: none 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: none 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: 69, 112, 113, 124, 131, 144, 169, 170, 171, 172, 177, 189, 172, 218,  
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219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 227 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: none 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: 171 
 ÄGYPT: 223, 323 
 ORIENT: none 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
BGE    RÖM:  28, 46, 48, 55, 201, 229, 248 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: 20, 30, 52, 208 
 ASIA:  P, 52, 56, 188, 208 ,238 
 CHINES: 210, 245, 267 
 ARISCH: 244 
 ARAB: none 
 JAPAN: 229 
 SKANDINAV: 260 
 WIKING: 260 
 GRIECH: 7, 20, 28, 30, 49, 52, 121, 238, 248, 260, 262, 267 
 MUSEL: 20, 30 
 PERSER: 30 
 KELTEN: 48 
 BUDDH: 56, 61, 202 
 CONFUC: none 
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 AMERIK: 44 
 ÄGYPT: P, 28 
 ORIENT: 46, 50, 238 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: 46, 229 
 GÄL:  none 
BT    RÖM:  21, 23 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: P (1), 20, 21 
 ASIA:  1 
 CHINES: none 
 ARISCH: 9 
 ARAB: none 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: none 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: P (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18,  
19, 20, 21, 23 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: 21 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: 7, 18, 21 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: none 
 ÄGYPT: 9, 17 
 ORIENT: 23 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
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 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
CW    RÖM:  E 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: 2 
 INDI/E: 14 
 ASIA:  none 
 CHINES: none 
 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: none 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: 9 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: PS1 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: PS1 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: none 
 ÄGYPT: none 
 ORIENT: none 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
D    RÖM:  9, 71, 72, 74, 175, 195, 207 
 SCHWARZ: 272, 241 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: 14, 96, 113, 130, 136, 197, 575 
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 ASIA:  169, 206 
 CHINES: 206, 560 
 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: 496 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: 130 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: 14, 29, 38, 69, 72, 78, 85, 130, 134, 154, 156, 161, 165, 169, 170, 172,  
175, 190, 195, 199, 207, 272, 306, 360, 367, 424, 426, 430, 496, 529, 
544 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: 130 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: 96, 469, 558 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: 24, 271 
 ÄGYPT: 72, 142, 205, 554 
 ORIENT: 75, 169, 197 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
EH    RÖM:  none 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: III: CW (3) 
 INDI/E: III: D (1) 
 ASIA:  none 
 CHINES: IV:4 
 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: none 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
367 
 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: III: CW (3) 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: I:4, III:2, BT (1, 3, 4), D (1) 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: IV:3 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: I:6, III: TSZ (1) 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: II:4, III: UM (2) 
 ÄGYPT: none 
 ORIENT: none 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
GM    RÖM:  I:11, 16, II:5, III:18, 22 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: III:7, 8, 17, 27 
 ASIA:  III:22 
 CHINES: I:12, 16, II:13 
 ARISCH: I:5, 6, 11, III:26 
 ARAB: I:11 
 JAPAN: I:11 
 SKANDINAV: I:11 
 WIKING: I:11 
 GRIECH: I:5, 10, II:7, 23, III:9, 17, 18, 22 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
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 KELTEN: I:5 
 BUDDH: P (5), I:6, II:21, III:7, 17, 27 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: III:19 
 ÄGYPT: II:5 
 ORIENT: III:17, 24 
 CAMBODJA: III:9 
 NEGER: II:7 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  I:5 
GS     RÖM:  43, 83, 146, 157, 240, 350, 353, 358 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: P (3), 134, 145, 329, 359 
 ASIA:  42, 350 
 CHINES: 24, 69, 146, 377 
 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: 306 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: none 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: P (4), 18, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 135, 139, 146, 149, 155, 302, 317, 339,  
340, 351, 356, 357, 359, 369 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: 9, 108, 134, 142, 346, 347, 353 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: 329, 356 
 ÄGYPT: P (4) 
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 ORIENT: P (3), 135, 141, 291, 350 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
HATH  RÖM:  80, 247, 442, 459, 472, 475, 477 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: 110, 111, 144 
 ASIA:  26, 114, 161, 265, 475 
 CHINES: none 
 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: none 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: none 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: P (1), 45, 68, 80, 81, 96, 111, 114, 144, 145, 154, 170, 195, 214, 218,  
221, 223, 259, 261, 262, 265, 267, 354, 442, 474, 475 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: 144, 607 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: 285 
 ÄGYPT: none 
 ORIENT: 475, 638 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
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NCW    RÖM:  none 
SCHWARZ: none  
 AFRIK: none (but note VII, where Nietzsche remarks on the ‘dark continent’  
“Where the ‘slaves’ ought to be freed”) 
 INDI/E: E (1) 
 ASIA:  none 
 CHINES: none 
 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: none 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: V 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: VI, E (2) 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: none 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: none 
 ÄGYPT: E (2) 
 ORIENT: none 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
OTL     RÖM:  1 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: none 
 ASIA:  none 
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 CHINES: none 
 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: none 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: none 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: 2 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: none 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: none 
 ÄGYPT: none 
 ORIENT: none 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
TI    RÖM:  X:1, 2 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: III:5, VII:3 
 ASIA:  none 
 CHINES: IX:40 
 ARISCH: VII:4 
 ARAB: none 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: none 
 WIKING: none 
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 GRIECH: II:2, 3, 5, 10, III:5, IX:23, 47, X:2, 3, 4 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: none 
 CONFUC: VII:5 
 AMERIK: none 
 ÄGYPT: III:1, X:2 
 ORIENT: none 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
TSZ    RÖM:  none 
 SCHWARZ: none (but note IV:6, where Nietzsche refers to the last pope as a  
“schwarzen Manne”) 
 AFRIK: IV: 16 (2) 
 INDI/E: none 
 ASIA:  none 
 CHINES: none 
 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: none 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: none 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: I:15 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: none 
Hudgens  Forget Not the Whip 
373 
 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: none 
 ÄGYPT: none 
 ORIENT: none 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
 GÄL:  none 
UM     RÖM:  I:12; II:5, 8, 9; III:2, 8; IV: none 
 SCHWARZ: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 AFRIK: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 INDI/E: I:11; II: none; III:3, 6, 8; IV:6 
 ASIA:  I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: 1 
 CHINES: I: none; II:8; III:6; IV: none 
 ARISCH: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 ARAB: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 JAPAN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 SKANDINAV: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 WIKING: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 GRIECH: I:1, 2; II:P, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; III:2, 3, 6, 8; IV:1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 
 MUSEL: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 PERSER: I:6; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 KELTEN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 BUDDH: I:9; II: none; III:3, 7; IV: none 
 CONFUC: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 AMERIK: I:9; II:2; III:8; IV: none 
 ÄGYPT: I: none; II:10; III: none; IV: none 
 ORIENT: I: none; II:10; III:1, 6; IV:4 
 CAMBODJA: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 NEGER: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
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 PHÖNI: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 GÄL:  I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
WS     RÖM:  110, 215, 216, 225 
 SCHWARZ: none 
 AFRIK: none 
 INDI/E: none 
 ASIA:  215, 231 
 CHINES: none 
 ARISCH: none 
 ARAB: none 
 JAPAN: none 
 SKANDINAV: none 
 WIKING: none 
 GRIECH: 114, 122, 127, 140, 167, 184, 190, 214, 215, 225, 226, 232, 265, 285,  
295, 336 
 MUSEL: none 
 PERSER: none 
 KELTEN: none 
 BUDDH: none 
 CONFUC: none 
 AMERIK: 215, 287 
 ÄGYPT: 105 
 ORIENT: none 
 CAMBODJA: none 
 NEGER: none 
 PHÖNI: none 
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List of passages referring to class or rank: (“Classe-,” or “Klasse-,” “Rang-,” “Junker-,” 
and “Pöbel-,”) 
A   KLASSE: 27 
 RANG: 27, 39, 43, 44, 45, 57 
 JUNKER: none 
 PÖBEL: none 
AOM   KLASSE: 170 
 RANG: 25, 141, 169, 220, 318, 320, 362 
 JUNKER: none 
 PÖBEL: 324, 386 
BGE    KLASSE: 19, 61 
 RANG:  5, 6, 20, 30, 32, 36, 59, 61, 62, 194, 203, 204, 212, 213, 219,  
221, 224, 228, 245, 257, 260, 263, 265, 268, 270, 285, 287, 294 
 JUNKER: none 
 PÖBEL: 14, 22, 49, 58, 61, 190, 204, 205, 212, 224, 254, 264, 282, 287 
BT    KLASSE: none 
 RANG: 14 
 JUNKER: none 
 PÖBEL: none 
CW    KLASSE: none 
 RANG: 7, 8, PS1 
 JUNKER: E 
 PÖBEL: none 
D    KLASSE: (c) 175, 203, (k) 554 
 RANG: 27, 104, 141, 198, 278, 446, 548 
 JUNKER: 234 
 PÖBEL: 157, 188 
EH    KLASSE: I:4 
 RANG: II:6, 9, 10, III:5, BT (2), D (2), CW (4), IV:5 
 JUNKER: I:4, III:1 
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 PÖBEL: I:4, IV:1 
GM    KLASSE: none 
 RANG: P (3) (Ranggrade), I:2, 5, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17fn, II:5, 6, 7, 12, 20, III:11,  
23, 25 
 JUNKER: III:17 
 PÖBEL: I:2, 4, 9, 16, II:3 
GS     KLASSE: (c) 5, 56, 94, 348 
 RANG: 23, 44, 76, 83, 87, 94, 95, 115, 116, 123, 266, 281, 290, 318, 344, 356,  
358, 373 
 JUNKER: none 
 PÖBEL: P (4), 95, 104, 144, 187, 282, 292 
HATH  KLASSE: (c) 201, 243, 244, 340, 451, 472, 475, 480, 635 
 RANG: P (6, 7), 42, 103, 107, 132 
 JUNKER: none 
 PÖBEL: 250 
NCW    KLASSE: none 
 RANG: I, X (3) 
 JUNKER: none 
 PÖBEL: E (2) 
OTL     KLASSE: 1 
 RANG: 1 
 JUNKER: none 
 PÖBEL: none 
TI    KLASSE: IX:30 
 RANG: III:4, VII:4, IX:21 
 JUNKER: none 
 PÖBEL: II:3, 5, 7, IX:6 
TSZ    KLASSE: none 
 RANG: III:4 
 JUNKER: IV:3 (1) 
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 PÖBEL: I:7, III:12 (5, 11), IV:3 (1), 5 (2), 8, 11, 13 (1, 3, 8, 9, 16, 19, 20) 
UM     KLASSE: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 RANG: I:9; II: none; III: 7; IV: none 
 JUNKER: none 
 PÖBEL: I: none; II: 7; III: none; IV: none 
WS     KLASSE: 197, 215, 233, 293 
 RANG: 30, 33, 58, 167 
 JUNKER: none 




List of passages referencing men: (“-mann-”)  
I exclude here the uses of jedermann. 
A  16 (Privatmann), 17, 23, 31 (Wundermann), 32 (Hauptmannes?), 38, 46, 52 
(Kalendarmann), 53 (Kirchenmann), 56 (eignen Mann), 58, 59, 60 
AOM  3, 32 (Seemann), 95, 169 (Kaufmann), 170, 191, 207, 268, 272, 273, 274, 281, 286, 287, 
291, 301, 320, 324, 390 
BGE  11, 20, 22, 28, 30, 33, 57, 58, 62, 85, 94, 97, 126, 131, 139, 144, 145, 204 (Hartmann), 
209, 212, 216, 220, 230, 231, 232, 233, 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 245 (Schumann), 248, 
262, 269, 293 
BT  F (RW), 1, 9, 13, 14, 18 (Eckermann), 20 (Winkelmann), 21, 23  
CW  3, 7, 11 (Riemann), PS1 
D  3, 9, 14, 28, 29, 42, 75, 78, 88 (Bergmannssohn), 111, 119, 133, 163, 166, 167, 168,  
170, 172, 175, 177, 178, 182, 188, 191, 199, 201, 226, 231, 276, 285, 294, 321, 324, 325 
(Wundermann), 342, 346, 347, 372, 379, 403, 436, 482, 503, 504, 522, 542 
EH  I:3 (Edelmann), II:1 (Seemann), 9, III:3, 5, HATH:3  
GM  I:4, 5, 9, 10, 14, III:1, 3, 5, 8, 9 (Medizinmann), 19, 22, 26 
GS  F (3, 22, 50), 2, 6, 24 (Mannspersonen), 30, 31, 38, 40, 48, 60, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71,  
72, 73, 74, 75, 82, 95, 99, 104, 119, 122, 169, 208, 283, 293, 302, 340, 351, 356, 358, 
360, 361, 362, 363, 366, 377, A (5, 9) 
HATH 3, 13, 51, 61, 80, 98, 122, 137, 139, 147, 163, 174, 203, 207, 208, 242, 243, 250, 259,  
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261, 267, 272, 283, 298, 342, 353, 356, 371, 374, 377, 384, 388, 390, 394, 399, 400, 401, 
405, 407, 408, 410, 411, 412, 414, 415, 417, 420, 421, 424, 425, 430, 434, 435, 440, 445, 
449, 453, 458, 460, 470, 472, 481, 487, 492, 579, 594, 599, 612, 615, 627, 636 
NCW  IV (2), VIII (3), X (1), E (1) 
OTL   1 
TI  I:13, 28, II:8, VI:2, VII:3, VIII:1, 2, 5, IX:3, 6, 12, 13, 38, 39, 44, 45, 47, X:3  
TSZ  P (2, 6, 8), I:7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, II:1, 5 (1), 10, 12 (12), 15, 18, III:2 (1), 5  
 (2), 10 (2), 12, 23, 28, IV: 2, 5 (1, 2), 6, 8, 13 (13), 14 (2), 16 (1, 2), 17 (1), 18 (2) 
UM   I:q, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12; II: 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; III: 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 (Mannes- 
 Natur), 9, 10; IV: 1q, 1, 4, 6, 7, 8  
WS   9, 17, 20, 22, 25, 42, 43, 65, 73, 84, 90, 107, 109, 115, 118, 125, 155, 168, 169, 215, 216, 




List of passages referencing men: ( “Bru/üder-,” “Va/äter-,” “Ju/ünge-,” “So/öhn-,” 
“Knabe-,” “Herr-,” “Gebieter-,” “Magnat-,” “Lord-,” “Meister-,” “Onkel-,” “Neffe-,”)  
Note: Excluding variations like Vaterland. 
A  BRUDER:  45 (Brüdern) 
VATER:  10 (Grossvater), 34, 45, 52 (vaterlandischen), 55, 59 (Kirchenväter) 
JUNG:  31, 40  
SOHN:  10, 26, 34, 40, 41 
KNABE:  none 
HERR:  6 (Herrschaft), 8, 12 (geherrscht), 17 (Herren, Herrische, Hern), 21, 22,  
23, 24 (beherrscht), 26 (herrschend), 27 (herrschenden Klasse/Ordnung), 
29, 31 (verherrlicht?), 38, 39 (herrschten?, Herrschaft),  40 (herrschende 
Judentum), 43 (Herrschaftsrechten), 44 (verherrlichen, Herrschaft), 48 
(herrschte), 49 (herrscht), 51, 53, 55, 57, 58, 59 
GEBIETER:  none  
MAGNAT:  none 
LORD:  none 
MEISTER:  31, 40, 44 (allermeistern), 45 
ONKEL:  none 
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NEFFE:  none 
KÖNIG: 25, 57 
FÜRST: 9, 38 
PRINZ: none 
MAGISTER: none 
AOM  BRUDER: 347 
VATER: P (1), 96, 144, 176, 223, 301 
JUNG: 69, 161, 170, 173, 231, 268, 269, 277, 293, 300 
SOHN: none 
KNABE: none 




MEISTER: 15, 26, 55, 98, 110, 113, 125, 126, 131, 147, 220, 231, 318, 320, 324,  
 341, 356, 357 
ONKEL: none 





BGE  BRUDER: 52, 61, 202, 252 
VATER: 6, 53, 191, 194, 209, 214, 216, 261 
JUNG: 11, 50, 61, 251 
SOHN: 164, 209, 235 
KNABE: none 
HERR: 6, 14, 16, 19, 25, 46, 61, 82, 198, 202, 204, 207, 212, 229, 230, 234, 239,  




MEISTER: 7, 28, 186, 189, 200, 239, 240, 245, 246, 256, 295 
ONKEL: none 
NEFFE: none 
KÖNIG: 61, 204, 209, 258 






BT  BRUDER: P (7), 9, 21, 22, 24 
VATER: P (1), 3, 4, 5, 9, 18 
JUNG: P (3, 4), 13, 14, 15, 17 
SOHN: 1, 15 
KNABE: 4, 6, 10, 22 




MEISTER: 8, 11, 14, 19 
ONKEL: none 
NEFFE: none 




CW  BRUDER: none 
VATER: 9, PS1 (fn), E 
JUNG: P (3}, 5, 6, 8, 10, PS1 
SOHN: PS1 
KNABE: none 











D  BRUDER: 78, 45 ,132, 575 
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VATER: 35, 62, 81, 128, 176, 199, 205, 432, 449, 473, 540 
JUNG: P (3), 72, 196, 207, 297, 504, 544, 547 
SOHN: P (3), 68, 88 (Bergmannssohn), 206, 254, 336 
KNABE: 195, 357 
HERR: 152, 183, 205, 206 
GEBIETER: 260 
MAGNAT: none 
LORD: 109, 254 
MEISTER: P (3), 13, 68, 142, 207, 344, 423, 447, 575 
ONKEL: none 
NEFFE: none 
KÖNIG: 59, 113, 142, 240 
FÜRST: 26, 60, 97, 105, 146,  158,  188, 189, 191, 207, 321, 374, 448, 526 
PRINZ: none 
MAGISTER: none 
EH  BRUDER: I:8 
VATER: I:1, 3, 4, 5, III HATH:4 
JUNG: P (4) 
SOHN: none 
KNABE: II:1 





MEISTER: I:1, III HATH:2, CW:1 
ONKEL: none 
NEFFE: none 
KÖNIG: III HATH:2 
FÜRST: none 
PRINZ: III GS 
MAGISTER: none 
GM  BRUDER: I:14 
VATER: P(3), I:15, II:22, III:22, 27 
JUNG: I:16, II:25, III:3, 6, 20 
SOHN: III:7 
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KNABE: P (3) 









FÜRST: II:6, III:8 
PRINZ: none 
MAGISTER: none 
GS  BRUDER: F (41), 1, 16, 222, 278, 362, A (14) 
VATER: 9, 36, 72, 92, 95, 210, 221, 223, 347, 348, 357, A (4) 
JUNG: P(4), 21, 25, 32, 68, 84, 99, 106, 123, 340, 357, 359, 371, 381 
SOHN: 9, 221, 348 
KNABE: 208, 278 




MEISTER: Frontpoem, P (3), 75, 80, 87, 92, 99, 106, 138, 281, 292, 303, 354, 356,  
 361, 366 
ONKEL: none 
NEFFE: none 
KÖNIG: 61, 70, 102, 103, 136, 175, 188, 223, 383  
FÜRST: 5, 22, 176, 282, 329, 347 
PRINZ: 22, 167, A (title) 
MAGISTER: none 
HATH  BRUDER: 34, 291, 473 
VATER: 51, 72, 81, 110, 133, 227, 259, 268, 272, 381, 382, 386, 389, 408, 411,  
 422, 450, 455, 456, 471, 592, 596, 600, 631 
JUNG: 147, 259, 291, 339, 582, 600, 612, 613 
SOHN: P (2), 51, 78, 81, 113, 144, 227, 268, 272, 382, 385, 455 
KNABE: 479 
HERR: P (3, 6), 11, 45, 93, 114, 139, 213, 450, 612 





LORD: 221, 422 




FÜRST: 81, 101, 194, 237, 249, 370, 441, 445, 461, 475, 596, 629, 631 
PRINZ: none 
MAGISTER: none 
NCW  BRUDER: none 
VATER: P 
JUNG: E (2) 
SOHN: none 
KNABE: none 











OTL  BRUDER: none 
VATER: 1 (fn) 
JUNG: none 
















TI  BRUDER: XI 
VATER: IX:2 
JUNG: II:8, IX:6, 23, 47, X:2, 5 
SOHN: none 
KNABE: none 











TSZ  BRUDER: P (3), I:3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 (1, 2, 3), II:quote, 2,  
3, 4, 6, 20, III:2 (2), 8 (2), 12 (4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29),  IV:3 (1), 8, 12, 13 (2, 3, 4, 17, 19, 20), 
18 (1) 
VATER: I: 2, 15, II:2, 7, 14, III:8 (2), 12 (11, 16), IV:3 (1, 2), 8, 13 (13), 19 (3, 6) 
JUNG: I:2, 8, 19, 21, 22 (1, 2, 3), II:1, 4, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20 
SOHN: II:7, IV:6, 11 
KNABE: P (2), IV:5 
HERR: I:1, 2, 12, 20, 21, II:8, 10, 12, III:3, 5 (2), 12 (11, 21), 14, IV:3 (1), 6, 13  
 (2, 3), 19 (4, 5, 7), 20 
GEBIETER: I:4, 20 
MAGNAT: none 
LORD: none 
MEISTER: I:14, II, 5, III:10 (1), 12 (2, 16), IV:1, 4, 6, 8 
ONKEL: none 
NEFFE: none 
KÖNIG: II:18, III:11 (2), 12 (21), IV:3 (1, 2), 11, 12, 16 (1), 17 (2) 
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FÜRST: III:7, 12 (12) 
PRINZ: none 
MAGISTER: none 
UM  BRUDER: I:2, 12; II:9; III: 2, 8; IV: 1q  
VATER: I:7; II:3, 7; III:11; IV: 2, 4, 7, 8 
JUNG: I:12; II:7, 10; III: 1, 2, 3; IV: 4, 6, 7, 8 
SOHN: I:2; II:8; III: none; IV: 2, 8 
KNABE: I:12; II:7; III:2; IV: none 
HERR: I: none; II:1, 6, 7, 9; III: 1, 2, 5, 8, 10; IV: 2 (Hause Herren), 6, 8 
GEBIETER: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
MAGNAT: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
LORD: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
MEISTER: I:5, 7, 9, 12; II:2, 6, 7, 9, 10; III: 3, 5, 8, 9, 10; IV:1, 2, 4, 6, 8 
ONKEL: I:4; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
NEFFE: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
KÖNIG: I:7, 12; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
FÜRST: I: none; II:2; III:10; IV:8 
PRINZ: I: none; II: none; III:4; IV: none 
MAGISTER: I:3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
WS  BRUDER: 29, 66, 180, 263 
VATER: 74, 84, 90, 125, 158, 216, 281 
JUNG: P, 5, 73, 109, 118, 125, 161, 190, 216, 222, 266, 268 
SOHN: 84 
KNABE: 125, 172, 295, 303 




MEISTER: 65, 179, 266, 280 
ONKEL: none 
NEFFE: none 
KÖNIG: 34, 118, 232, 281 









References to the human: (“Mensch-,” and “Human-”) 
Note: Because Nietzsche uses the word “Mensch” so frequently, I have included only the number 
of usages below, followed after the semicolon by the specific passages in which the more rare 
“Human” variants appear. 
A  135 usages; §62 
AOM  183 usages; §62, 231 
BGE   393 usages; §22, 35, 210, 252, 257 
BT  166 usages; §19 
CW  22 usages; §3 (l’humanité) 
D  477 usages; §49, 63, 81, 149,191, 447, 528, 546 
EH   163 usages; §I:5, 8, III UM:2, CW1, 4 
GM   283 usages; none 
GS   481 usages; §77, 115, 377 
HATH 732 usages; §246 
NCW   18 usages; §VI 
OTL   62 usages; none 
TI  136 usages; §VII:4, VIII:3, 5, IX:15, 37 
TSZ 509 usages; none 
UM   I: 74 usages; none; II: 183 usages; §2; III: 115 usages; none; IV: 233 usages; §8 
WS   261 usages; §7, 205, 209, 284, 288 
Total:  4,626; 40 
 
 
References to eunuchs: 
A   none 
AOM  none 
BGE   none 
BT  none 
CW  none 
D  none 
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EH  none 
GM  III:26 
GS   none 
HATH none 
NCW   none 
OTL   none 
TI  none 
TSZ  none 
UM   I: none; II: 5; III: none; IV: none 
WS   none 
Total:  2 
 
 
References to breeding: (“Zucht-”, “Zücht-”, “Zuecht-”) 
A   3, 25, 36, 37, 41, 47, 53, also Gesetz wider das Christenthum 
AOM  P (1, 3, 5), 26, 113, 269 
BGE   P, 4, 61, 62, 142, 188, 199, 200, 201, 203, 207, 210, 213, 219, 225, 230, 239, 242,  
251, 252, 257, 261, 263, 264 
BT  2 
CW  11, PS1 
D  18, 36, 68, 75, 111, 207, 328, 344, 366 
EH  I:2, II:9, III: BT:4, UM:1, 3, HATH:5, CW:2, IV:7 
GM  I:11, II:1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, III:4, 6, 11, 12, 15, 18, 23, 27 
GS   76, 111, 113, 344, 357, 361, 366, 377 
HATH P (4), 108, 130 144, 194, 234, 266,629 
NCW   none 
OTL   none 
TI  VII:2, 3, 4, 5, IX:28, 38, 45, 47 
TSZ  P (4), II:10, III:12:12, IV:13 (13, 20), 15, 17 (2) 
UM   I:1, 2, 5, 12; II:3; III:1, 2; IV: none 
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References to democracy: (“demok-” root) 
Please note that Nietzsche makes only a single reference to “Emanzipation,” in his published 
works, namely A 48, and this is specifically a reference to the “Emanzipation vom Priester,” with 
no explicit reference to the emancipation of any other group. 
A   17, 51 
AOM  316 
BGE   P, 22, 44, 202, 203, 204, 208, 210, 224, 239, 242, 245, 254, 261 
BT  P (4, 6), 7 
CW  none 
D  168 
EH  none 
GM  I:4, 5, 9, II:12, III:8, 25 
GS   103, 348, 356, 368 
HATH 15, 261, 472 
NCW   none 
OTL   none 
TI  III:5, VIII:5, IX:2, 38, 39, 44 
TSZ  none 
UM   I:7, 12; II:5; III: none; IV: none 




References to equality, sameness, and identity: (“gleich-,” “Gleichheit”) 
Note that there are no references to the ‘egalitarian’ or “egalitären/egalitaeren” in Nietzsche’s 
published works.  
A   GLEICH: P, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 38 ,39,  
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40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, also 
Gesetz wider das Christenthum 
GLEICHHEIT: 43, 57, 62 
AOM   GLEICH: P (1, 2, 4, 5), 24, 26, 33, 37, 49, 51, 73, 88, 90, 91, 98, 99, 101, 113,  
119, 126, 127, 134, 144, 149, 162, 163, 171, 172, 173, 177, 179, 180, 
189, 194, 203, 218, 219, 220, 222, 224, 225, 226, 228, 236, 241, 245, 
259, 261, 267, 285, 287, 304, 318, 319, 323, 335, 339, 349, 352, 356, 
375, 383, 400, 402 
GLEICHHEIT: 126 
BGE   GLEICH: 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 30, 31, 34, 36, 39,  
40, 41, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 77, 81, 85, 98, 
124, 131, 148, 173, 179, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 196, 198, 200, 201, 
202, 203, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 218, 219, 224, 
227, 228, 230, 234, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 247, 248, 250, 
252, 253, 254, 256, 258, 259, 260, 262, 264, 265, 268, 269, 270, 283, 
285, 293, 295, A 
GLEICHHEIT: 22, 30, 44, 201, 212, 219 
BT    GLEICH: P (1, 3, 4, 5, 6), F (RW), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,  
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 
GLEICHHEIT: none 
CW    GLEICH: 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, PS1, PS2, E 
GLEICHHEIT: none 
D    GLEICH: P (2, 3, 5), 9, 11, 14, 17, 24, 26, 27, 36, 38, 42, 44, 53, 61, 62, 63, 68,  
70, 71, 72, 77, 78, 84, 85, 87, 102, 105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 117, 
118, 119, 125, 126, 129, 132, 133, 136, 137, 146, 147, 149, 157, 166, 
172, 192, 195, 197, 199, 201, 202, 206, 207, 210, 216, 219, 261, 272, 
287, 290, 297, 298, 312, 323, 326, 327, 328, 381, 414, 424, 426, 427, 
429, 436, 440, 441, 448, 449, 460, 468, 469, 471, 472, 477, 481, 483, 
499, 529, 532, 538, 539, 540, 542, 543, 548, 549, 550, 553, 560, 562, 
564, 566 
GLEICHHEIT: 138, 532 
EH    GLEICH: P (4), I:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, II:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, III:1, 3, 4, 5, BT (2,  
4), UM (2, 3), HATH (1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6), D (1), TSZ (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8), 
BGE (2), TI (3), CW (1, 2, 4), VI:1, 7, 8 
GLEICHHEIT: I:7 
GM    GLEICH: P (2, 3, 4, 6, 7), I:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 17fn,  
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II:1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, III:2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 
12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 
GLEICHHEIT: none 
GS     GLEICH: P (2, 3, 4), F (5, 11, 33, 41, 62), 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17,  
18, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 38, 40, 42, 46, 48, 49, 54, 58, 60, 61, 
69, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 
102, 104, 109, 110, 111, 120, 127, 128, 133, 136, 137, 145, 149, 156, 
166, 174, 190, 218, 224, 228, 233, 240, 256, 261, 268, 281, 282, 283, 
288, 289, 291, 293, 295, 296, 300, 301, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 316, 
317, 318, 319, 321, 322, 335, 337, 338, 339, 342, 343, 345, 347, 351, 
353, 354, 356, 357, 360, 361, 362, 363, 366, 369, 370, 371, 375, 377, 
378, 379, 380, 381, 382, A (1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 11, 14) 
GLEICHHEIT: 18, 111, 120, 335 
HATH  GLEICH: P (1, 2, 3, 5, 7), 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25, 36, 37,  
42, 44, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 60, 78, 79, 81, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 101, 110, 
111, 112, 114, 128, 132, 133, 136, 137, 138, 141, 143, 145, 152, 158, 
159, 160, 163, 164, 168, 178, 190, 199, 201, 212, 217, 218, 221, 2222, 
223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 233, 234, 236, 238, 242, 250, 251, 255, 260, 
261, 262, 265, 272, 275, 278, 282, 290, 291, 305, 312, 316, 318, 321, 
324, 338, 349, 352, 360, 369, 371, 372, 376, 380, 410, 411, 416, 418, 
424, 426, 430, 431, 433, 443, 447, 448, 451, 453, 457, 463, 470, 472, 
473, 477 ,479, 481, 503, 512, 561, 585, 595, 596, 603, 607, 609, 611, 
613, 616, 617, 625, 626, 628, 631, 638 
GLEICHHEIT: P (1), 11, 110, 224, 300, 451 
NCW    GLEICH: I, II, IV:1, VI, VIII:2, 3, IX:2, X:3, E (1, 2), P 
GLEICHHEIT: none 
OTL     GLEICH: 1, 2 
GLEICHHEIT: none 
TI    GLEICH: I:19, II:1, 2, 4 ,7, 9, 11, III:4, 5, V:2, VI:3, 4, 6, 8, VII:2, 3, VIII:4,  
IX:2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 20, 21, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49 
GLEICHHEIT: IX:37, 48 
TSZ    GLEICH: P (1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10), I:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21,  
22 (1, 2), II:1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
III:1, 2 (1, 2), 3, 4, 5 (1, 2, 3), 6, 8 (1), 9, 10 (1, 2), 11 (1, 2), 12 (2, 3, 11, 
12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 30), 13 (2), 14, 16 (2), IV:1, 2, 3 (1, 2), 4, 5 (1, 2), 
6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13 (1, 7, 11, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20), 14 (2, 3), 15, 16 (1, 2), 
17 (1,  2), 19 (1, 2, 6, 9), 20 
GLEICHHEIT: II:7 
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UM     GLEICH: I:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; II:P, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10;  
III:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; IV: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
GLEICHHEIT: I: none; II: none; III:  none; IV: 4 
WS     GLEICH: P, 6, 11, 12, 14, 16, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 47, 50, 57, 63,  
69, 73, 81, 83, 84, 87, 93, 110, 111, 115, 123, 130, 136, 139, 145, 159, 
165, 171, 177, 181, 184, 189, 190, 191, 195, 203, 204, 213, 214, 215, 
216, 219, 226, 258, 260, 263, 269, 279, 285, 292, 295, 299, 308, 318, 
320, 323, 339, 341, 350, A 





INDEX III: TRUTH, WISDOM, KNOWLEDGE, AND BELIEF 
 
List of passages referencing truth: (“Wahrheit-,” “Wahr-,” “-echt-,” “-ä/aecht,-” 
“wirklich,” “treu,”) Note: Die Wahrheit ist feminin, which is to say that in German, “truth” is a 
feminine noun. Also: “wahr” translates as true, real, and genuine. 
A   WAHRHEIT:  P, 8, 9 (Kriterium der Wahrheit), 12 (Kriterium der Wahrheit), 13, 23,  
 29, 32, 34, 38, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50 (Kriterium der Wahrheit), 52, 53, 54, 55 
(Feinde der Wahrheit), 57, 58, 59, 62 
 WAHR:  7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 29, 31, 35, 39, 42, 45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 58 
(wahre Dinge)  
 Ä/ECHT: 13, 39, 41, 57 
 WIRKLICH: 8, 15, 20, 23, 39, 40, 42, 47, 56, 58 
 TREU: 31, 33 
AOM   WAHRHEIT: P (1, 3), 5, 6, 7, 8, 20, 26, 32, 79, 96, 98, 125, 126, 165, 190, 208, 222,  
  226, 261, 270, 285, 286, 297, 345, 358 
 WAHR: 7, 11, 13, 26, 31, 32, 33, 55, 61, 87, 88, 99, 126, 148, 169, 171, 212,  
222, 223, 226, 238, 245, 246, 273, 302 
 Ä/ECHT: 32, 113, 115, 154, 171, 301, 304 (Unechte), 327 
 WIRKLICH: 3, 26, 32, 33, 96, 98, 99, 114, 118, 126, 135, 176, 178, 190, 219, 220,  
  224, 225, 227, 228, 241, 270, 273, 304, 318, 330 
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 TREU: 268, 357  
BGE  WAHRHEIT: P, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 25, 34, 35, 39, 43, 44, 45, 48, 59, 62,  
 81, 128, 134, 166, 191, 202, 205, 210, 211, 220, 229, 230, 231, 232, 241, 
244, 253, 257, 296 
 WAHR: 1, 2, 5, 11, 16, 18, 20, 22, 25, 29, 34, 39, 41, 43, 48, 54, 77, 177, 188,  
 189, 192, 205, 208, 210, 214, 226, 227, 230, 232, 238, 240, 242, 244, 
251, 254, 260, 261, 264, 266, 269, 277, 281, 282, 284, 293, 295 
 Ä/ECHT: 7, 10, 47, 207, 210, 213, 222, 239, 240, 252, 254, 260, 294 
 WIRKLICH: P, 4, 6, 10, 16, 21, 36, 47, 56, 61, 193, 194, 204, 208, 211, 220, 228, 230, 
244, 245, 252, 254, 283 
 TREU: 46, 50, 192, 214, 244, 264, 269, 293 
BT  WAHRHEIT:  P (1, 5), 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22 
 WAHR: P (4, 5, 7), 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 25 
 Ä/ECHT: P (5, 7), 5, 7, 8, 918, 21, 22 
 WIRKLICH:  P (4, 7), F (RW), 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24 
 TREU: 11, 19 
CW  WAHRHEIT: PS1 (fn) 
 WAHR: 3, 4, 8, 9 (fn), E 
 Ä/ECHT: 8, 11, 12 
 WIRKLICH: 1, 3, 7, 9, 11 
 TREU: 3, PS1 (fn) 
D  WAHRHEIT: P (3, 4), 6, 26, 32, 45, 47, 59, 60, 73, 90, 91, 93, 103, 108, 116, 133,  
 163, 164, 168, 176, 192, 196, 204, 215, 245, 255, 259, 277, 353, 370, 
396, 407, 423, 424, 433, 451, 456, 460, 469, 479, 490, 507, 511, 512, 
532, 535, 539, 542, 543 
 WAHR: P (3), 1, 14, 22, 33, 34, 37, 38, 50, 68, 72, 77, 84, 91, 93, 96, 102, 108,  
 109, 111, 113, 121, 129, 146, 150, 155, 163, 167, 197, 201, 202, 205, 
223, 241, 255, 270, 272, 302, 349, 379, 418, 456, 472, 479, 507, 539, 
542, 546 
 Ä/ECHT: 177, 192, 226, 337, 424, 529, 542 
 WIRKLICH: 7, 10, 14, 15, 18, 26, 32, 33, 43, 68, 76, 77, 78, 88, 90, 92, 103, 105,  
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 113, 116, 117, 128, 130, 134, 142, 169, 190, 195, 196, 201, 215, 217, 
240, 244, 248, 270, 298, 307, 324, 348, 392, 433, 437, 448, 456, 543, 
545, 550, 551, 559, 561 
 TREU: 27, 136, 199, 237, 433 
EH  WAHRHEIT: P (3, 4), I:6, II:1, 4, 9, 10, III:1, 3, BT:2, 4, HATH:2, 6, D:2, TSZ:3, 6,  
  GM, TI:1, 2, CW:2, 3, IV:1, 3, 4, 5, 8 
 WAHR: P (2), I:8, II:10, III:3, D:1, TSZ:1, CW:2, 4, IV:3, 4, 5, 8 
 Ä/ECHT: II:3, III:1, HATH:2, CW:1 
 WIRKLICH: III:2, 4, UM:2, HATH:1, TSZ:3, IV:7, 8 
 TREU: none 
GM  WAHRHEIT: P (2, 6), I:1, 8, 11, 15, 16, II:4, 11, III:7 (?), 8, 12, 17, 19, 23, 24, 25, 27 
 WAHR: P (3, 4,), I:3, 5, 8, 11, 17fn, II:6, 13, 15, 20, 24, III:9, 10, 11, 12, 15,  
  16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 27 
 Ä/ECHT: II:14, III:19, 25 
 WIRKLICH: P (7), I:5, 10, 13, 16, II:2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 14, 22, 24, III:2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9,  
  10, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27 
 TREU: I:11, III:19 
GS  WAHRHEIT: P (2, 4), F (47), 1, 4, 13, 14, 20, 23, 25, 51, 64, 76, 84, 88, 94, 105,  
 106, 110, 112, 123, 126, 138, 152, 205, 253, 260, 265, 307, 311, 326, 
333, 344, 345, 347, 353, 354, 356, 357, 373, 377, 381 
 WAHR: P (4), 1, 8, 9, 10, 21, 22, 23, 25, 37, 40, 54, 58, 68, 76, 84, 92, 99, 104,  
 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 124, 176, 194, 234, 279, 280, 292, 296, 303, 
307, 309, 310, 318, 324, 335, 338, 343, 344, 347, 349, 351, 357, 366, 
373, 377, 382, A (3, 11) 
 Ä/ECHT: P (3), 36, 47, 96, 149, 366, 372 
 WIRKLICH: 10, 21, 24, 30, 43, 44, 48, 57, 58, 71, 76, 78, 79, 80, 85, 87, 98, 102,  
 104, 105, 111, 149, 301, 308, 309, 320, 326, 338, 339, 344, 346, 356, 
357, 373, 380, 381 
 TREU: F (7, 55), 23, 99, 103, 112, 229, 296, 312, 345, 350, 358, 363 
HATH WAHRHEIT: 1, 2, 3, 13, 14, 15, 18, 22, 34, 36, 39, 52, 53, 54, 55, 68, 71, 101, 107,  
 109, 110, 131, 134, 138, 141, 146, 155, 161, 162, 187, 220, 225, 227, 
244, 251, 257, 261, 264, 265, 360, 426, 441, 477, 483, 501, 506, 516, 
517, 519, 609, 630, 631, 634, 633, 635, 636 
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 WAHR: P (1), 4, 5, 9, 11, 13, 19, 21, 30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 46, 53, 61, 97, 107,  
 110, 120, 131, 133, 136, 137, 138, 141, 145, 146, 150, 161, 164, 212, 
317, 221, 222, 225, 227, 237, 238, 251, 252, 253, 254, 259, 264, 282, 
285, 291, 302, 359, 376, 377, 378, 424, 425, 426, 434, 439, 472, 476, 
481, 491, 488, 599, 609, 612, 614, 624, 630, 633, 637 
 Ä/ECHT: 38, 157, 264, 456 
 WIRKLICH: 11, 27, 29, 33, 36, 45, 46, 51, 57, 73, 97, 108, 110, 116, 141, 148, 157,  
 160, 170, 182, 208, 211, 212, 214, 221, 222, 234, 235, 240, 263, 264, 
266, 269, 284, 347, 353, 373, 396, 412, 416, 429, 446, 461, 476, 586, 
599, 600, 621, 629, 634, 636 
 TREU: 22, 57, 58, 64, 72, 250, 253, 274, 351, 489, 511, 536, 629 
NCW  WAHRHEIT: IX (1), E (2), P 
 WAHR: V, X (1), E (2) 
 Ä/ECHT: V, E (1) 
 WIRKLICH: I, IV (2), VII, VIII (2, 3) 
 TREU: X (2) 
OTL  WAHRHEIT: 1, 2 
 WAHR: 1, 2 
 Ä/ECHT: none 
 WIRKLICH: 1, 2 
 TREU: 1 
TI  WAHRHEIT: I:4, 16, II:1, III:5, IV, VI:4, 5, 6, VII:1, IX:5, 20, 21, 42, 48 
 WAHR: I:31, II:1, 2, 9, III:1, 2, 4, 6, IV, VI:5, 6, IX:38, 44, 48, X:4 
 Ä/ECHT: I:38, IX:9, 18 
 WIRKLICH: III:1, 3, 6, V:6, VIII:1, IX:3, 7, 19, 32, 36, 37 
 TREU: VIII:1, 2 
TSZ  WAHRHEIT:  P (6, 9); I: 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21; II: 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12,  
13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22; III: 2 (2), 5 (2), 9, 11 (2), 12 (7, 10, 23, 26); IV: 4, 
5 (2), 7, 9, 13 (1, 9), 14 (3), 15, 19 (1), 20 
 WAHR:  P (3, 4, 7, 8, 10), I:1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22 (1, 2,  
 3), II: quote, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
20, 21, 22, III:1, 2 (1, 2), 3, 4, 5 (1, 2, 3), 6, 8 (1, 2), 9, 10 (2), 11 (1, 2), 
12 (2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 18, 21, 30), 13 (2), 14, 15 (1), 16 
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(1, 6), IV:1, 2, 3 (1), 4, 5, (2), 6, 8 (mehr wahr), 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 (3, 5, 
13, 15, 17, 18), 14 (2), 15, 16 (1, 2), 17 (1, 2), 18 (1, 3), 19 (1, 10), 20 
 Ä/ECHT: I:10, 18, III:5 (2), IV: 5 (2), 11 
 WIRKLICH: II:14, 18, 20, IV:4, 15, 17 (2) 
 TREU: P (3), I:6, 15, 22 (2), II:10, 11, III:6, 10 (1), 11 (2), 13, (2), 15 (2),  
  IV:10 
UM  WAHRHEIT: I: 7, 8, 9, 10, 12; II: 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10; III: 3, 6, 9, 11; IV: 3, 4, 6 (Trieb  
  zur Wahrheit), 7, 8 
 WAHR: I:q, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12; II:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; III: 1, 2,  
  3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11; IV: 1, 2, 2q, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
 Ä/ECHT: I:1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 12; II: 4, 6, 9, 10, 12; III: 8 (zwei ächte Tugenden); IV:  
 2 (echtes Vertrauen), 3, 6 (Falschen und Unächten), 8 (der ächten 
Wahrheit) 
 WIRKLICH: I:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; II: 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; III: 4, 5, 6, 7,  
  8, 9, 11; IV: 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 
 TREU: I:2, 8, 11; II:3, 5; III:2, 3, 8, 10, 11; IV:3, 6 
WS  WAHRHEIT: 2, 4, 11, 13, 16, 25, 41, 43, 61, 66, 72, 75, 112, 213, 215, 237, 262,  
  316, 333, 349 
 WAHR: P, 1, 10, 11, 14, 17, 22, 33, 57, 66, 73, 74, 102, 123, 125, 140, 150, 162, 
169, 174, 189, 201, 209, 213, 220, 246, 257, 320, 350, E 
 Ä/ECHT: 5, 103 
 WIRKLICH: P, 5, 6, 14, 17, 23, 29, 33, 43, 68, 69, 70, 84, 87, 91, 103, 105, 118, 122, 
124, 125, 136, 137, 165, 167, 190, 214, 215, 232, 241, 284, 285, 293, 
309, 350 




List of passages referencing falsity and error: (“Falsch-,” “Fälsch-,” “Unwahr-,”  
“Lüge-,” “Lügner-,” “Untreu-,” “Irrt-,”) 
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Note: “Irrthum” refers to error, and “irre” to madness; see “irre” below. Note also the few 
“Nothlügen” or “necessary lies” Nietzsche explicitly references in UM II:10 and HATH 40 and 
104.  
A  FALSCH: 4, 9, 12, 15, 24, 26, 27, 38, 39, 42, 44, 46, 50, 52, 62, also Gesetz wider  
das Christenthum 
UNWAHR: 12, 13, 54, 55 
LÜGE:  8, 10, 15, 18, 26, 36, 38, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 62 
UNTREU: 33 
IRRT:   10, 14, 38, 39, 43, 47, 53, 61 
AOM  FALSCH: 6, 222, 238, 321, 327 
UNWAHR: 26, 186, 223 
LÜGE:  P (1, 3), 6, 26, 37, 188, 345 
UNTREU: 357 
IRRT:   5, 26, 33, 51, 74, 96, 106, 147, 190, 201, 227, 285 
BGE   FALSCH: 4, 9, 11, 16, 17, 19, 24, 28, 31, 34, 39, 40, 44, 59, 62, 186, 191, 207,  
213, 230, 256, 261, 269, 270, 291 
UNWAHR: 1, 4, 16, 24, 45, 59, 62 
LÜGE:  26, 66, 166, 180, 192, 208, 212, 230, 232, 256, 260, 269 
UNTREU: none 
IRRT:   P, 2, 19, 24, 29, 34, 60, 190, 229, 237, 253, 269 
BT  FALSCH: P (1), 9, 19, 21 
UNWAHR: none 
LÜGE:  P (5), 1, 8, 9, 12, 13, 19 
UNTREU: none 
IRRT:   P (5), 7, 9, 12, 15, 20 
CW FALSCH: 1, 10, PS1, PS2, E 
UNWAHR: E 
LÜGE:  1, 7, 12, E 
UNTREU: none 
IRRT:   9fn 
D  FALSCH: P (3), 4, 35, 37, 99, 107, 115, 118, 164, 204, 214, 226, 349, 451, 543,  




UNWAHR: 1, 192, 202, 207, 379, 507 
LÜGE:  P (4), 27, 114, 152, 199, 248, 279, 298, 302, 306, 391, 451, 543 
UNTREU: none 
IRRT:   3, 22, 32, 59, 91, 103, 112, 116, 117, 128, 148, 149, 168, 240, 399,  
423, 424, 425, 449, 453 
EH  FALSCH: P (2), I:7, II:2, 10, III:1, 5, UM:1, HATH:3, CW:3, IV:4, 7 
UNWAHR: III TSZ:1, CW:2 
LÜGE:  P (2), II: 10, III BT:2, D:2, CW:2, IV:1, 4, 7, 8 
UNTREU: none 
IRRT:   P (3), I:3, III HATH: 1, IV: 3, 7 
GM  FALSCH: I:2, 3, 10, 13, 14, 16, II:11, III:4, 14, 15, 17, 19, 24, 26, 27 
UNWAHR: P (4), I:11, III:24 
LÜGE:  I:5, 10, 13, 14, 16, II:2, 24, III:19, 24, 25, 27 
UNTREU: none 
IRRT:   P (4), I:2, 13, III:6, 11, 12, 15, 17, 24 
GS   FALSCH: 56, 76, 98, 115, 143, 346, 350, 354, 357, 359, 361, 372, 377, A (3) 
UNWAHR: 107, 110, 133, 344 
LÜGE:  20, 28, 29, 84, 143, 157, 222, 326, 344, 346, 357, 359, 361, 368, A (7) 
UNTREU: none 
IRRT:   F (61), 7, 8, 11, 37, 58, 85, 99, 106, 107, 109, 110, 115, 120, 121, 138,  
151, 265, 307, 335, 344, 345, 354, 359, 360, 370 
HATH FALSCH: P (1, 3), 19, 30, 37, 56, 68, 81, 80, 96, 99, 101, 107, 109, 126, 127,  
134, 135, 143, 160, 176, 196, 220, 221, 222, 238, 264, 281, 282, 336, 
352, 373, 423, 424, 471, 609, 621, 629 
UNWAHR: 34, 39, 109, 196, 225, 245, 424 
LÜGE:  P (5), 12, 40, 54, 104, 154, 234, 241, 373, 422, 463, 475, 483 
UNTREU: 57, 72, 629 
IRRT:   1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 16, 18, 19, 20 ,27, 29, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 53, 81,  
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89, 99, 102, 106, 107, 109, 110, 124, 126, 131, 132, 133, 134, 143, 149, 
187, 220, 231, 238, 239, 245, 251, 257, 258, 375, 376, 383, 389, 423, 
438, 452, 519, 629, 634, 636 
NCW   FALSCH: VIII (1), X (1, 3) 
UNWAHR: none 
LÜGE:  none 
UNTREU: none 
IRRT:   VI 
OTL   FALSCH: 1 
UNWAHR: none 
LÜGE:  1 
UNTREU: none 
IRRT:   1 
TI  FALSCH: III:2, VI:3, 6, 7, IX:6, 7, 21 
UNWAHR: none 
LÜGE:  I:4, 32, III:1, 2, V:5, VII:5, IX:35, 42, 46 
UNTREU: VIII:1 
IRRT:   I:33, II:11, III:5, IV, V:6, VI:1, 3, 4, 6, 7, IX:32, 33, X:2 
TSZ  FALSCH: P (4), I:2, 11, 17, II:4, 10, 16, 17, III:10 (2), 12 (15, 23, 28), IV:3 (1), 5  
(2), 8, 13 (8, 11), 14 (3), 15 
UNWAHR: none 
LÜGE:  I:9, 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, II:2, 5, 7, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, III:2 (2), 5 (2), 6, 8,  
10 (1), 11 (2), 12 (24, 28), 13 (2), 16 (7), IV:5 (2), 9, 13 (6, 8, 9), 14 (3) 
UNTREU: II:11 
IRRT:   I:16, 22 (2), IV:6, 7, 13 (6, 9) 
UM  FALSCH: I:2, 5, 12 (falschen Meinungen); II:4, 6, 7, 10; III:10; IV:3, 4, 6, 8  
(falsche „Wahrheit“) 
UNWAHR: I:q, 1, 11; II: 6; III:9; IV:2, 4, 6 
LÜGE:  I: none; II:5, 8, 10; III:8; IV:2, 4, 6, 8 
UNTREU: I: none; II: none; III: 3, 11; IV: none 
IRRT:   I:1, 2, 5, 7, 8; II:1, 3, 8, 9; III:6, 8, 10; IV:2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 
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WS  FALSCH: F, 6, 9, 11, 201, 282 
UNWAHR: 14, 22 
LÜGE:  5, 66, 75, 213 
UNTREU: none 




References to Wisdom, the Wise[men], and Proof: (“-Weisheit-,” “-Klugheit-,” “-Weis-,” “-
beweis-”) 
Note: this excludes references to knowledge and other related usages of the w-e-i-s spelling in 
German words. 
A   WEISHEIT: 23, 44, 45, 46, 47 
 KLUGHEIT: 23, 24, 39, 54, 55, 57 
 WEIS:  4, 20, 23, 24, 25, 40, 45, 46 
 BEWEIS: 10, 11, 14, 26, 27, 29, 32, 40, 42, 44, 50, 53, 54, 57, 58 
AOM   WEISHEIT: 5, 170, 176, 223, 224, 337, 386,  
 KLUGHEIT: P (2), 48, 145 
 WEIS:  3, 52, 75, 170, 180, 219, 2222, 246, 286 
 BEWEIS: P (3), 5, 45, 63, 69, 181, 247, 254, 295, 319, 323  
BGE    WEISHEIT: 5, 59, 198, 205, 212, 230, 295  
 KLUGHEIT: 34, 45, 198, 232, 291 
 WEIS:  2, 4, 21, 30, 46, 50, 69, 71, 186, 208, 209, 232, 247, 256, 262, 270,  
288, 294, 295 
 BEWEIS: 25, 29, 54, 188, 191, 194, 209, 218, 287  
BT    WEISHEIT: 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24 
 KLUGHEIT: 11 
 WEIS:  1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 
 BEWEIS: P (3), 5, 12, 15, 22 
CW    WEISHEIT: 1  
 KLUGHEIT: 3, 9, 10 
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 WEIS:  6, 10, PS2 
 BEWEIS: 1, 3, 6, 9, 11, PS1, E 
D    WEISHEIT: 14, 45, 183, 201, 308, 330, 345, 376, 522, 542 
 KLUGHEIT: 26, 50, 112, 197, 202, 300, 421 
 WEIS:  P (3, 4), 26, 40, 41, 58, 77, 103 (Weise Irrthümer), 109, 119, 123, 133,  
174, 182, 195, 298, 426, 431, 448, 460, 469, 519, 551, 561 
 BEWEIS: P (3), 14, 24, 49,50, 68, 87, 95, 116, 139, 140, 179, 192, 207, 217, 230,  
253, 330, 424, 480, 542, 549 
EH    WEISHEIT: P (4), III BT:3, D: 2, TSZ: 6 
 KLUGHEIT: I:5, II:3, 8, 9, III BT: 3 
 WEIS:  P (2), II:2, III: 1, 4, HATH:3, 4, TSZ:2, 8 
 BEWEIS: I:2, 4, 6,7, II:4, 8, III BT:1, 2, 4, UM:1, TSZ:1, IV:4 
GM    WEISHEIT: III:14 
 KLUGHEIT: I:2, 10, 13, II:15, 19, III:18 
 WEIS:  P (3, 7), I:6, 7, II:11, 15, 19, 20, 21, III:q, 2, 3, 6, 17, 21 
 BEWEIS: I:11, II:5, III:22, 24, 26, 27 
GS     WEISHEIT: F (36), 1, 3, 36, 37, 95, 107, 109, 113 128, 277, 285, 318, 340, 342,  
351, 359, 377, A (9) 
 KLUGHEIT: F (6 title), 20, 335, 344, 359, 372 
 WEIS:  P (1), F (11, 49), 12, 15, 23, 42, 61, 68, 71, 83, 84, 109, 110, 122, 129,  
131, 145, 213, 224, 2777, 281, 291, 295, 300, 311, 330, 334, 335, 338, 
340, 342, 344, 351, 354, 357, 359, 360, 365, 369, 373, 374, 377, 382, 
383, A (14) 
 BEWEIS: P (4), 7, 21, 33, 39, 88, 94, 144, 193, 260, 277, 307, 329, 335, 347,  
348, 357  
HATH WEISHEIT: P (5), 97, 110, 143, 289, 292, 417, 594 
 KLUGHEIT: 110, 117, 250, 412, 415, 472, 588 
 WEIS:  16, 28, 68, 73, 98, 105, 107, 110, 111, 113, 127, 139, 141, 143, 217,  
218, 227, 235, 244, 267, 297, 340, 368, 376, 421, 461, 475, 570, 595, 
618, 638 
 BEWEIS: P (3), 15, 21, 26, 39, 68, 111, 113, 120, 131, 134, 143, 161, 221, 239,  
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253, 271, 417, 588, 630, 633 
NCW   WEISHEIT: P 
 KLUGHEIT: none 
 WEIS:  VIII:3, X:3, P 
 BEWEIS: IX:1 
OTL     WEISHEIT: none 
 KLUGHEIT: 1 
 WEIS:  1 
 BEWEIS: none 
TI    WEISHEIT: I:5, II:1, 2, 12, IX:42 
 KLUGHEIT: P 
 WEIS:  II:1, 2, III:5, IV, VI:4, VIII:3, IX:2, 5, 28, 38  
 BEWEIS: P, II:1, 2, 5, 6, III:5, IV, VI:5, VIII:3, IX:11, 12 ,36, 41, X:5 
TSZ    WEISHEIT: P (1, 8), I: 1, 24, 7, 9, II:1, 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 21, III:2 (1), 4, 5 (2), 7, 8  
(1), 9, 10 (1, 2), 12 (2, 13, 14, 16), 14, 15 (2), 16 (7), IV: 3 (1), 5 (2), 12, 
13 (7, 19), 17 (2), 18 (1) 
 KLUGHEIT: P (10), I:5, 12, II:21, III:5 (3), 8 (2), IV:13 (3), 15 
 WEIS:  P (1, 3), I:2, 4, 11, II:7, 8, 11, 12, 18, 21, III:5 (2), 9, 10 (2), 11, 12 (2),  
4, 19), IV, 4, 11, 12, 13 (5), 18 (1), 19 (10) 
 BEWEIS: 3, 12, 19, II:4, 19, III:8 (2)  
UM     WEISHEIT: I:7, 8, 11; II:1, 6, 7, 8, 9; III:3, 4, 6, 7; IV: 6, 7, 8 
 KLUGHEIT: I:8; II:9; III: none; IV: 8 
 WEIS:  I:3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; II:3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9; III: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11; IV:  
1, 2, 7, 8 
 BEWEIS: I:5, 8, 9, 10, 12; II:1, 2, 4, 9, 10; III: 4, 5, 6, 8; IV: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
WS     WEISHEIT: 64, 86, 185, 297, 348 
 KLUGHEIT: 26, 57, 61, 74, 189, 226 
 WEIS:  P, 16, 33, 57, 61, 69, 72, 73, 86, 112, 125, 152, 196, 269, 298, 313,  
337, 339  
 BEWEIS: 2, 7, 33, 34, 139, 145, 264, 276, 303, 310 






References to knowledge and knowing: (“kenn-,” “kann-”) 
A   P, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 47, 
48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62 
AOM  P (1, 4, 6), 2, 4, 8, 10, 13, 18, 19, 23, 26, 27, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 46, 50, 58, 60, 62, 74, 
79, 86, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 106, 110, 113, 119, 121, 124, 126, 127, 134, 142, 144, 150, 
153, 156, 158, 159, 161, 162, 165, 170, 171, 175, 177, 179, 183, 185, 186, 189, 199, 200, 
201, 204, 218, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 230, 232, 235, 236, 238, 240, 251, 254, 256, 
257, 268, 269, 271, 275, 291, 293 296, 300, 310, 318, 320, 321, 323, 324, 329, 333, 337, 
338, 355, 363, 365, 366, 370, 385, 399, 400 
BGE   P, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16 ,19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 39, 40, 41, 
43, 44, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, 68, 71, 80, 87, 101, 105, 119, 129, 130, 136, 
152, 160, 169, 171, 172, 186, 187, 191, 192, 193, 194, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 
209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 220, 224, 227, 228, 239, 230, 231, 232, 238, 239, 242, 244, 246, 
247, 248, 249, 252, 253, 256, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 266, 267, 269, 270, 273, 281, 282, 
287, 289, 293, 296 
BT  P (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7), F (RW), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 
CW  1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, PS1, PS1fn, PS2, E, Efn 
D  P (3, 4, 5), 6, 9, 14, 18, 22, 23, 26, 28, 33, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 52, 62, 64, 
67, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 91, 93, 96, 97, 103, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 
111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 124, 125, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 140, 
142, 146, 149, 150, 154, 157, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 174, 184, 187, 188, 189, 190, 
192, 195, 197, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 209, 212, 215, 218, 223, 226, 229, 243, 245, 
254, 255, 256, 261, 264, 270, 278, 287, 291, 292, 298, 299, 300, 303, 304, 309, 313, 314, 
321, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 334, 335, 339, 341, 342, 345, 357, 359, 368, 369, 370, 372, 
373, 374, 375, 381, 386, 398, 404, 416, 423, 424, 425, 429, 437, 440, 442, 445, 448, 450, 
452, 453, 456, 457, 459, 460, 461, 462, 466, 469, 475, 476, 480, 482, 483, 484, 487, 490, 
497, 498, 500, 501, 504, 512, 523, 526, 527, 531, 538, 539, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 
550, 551, 552, 559, 560, 566, 567, 573 
EH  P (3, 4), I:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, II:1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, III:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, BT (1, 2, 3, 4), UM (1, 
2, 3), HATH (1, 2, 34, 6), GS, TSZ (1, 6, 7, 8), BGE (2), GM, CW (1, 2, 3, 4), IV:1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 8 
GM  P (1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8), I:1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17fn, II:3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 
16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24 ,III:2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 27, 28 
GS   P (1, 2, 3), F(23, 25, 28, 33, 55), 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 23, 25, 28, 30, 32, 37, 39, 
40, 44, 45, 48, 52, 54, 55, 61, 68, 69, 71, 72, 76, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 95, 98, 99, 
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100, 103, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 113, 116, 120, 122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 129, 135, 139, 
146, 149, 153, 156, 160, 164, 167, 169, 173, 178, 183, 207, 213, 227, 231, 242, 244, 246, 
249, 251, 260, 261, 277, 279, 280, 281, 283, 285, 286, 288, 291, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 
300, 301, 305, 306, 307, 310, 312, 316, 319, 320, 324, 330, 333, 335, 337, 338, 342, 343, 
344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 351, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 363, 364, 365, 366, 
367, 369, 370, 371, 373, 374, 375, 377, 379, 380, 381, 383, A (14) 
HATH P (3, 4, 5, 6, 7), 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45, 50, 51, 56, 58, 61, 63, 65, 68, 72, 
73, 75, 81, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 
113, 116, 121, 122, 126, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 
153, 154, 156, 157, 160, 162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 171, 174, 177, 179, 181, 195, 196, 197, 
198, 199, 200, 202, 208, 213, 216, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 228, 230, 231, 234, 235, 
236, 239, 243, 244, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 257, 260, 261, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 272, 
273, 274, 275, 278, 280, 282, 285, 286, 288, 291, 292, 295, 296, 300, 314, 337, 340, 342, 
345, 346, 352, 355, 364, 367, 370, 371, 373, 374, 375, 376, 387, 403, 416, 421, 423, 424, 
425, 429, 430, 433, 435, 436, 438, 439, 443, 444, 446, 447, 450, 453, 454, 456, 458, 459, 
463, 472, 473, 475, 477, 500, 503, 509, 513, 528, 537, 548, 550, 557, 567, 578, 588, 590, 
591, 594, 596, 599, 603, 613, 614, 618, 619, 621, 626, 629, 630, 631, 632, 635, 636, 637, 
638  
NCW  I, II, IV:1, VI, VII, VIII:2, 3, X:1, 3, A  
OTL   1, 2 
TI  I:5, 11, 16, II:2, 3, 6, 7, III:3, 4, 6, IV, V:3, 5, VI:1, 2, 3, 5, 8, VII:1, 2, VIII:1, 2, 4, 7, 
IX:7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 45, 46, X:1, 4 
TSZ  P (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8), I:1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22 (1, 2, 3), 
II:2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, III:1, 2 (2), 3, 4, 5 (3), 6, 7, 
8 (1, 2), 9, 11 (2), 12 (4, 7, 9, 16, 19, 20, 25), 13 (2), 14, 16 (1), IV:2, 3 (1), 4, 5 (1, 2), 7, 
11, 13 (3, 4, 9), 14 (2), 15, 16 (2), 18 (1), 19 (7, 11) 
UM   I:1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ,6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; II:P 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; III:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; 
IV:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
WS   P, 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 33, 34, 43, 45, 48, 49, 51, 57, 
68, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 89, 90, 95, 97, 102, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 122, 124, 125, 143, 
149, 151, 154, 171, 172, 174, 175, 179, 181, 185, 189, 190, 197, 209, 213, 215, 216, 227, 
237, 241, 244, 259, 260, 264, 265, 266, 267, 275, 276, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 




List of passages dealing with objectivity, subjectivity, objects, subjects, and belief:  
(“-jekt-,” “-glaube-” “-urtheil-,”) 
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Note: I have chosen to include uses of “verurtheil,” “vorurtheil,” and “beurtheil” because 
condemnation, prejudice, and judging are all importantly relevant to Nietzsche’s discussions of 
belief. 
A   JEKT:   13, 20, 23, 31 
GLAUBE:  4, 5, 9, 16, 23, 27 (Unglaube), 32, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 
48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59 
 URTHEIL: (no h) 7, 9, 20, 28, 32, 43, 50, 62 
AOM  JEKT:   P (5), 31 
GLAUBE: P (1, 6, 7), 1, 9, 20, 26, 27, 32, 33, 51, 60, 71, 96, 97, 98, 124, 126, 175, 
176, 180, 182, 184, 192, 201, 207, 219, 222, 225, 226, 227, 234, 237, 
289, 299, 305, 318, 320, 324, 340, 363, 380 
URTHEIL: (no h) P (3, 5), 26, 33, 35, 73, 87, 98, 144, 170, 182, 224, 244, 264, 302, 
318, 382, 387, 388 
BGE   JEKT:   P, 12, 16, 17, 20, 34, 54, 80, 207, 208, 281, (16, 281 contradictio in  
adjecto) 
GLAUBE: P, 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 27, 30, 32, 34, 36, 46, 47, 48, 
54, 55, 58, 62, 87, 112, 134, 148, 178, 180, 183, 186, 191, 192, 193, 195, 
199, 201 (Glaube an sich), 202, 203, 204, 205, 209, 210, 213, 214, 216, 
219, 223, 227, 229, 231, 236, 239, 241, 244, 245, 251, 253, 255, 256, 
257, 258, 260, 261, 264, 265, 269, 281, 287, 289, 291, 295 
URTHEIL: Ch 1 title, 2, 4, 5, 11 (w/ & w/o h), 12, 19 ,20, 23, 29, 32, 34, 38, 43, 44, 
189, 190, 191, 199, 201, 202, 205, 219, 239, 241, 242, 260, 269, 273, 
289 
BT  JEKT:   (c) 1, 5, 6, 8, 12, 16, 17, 19, 22 
GLAUBE: P (5, 7), 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
24 
 URTHEIL: P (4, 5), 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 23 
CW  JEKT:   none 
GLAUBE: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, PS1, PS2 
 URTHEIL: 9, E 
D  JEKT:   (c) 26, 40, 111, 116, 137, 140, 143, 324 
GLAUBE: P (1, 2, 3, 4), 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 22, 27, 31, 38, 39, 42, 43, 
44, 47, 50, 51, 52, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 67, 68, 72, 73, 84, 85, 89, 90, 92, 
95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 111, 112, 113, 116 ,118, 130, 132, 
133, 142, 155, 167, 175, 177, 179, 188, 197, 199, 202, 204, 205, 206, 
207, 215, 216, 234, 240, 255, 276, 280, 287, 301, 302, 303, 324, 325, 
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343, 358, 367, 384, 399, 416, 418, 429, 433, 436, 490, 496, 497, 501, 
504, 505, 520, 536, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 550, 552, 560, 562 
URTHEIL: (subtitle), P (4), 2, 20, 26, 28, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 44, 56, 58, 61, 
70, 76, 82, 87, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 
119, 131, 132, 137, 140, 149, 186, 189, 197, 199, 203, 207, 214, 217, 
234, 238, 245, 272, 317, 323, 329, 333, 372, 402, 409, 424, 453, 523, 
528, 542, 544, 550, 560 
EH  JEKT:   III:5, BT:4, BGE:2 
GLAUBE: P (3, 4), I:2, 3, 4, II:1, 3, 5, III:1, 5, BT:1, UM:1, 2, HATH:1, 5, 6, D:2, 
TSZ:3, GM, CW:1, IV:1, 8 
 URTHEIL: P (1), II:1, 3, 6, 8, 10, III:3, TSZ (7), CW (2) 
GM  JEKT:   I:4, 5, 10, 13, II:4, 8, 11, 12, III:9, 11, 12, 26 
GLAUBE: P (6), I:1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, II:1, 7, 11, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, III:1, 5, 
8, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 
 URTHEIL: P (2, 3), I:2, 3, 4, 7, II:4, 7, 14, 15, III:5, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24 
GS   JEKT:   P (2, 3), 351, 354, 355, 364; (c), 3, 85, 99 
GLAUBE: P (1, 3, 4), F (4, 27), 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 23, 37, 44, 46, 48, 52, 56, 
57, 58, 64, 70, 76, 77, 80, 82, 84, 87, 91, 94, 98, 99, 102, 104, 106, 109, 
110, 121, 122, 123, 125, 127, 133, 141, 143, 149, 152, 170, 214, 217, 
226, 246, 258, 269, 277, 279, 283, 284, 288, 295, 300, 301, 303, 326, 
238, 332, 335, 338, 339, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 351, 352, 353, 
354, 356, 357, 358, 359, 361, 362, 363, 366, 367, 368, 370, 372, 373, 
375, 376, 377, 381 
URTHEIL: P (2), F (46), 2, 4, 7, 11, 21, 39, 46, 48, 55, 57, 70, 76, 83, 101, 109, 110, 
111, 117, 120, 123, 169, 178, 192, 193, 259, 283, 293, 296, 327, 329, 
335, 340, 345, 357, 363, 369, 372, 373, 377, 379, 380 
HATH JEKT:   4, 18, 111, 137, 220, 274, 513 
GLAUBE: P (1, 3, 5), 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 
29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 46, 52, 53, 55, 81, 89, 91, 99, 100, 101, 107, 
109, 110, 11, 113, 114, 116, 117, 120, 125, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 138, 
141, 143, 145, 146, 155, 159, 161, 162, 164, 220, 222, 224, 225, 226, 
227, 239, 242, 249, 252, 255, 261, 265, 267, 271, 272, 285, 286, 292, 
301, 337, 342, 372, 375, 406, 418, 426, 441, 449, 454, 463, 472, 490, 
492, 574, 583, 599, 629, 630, 631, 632, 635, 636, A (2) 
URTHEIL: P (1), 3, 13, 18, 32, 35, 37, 50, 53, 67, 86, 89, 99, 107, 108, 121, 133, 
138, 141, 144, 155, 161, 170, 194, 235, 260, 261, 265, 271, 282, 287, 
352, 361, 364, 371, 375, 412, 417, 423, 476, 518, 604, 607, 608, 617, 
634, 636 
NCW   JEKT:   none 
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GLAUBE: I, II, IV (2), VI, VIII (1), X (2), E (1, 2) 
 URTHEIL: V, VI, IX (1), X (1) 
OTL   JEKT:   1 
GLAUBE: 1 (fn), 2 
 URTHEIL: 1 
TI  JEKT:   II:2, III:5, VI:3, VIII:6, IX:3, 34; (c) I:23 (contradictio in adjecto) 
GLAUBE: P, I:18, 24, II:11, III:1, 2, 5, VI:3, 4, 6, VII:1, VIII:2, IX:3, 4, 5, 8, 12, 
18, 19, 337, 39, 42, 43, 44, 47, 49, X:1, 4 
URTHEIL: II:1, 2, 3, III:5, V:3, 4, 5, 6, VI:8, VII:1, VIII:3, 6, IX:5, 8, 19, 20, 24, 34, 
35, 36, 37 (w/ & w/o h), X:3 
TSZ  JEKT:   none 
GLAUBE: P (3), I:9, 12, 21, 22 (3), II:3, 4, 10, 12, 14, 20, III:2 (2), 8 (2), 12 (9), 13 
(2), IV:2, 3 (1), 6, 7, 13 (1), 16 (1), 17 (2), 19 (1) 
 URTHEIL: III:2 (1), IV:18 (1) 
UM  JEKT:   (c) I:2, 7, 12; II:5 (Ewig-Objectiven), 6, 8; III: 4; IV: none 
GLAUBE: I:2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; II:P, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; III:1,  
3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11; IV: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
 URTHEIL: I:2, 5, 6, 8, 12; II:1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10; III:2, 3, 6; IV:4, 5, 6, 10 
WS  JEKT:   5, 25 
GLAUBE: P, 11, 12, 16, 20, 34, 39, 52, 57, 58, 61, 66, 73, 74, 78, 83, 84, 118,  
123, 125, 144, 145, 152, 165, 181, 190, 207, 209, 211, 213, 215, 216, 
234, 241, 246, 260, 264, 266, 270, 280, 283, 285, 309, 319, 320, 321, 
349 




References to facts: (“Tatsach-” “Fakt-”) 
Note: I have excluded the few references Nietzsche makes to “Faktoren” or factors. 
A   TATSACH: 20, 25, 39, 52, 59 
 FAKT:  none 
AOM   TATSACH: 33 
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 FAKT:  P (1) 
BGE    TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  259 
BT    TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
CW    TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
D    TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
EH    TATSACH: II:2 
 FAKT:  none 
GM    TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
GS     TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
HATH TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
NCW   TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
OTL     TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
TI    TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
TSZ    TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
UM     TATSACH: none 
 FAKT:  none 
WS     TATSACH: 164, 170 
 FAKT:  11, 12 
Total:  13 






INDEX IV: VARIOUS AND SUNDRY RELATED TERMINOLOGY 
 
List of passages referencing Saïs, veils, and secrets: (“-schlei-”) 
A  10 (Schleichweg), 58 (Mucker-Schleicherei) 
AOM  10, 32, 49, 90, 94, 170, 180, 222, 259, 316, 321 
BGE   5, 10, 31, 244, 262 
BT  P (3), 1, 2, 7, 8, 18, 21, 24, 25 
CW  none 
D  18, 114, 117, 190, 193, 323, 474, 552 
EH   I:7, II:9, III:5, CW:2, 3 
GM  I:10, II:11, III:14, 25 
GS  P (3, 4), F (58), 3, 37, 57, 334, 337, 339, 377, A (1, 7, 11) 
HATH P (3, 6), 131, 187 (Wahrheit scheicht), 218, 341, 363, 436, 472, 479 
NCW   E (1, 2) 
OTL   none 
TI  none 
TSZ  P (6), I:3, 18, 21, 22 (1), II:5, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, III:1, 4, 6, 12 (18), IV:5 (1), 6, 13 (14), 
14 (3), 19 (3) 
UM  I:4, 6, 7, 11, 12; II:3, 7, 9, 10; III:1 ,2, 4, 9; IV: 1, 4, 5, 6 
WS  8, 37, 105, 216, 265, 295 




A   none 
AOM  none 
BGE   16, 220 
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BT  10, 15 
CW  PS1 
D  116, 170, 538 
EH  none 
GM  none 
GS   P (4), 352 
HATH 36, 275 
NCW   E (2) 
OTL   none 
TI  none 
TSZ  I:14, 21, II:4, 14, 18, 21, III:13 (2), 14, IV:4, 5 (2), 9, 14 (3), 15 
UM   I:9, 10; II: 5 (Göttin Philosophie), 8; III:5; IV:1 
WS   95, 215 
Total:  34 
 
 
References to whips and related terms: (“-peitsch-”) 
A   none 
AOM  none 
BGE   none 
BT  none 
CW  none 
D  none 
EH  none 
GM  none 
GS   86 
HATH none 
NCW   none 
OTL   none 
TI  none 
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TSZ  I:18, II:1, 5, III:15 (1, 2), IV:1 
UM   I: none; II: 7; III: none; IV: none 
WS   172 
Total:  10 
 
 
Referencing the sultry (also a slang term for gay persons): (“-schwul-”)(“-schwül-”) 
A   none 
AOM  P (3) 
BGE   256 
BT  none 
CW  none 
D  332 
EH  none 
GM  none 
GS   A (7) 
HATH none 
NCW   VIII:1 
OTL   none 
TI  none 
TSZ  II:4, 19, III:13 (2), 16 (1), IV:13 (16), 15 
UM   none 




References to madness, insanity, and irrationality: (“Geisteskrank-,” “-wahnsinn-,” “-irre-
,”  
“-irrsinn-,” “-wild-,” “-irration-,” and “-verrück-”) 
A   GEISTESKRANK: 38 
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 WAHNSINN:  none 
 IRRE:   5, 38, 44, 45, 51, 54 
 IRRSINN:  none 
 WILD:   22, 40 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  43, 51 
AOM   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  33, 227 
 IRRE:   171, 183, 299 
 IRRSINN:  none 
 WILD:   119, 134, 181, 219, 220, 223 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  none 
BGE   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  256, 269 
 IRRE:   5, 16, 47, 190, 261 
 IRRSINN:  156 
 WILD:   31, 45, 47, 62, 212, 224, 229, 237, 239, 262 
 IRRATION:  191 
 VERRÜCK:  263, 265 
BT   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  P (4), 6, 14, 25 
 IRRE:   P (4), F (RW), 1, 3, 10 
 IRRSINN:  none 
 WILD:   1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 20, 23 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  9, 14 
CW   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  none 
 IRRE:   none 
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 IRRSINN:  none 
 WILD:   PS1 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  none 
D   GEISTESKRANK: 202 
 WAHNSINN:  14, 18, 39, 77, 116, 179, 190, 206, 246, 501, 549 
 IRRE:   14, 26, 87, 115, 133, 164, 191, 245, 264, 303, 324, 452, 501,  
549 
 IRRSINN:  312, 538 
 WILD:   5, 14, 50, 109, 135, 141, 188, 199, 202, 206, 212, 221, 263,  
312, 427, 468, 481, 502, 515, 560 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  50, 76, 142, 171, 188, 199, 451 
EH   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  II:4 
 IRRE:   III: TSZ (6), GM 
 IRRSINN:  none 
 WILD:   none 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  none 
GM   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  II:22, III:9 
 IRRE:   P (2), II:22, III:4, 14, 21 
 IRRSINN:  III:1, 17 
 WILD:   I:11, II:9, 16, III:15, 20 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  none 
GS   GEISTESKRANK: 373 
 WAHNSINN:  P (4), 89, 117, 135, 152, 357, 370 
 IRRE:   F (32), 46, 99, 111, 112, 125, 333, A (8) 
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 IRRSINN:  3, 76 
 WILD:   14, 31, 47, 84, 147, 290, 310, 329, 352, 375, 383, A (14) 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  3, 10, 55, 357 
HATH GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  45, 126, 127, 140, 164, 244 
 IRRE:   74, 81, 337, 341 
 IRRSINN:  161, 244 
 WILD:   P (3), 12, 13, 56, 64, 103, 107, 111, 137, 142, 221, 233, 234,  
235, 236, 244, 246, 463, 472, 614 
 IRRATION:  111, 199, 574 
 VERRÜCK:  282, 349, 438 
NCW   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  none 
 IRRE:   V, VII 
 IRRSINN:  none 
 WILD:   A 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  none 
OTL   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  none 
 IRRE:   none 
 IRRSINN:  none 
 WILD:   none 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  2 
TI   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  none 
 IRRE:   III:5 
 IRRSINN:  none 
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 WILD:   I:6, IX:30, 45 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  none 
TSZ   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  P (3), I:3, 6, 7, 11, 22 (2), II:7, 20, III:12 (11), IV:14 
 IRRE:   P (5), III:12 (19), 15 (1)  
 IRRSINN:  none 
 WILD:   I:5, 6, 8, 9, II:1, 8, 10, 11, 13, 21, III:2 (2), 8 (2), 9, 12 (2), 15 
(1), IV:1,  
4, 5 (1), 6, 8, 11, 13 (13, 20), 14 (3), 15, 20 
 IRRATION:  none 
 VERRÜCK:  III:11 (2) 
UM    GEISTESKRANK: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 WAHNSINN:  I: none; II:6; III: none; IV:5 
 IRRE:   I:7, 12; II:3, 8, 10; III:3, 4; IV:4, 5, 10 
 IRRSINN:  I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 WILD:   I:2, 7; II:1; III:4, 6, 8; IV:2, 5, 9 
 IRRATION:  I:9; II: none; III: none; IV: none 
 VERRÜCK:  I: none; II:6; III:4; IV: none  
WS   GEISTESKRANK: none 
 WAHNSINN:  none 
 IRRE:   171, 189, 343 
 IRRSINN:  none 
 WILD:   37, 65, 138, 274, 275 
 IRRATION:  none 




References to opposites: (“-gegensatz-”) 
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A   7, 8, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 36, 37, 39, 42, 44, 45, 52, 54, 55, 57 
AOM  P (4, 7), 17, 26, 33, 90, 97, 211, 304 
BGE   2, 24, 28, 34, 40, 44, 186, 188, 199, 202, 224, 225, 254, 260 
BT  P (5), F (RW), 1, 2, 5, 6 ,7, 8, 10, 12, 16, 21 
CW  1, E 
D  50, 57, 112, 133, 176, 191, 271, 306, 471, 474, 496, 533, 550 
EH  P (2), I:2, 3, II:5, 9, 10, III:1, BT (1, 2, 3), UM (3), HATH (1), D (2), TSZ (3, 6), BGE 
(2), IV:1,  
3, 5, 6, 8 
GM  I:2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 15, 21, III:2, 12, 22, 23, 25, 27 
GS   3, 14, 21, 42, 49, 54, 76, 88, 110, 120, 346, 354, 357, 358, 363, 370, 375 
HATH  1, 96, 97, 107, 114, 195, 196, 472 
NCW   VI, VIII (2), IX (2) 
OTL   1 
TI  V:3, VII:3, 4, IX:10, 36, 39, X:1, 4 
TSZ  none 
UM   I:1, 2, 5, 7 ,12; II:1, 3, 4, 6, 10; III:2, 4, 6; IV:2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11 











[A]  The Antichrist 
[AOM]  Assorted Opinions and Maxims 
[BGE]  Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future 
[BT]  The Birth of Tragedy, Or: Hellenism and Pessimism 
[D]  Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality 
[EH]  Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is 
[GM]  Towards the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic 
[GS]  The Gay Science (“la gaya scienza”) 
[HATH] Human, All-Too-Human: A Book For Free Spirits 
[KS]  Kritische Studienausgabe Herausgegeben 
[OTL]  “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” 
[TI]  Twilight of the Idols, Or: How One Philosophizes with a Hammer 
[TSZ]  Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All 
[UM]  Untimely Meditations 
[UM I]  1: “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer” 
[UM II] 2: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” 
[UM III] 3: “Schopenhauer as Educator” 
[UM IV] 4: “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” 
[WP]  Will to Power 
[WS]  The Wanderer and His Shadow 
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